


CHRISTIAN ETHICS
IN HISTORY
AND MODERN LIFE



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Christian ethics in history
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Christian Ethics in History and Modern Life

BY

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ROUND TABLE PRESS, INC.
NEW YORK

1940

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PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
BY CORNWALL PRESS, INC., CORNWALL, N. Y.

To the memory of

WILLIAM RITCHIE SORLEY

Knightbridge Professor of Moral Philosophy
University of Cambridge

and

HASTINGS RASHDALL

Dean of Carlisle

PREFACE

In my Tallman Lectures on "Living Religions and Modern Thought," I maintained that the great religions present a wider vision than that limited to the physical and secular cultural goods of life on this earth. With this wider vision, these religions have ethical implications differing from merely secular humanistic ethics. Problems of morality are the most urgent of modern life. But confusion has been caused by writings of many without the training and the knowledge necessary for well-balanced judgments in this connection. Comparable pronouncements regarding the physical world by persons with similar deficiencies of scientific training and knowledge would be disregarded. Novelists, journalists, politicians, and social reformers have obviously important roles in modern life, but too often with regard to morality they are accorded the position that should be occupied by the qualified moral philosopher and social scientist.

A modern conception of Christian ethics, by the tests of experience and of critical philosophical reflection, can claim to be not merely the equal of, but superior to, any other form of ethics with which it can be compared. Among modern thinkers, there is a large amount of ignorance concerning the general nature and the details of that ethics. It is my aim in this volume to give a scholarly presentation of Christian ethics with some consideration of its implications for modern life. The earlier chapters are not meant to be a history: in them, as in the later ones, historical material is introduced in order to show the nature and the details of that ethics from classical examples and presentations in Christian

PREFACE

history. As the great leaders in natural science have by experiment and observation attended to Nature itself, and their theories have depended on that attention, so the leaders in Christian ethics have been intimately concerned with actual morality. On that, and not pre-eminently on their intellectual status, their position depends. Thus in the consideration of Christian ethics, men like Francis of Assisi, John Bunyan, and George Fox have a place along with Augustine of Hippo, Thomas Aquinas, and John Calvin. In large measure I have used the words of the men I have considered: an apology might have been called for, if I had not done so.

The present volume is an elaboration of a course of lectures delivered on the Stanton Foundation in the University of Cambridge. In dedicating it to the memory of Dr. W. R. Sorley and Dean Hastings Rashdall, I wish to express my high personal regard for and my indebtedness to the two scholars from whom I learned most in my study of ethics.

The notes and bibliographical references have been placed at the end of the volume, so that they may be disregarded by the general reader.

ALBAN G. WIDGERY.

Duke University, 1940.

CONTENTS

	PAGE
<i>Preface</i>	vii
INTRODUCTION	3
I. THE ETHICS OF THE GOSPELS	11
II. THE EXPANSION OF CHRISTIANITY IN THE GRECO-ROMAN WORLD	35
III. FROM CONSTANTINE THROUGH THE MID- DLE AGES	64
IV. FROM THE RENAISSANCE AND THE PROT- ESTANT REFORMATION TO THE PRESENT TIME	103
V. CHRISTIAN ETHICS AND THE NATURE OF MAN	136
VI. THE CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE OF GOD AND ITS ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS	157
VII. CRITICISMS OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS	177
VIII. CHRISTIAN AND NON-CHRISTIAN ETHICS COMPARED	199
IX. THE CHRISTIAN ETHICS OF SEX AND THE FAMILY	214
X. CHRISTIAN ETHICS AND POLITICS	238
XI. CHRISTIAN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS	261
XII. CHRISTIAN ETHICS AND HUMAN CUL- TURE	281
<i>Notes</i>	295
<i>Index</i>	315

CHRISTIAN ETHICS IN HISTORY
AND MODERN LIFE

INTRODUCTION

THE PROBLEMS OF ETHICS IN MODERN LIFE

What is the nature of human satisfaction? Upon what does that satisfaction depend? What are the necessary attitudes and activities of men to attain it? Those, whether explicitly recognized or not, have been the fundamental problems of human life in all ages. They are its central problems today. Men have sought and seek satisfaction in different ways and to some extent have found and find it. Some discontent has always remained and still remains. The fundamental problems have not been completely solved. With reflection on the demands of their nature and how these are to be met, men have endeavoured to form general conceptions of the ideal of human life, and to indicate some of its constituents in detail and the ways to realize them. Taken in its broadest sense the term ethics may be given to the theories thus elaborated. History has been in part a testing by mankind of different conceptions of human well-being, and it has given good grounds for doubt concerning the adequacy of some of them.

Christian ethics is not, and has never been, a closed and static system. It has taken up into itself the fruits of historical experience. Throughout Christian history, it has been a developing whole, bringing into relief new details, modifying relative emphases, and so becoming less and less inadequate and correcting temporary partial exaggerations. In this development are the results of continuous experiments in Christian living and of efforts at intellectual formulation. In its historical continuity, Christian ethics has characterized the main flow of life of Christian peoples during the centuries. It has

taken up into itself much, even most, of what has been of worth discovered or urged not only by Christians but also by others not regarded as such. Christian ethics may be described as the theory of the mode or modes of life as lived in Christian institutions and as expressed in Christian literature, not of any specific period but of the whole course of Christian history. It has indicated and indicates the nature of human satisfaction, shows upon what that satisfaction depends, and the necessary attitudes and activities of men to attain it.

On the basis of experience, it cannot be maintained that for each and every individual, or for different human races, or for mankind as a whole, there has been a continuity of ever-increasing satisfaction. At times, individuals, and even whole groups of men, have become restricted in the scope of their efforts for satisfaction. Forms of ethics have been proposed and accepted, falling short of those appreciated in earlier times. That has usually been due to over-emphasis of some constituents of the good life to the neglect and the negation of other constituents. In the Middle Ages in Europe some neglected and denied the worth of certain goods associated with the physical body. In our own times, not a few over-emphasize those goods to the ignoring of spiritual values. For a proper appreciation of the problems of ethics in modern life something must be learned from the theoretical and practical efforts of the past, from the experiences of those who in the course of history have had their successes and their failures in their endeavours to reach satisfaction. Unfortunately there are too many, inspired solely by the spirits of this age, who fail to attain that significant though relative stability that comes through an appreciation of the spirit of the ages. Hence, to no small extent, the confusions in morality and ethics in modern life.

Except for brief periods and then only among minority groups, since men arrived at the level of philosophical re-

flection, there has been continuous recognition that the character of human satisfaction must depend in part upon the actual nature of man himself. By this is meant, not man as he may superficially appear, but man in his ultimate being, man as metaphysically understood. Many of the problems of modern ethics have arisen because some naturalistic moralists will not face the questions thus involved, and because some others who try to answer them deliberately or surreptitiously ignore aspects of human nature which the adherent of Christian ethics declares to be fundamental. A first requirement for modern life is an adequate conception of human nature. This must include not only each and every aspect of man, but also give due consideration to the relative significance of them for its satisfaction as a whole. Most contemporary psychology is lamentably defective in its account of human nature, and yet it is not infrequently from its standpoint that efforts are made to meet the moral problems of modern life. Compared with its superficiality and narrowness, the Christian doctrine of man which has developed through and stood the test of the ages may be claimed to be broad and profound.

In their efforts to make psychology "scientific" workers in that field have occupied themselves with quantitative measurements, paying little attention to the qualities of what is measured and to those aspects of human experience not measurable with the means at their disposal. Of even more significance is the assumption, not often recognized by themselves nor explicitly admitted, of a Naturalistic standpoint. Though they pose as abjuring metaphysics, that standpoint involves a metaphysics in accordance with which there is a denial or an ignoring of functions which a wider view reveals to be fundamental. A psychology which considers merely the aspects of an individual's behaviour directed outwards with reference to his fellow men and the non-human physical world may be correct as far as it goes. But it

cannot claim to present an adequate conception of human nature except upon the assumption of a metaphysic which virtually denies any intrinsic inner values of character, any continuity of mental life beyond death, and any commerce with a Being transcending the human and the physical. Such a psychology has already proved itself incapable of affording significant help for meeting the major problems of morality in modern life.

Human satisfaction does not depend on human nature alone. Man is within an environment and his satisfaction also rests in part upon it. Any adequate conception of the nature of complete satisfaction must involve a knowledge of that environment. Again, by this is meant the environment in its ultimate being, the environment as metaphysically understood. Many of the confusions of modern life have arisen because modern Naturalistic thinkers will not face the questions involved, or answer them in such a way as to assume that the environment is limited to "Nature," by which is meant man and the non-human physical world. The latter attitude implicates a metaphysical view as definitely as that which treats the environment as including, in addition, a supreme spiritual being, God. As a consideration of man's environment cannot be eliminated from ethics, neither can metaphysical implications be escaped. Man has to recognize that even his worldly well-being depends more upon his conformity with processes of Nature, not due to himself, than upon any wishes or actions of his own. It may be, and through history has been maintained, that man has a spiritual environment and that his complete satisfaction depends more upon his conformity with this than on his own acts or wishes. Even man as a physical being and non-human physical Nature implicate characteristics, as of intelligibility, that suggest reference to some spiritual intelligence beyond themselves.

An ethics which is not simply Naturalistic claims, and

must claim, to be in accordance with the conditions set by a spiritual environment not open to discovery by the methods of the sciences of Nature. It is purely arbitrary to suppose that unless the existence of something can be shown by the evidence of the physical sense organs, as involved for the data of the natural sciences, it must be assumed not to exist. Throughout the course of human history, and especially in the realm of the moral, men—though not necessarily every man—have been aware of an impact upon them of an environment of which they have not been aware by their physical sense organs. They have felt that their well-being has in part depended on this spiritual environment and they have in no small measure attained satisfaction through adjustment to it. Thus in contrast with many contemporary views, a second requirement for modern life is an adequate conception of man's environment. The Christian conception, developed in the course of its history, by the tests of experience and of reflection is declared to be less inadequate than any offered as a substitute for it.

The problems of ethics in modern life depend in part upon the great increase in the possibility of experiences of particular values. There is a richness of detail in human life today far surpassing that of any previous age. One of the chief gains of modern practical efforts as well as of scientific and philosophical reflection has been this enrichment of human life by attention to details. Wide conceptual generalizations have been found inadequate to cover the multiplicity of values, and are accorded a subordinate place. Whereas it was formerly supposed possible to subsume these values under one general concept of the ideal of human life, it is now evident that the concepts previously proposed must be regarded not as alternatives but as supplementing one another. Little help is obtained today from the description of the ideal by such general terms as "pleasure,"

"happiness," "self-realization," "social harmony," or "perfection." Christian ethics, though it has made use of such terms, has never been in the main a discussion of them, or an attempt to deduce the details of moral life from them. It has been constituted by a combination of moral judgments and precepts with reference to particular though related aspects of human life. In its evolution there has been an increasing appreciation of an ever-widening range of satisfactions. The most recent scientific and philosophical considerations of ethics have assumed the form of enquiries into particular values and so come to attend to what Christian ethics has concerned itself with throughout its entire history. It may claim to be superior to them in that, on the basis of continued tests in experience and thought, it presents a view in which these values are co-ordinated with due reference to their relative significance for human satisfaction. Some alternatives to Christian ethics can be charged with a failure to include important values.

The evidence of history cannot be allowed to be pushed on one side by short-sighted contemporary Naturalistic leaders who concentrate their attention on a limited range of values, and all too frequently describe moral values as merely instrumental forms of conduct. A comparative historical survey of morality and of ethical ideas provides adequate evidence that men have always sought and in part found satisfaction in qualities of inner character. It has not been without good reason that Christian ethics has always insisted on the importance of those qualities. The failure to give them their due attention is one main cause of the pernicious effects upon modern men and women of contemporary non-Christian ethics. Moral integrity is sacrificed too often to individual or social expediency and utility. Thus a third requirement for modern life is an adequate appreciation of the whole realm of values and of the manner of their co-ordination for human satisfaction.

The three requirements to which we have referred for dealing with the problems of ethics in modern life are met by a modern Christian ethics based upon the general history of Christian morality and ethical ideas. From the outset Christian ethics has implicated a view of human satisfaction as a whole, as a many-sided life, and throughout its history this view has become more and more clear as a whole and in its details. The earliest expressions of this ethics in the New Testament were not something wholly new. They were a truly significant re-statement and re-orientation of what had already been tested for long in the previous history of the Hebrews. All further developments have been within the general view given in the New Testament and in accordance with the principles there expounded. That Christian ethics includes ultimate principles and recognizes absolute values, which cannot be superseded, is definitely affirmed, while it is still insisted that it is not yet a whole perfect in all its details, being itself dynamic and in process of development.

In the course of this book it is shown how within the frame-work of its general ideas, Christian ethics has always insisted on the moral values of character in detail, on the virtues as of intrinsic worth. It is further evident that it has maintained certain definite views as to the relative significance of values for human satisfaction. During the course of its history it brought into itself the best from the ethical ideas of Greek and Roman civilization; and it has given a place to new values as they have been discovered in all stages of human advance since it attained a level of conscious elaboration. Sometimes by the character of that against which it had to fight, and sometimes from forms of misinterpretation by its own adherents, it assumed for periods an over-exaggeration of certain of its aspects. That appears to have been the case in the emphasis on "other-worldliness" in the Middle Ages. Nevertheless through Chris-

CHRISTIAN ETHICS

tian history Christian ethics has increasingly attained to expression as a well-balanced whole. What this means for the problems of ethics in modern life is what, with reference to its character as revealed in history, it is the aim of the following chapters to describe.

CHAPTER I

THE ETHICS OF THE GOSPELS

The moral life of the specifically Christian community began with the influence of the person of Jesus and his teachings. During most of the centuries for which we have a historical record of Christianity, Christians have accepted the Gospels as containing the authoritative documentary statement of the ethics of Jesus and the earliest Christian community. Christianity as a living religion has been subject to growth. Christian ethics having shared in that development, it cannot be entirely identified with the ethics of the Gospels or of the New Testament as a whole. Although the fundamental principle of love has been regarded as final and as central throughout all Christian ethical development, that principle has never at any time constituted the whole of Christian ethics. That has included details which in the course of history have been elaborated around the fundamental principle to cover the widening comprehension of Christian character and moral life. Even the New Testament itself contains reference to details in addition to the central principle of love. The Gospels are accorded primary importance as concerned with the life, personality and teachings of the Founder of the religion and demand independent consideration. The other New Testament writings deal with times after his death and with conditions differing in many ways from those of his own personal mission.

Modern scholars have raised serious questions as to what we may rightly claim to know about Jesus, as to whether he actually did and said what is recorded in the Gospels. Those questions cannot be answered with certainty. In the circumstances it is wiser for our pur-

pose to talk of the ethics of the Gospels rather than of the ethics of Jesus. For as contributing to the formation of Christian ethics, from early times and throughout Christian history up to and including our own day, the ethical teachings of Jesus have been considered just as they are found in the Gospels.

The different Synoptic Gospels have some distinctive characteristics due in part to the varied temperaments, environments, and aims of the particular compilers. Though some of these differences involve difficult problems for the scholar, the general view of Christians has been that the Synoptic Gospels supplement one another. With reference to ethics and religion they have been considered as capable of harmonization, even if discrepancies of accounts concerning events cannot be entirely reconciled. Nevertheless, in the development of Christian ethics there have been tendencies at certain times and in particular communities continuing emphases of one Gospel or another. Thus Dr. Branscomb says that the Gospel of Matthew "utilized sayings of Jesus to present the view that the old law had not been destroyed by Jesus but rather completed or carried to its fulfillment, and that his teachings thus constituted a new law binding upon all Christians." Yet, while insisting that "Jesus never thought of his teachings as a new body of laws—taking the place of those of Moses," Dr. Branscomb recognizes that this notion of a Christian "law" has been helpful in the life of the Church. The tone of the Gospel of Luke differs from that of Matthew, and in consequence has on occasions been made special use of. One main character of it is described by Dr. Branscomb in saying: "Luke is the gospel of the outcasts and the poor," showing "a sense of sympathy and understanding for the more delicate emotions of the heart." The differences between the Synoptics are much less than those between them and the Fourth Gospel. According to Dr. Branscomb "One will always

read the Synoptic Gospels in the light of the Fourth Gospel." He ought rather to have said that traditional orthodox theologians always have so read the Synoptics. However, in a later chapter he writes: "Many people have been accustomed to think of Jesus as suddenly appearing in Galilee after his years of preparation, announcing to the people that he was the expected Messiah, performing various miracles to prove the statement, and calling upon men to accept his claims and follow his commands. *This is indeed the impression which a reading of the Fourth Gospel leaves.* It seems to us the natural thing for him to have done. *But it was not Jesus' method.*" * One not adopting the attitude above indicated may insist that the Fourth Gospel emphatically teaches the spirituality of Christian ethics.¹

The ethical teachings of the Gospels, certainly of the Synoptics, and at least in some measure of the Fourth Gospel, were developed first on Jewish soil and in continuity with Jewish tradition. The Old Testament has in general been included in the body of sacred scriptures acknowledged by Christians. Its books are essentially religious and ethical. The Decalogue is referred to in the Gospels and has occupied a definite place in Christian moral teaching. Indeed, Jesus is reported to have said that he came not to destroy but to fulfil the Law and the Prophets. "For verily I say unto you, till heaven and earth pass away, one jot or one tittle shall in no wise pass away from the Law, till all things be accomplished." Reprimanding the Pharisees for their neglect of the weightier matters of the Law, judgement, mercy, and faith, Jesus said "but these ought ye to have done and not to leave the others undone," as though actually accepting the whole Law as they understood it. Yet they complained that his disciples did not wash their hands before they ate and were negligent of the ceremonial fasts. One who invited Jesus him-

* Italics are mine. A. G. W.

self, "marvelled" that he had not "first washed before dinner." What Jesus most probably meant was that there was nothing fundamental in the Law, as given by God, which "would pass away." He charged the Pharisees with making the real commandments of God of no effect by their own "tradition." With reference to ceremonial cleanliness, Jesus said "Not that which goeth into the mouth defileth a man, but that which cometh out of the mouth, this defileth a man." For "those things which proceed out of the mouth come forth from the heart; and they defile a man. For out of the heart proceed evil thoughts, murders, adulteries, fornications, thefts, false witness, blasphemies: these defile a man, but to eat with unwashen hands defileth not a man." Admitting the Law in its true moral sense he stood for emancipation from those "heavy burdens, grievous to be borne" which in its name had been put "on men's shoulders."²

It has been complained that Jesus misrepresented the attitude of his opponents and of some aspects of the past. The law of revenge: "An eye for an eye; a tooth for a tooth" which he contrasted with his own teaching is actually found in the book of Exodus. But the latter phrase of his statement: "Ye have heard that it was said, Thou shalt love thy neighbour and *hate thine enemy*," is nowhere found in the Mosaic Law. It may, however, be asked whether such a sentiment is not implicated in the Old Testament. Jesus' criticisms and condemnations were incidental to his constructive work, which was undoubtedly conceived by him to be harmonious with the true spirit of the Law and the Prophets and with "the hope of Israel" of a coming time when the earth should be filled with the glory of the Lord.³

It was with such a faith that "Jesus began to preach and to say: 'Repent, for the Kingdom of Heaven is at hand.'" This indicates at the outset the main concept of Jesus' teaching. John the Baptist had made a similar

proclamation, and Jesus in accepting baptism from him showed that he was prepared to take up the same mission. "Jesus spoke of the Kingdom of God," writes Dr. Branscomb, "because as a man of his age it was the centre of his intellectual and religious outlook." "The idea of a Kingdom of God or reign of righteousness on earth was very prominent"; says Dr. Inge, "and the notion was not strange to the Jews that in a sense we may enter into the Kingdom here and now by holiness of life." Many probably associated the idea with political nationalistic hopes, but for those imbued with the Hebrew religious spirit it meant far more than worldly triumph. Jesus himself and the early Christians thought of this Messianic Kingdom as coming in a very short time. It has been maintained with some justification that some of what Jesus taught had reference to that expected event, was directed to preparation for it, and therefore is to be regarded as simply an ethics for the period of waiting. It is neither possible nor necessary to deny that both John and Jesus shared beliefs, sufficiently common in their time, of some radical change in which a Messianic Kingdom would be inaugurated. Yet it is not even important to enquire whether Jesus ever abandoned this apocalyptic view. For an examination of his teachings reveals how very little may be reasonably declared to be applicable only to conditions of a brief time of waiting for the coming of the Kingdom as so conceived. "There is no trace of the temporary about the ethical principles in Christ's teaching" wrote Dr. Sorley. For Jesus the Kingdom was "of Heaven," "of God." Whether or not it was in any way "at hand" in the temporal sense, he was concerned with preaching the condition of entrance to it: repentance; the character of its subjects; and the principles of their life in it. The historic continuity of Christian ethics shows that the apocalyptic outlook in Jesus' teaching

has not interfered with the acceptance of his ethical principles.⁴

On different occasions Jesus made clear the initial attitude required for "entrance" to the Kingdom. According to Matthew the first word of his preaching was: repent. This meant essentially a change of mind and heart, a definite turning to God, not simply to make verbal obeisance saying "Lord, Lord" but doing "the will" of the Father which is in heaven. Admission to the Kingdom requires an attitude of trust and sincerity best typified by that of an unsophisticated child. "Who-soever shall not receive the Kingdom of God as a little child shall in no wise enter therein." Worldly riches and other earthly cares distract men from it: "How hardly shall they that have riches enter into the Kingdom of God!" The acceptance of the call to the Kingdom involves the subordination of all other loyalties to it, not that these are to be abandoned but rather that they can find their true good only in it. In view of what Jesus says elsewhere, the word "hate" in the following passage is not to be taken to suggest rejection of the loyalties involved. "If anyone come to me and hate not his father and his mother and his wife and children, and brethren and sisters, yea, even his own life also, he cannot be my disciple." In the Fourth Gospel the entrance to the Kingdom is likened to a "new birth," a spiritual regeneration. In the Gospels, the Christian life is seen to involve not simply specific kinds of conduct but a fundamental attitude.⁵

This fundamental initial and persisting attitude though essential is not all. A continuity of effort is required: "No man having put his hand to the plough and looking back is fit for the Kingdom of God." The attainment of what it stands for among men is only gradual. Its spirit is to permeate mankind like leaven in the measure of wheat. The Kingdom "cometh not with observation": it is like a seed growing secretly.

The parable of the wise and the foolish virgins teaches the necessity of constant watchfulness. All are freely invited into it, as guests to a marriage feast. Those who would enter must make themselves ready for it: the man who came to the feast without a wedding garment was cast into outer darkness. It includes the highest and best open to mankind: it is a goodly pearl, a treasure hidden in a field, to obtain which a man will sell all he has. The bonds of membership of the Kingdom have no relation with ties of blood: "Whosoever shall do the will of my Father which is in heaven, the same is my brother, and sister, and mother." ⁶

The collection of Jesus' sayings described as the Sermon on the Mount has been said to include "the moral law of the Kingdom of Heaven." He emphasized there the fundamental inwardness of morality and the universality of its practical range. Morality is a state of the inner spirit, of feeling, will, and thought, and it is also concerned with the widest possible external expression in word and deed. Jesus illustrated his teaching by contrasting it with the common understanding of the commandments of the Old Testament. One further quotation may suffice: "Ye have heard that it was said to them of old time, Thou shalt not kill; and whosoever shall kill shall be in danger of the judgement: but I say unto you, that every one who is angry with his brother [without a cause] shall be in danger of the judgement; and whosoever shall say to his brother: Ra-ca (vain fellow), shall be in danger of the council; and whosoever shall say: Thou fool, shall be in danger of the hell of fire." All of the other commandments of the Decalogue are to be similarly interpreted from the standpoint of the inner attitude and with an analogous comprehensive reference. The Sermon opens with the Beatitudes. In these, as Dr. Gore observes "we have a description of a certain character, not of certain acts." The Kingdom consists of "the poor in spirit,"

those who in true humility surrender themselves to God; "they that mourn"; "the meek"; "they that hunger and thirst after righteousness"; "the merciful"; "the pure in heart"; "the peace-makers"; and "they that are persecuted for righteousness sake." It is these who will attain that satisfaction called by Jesus "blessedness." "Theirs is the Kingdom of Heaven"; "they shall be comforted"; "they shall inherit the earth"; "they shall be filled"; "they shall obtain mercy"; "they shall see God"; and "they shall be called the sons of God."⁷

From the ethical standpoint the main significance of the teaching of Jesus is not that he introduced any new ideas. What he did was to take principles already present in Hebrew ethics and so concentrate attention on them in his utterances and in his life as to show their centrality and dominance in morality. The ethical transformation he accomplished was essentially one of change of emphasis. This he did not merely by bringing these principles themselves clearly into view, but also by an emancipation from trivialities which obscured them. He did not invent even a new phraseology for these principles. The first he quoted or accepted* as in the book of *Deuteronomy*: "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thine heart, with all thy soul, and with all thy might"; and the second as expressed in *Leviticus*: "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself."⁸

Jesus' answer to the question, "Who is my neighbour?", an answer given in the form of the parable of the good Samaritan, has been taken to imply: anyone whom we may help or from whom we may receive help. Thought out to the furthest implication, this can be regarded as involving everybody. His making use of the term "Samaritan," suggests that his principle necessitates the suppression of all prejudices, racial or other,

* According to Matthew, Jesus quoted the commandments; according to Luke, it was the lawyer who did so.

which might militate against its application. Not even the enmity of others must be allowed to obstruct its observance. "Love your enemies, bless them that curse you, do good to them that hate you and pray for them which despitefully use you and persecute you. . . . For if ye love them which love you, what reward have ye: do not even the publicans the same?" "Be ye therefore merciful as your Father also is merciful." The implication of all this is tersely expressed in the Golden Rule: "And as ye would that men should do to you, do ye also to them likewise." If, as Mr. Gardner Smith maintains, "The Golden Rule *in its positive form* has not been found elsewhere"; this positive formulation constitutes an ethical contribution of first importance in manner of statement, though it *adds* nothing to the commandment "to love others as ourselves." As Dr. King pointed out, this Golden Rule involves what was repeatedly emphasized by Jesus: "absolute truth and honesty in his disciples."⁹

Jesus saw that adherence to the principle of love in the present world would entail the willing acceptance of suffering, and the constant exercise of self-control. He warned his disciples "in the world ye have tribulation," nevertheless in his trust in God convinced of the supremacy of love, he added: "but be of good cheer, I have overcome the world." "Be ye . . . harmless as doves." "Resist not him that is evil: but whosoever shall smite thee on thy right cheek, turn to him the other also." "Whosoever doth not bear his own cross, and come after me, cannot be my disciple." Men are not to fear those who can kill the body but are not able to kill the soul, indeed they are to be prepared to "lose" their life if necessary. "For whosoever will save his life shall lose it, but whosoever will lose his life for my sake, the same shall save it." "Greater love hath no man than this: that he lay down his life for his friends." His true disciples will be in constant readiness for the

call to "bear the cross" in following Jesus. Adherence to the principle of love demands persistence and fortitude. "He that shall endure unto the end, the same shall be saved."¹⁰

Giving instructions to those he sent out to preach, Jesus told them that when they entered a house they should first say: "Peace be to this house." He exhorted his hearers to "have peace with one another." In the elaborated accounts of the circumstances of his birth we are told of a "heavenly host" announcing "on earth peace." "Peace I leave with you; my peace I give unto you," says Jesus. Nevertheless, it is clear that this is not a feigned peace attained by acquiescence in anything contrary to God's will. The division he recognized between his followers and others cannot be disregarded: "He that is not with me is against me." "Suppose ye that I am come to give peace on earth? I tell you: Nay; but rather division." Though his followers might "here and now" taste of the peace of God, its complete realization is rather beyond the present conditions. With peace Jesus associated a spiritual joy.¹¹

Jesus accepted no compromise between good and evil. Throughout the history of Christian ethics there has been reiteration of his teaching of the two ways, one that "leadeth unto life" and the other "to destruction." Jesus accepted as authoritative the commandments of the Decalogue, in a deep and wide interpretation and condemned the sins which were their violation. The attitude he most frequently condemned was that of hypocrisy, especially the outward suggestion and pretence of moral goodness and piety in contrast with an inner spirit and actual conduct contrary to this. Hypocrisy is associated with pride. Some of his most severe utterances are against the unforgiving, the hard-hearted, and those not caring for the afflicted and needy. There is pity for, as well as disapproval of, the worldly. Men are warned against laying up treasures on earth where

moth and rust do corrupt and where thieves break through and steal. In the parable of the man who proposed to enlarge his barns, who would say to himself "take thine ease, drink, eat, and be merry," "God said unto him: Thou foolish one, this night thy soul shall be required of thee; then whose shall those things be which thou hast provided?" The untrustworthy, those who will not repent, and those who do not use their God-given talents, also are described as meriting punishment. The one sin declared to be unpardonable: "Speaking against the Holy Spirit" has been understood by Dr. Davidson as the "wilful and persistent sinning against light till light itself is turned into darkness."¹²

Thus the love of God and man taught in the Gospels is spiritual, of worth superior to anything of material welfare. "For what shall it profit a man, if he shall gain the whole world and lose his own soul." The essentially spiritual character of the Kingdom for Jesus is not impugned even if instead of the well-known version "the Kingdom of Heaven is within you" we read "in the midst of you." The community of Christians in the Kingdom is presented in the Fourth Gospel in mystical rather than social fashion. Yet there are definite social implications in the Gospels; the very conception of a kingdom is a social one. All are to be the servants of all; the life of the Kingdom is one of service. "He that is greatest among you shall be your servant." "For even the Son of Man came not to be ministered unto, but to minister . . ." In many of the parables men are represented as servants. Jesus having washed his disciples' feet, as a symbolical act, then said: "If I then, your lord and master, have washed your feet, ye ought also to wash one another's feet." Nevertheless the members of the Kingdom are not merely servants, they are "friends," more, "they are the children of God."¹³

One who adopts this motive of service will not assume

to himself any pretence of superiority or dominance. Jesus unequivocally stressed a virtue which throughout a large part of the history of Christian ethics has been placed in the forefront of moral qualities: humility. Some of his disciples asked him: "Who is the greatest in the Kingdom of heaven?" He called a little child and set him in the midst of them and answered "Whosoever shall humble himself as this little child, the same is the greatest in the Kingdom of heaven." Among Catholics, clerical and lay, this virtue has been definitely appreciated. Unfortunately the Protestant churches have almost entirely failed to give humility the place Jesus accorded it. "Whosoever exalteth himself shall be abased; and he that humbleth himself shall be exalted." "If any man desire to be first, the same shall be last of all, and the servant of all." When we have done all that God requires we have nothing to justify pride: "We are unprofitable servants"; our service falls short of what God does for us.¹⁴

Though the virtues and vices are primarily inner states the external conduct arising from them is significant. It is by their fruits that the good and the evil may be known by others. The parable of the fig tree symbolizes the requirement of good fruits. The parable of the talents teaches that man is to be judged worthy or unworthy according to his use of them. The Christian life is not simply one of passive contemplation: men are called to *work* in the "vineyard." "A good man out of the good treasure of his heart bringeth forth that which is good; and an evil man out of the evil treasure of his heart bringeth forth that which is evil, for of the abundance of his heart his mouth speaketh." But Jesus gave a warning against such occupation with "works" as to rule out or unduly minimize inner contemplation and devotion. There is the interesting episode of Jesus' visit to Mary and Martha. Mary sat at his feet "and heard his word," while Martha "cum-

bered" herself "about much serving." And this is what Jesus said: "Martha, Martha, thou art careful and troubled about many things, but one thing is needful, and Mary hath chosen that good part which shall not be taken away from her."¹⁵

In earlier periods, and still among many Christians today, the Kingdom, so far as on earth, has been considered as essentially coincident with the Church. In later times, especially during the last seventy years or so, the Kingdom has often been considered simply in its terrestrial social aspects and implications. Though both of these conceptions embody important truths, they are not adequate to the full implications of Jesus' teaching. Dr. Walker's description comes nearer to its significance: "It is the common and inclusive Good of all persons imbued with its spirit. It is the new and perfect social order, whose members live in an ideal relationship to God of trust and sonship, and in an ideal relationship to each other of brotherhood and love. Entrance into this divine society is for each individual the promise and earnest of the highest good."¹⁶

"Jesus speaks chiefly of God, and speaks chiefly to the individual," wrote Dr. Peabody. Yet the social implications of his teaching are quite clearly evident in his use of the term "Kingdom." His fundamental principles have a direct bearing on social life. In his conduct and sayings he paid definite attention to it. Although the Fourth Gospel with its emphasis on the "eternal life" almost entirely ignores it, economic wellbeing, while certainly not Jesus' primary consideration, came within the scope of his conceptions. In the prayer he taught his disciples, after the plea "Thy Kingdom come on earth," comes the supplication "Give us this day our daily bread." In his description of the division of the unworthy from the worthy, he suggested that the latter manifested their goodness in social benevolence: "I was hungry and ye gave me meat; I was thirsty and ye gave

me drink; I was a stranger and ye took me in; naked and ye clothed me; I was sick and ye visited me. I was in prison and ye came unto me. . . . Inasmuch as ye have done it unto one of these my brethren even the least, ye have done it unto me." Notwithstanding some attempts to maintain the contrary, Dr. Rauschenbusch rightly observes: Jesus "was not a social reformer of the modern type." He taught the fundamental attitude of love of one's neighbour, from which appropriate social conduct would come. It was John the Baptist who answered explicitly to those who asked him: "What then shall we do?"—"He that hath two coats let him impart to him that hath none; and he that hath meat let him do likewise." Jesus pointed to John as his forerunner, accepting baptism by him, and so presumably was in accord with such an attitude. In recent times stress has been placed on the social side of Jesus' teaching and work: "The Kingdom of God," wrote Rauschenbusch, "is the true human society; the ethics of Jesus taught the true social conduct which would create the true society."¹⁷

The Gospel of Luke has been considered to represent Jesus as more concerned with earthly well-being than do the other Synoptics. In Luke the Beatitudes refer to "ye poor"—"ye that hunger now"—not as in Matthew "the poor *in spirit*"; "they which do hunger and thirst *after righteousness*." In Luke these are followed by the "woes," including "woe unto you that are rich" "woe unto you that are full." The impression is thus given in this Gospel of Jesus' definite interest in the social conditions of those surrounding him. Nevertheless Dean Inge maintains that even Luke "gives no support to the idea that Jesus was a socialist reformer," pointing out that he refused to adjudicate in the matter when one asked him "bid my brother divide the inheritance with me." This lack of explicit concern with social problems, observes Dr. Inge, "is the more remarkable when we

remember that Jesus deliberately placed himself in the line of the prophets, and that denunciation of social abuses was common among the Old Testament prophets." However, Luke and Matthew, following Mark, refer to his denunciation of those who "devour widows' houses." But Jesus was not interested in the ordinary ideas of justice, as may be seen from several of his parables, e.g. the laborers in the vineyard who all received a "penny"; and the prodigal son who in appearance on ordinary calculation in sum received more than his brother. In both of these parables the objection raised from the standpoint of "justice" is brushed on one side. Conduct is to be determined by love. "Give to him that asketh thee, and from him that would borrow of thee turn not away." "In short," wrote Dr. Peabody, "Jesus approaches the social question from within: he deals with individuals; he makes men. It is for others to serve the world by organization; he serves it through inspiration."¹⁸

In the Gospels there are passages which suggest some limitation in Jesus' view as to the scope of the Kingdom, and yet there is also enough to show that the implications of his teaching remove and definite sayings transcend those limitations. According to Matthew he said to the Syro-Phoenician woman: "I am not sent but unto the lost sheep of the house of Israel," but this is not found in Mark. Again, in sending forth the twelve, he directed them to go "to the lost sheep of the house of Israel," and "Go not into any way of the Gentiles, and into any city of the Samaritans enter ye not." Yet on another occasion he said: "This Gospel of the Kingdom shall be preached in all the world for a witness unto all nations," and his last utterance as recorded by Matthew was an exhortation to his disciples to "go" and "teach all nations." Luke reports him as saying: "The law and the prophets were until John; since that time the Kingdom of God is preached and every man presseth into

it." He did not limit his ministrations; eventually he did not turn away the Syro-Phoenician woman, and in his talk with the woman of Samaria he described a view that included Samaritans and all others in a spiritual worship of God.¹⁹

It has been previously admitted that Jesus shared the belief held by many Jews of his time in the early coming of the Messianic Kingdom. Luke reports him as saying: "But I tell you of a truth, there be some standing here which shall not taste of death till they see the Kingdom of God." This Messianic Kingdom is described as coming with surprising suddenness. Yet in its inner ethical significance, the term "Kingdom of God" seems to have implied for him a condition that could then and there be in part experienced by his followers—"The Kingdom of God is within (or among) you"; though its final and complete attainment, "life everlasting" was to be looked for "in the world to come." It is in this sense that the Kingdom comes gradually. The idea of a future life is much more implied than affirmed or discussed in the Gospels and Jesus' teaching concerning the Kingdom cannot be entirely divorced from it. The author of the Fourth Gospel was so far free from the Messianic eschatological views present in the Synoptics, as to render the meaning of the Kingdom of God essentially as "eternal life." "In my Father's house are many mansions. . . . I go to prepare a place for you." Of the "sheep of his flock," the members of the Kingdom, Jesus says: "I give unto them eternal life."²⁰

The ideal of the Kingdom, says Dr. Major, is "the supreme ideal of Christendom." Yet it is a strange and remarkable fact, as the careful reader of the following chapters will observe, that "the teaching of the Kingdom has never been prominent in the Church's message since the days of the Apostles." In the course of history, continues Dr. Major, the ideal has "suffered cor-

ruption." Even after the resurrection, Jesus' disciples are reported to have asked him: "Lord, wilt thou at this time restore the Kingdom to Israel?"—thus suggesting a misunderstanding of his mission. Later, Christian leaders became engrossed "in cosmological and Christological speculations" and in questions of "Church organization and discipline and of the nature and benefit of the sacraments." But though the general concept of the Kingdom, and many of the implications of that concept fell into the background and were neglected, it will be seen that most of the details of its ethical content have been insisted on throughout the course of Christian history. In recent times the significance of the general idea of the Kingdom for Christian ethics was again brought to the attention of Christians under the stress of social problems. The circumstances of this revival of attention led for a time to a sociological and predominantly humanistic interpretation. Since that time there has been a great increase of scholarly study of the Gospels, and it has become evident that such an interpretation is not only quite inadequate in its scope, but also fundamentally wrong in its humanistic standpoint. For the Christian conception—that of the Gospels—is not simply of a social group, "a kingdom"—it is of a "Kingdom of *God*."²¹

Whether it was Jesus' deliberate purpose to found a new religion and establish an institutional church may be debated. There is evidence of his participation in Jewish festivals. "He taught in their synagogues." Whatever his intention, Christianity developed as a religion distinct from Judaism, and acquired an institutional embodiment. At least this may be said, that the beginnings of this achievement were because Jesus inspired in a number of persons a loyalty to himself and to one another. It was through this personal influence equally with, even perhaps more than by, his teachings that he established and promoted the development of

Christian ethics. He not only directly impressed his immediate followers but provided what through the ages has been accepted as a pattern for Christian life and character so that Christian morality could be described as "the imitation of Christ." Though nothing that may significantly be called a biography of Jesus is possible, the Gospels have been considered to give us a distinct moral portrait of him.²²

As Dr. Branscomb says: "Not as a teacher expounding a thesis is he (Jesus) to be understood, but as the prophet of the Kingdom and the Shepherd of the lost sheep of Israel." "No rich personality," wrote Dr. Newman Smyth, "has ever put itself wholly into speech," and we may add, words of ours are certain to be inadequate to describe it. Jesus appears to have been a man of truly remarkable poise. His confidence, based quite clearly in his trust in his heavenly Father, gave to his utterances the mark of authority. "His was a commanding personality," says Dean Inge. . . . "Again and again the word 'power' is used in connection with his personality." This strength even when expressed in righteous anger was accompanied by an evident sympathy, even pity, for those who needed to be reprimanded. He manifested in his own attitude the humility he stressed in his preaching. He could be friendly with "publicans and sinners," concerned with their spiritual health. He comforted the poor and the sick. "We see in his character," wrote Dr. Robinson, "as in that of none other, 'manhood fused with female grace'; we see tender and affectionate sympathy combined with rigid and masculine austerity." Though he called for moral decision rather than played on the feelings of his hearers, the Gospels without suggesting weakness give us an impression of his serene, dignified gentleness and compassion, not merely in his contact with children and women but also with men. "He could recognize possibilities of good in the prostitute,

the thief, or the despised and often despicable publicans, one of whom he called to be his apostle, whilst he invited another to entertain him in his own house. Even in the presence of flagrant . . . sin, he could anticipate a future of purity and goodness, as may be seen from his words to the woman taken in adultery, 'neither do I condemn thee: go thy way; from henceforth sin no more.' " The scholarly Dr. Montefiore, from the Jewish standpoint, suggests that the methods and intensity of Jesus' redeeming activity were a new thing: his opponents scorning him for being a "friend of sinners." "The rescue and deliverance of the sinner through pity and personal service—the work and the method seem both alike due to the teacher of Nazareth." ²³

There is no trace of Jesus' having had any desire for worldly goods or honours. He gave himself to prayer and meditation, at times in solitude. "His sanity of judgement," says Dr. Peabody, "is as extraordinary as his depth of sympathy." His parables reveal his simple unsophisticated observation of men and things. He called for and inspired a loyalty to himself. Of himself he is reported to have said: "I am meek and lowly of heart," yet he sternly rebuked the powerful Pharisees, and dared to refer to Herod as "that fox." His life, as Dr. King remarked, manifested a "downright earnestness." Though described as a wandering teacher "without where to lay his head" there is no evidence that he was at any time a member of an ascetic sect. As a carpenter, he was one of the "common people," and we are told that they "heard him gladly." Those who really came to know him he held to himself by his love and manifest sincerity. Dr. Rauschenbusch has described him as having "a revolutionary consciousness, emancipated from things as they are," for he deprecated the usual notions of rank and distinction, recognizing "the only title to greatness . . . to be distinguished service at cost to self." Whatever the explanation may

be, one of the most remarkable things of the accounts of Jesus in the Gospels is that it is possible to maintain, as Dr. Forrest has done, that he was entirely free of any kind of remorse or self-condemnation. "The note of contrition," says that author, "which ever belongs to the saintly soul, is in his case wholly absent."²⁴

It is interesting to note that the main motive implied in the stories of the "miracles" of Jesus is not to produce specific doctrinal belief. That they stimulated faith in him is undoubtedly affirmed, but he himself was critical of those who sought "signs and wonders." Rather they represent forms of benevolent activity, as in the feeding of the hungry, the taking of fear from those afraid, the healing of the sick, and even the comforting of the sorrowing by the raising of their dead. The stories may indeed be considered as though parables with ethical significance, as Dr. Lang has done in his attractive study of "The Miracles of Jesus."²⁵

Here we are not concerned with the ecclesiastical dogmas which represent Jesus as a divine incarnation and his death as the central fact in an "atonement" of men to God. Apart from such conceptions, his death has been accorded ethical significance. It appears that Jesus did evade on some occasions those who sought to destroy him. When he was eventually taken, he submitted as always to the Divine will. On the cross he uttered his only expression suggesting, if momentarily, a weakening of his faith: "My God, My God, why hast Thou forsaken me?" But his trust returned: "Father, into Thy hands I commend my spirit." Otherwise his thought was of others, as for the thief crucified with him. For those concerned with his execution, he prayed, "Father, forgive them, they know not what they do." To two standing at the foot of the cross he said: "Woman, behold thy son"; "Behold thy mother." His death has been regarded as showing what a good man may expect of the "world," and how he should remain

loyal nevertheless. The Gospels tell of his resurrection and his ascension into heaven, and for Christian thought his death cannot be separated from these ideas. For Christian ethics they are a form of expression of the conviction that death is not the end, but is rather the gateway to "life everlasting."²⁶

The ideas of reward and punishment are present in the Gospels and have been stressed with varying emphasis throughout Christian history. God "shall reward every man according to his works." All must appear before the judgement seat, and every detail of life comes for consideration. "Every idle word that men shall speak, they shall give account of in the day of judgement." The expression, "day of judgement," has tended to suggest a postponement of the judgement until after death. In the parable of the wheat and the tares, it is only after the harvest that the tares are cast into the fire. Jesus exhorted his hearers to expect their recompense "at the resurrection of the just." The parable of Dives and Lazarus depicts the reward and punishment as after this life. There is much that suggests anything but sentimental leniency. The Lord sent to "destroy those husbandmen" who killed the heir. Hell is described as "the fire that never shall be quenched." Though he manifested redemptive sympathy for the sinner from whom he required repentance, Jesus never condoned evil.²⁷

That each is to receive "according" to his works does not necessarily signify "in exact proportion" to his works. Much in the Gospels seems directly opposed to such an idea. The parable of the laborers in the vineyard suggests that the measure of the reward is in no simple quasi-mathematical ratio with the work done. Love leads beyond what such a ratio implies. The Gospels also indicate another mode of measurement. "With what measure ye mete it shall be measured to you again" . . . "with what judgement ye judge ye

shall be judged." An illustration is given in the parable of the unforgiving debtor. Forgiven his own debt, he failed to forgive the debt owed to himself, and in consequence he was required to pay an amount equal to his own debt even unto "the uttermost farthing." As rewards may exceed deserts, so, on account of forgiveness, punishment may be less than deserts. Another characterization of reward and punishment is found in the parable of the talents. The reward for good use of talents takes the form of increased responsibility, thus recognizing a definite aspect of human nature that a position of greater responsibility is appreciated by the soul worthy of it. Similarly punishment is by deprivation of responsibility, implying the unhappiness a man feels in being regarded as unworthy of trust. Reward and punishment are not represented as calculated solely on the good or evil of actual acts: conditions and motives are taken into account. Jesus warned his disciples: "Take heed that ye do not your alms before men to be seen of them—otherwise ye have no reward of your Father which is in heaven." The Father who "seeth in secret shall reward thee openly." Punishment also depends in part on the individual's knowledge of what is required. "That servant who knew his Lord's will and prepared not himself, neither did according to His will, shall be beaten with *many* stripes." Ignorance is not a ground on which to escape all punishment, for ignorance in this realm must be due to lack of the proper attitude. "He that knew not and did commit things worthy of stripes shall be beaten with *few* stripes." Punishment comes for sins of omission, to those, for example, who neglect to show kindness. "Inasmuch as ye did it not to one of the least of these ye did it not to me."²⁸

Are reward and punishment considered individualistically in the Gospels? It is quite clear that they are applied specifically to the individual. Yet, on the other

hand, there is much that implies that the consequences of vice and virtue are felt beyond the individual manifesting them. Jesus is presented as vicariously suffering for the sins of others. The reward of goodness comes in a social environment. "One soweth and another reapeth." "And he that reapeth receiveth wages, and gathereth fruit unto life eternal, that both he that soweth and he that reapeth may rejoice together." The implication here, however, is plainly that though both rejoice together both do their part.²⁹

On the surface it appears as though the Fourth Gospel does not place emphasis on moral virtue so much as on acceptance or rejection of Christ, belief or disbelief in him. There is nevertheless a moral implication, in that acceptance of Christ involves conformity with the Christlike life. "Every branch in Me that beareth not fruit, He taketh away, and every branch that beareth fruit He purgeth it that it may bring forth more fruit." The Fourth Gospel gives definite recognition of an attitude more fundamental than any good works to which it may lead. "He that heareth my word and believeth on Him that sent me, hath everlasting life." "For God so loved the world that He gave His only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth on Him should not perish but have everlasting life." The reward is absolute: in it there shall be no "hunger," no "thirst." It is to be complete spiritual satisfaction. "I am the bread of life: he that cometh to me shall never hunger; and he that believeth on me shall never thirst." Compared with this all other rewards are insignificant: "Labour not for the meat which perisheth, but for that which endureth unto everlasting life."³⁰

In spite of such symbolism as that of the fire of hell, the nature of reward and punishment according to the Gospels is "blessedness" and "woe," happiness and unhappiness of an inner kind. As they came to be described in the Epistles, the wages of sin is "death," the

reward of virtue "eternal life." Viewed externally "everlasting punishment" seems entirely and unjustly out of proportion to any wrong man may commit, yet considered as a kind of atrophy of soul, continuing until repentance, the significance of the phrase is ethically unobjectionable. There is something narrowing about sin, and that is its punishment: there is something of expansion into an abundant life in goodness, and that is its reward. From the standpoint of the Gospels and of the New Testament generally sin's narrowing tendency involves an alienation from God, while goodness implies the broad sweep of cooperation and communion with God which is expressed as "everlasting life."

CHAPTER II

THE EXPANSION OF CHRISTIANITY IN THE GRECO-ROMAN WORLD

During its first century the expansion of Christianity was in small communities. Their interests were those of practical conduct rather than of rational reflection. Their attitude was one of desire of escape from the world rather than of endeavour to reform it. Even when, as in later times, attempts were made to reconcile Greek and Roman thought with Christian teaching the practical motive still dominated. These communities were concerned at first almost entirely with the relations among themselves; only later did they seriously attend to questions of those with non-Christians. According to Harnack, for over a century and a half the Christian Church ranked almost everything secondary to the supreme task of maintaining its morality. The early Christians felt themselves to be pilgrims on earth. Their lives were dominated by the idea of the future kingdom of heaven, and their self-control and fortitude in persecution were largely motivated by this idea. Together with the aim of personal godliness, the ideal of corporate unity was stressed. Christianity was conceived as healing and redemptive: care was shown for those physically and morally diseased, charity being organized officially for these and allied aims. Love was considered as unqualified: brotherliness "on a footing of equality" implicating alike the emperor and the slave. The worldly condition of slaves was regarded as of no fundamental consequence. Hospitality was shown to travellers, at first especially to Christians, thus uniting the scattered communities. The separate churches aided one another, "consoling and strengthening each other

and sharing their sorrows and their joys." They promoted the ideas of the sanctity of human life and of the brotherhood of men.¹

Some aspects of early Christian morality are also seen in their avoidance of pagan vices and in the attacks upon them: sensuous luxury, the obscenities of the theatre, the cruelties of the arena, sex-perversion, abortion and infanticide, covetousness and greed, dishonesty in business, double-dealing, falsehood, and idolatry. The Christians were charged with atheism on account of their refusal to participate in pagan worship; and with being "haters of the human race" because of their separateness, regarding themselves as a special people. Even during the early centuries two attitudes are found which have continued right up to our own day. For one, Christianity is life dominated by an inner disposition in contrast with the old conception of conformity to law. For the other, it is life in accordance with a "new" law. Sometimes there is the appeal to manifest the spirit of Christ; at other times the exhortation to obey his commandments.

Not till the latter half of the second century was there a beginning of serious reflection on ethical problems, chiefly in contact and in conflict with Greek thought. As history proceeded, while the Greek Fathers endeavoured to present Christian ethics as continuous with, though an advance on, ancient, especially Greek thought, the Latin Fathers tended rather to maintain that Christianity is ethically something new, involving the condemnation of pagan ideas and conduct. The early Greek Churches gave a higher place to knowledge and contemplation than did early Roman Christendom. The early Apologists emphasized the moral qualities of Christians, not primarily as a proof of their beliefs, but in order to obtain toleration and relief from persecution. Yet they insisted that their beliefs in God and in a future life were incentives to right living.²

The transition from the time of Jesus to that of this wider expansion of Christianity is best studied first in the work and teachings of Paul. Jesus and Paul were different types of mind. Paul was pre-eminent in carrying Christianity beyond the country of its birth. His Epistles are in large measure concerned with ethical ideas, righteousness and law, sin, the virtues and the vices, as well as with the religious concepts of God, immortality, and redemption. Paul certainly appears to have been convinced that he was simply carrying on the work of Jesus as regards the moral life. It is not necessary to discuss here the extent to which his thought and attitudes were due to Greco-Roman influences. Dr. Alexander's statement is probably in the main correct: "In him, Jew, Greek and Roman met and his ethical outlook was coloured by the complex civilization of his day." "The language of the apostle is impregnated with the atmosphere of the city, and is alive with the bustle of the Roman world." Paul may have been influenced by Greco-Roman ideas of wisdom, freedom, and cosmopolitanism, but he gave them a different tone and motive in bringing them into a Christian context. He recognized no abrupt break in the moral development of mankind. "There is a law written in the heart and when the heathen do by nature the things contained in the law they witness to their divine origin and destiny. Christian morality is, therefore, nothing else than the morality prepared from all eternity, and is but the highest realization of that which heathen virtue was striving after."

Different ethical emphases in Paul's writings are more satisfactorily explained as due to the specific needs of those to whom he wrote than as implying contrary evaluations. Paul, as Jesus, aimed at making men aware of the primary inward character of morality, of that love that is itself or leads to the fulfilling of the law. He was expressing an essential Christian attitude,

when he placed "spiritual things" as of higher value than "earthly things." Christian moral freedom of the spirit is in contrast to the feeling of bondage to the Mosaic law. Paul's ideal of human life was conformity with God's will, likeness to Christ, leading to or involving supreme blessedness. He emphasized harmony with, or "sharing" the attitude or "spirit" of Jesus. He rarely pointed to Jesus as moral example and seldom mentioned Jesus' earthly life. He did "not deduce the virtues of the Christian life directly from the character of Jesus." Nonetheless he was impressed by Jesus' gentleness and self-denial; his obedience, his endurance of reproach and suffering; his humility and self-sacrificing love.

God is the supreme object of human life: the love of God its main motive. "Whether we live, we live unto the Lord, or whether we die, we die unto the Lord." "Whether therefore ye eat, or drink, or whatsoever ye do, do all to the glory of God." "Let no man glory in men." Regarding this as a life of service, Paul specifically taught that each has a particular vocation, which it is his duty and privilege to fulfil. Life as divine service has dignity and stability. There is a call for thoroughness in and fidelity to work. Life is uncertain and short: the time that remains must be given to the practice and cultivation of the good, especially the worship of God.

In his contention that "Christ died for all"—Paul implicated the idea of the worth of all, the intrinsic value of each individual person. While admitting the moral requirements of self-love he gave little attention to the particular duties involved in it. The self is to be achieved chiefly through self-sacrifice. The individual is to be of firm character and steadfast purpose, and to exercise independence of judgement, for each must give an account of himself. Paul's conception of Christian ethics was also a distinctly social one: for we "are mem-

bers one of another." The love of others is involved in the love of God. "Let no man seek his own, but every man another's wealth." "Bear ye one another's burdens and so fulfill the law of Christ." That does not mean a mere dependence on others, for paradoxically he urged "every man shall bear his own burden." For Paul the Christian ideal had no limits—but is universal. "There is neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither bond nor free, there is neither male nor female: for ye are all one in Christ Jesus." Though he admitted that the duty of help was first to fellow Christians, he exhorted them to minister also to the needs of their enemies. Paul's universalism in ethics was a definite statement of the implications of the ethics of the Gospels. The challenge of the Greco-Roman world led him to explicit enunciation of this universalism.

Dr. Alexander absolves Paul from all charge of asceticism except that involved in some service which without sacrifice could not be adequately performed. "Paul is no ascetic. Every gift of God is good if used wisely and with due regard to the welfare of others." But when he says: "we do not think we are forcing the apostle's meaning if we interpret his teaching thus—use the world for the highest and noblest ends of life" he really suggests that some doubt may not be unreasonable in the matter. The affairs of the physical world are to be regarded as of little account in the good life, nevertheless "the earth and all that is therein is the Lord's" and is to be used morally. The body is "the temple of God." Temperance is to be observed in the satisfaction of its impulses. "Glorify God in your body and in your spirit." Paul insisted on labour, both with hands and in the service of mankind. The Christian is to endeavour to supply his own needs honestly and to aid others who are unfortunate. Idleness is a sign of weakness of character. He did not encourage worldly ambition, but advocated contentment. It has been suggested that Paul

emphasized the "gentler" virtues. Dr. Alexander urges that in Paul's time there was no lack of attention to the "strong" virtues while the "gentler" were not duly appreciated. Paul definitely exhorted his fellow Christians to courage and virile fortitude. "Watch ye, stand fast in the faith, quit you like men, be strong."

Two impressive passages may be cited as concisely stating the Pauline attitude: "Walk in the Spirit and ye shall not fulfil the lust of the flesh. For the flesh lusteth against the Spirit and the Spirit against the flesh: and these are contrary the one to the other: so that ye cannot do the things that ye would. Now the works of the flesh are manifest, which are: adultery, fornication, uncleanness, lasciviousness, idolatry, witchcraft, hatred, variance, emulations, wrath, strife, seditions, heresies, envyings, murders, drunkenness, revellings, and such like. But the fruit of the Spirit is love, joy, peace, long-suffering, gentleness, goodness, faith, meekness, and temperance." "Though I speak with the tongues of men and of angels and have not charity, I am become as sounding brass or a tinkling cymbal. And though I have the gift of prophecy and understand all mysteries and all knowledge, and though I have all faith so that I could remove mountains, and have not charity, I am nothing. Charity suffereth long and is kind; charity envieth not, vaunteth not itself, is not puffed up, doth not behave itself unseemingly, seeketh not her own, is not easily provoked, thinketh no evil, rejoiceth not in iniquity, but rejoiceth in the truth; beareth all things, believeth all things, hopeth all things, endureth all things. Charity never faileth. . . . And now abideth faith, hope, and charity, these three, but the greatest of these is charity."⁸

The "Acts of the Apostles" suggests first the life of a closely united group of disciples of Jesus sharing much in common and then the beginning of a wider expansion with the recognition of a universalism as contrasted with

the continuity of a Jewish nationalism. The later writings of the New Testament, in addition to those of Paul, reveal in general principles and in some detail, how Christian morality was conceived. There is an emphasis on the distinctly subordinate place of the terrestrial. "Love not the world, neither the things that are in the world. If any man love the world, the love of the Father is not in him. For all that is in the world, the lust of the flesh, and the lust of the eyes, is not of the Father but is of the world." "And the world passeth away and the lust thereof but he that doeth the will of God abideth forever." God and the world are even represented as opposed to one another: "Whosoever will be a friend of the world is the enemy of God." Devotion to God, conformity to His will, is to be central, the dominant, all-pervading attitude. "For this is the love of God, that we keep his commandments and his commandments are not grievous." "Sin is the transgression of the law." The Christian ideal is that of likeness to God: "Be ye holy; for I am holy."

The love of man is implicated in the love of God. "Beloved, let us love one another. He that loveth not knoweth not God; for God is love." Such love is not simply a sentimental feeling but an attitude issuing in active service. "Pure religion and undefiled before God and the Father is this, To visit the fatherless and widows in their affliction and to keep himself unspotted from the world." Christians are exhorted to show "hospitality to brethren and to strangers." They are to be "kind one to another, tender-hearted, forgiving one another, even as God for Christ's sake hath forgiven you." "See that none render evil for evil unto any man; but ever follow that which is good, both among yourselves and to all." "Let all bitterness and wrath, and anger and clamour and evil speaking be put away from you, with all malice." "We exhort you, brethren, warn them that are unruly, comfort the feebleminded, sup-

port the weak, be patient toward all men." The evil are not "to be counted as enemies, but admonished as brothers."

A peaceful attitude of mind is constantly insisted on: "The wisdom that is from above is first pure, then peaceable; gentle and easy to be entreated; full of mercy and good fruits; without partiality and without hypocrisy; and the fruit of righteousness is sown in peace of them that make peace." As pride and arrogance militate against peace, the Christian must manifest humility and patience. Walk "with all lowliness and meekness, with long-suffering, forbearing one another in love; endeavouring to keep the unity of the Spirit in the bond of peace." Each has his work to perform and should work diligently, providing thus for himself and for those unable adequately to provide for themselves. "Study to be quiet and to do your own business and work with your hands." "If any would not work, neither should he eat." "Let him that stole steal no more; but rather let him labour working with his hands the thing which is good, that he may have to give to him that needeth."

The Christian must apply the commandments not only to outward deeds but also to thought and word. "Let no corrupt communication proceed out of your mouth, but that which is good to the use of edifying that it may minister grace unto the hearers." "Putting away lying, let every man speak truth." "Above all things, my brethren, swear not, neither by heaven, neither by the earth, neither by any other oath; but let your yea be yea, and your nay, nay; lest ye fall into condemnation." Christians are warned against "blasphemy against God," "vanity of mind and blindness of heart," "the fleshly lusts that war against the soul," fornication, adultery, lasciviousness and all uncleanness, "excess of wine, revellings, banqueting and abominable idolatry," theft, greediness and covetousness, envy and

malice, lying and hypocrisy, foolish talking and jesting, despising the poor, considering a person's poverty or riches instead of his goodness, respecting persons for worldly advantage and not respecting dignities and government. On the other hand they are to "humble themselves in the sight of the Lord," to be temperate, pitiful, and courteous. They are to "rejoice evermore," for they are assured that in God's good time for those who are faithful and virtuous, "there shall be no more death, neither sorrow, nor crying, neither shall there be any more pain." ⁴

Towards the end of the first century Clement of Rome in his "Epistle to the Corinthians" described the motive of Christian conduct as "fear" or "reverence" of God, from whom moral distinctions are ultimately derived. "Let us see how near He is, and how that nothing escapeth Him of our thoughts or our devices which we make. It is right therefore that we should not be deserters from His will." The Christian community as such has a relation to God, and the Christian life is to be lived in it. Those who cause schism are to be subjected to penance. As Christians are brethren, capacities and wealth are to be devoted to the common good, not necessarily in communistic fashion, for grades are to be admitted in society, and opportunities for individual family life maintained. The strong are not to despise the weak, but all are to cultivate attitudes of contentment, hope, and consideration for others. "Let us reverence our rulers; let us honour our elders; let us instruct our young men in the fear of God. Let us guide our women toward that which is good; let them show their lovely disposition of purity; let them prove their sincere affection of gentleness; let them manifest the moderation of their tongue through silence; let them show their love not in factious preferences but without partiality towards all them that fear God, in holiness. Let our children learn how lowliness of

mind prevailed with God, what power chaste love hath with God, how the fear of Him is good and great and saveth all them that walk therein in a pure mind with holiness."

Christians must eschew envy and doubt—not so much theoretical scepticism as practical hesitation. They must follow the example of Jesus in personal humility and obedience. Humility is contrasted with the arrogance and pride of non-Christian contemporaries. Above all is the love of God. "Who can declare the bond of the love of God? . . . Love joineth us to God; love covereth a multitude of sins; love endureth all things, is long-suffering in all things. There is nothing coarse, nothing arrogant in love. Love hath no divisions, love maketh no seditions, love doeth all things in concord. . . . Without love nothing is well-pleasing to God. . . ." ⁵

Ignatius insisted on the importance of right beliefs for moral practice. False theology may lead to wrong attitudes and bad conduct. "Faith is the beginning and love the end" of the Christian life. Faith and love will issue in good works by which they may be tested. Jesus provides an object for imitation. Ignatius was much concerned with the preservation of Christian unity. He urged his brethren to assemble together for common worship and co-operation. "Let there be one prayer in common; one supplication; one mind, one hope, in love and in joy unblamable." "Shun divisions as the beginning of all evils." Heretics "have no care for love, none for the widow, none for the orphan, none for the afflicted, none for the prisoner, none for the hungry or thirsty." Members of the Christian communities are to cultivate an attitude of obedience and to submit to the leaders, who are to bear in mind that the whole has a responsibility for the conduct of its members. Care is to be given to the weak. "Let not widows be neglected. . . . Despise not slaves. . . . (Women) are to be con-

tent with their husbands in flesh and in spirit. . . . (men) to love their wives. . . . Let all things be done to the honour of God." "Be ye long-suffering one with another in gentleness."

Those who imitate Jesus, and not merely perform his commands, will love one another, be gentle, forbearing and pure, temperate, sober, and guileless. Those who hold office are to beware of the sin of pride. In man the flesh and the spirit are united, but the former is the lower nature and is to be dominated by the latter. "Keep your flesh as a temple of God." Yet, writing, as he was, with martyrdom in prospect, he emphasized rather the power to overcome the flesh than to reform it. He went to his own martyrdom desiring to imitate Jesus and to show the reality of his faith in immortality. By martyrdom "I can attain to God." "Permit me to be an imitator of the passion of my God." Though Christianity acknowledges an immediate relation with God here and now, the Christian life is an unwearying striving for an ideal of perfection and the goal of life everlasting.⁶

Polycarp's "Epistle to the Philippians" is a homily concerning righteousness, appealing to the words of Jesus as sanctions. He exhorted his readers "to do Christ's will, loving the things he loved." Faith, hope, and love are the fundamentals of the Christian life. He ascribed heresy as due to a desire to live otherwise than is implied by the true faith. Every vocation and status in life has its specific moral requirements. Young men should "refrain from the lusts in the world." "Neither whoremongers nor effeminate persons nor defilers of themselves with men shall inherit the kingdom of God. . . ." Polycarp gave a particular warning against covetousness. "The love of money is the beginning of all trouble." Gentleness is to be cultivated; orphans and widows, the poor and the sick, visited and

assisted. The martyrs are examples of Christian fortitude and endurance.⁷

The "Didache" is a kind of catechism, possibly a scheme of instruction primarily for those seeking admission to the church, but also for the use of members. It has a definitely ethical character insisting on a clear distinction between right and wrong. It opens with the statement: "There are two ways: one of life and one of death." The way of life is to be lived in the Christian community. The Church is not just an ideal conception, but an actual social group with a moral character of its own. There are moral requirements for participation in its religious ceremonies. There must be confession of sins, and the dominant attitude must be that of thanksgiving. The "Didache" has Jewish features, its ethical code being expressed mainly in terms of the Decalogue. Nevertheless, it is free of Jewish nationalism, being universalistic in spirit. The moral life involves the love of God and of one's neighbour, the latter expressed in the Golden Rule, given in its negative form. The individual has duties to himself, to his family and servants, to the poor, and to the Church. Work is necessary in the good life: an idle man cannot be a Christian. The Christian is to be meek, humble, long-suffering, and to give alms liberally. The way of death is pursued by unjust judges of the poor, by those who side with the rich against the poor, or do not help those oppressed with toil. The Christian is to abstain from abortion and infanticide, adultery, fornication, theft, idolatry, blasphemy, anger, lustful thoughts, and falsehood. A true prophet or teacher is to be distinguished from a false one by his conduct. The Didache suggests the idea of two levels of Christian morality: to live in conformity with the "counsels of perfection" is to rise above the level to be normally expected.⁸

The "Epistle of Barnabas" has some similarities with

the "Didache." Christianity is a new covenant bringing men and God into religious fellowship. Its aim is spiritual. "Let us become spiritual, a perfect temple unto God." The Jews mainly misunderstood their ordinances, which are to be taken, not literally but spiritually. "Be ye circumcised in your hearts." "The righteous man both walketh in this world and at the same time looketh for the holy world to come." Christians should consult together concerning the common welfare. Those who find the way to God will attain peace of conscience and realize the duty of gladness. The Christian Sunday is to be essentially a day of gladness.

"There are two ways . . . the one of light and the other of darkness. . . ." This is the way of light: "Thou shalt love Him that made thee, thou shalt fear Him that created thee, thou shalt glorify Him that redeemed thee from death; thou shalt be simple in heart and rich in spirit; . . . thou shalt hate hypocrisy; thou shalt never forsake the commandments of the Lord. Thou shalt not exalt thyself, but shalt be lowly-minded in all things. . . . Thou shalt not entertain a wicked design against thy neighbour. . . . Thou shalt not commit fornication, thou shalt not commit adultery, thou shalt not corrupt boys. . . . Thou shalt be meek, thou shalt be quiet. . . . Thou shalt not bear a grudge against thy brother. Thou shalt love thy neighbour more than thine own soul. Thou shalt not murder a child by abortion, nor again shalt thou kill it when it is born. . . . Thou shalt not be found coveting thy neighbour's goods; thou shalt not be found greedy of gain. . . . Thou shalt not be hasty with thy tongue, for the mouth is a snare. . . . So far as thou art able, thou shalt be pure for thy soul's sake. . . . Thou shalt not hesitate to give (alms). . . ." The way of darkness "is a way of eternal death . . . idolatry, boldness, exaltation of power, hypocrisy, doubleness of heart,

adultery, murder, plundering, pride, transgression, treachery, malice, stubbornness, witchcraft, magic, covetousness, absence of the fear of God, persecutors of good men, hating the truth, loving lies, . . . paying no heed to the widow and the orphan; men from whom gentleness and forbearance stand aloof . . . loving vain things . . . not pitying the poor man . . . ready in slander . . . oppressing him that is afflicted, advocates of the wealthy, unjust judges of the poor, sinful in all things.”⁹

“The Shepherd of Hermas” gives an impression of a felt conflict of attitudes; reliance on divine mercy and insistence on the moral demands of the Christian life. It suggests a struggle to maintain Christian standards. The necessity of repentance is stressed. Here we have no abiding city and the true Christian attitude must be other-worldly, living unto God. In the sections called the *Mandates* is a quasi-systematic statement of essentials of Christian morality. “There are two angels with a man: one of righteousness and one of wickedness.” The former “is delicate and bashful, gentle and tranquil.” The latter is “quick tempered, bitter, and senseless.” “Fear the Lord and keep His commandments.” The spirit dwells in the flesh, and for this reason carnal sins must be avoided. Genuine fasting is to do no wickedness. Ordinary fasting may make possible increased charity to widows and orphans. “They that are rich in this world, unless their riches be cut away, cannot become useful to the Lord.” Poverty is declared to be in itself spiritually valuable, leading to richness of prayer. The poor may pray for the rich, and the rich care for the poor. Those who receive by false pretence of need “shall pay the penalty.”

“Keep simplicity and be guileless. . . .” “Love truth and let nothing but truth proceed out of thy mouth.” “Guard faith, fear, and temperance.” Purify thy heart from the vanities of the world, and cultivate

humility. "Be thou long-suffering and understanding"; the devil dwells in angry temper. "Every man ought to be rescued from misfortune." If ill befalls a man, which our aid might have prevented, we are in part guilty. The "Shepherd" also insists that cheerfulness is a Christian duty and privilege. "Put away sorrow from thyself." "Clothe thyself in cheerfulness, which hath favor with God always, and is acceptable to Him, and rejoice in it. For every cheerful man worketh good, and thinketh good and despiseth sadness; but the sad man is always committing sin."¹⁰

"The Epistle to Diognetus" maintains that, though in the world, Christians are animated by a spiritual principle which keeps them from being absorbed in the things of the world. They do not fear death. God is the source of the Christian ideal. "Loving Him thou wilt be an imitator of His goodness." Christianity is universal in its range. "Every foreign country is a fatherland to Christians, and every fatherland is foreign." Christians marry like all other men and they beget children, but they do not cast away their offspring. They have their meals in common but not their wives. They find themselves in the flesh, but they live not after the flesh. Their existence is on earth but their citizenship is in heaven. They obey the established laws and they surpass the laws in their own lives. "They love all men and they are persecuted by all. . . . They are reviled and they bless."¹¹

The so-called "Second Epistle of Clement to the Corinthians," probably from the middle of the second century, is a homily concerning piety and morality. "Do the will of the Father." "Serve God with a pure heart." "The sojourning in the flesh in this world is but brief and transient." "This world and the next are two enemies." Though the flesh is not inherently evil, it is the source of dangers to the spiritual life. However, through the outward the inward may be reached, and

thereby the former transcended. True repentance is of the utmost importance in a moral life that is a continuous endeavour, one long struggle. With a vivid conception of the coming judgement the doctrine of future consequences is expounded: present pain brings future happiness; and present pleasure future pain.¹²

Justin Martyr acknowledged that there is much of worth in ancient Greek philosophy, but contended that philosophy is inadequate, not leading to a real knowledge of God or of immortality. Christian teaching is the true goal of Greek ethical principles, being fundamentally a morality of universal reason. Justin made the Logos doctrine the foundation of his exposition. There is a natural moral law. "For (God) sets before every race of mankind that which is always and universally just, as well as all righteousness. . . ." The Christian life is based in Christ, the eternal and final law, as contrasted with the preparatory laws and ordinances of the Jews and the heathen. Jesus summed up all righteousness in the two commandments of loving God, and loving one's neighbour as one's self. The Christian's destiny is to be immortal and to attain to unity with God. "As the good of the body is health, so the good of the soul is knowledge, which is indeed a kind of health of soul, by which a likeness to God is attained." The Church is an ethical society requiring moral qualifications for entrance to it and remaining in it. The members must have fortitude, endurance, gentleness, kindness, and love for others, including enemies. With brotherly love Christians make provision for the poor. . . . "Deal thy bread to the hungry, and lead the homeless poor under thy dwelling; if thou seest the naked clothe him. . . ." Christians are veracious. They are patient in bearing injuries. For them chastity is of thought and feeling as well as outward conduct. They praise continence and virginity and abhor prostitution and infanticide. The Christian attitude towards

death indicates a superiority to the world of sense. Death is a debt to be gladly paid, an incident of existence not a cessation of being. To the question why Christians, who so highly praised martyrdom, condemned suicide, he replied that man is in the world to perform a duty and suicide would involve the thwarting of some purpose of creation. Existence is so constituted that good is rewarded and evil punished, and fear of punishment and hope of blessing are motives of good conduct.¹³

In contrast with Justin Martyr, Tatian maintained that no help could be obtained from Greek thought. The purpose of man's existence is union with God, whose image he bears. The Christian aim is essentially "other-worldly," and so to be contrasted with Greek culture, the theatre and spectacles of which are mere foolish and immoral "make believe." Greek games involve the glorification of the animal part of man. Compared with the pride and inutility of Greek philosophy, Christian doctrine is humble and seriously practical. Christianity centres its attention on the spiritually permanent as distinct from the transitory values of earth.

Though Irenaeus may have been a Greek, he became especially associated with the Church in the West. His extant writings are theological and ecclesiastical in character. Unorthodox theories are associated with immoral ideas and practices. "God at the first" "implanted in mankind" "natural precepts," which are expressed in the Decalogue. These "remain permanently with us." By the advent of Christ they received "extension and increase but not abrogation." "The means of life are found in fellowship with God; but fellowship with God is to know God and to enjoy His goodness." "Submission to God is eternal rest."¹⁴

In his "Plea for the Christians" addressed to Marcus Aurelius, Athenagoras rebutted the charges against them contending that they adopt their good type of

life now because it leads to a better one in the future. For there is a judgement to come, and God sees all by day and by night. Christians hold the things of this life as of no real worth. Athenagoras emphasized the Christian teaching of love even towards enemies, and called attention to the beneficial influence of Christianity among the poor and uneducated. He protested against abortion and infanticide as murder, and maintained that those who watched the gladiatorial games were not free of the guilt of killing.¹⁵

With a rapid increase in the number of Christians there was a tendency to compromise and so a loss of moral rigor. Efforts were made to return to what were regarded as the primitive conditions. The Montanist movement of the latter half of the second century was in this direction. Eusebius says that Montanists established a settlement with community of goods and rigid asceticism. Believing that certain things had been allowed by Jesus and the Apostles because of human weakness, they maintained that in Montanism the "new law" of Christianity was completed. This was by a strengthening of discipline in preparation for an imminent second-coming of Christ and the inauguration of a society of saints on earth. The Montanists probably had an influence in the development of the two-fold view of Christian morality—monastic and lay.

Tertullian who was influenced by Montanism scorned Greek and Roman culture as the work of demons, except some truth in it which he supposed had been obtained from early Hebrew Scriptures. Nevertheless, in his "Apology" he was really making an appeal based on an implied common moral judgement of mankind. He described Christian morality as having its basis in the divine law that may be known by the conscience everyone possesses. The special characteristic of the Christian law is its rule of the heart affecting conduct from within. Christianity insists on the inward and spiritual

rather than on the external. "Tell me then, which do you take to be the fullest and completest law, that which says, Thou shalt do no murder, or that which restrains the very passion of anger? Which expresses greatest purity and perfection, the law which prohibits the outward act of adultery, or that which condemns the bare lust of the eye? Which is the wisest provision for innocence, to forbid evil-doing, or not to permit so much as evil-speaking? Which is the most instructive lesson for the good of mankind, to debar men from doing injury, or not so much as to allow the injured person the common privilege of returning evil for evil?" The Christian moral ideal has no limits of application, but is universal in scope. "If then we Christians are expressly commanded by our Master to love our enemies, whom then have we left to hate?" "To wish ill, to do ill, to speak ill, or to think ill of anyone, we are equally forbidden without exception. What is injustice to an emperor is injustice to his slave." Among themselves as brothers, through the universal fatherhood of God, their love "continues even to the division of their estates, which is a test few brotherhoods will bear." Voluntary alms, accumulated in a common fund, were used for feeding the hungry, for the poor, orphans, the aged, the ship-wrecked and "those condemned to the mines or prisons for the faith of Christ." Christian morality is not just for an aristocracy of intellect but for all people. Further, it is authoritative, an expression of the will of God.

Tertullian criticized pagan conduct both directly and in defending Christians from base charges. He replied to the accusation that Christians were a useless people who kept themselves aloof from the common life. "We come to your forum, we frequent your shambles, your baths, your shops, your stalls, your inns, and your marts, and all other kinds of commerce; we cohabit, we sail, we war, we till, we traffic with you; we likewise com-

municate our arts and work for the public; and notwithstanding all this, how we should be of no service to the public is a thing quite past my understanding." The "love-feasts" of the Christians were not the gluttonous orgies of the heathen festivals: "We eat only what suffices nature and drink no more than is strictly becoming chaste and regular persons." Tertullian protested against the obscenity of the stage, and the cruelty of the arena. Not the Christians but their opponents practice incest and human sacrifices. Christians condemn abortion and infanticide and maintain that it is morally higher to suffer death than to kill. The Christians are the most law-abiding and harmless subjects of the State. "What the temple may lose in her offerings by the Christian religion, the State sufficiently gets in her taxes by the Christian fidelity in their public payments."¹⁶

The Gnostics were motivated in no small measure by ethical considerations, being concerned with the nature of evil and of redemption from it. Holding that higher phases of being had become imprisoned in lower ones, they sought to re-unite the higher in man with its source. They conceived human salvation as the emancipation of the rational and spiritual part of man from the physical. This led to some severely ascetic views of morality, and contrariwise to an antinomianism. Developed through subtle forms of reflection, most forms of Gnosticism were aristocratic, incapable of becoming a gospel for the many. In conflict with Gnosticism Christianity insisted on the significance of its theological doctrines for its ethics. As God is the creator and preserver of the world, physical nature is not evil. Consequently some forms of asceticism and complete indifference to the body are in opposition to Christian morality. Proper care of the body was supposed to be implied by the doctrine of its resurrection—a doctrine rejected by the Gnostics. The belief in the incarnation of the Son of God was supposed to imply a view of the physical in

opposition to that most commonly accepted among Gnostics. According to Christianity, God has made known His will in His governance of the world, and the truly wise will act in conformity with His purposes and laws. Divine justice and divine mercy are not opposed as some Gnostics contended.

The works of Clement of Alexandria include both a philosophical and a practical conception of Christian ethics. The problems he considered were suggested both by the philosophies and by the life of his times. He had a competent knowledge of Greek philosophy, the worth of which he admitted as leading to the full light of the Christian faith. Philosophy is a propaedeutic to faith. His work is a conscious blending of contributions from Greek thought and Judaism with the teachings of the New Testament and the Church. He looked upon Christianity as the goal of the previous historical development.

Clement has been described as before all else a moralist, considering even metaphysical and theological questions with reference to their relation to living. He was interested both in the morality of ordinary social life in the cities and that of the highest Christian perfection. He wished to win over his hearers by showing the sanity of the Christian way of life as contrasted both with a pagan sensuousness and an exaggerated asceticism. All knowledge of moral good comes eventually from God: morality is not an invention of the individual man or of the social group. Moral philosophy rests ultimately on God, yet in Christianity God has given a revelation that means for us more than philosophy. Clement realized that truth can only be attained by arduous effort. It is to be found in the teachings of the Catholic Church with its unity rather than in those of the numerous antagonistic sects. The teachers in the Church give instruction suitable to those they teach, leading to much allegorical interpretation of scripture and of doctrines

for those in the highest stages. Christ's words must be spiritually interpreted.

The ideal for man is to resemble God in the measure that that is possible. This goal is in its nature infinite, for it is becoming the friend of the infinite divine. No one can rob us of the love of God, nor prevent us from attaining it. The Christian ideal does not depend upon and is not affected by anything terrestrial. It is open to all, but each has to turn himself to it with his own freedom. The "Paedagogus" depicts Christian life as a moral transformation fitting man for communion with God.

Love of God is primary: and as likeness to God is the moral aim for man and all men are creations of God, they are to be the objects of love. Christians are to realize that they are "members one of another" and experience the beauty and power of love. Then will follow beneficence to all, Christian and non-Christian, forgiveness and the love of enemies; efforts to aid the poor and suffering in every possible way and to promote the moral and spiritual welfare of mankind; and kindness to animals. "Let not the strong neglect the weak and let the weak respect the strong." Property and wealth are not to be unduly estimated. They are not evil in themselves, but are to be used as instruments for good. Clement discountenanced luxurious living, urging instead more liberal charity.

The moral ideal appears in large measure as the triumph of the spiritual over the sensuous. The divine Logos as teacher leads man from the sensuous to the spiritual. The body as the vessel of the soul requires proper treatment. Simplicity is to be the guiding principle. This implies moderation as a keynote of the ethics. The Christian is to control his passions. Self-restraint is a foundation of virtue. All are to cultivate the attitude of lowly-mindedness, patience, endurance, peace and order, obedience, chastity, and hospitality.

They are to shun jealousy, a double mind, drunkenness and impurity, pride and strife.

According to much ancient Greek thought, the highest attainment is possible only for those devoted to wisdom, the philosophers, the Gnostics. Clement was too much in this tradition not to be affected by it. Thus, going beyond his teachings for the ordinary Christian, he gave a description of the Christian Gnostic. It is suggestive of the Stoic wise man. A Gnostic is one who apprehends truth. For Clement, the Christian gnostic is the man in the image and resemblance of God, similar to God not merely as rational but also as good will. He insisted on *moral* rather than intellectual excellence. "Abundance in the actions that are according to virtue is true riches, and destitution in decorous desires is poverty." The Christian gnostic limits his desires to what is necessary. He is united by love to God, from Whom he asks pardon for his sins and grace not only to avoid sin in future but to do good, to understand creation and the divine governance of the world, so that becoming pure in heart he may finally contemplate God "face to face." He is just in word and in action, both in avoiding evil and in doing good. The Christian gnostic is to perfect himself in the virtues of courage, fortitude, patience and temperance. Clement gave a gnostic interpretation to the Beatitudes.

At the highest stage the Christian gnostic, like the Stoic, attains to a condition of apathy. This idea has led to the impression that Clement's view is not precisely Christian. But he was endeavouring to present the Christian ideal to listeners in the terminology with which they were acquainted. Bearing in mind his exposition in general, by "apathy," he must have referred rather to the condition of the Christian, when in perfect love of God he attains that peace which the world cannot give. Yet Clement cannot be entirely freed from the charge of Stoicism. He maintained that Jesus was ab-

solutely devoid of "passion," feeling neither pleasure nor sorrow. He thus gave an aspect to the ideal of the Christian gnostic that is scarcely Christian, for he regarded Jesus as the pattern. With perfect love of God, the gnostic lacks nothing that is good and beautiful, and so is free of desire and envy. Nothing will arouse his anger. He will reverence the Creator in care for His creatures. The gnostic's love of God is not a striving but an immediately experienced intimacy for which considerations of time and place have no significance. Here Clement acknowledged the mystical. One who has experienced this highest bliss is unaffected by the comparatively trivial pleasures of ordinary life. The Christian gnostic is not idle: he works for others. His charity takes the form of teaching and guiding to the higher life rather than of concern with physical needs. He instructs others not merely by his words but also by his personal attitude and manner of life. That is the highest form of charity. He has no fear of death or of suffering: his courage is that of one who sees danger without trembling. He does not throw himself into danger but accepts it reasonably when it comes. He meets death or suffering not to achieve personal glory but in accordance with his trust in God. Imbued with the love of God he will depart from this life joyously.¹⁷

Origen, Clement's successor in eastern Christianity, was more theologically than philosophically minded and more ascetically inclined than his illustrious predecessor. His whole life, his whole thought and energy were given to the cause of the Christian faith, and he endured sufferings and hardships with patience. He was pre-eminently a commentator on the Scriptures, but he also wrote some systematic works including a reply to Celsus in defence of Christianity. Clement directed his attention in no small measure to non-Christians, Origen concerned himself chiefly with those already within the

Church. Compared with the buoyant constructive Clement, Origen was more concerned with warnings and criticisms of prevalent evils of attitude and conduct. Says l'Abbe Bardy: "He reproached bishops and priests for their cupidity and pride; women for their vanity, luxury and insolence; men for their sterile ambitions, their lewdness, sometimes their larceny and deceit; he knew virgins or the continent whose souls were sullied with the blots of pride, the sordidness of avarice, the dirt of slander and falsehood; he complained of the young who were ignorant of Christian teachings."

"The sovereign good to which all rational nature tends," Origen maintained, "consists in becoming like God in all the measure that is possible." God created man in His image; "but the perfection of resemblance has been reserved for the consummation of things." The possibility of perfection is given in the creation in the image of God, but it has itself to be achieved in the processes of living. The Christian life must ever be a struggle towards this perfection. God permits us to be tempted, for the crown of victory is gained only through conflict. There are two kingdoms, one of Christ, one of Satan: Christian morality is fighting on the side of Christ against Satan and his host. In his reply to Celsus, Origen insisted on the similarity of moral judgments and ideas among men, referring these to the law written by God in the heart of man, a natural law. This law has been taught again to men by the prophets and by Jesus. Any idea of a mere relativity of the ethical, Origen regarded as absurd. He agreed with Celsus that Greek and Christian moral values are not fundamentally opposed to one another. He even adopted a doctrine of the virtues as means between extremes, resembling that of Aristotle. He emphasized the active and universal character of Christian morality. Personal devotion to God is the goal. Insisting on the Christian idea of God as distinct from the universal reason of

Greek philosophy, he indicated the differences between Christian ethics and the Greek with which it is otherwise in much harmony. In face of the pagan pessimism of his times he maintained the possibility of the attainment of the ideal of life, but showed that it must be by moral conflict and not mere reflection or contemplation.

Virtue leads to unity: harmony is a characteristic of the good. Each virtue has its own perfection. Persons vary with regard to their virtues, being strong in some and weak in others. Origen was anxious to make clear that there must be a particular cultivation for each virtue. Perfection of character involves the perfection of each and all the virtues. With divine help, even if he starts from a state of vice, man may attain to the highest virtues. All are to recognize what they owe to God, to others, and to themselves: the proper rendering of what is due in all directions is Christian justice. The Christian acknowledges his debt of gratitude to God, and assembles with his fellows to worship Him. Origen saw that justice and charity apply to particular individuals in proportion to their special needs. The righteous are to keep patient even if they see the unrighteous prosper in this world.

The moral conflict had for Origen the character of an opposition between the spiritual and the sensuous. He failed to appreciate fully the significance of earthly things. In his account of the Lord's prayer he said that the petition for our daily bread is not for physical but for spiritual nourishment. The cultivation of the spiritual necessitates definite asceticism with regard to the physical and worldly. "If a man gives himself up entirely to God, if he divests himself of all care for the present life, if he keeps himself separate from other men who live according to the flesh and seeks no longer what is of earth, but only heavenly things, he is truly worthy to be called holy." In expounding duties to God, our neighbour and ourselves, he commended fasting, alms-

giving and virginity. "Our altars," he replied to Celsus, "are the hearts of the just." Our statues are "those formed and polished in ourselves by the Word of God," having the qualities of "temperance, justice, courage, wisdom, piety and the other virtues." The four mentioned first are the "cardinal virtues" of Greek ethics. These living statues are to be inwardly formed into the resemblance of God.

In his contention that the soul is wounded by sin, Origen expounded an important idea for Christian ethics. Wrong-doing is not simply an affair of acts which when performed are over and done with. Sin leaves a damaged soul. The moral ideal involves a perfect soul. The cure for these wounds, as far as man can care for them, is in penitence. The relative seriousness of sins is according to the extent and the nature of the wounds to the soul. "The Scriptures teach, what indeed everyone knows, that sins are not all equal." . . . "What is the greatest of all sins? Incontestably that by which the devil fell . . . pride, arrogance, vanity. . . ." In a sense all sins have their root in pride. In contrast Origen insisted on the virtue of humility. "One must be humble." "One must flee from pride." Anger is another capital sin, and practically none are free from it.

Origen appears to have been in accord with Clement in distinguishing between ordinary adherents to the faith and a spiritual élite, the Christian gnostics. To attain to the higher state the soul must come to know itself as spirit and the character of its perfection as spirit among spirits. The soul is made for love and contemplation. "We are on a journey; we are come into this world to go from virtue to virtue, not to dwell on the earth attached to terrestrial goods. . . ." The highest experiences of the Christian gnostic are not describable in words. "I do not know that they were even fully and integrally expounded by the holy apostles: I do not say that they were not known but that they were not

fully expounded." "Believing then that there are divine mysteries, let us make ourselves worthy of them, apt to receive them by our life, our faith, our acts, our merits, in order that when they have been worthily understood by us, we shall be able to obtain them by inheritance in heaven, in Christ Jesus, our Saviour." The way to this highest stage of knowledge of and communion with God, is first through the fulfillment of His commandments: the path of morality. It is the pure in heart who may see God. One should consider first the purification of the soul. Not in idleness is one to hope in the Lord, but in the practice of goodness. We are called on to cultivate our souls. "God said: Inhabit the earth. That means: Always take care of your soul; live in it always; cultivate the ground that you may reap riches when you commence to gather in the fruits of justice." Then nourished by the Lord one may attain to spiritual joy. For what a man sows, that shall he reap.

Origen made an important observation when he wrote that for the majority of men love is disorganized: "that which they ought to love in the first place, they love in the second . . . and what they should love in the fourth rank they love in the third." "The love of the holy is ordered." The love of God comes first. He made an interesting comment on the requirement: "Love your enemies." "The Word of God does not command the impossible: it does not say: Love your enemies as yourselves, but only—Love your enemies. For them, it is sufficient to love them and not to hate them: as for one's neighbour he is to be loved as one's self." Everyone loves: the trouble is that the love is not properly ordered. Either that is loved which ought not to be; or less or more than it ought to be. The love of God is to have no limit; that of others, being as to ourselves, is on a principle of equity, justice, the rendering to others according to their merit. Sufferings are

beneficial for Christians. This life is brief: that which awaits us in glory is everlasting and eternal.¹⁸

Lactantius (260-330) wrote at a time when the period we have been considering was giving place to one in which Christianity attained a position of prestige. In "The Divine Institutes" he laid some of the foundations for a more systematic treatment of Christian ethics. He discussed fundamentals and details in comparison with the teachings of the ancient Greek and Roman thinkers. The goal of human endeavour must be permanent, free of all evil, must relate to the soul only, involving knowledge and virtue, and must implicate happiness. "The one chief good is immortality, for the reception of which we were originally formed and born. To this we direct our course: human nature regards this; to this virtue exalts us." "There are two ways . . . the one which leads to heaven, the other which sinks to hell. . . ." The nature of good and evil things is so fixed that they always oppose one another. The mere knowledge of the good is not virtue. The Christian ideal is universal, for "God denies immortality to no human being." "The first office of justice is to be united with God, the second with man." "Humanity is to be preserved, if we wish rightly to be called men. But what else is this preservation of humanity than the loving a man because he is a man, and the same as ourselves?" The immortal is the spirit, the way of virtue is the way of the spirit, while the evil is essentially related with the body. Lactantius contrasted the worldly life in which are esteemed "wealth, honour, repose, pleasure, all kinds of enticements; but together with these are injustice, cruelty, pride, perfidy, avarice, discord, falsehood, folly and other vices," with "the heavenly way," in which are "justice, temperance, faith, chastity, self-restraint, concord, knowledge, truth, wisdom, and other virtues," but also "poverty, ignominy, labour, pain, and all kinds of hardship."¹⁹

CHAPTER III

FROM CONSTANTINE THROUGH THE MIDDLE AGES

With the conversion of Constantine in the fourth century, Christians became in general free from persecution by the State and the Church began to achieve power and prestige. A definite ecclesiasticism developed, and directly or indirectly the Church became the persecutor of pagans and heretics. Many Christians seeking for a way of self-sacrifice, now that martyrdom was rare, turned to the life of the hermit and the cenobite. In the Middle Ages, there was a fusion with and triumph over non-Christian forms of thought and practice, an expansion of Christianity through Europe, a wide-spread monasticism and ecclesiastical organization, a philosophical and theological consolidation, and an increase of ecclesiastical wealth, with tendencies to various forms of corruption. In face of the turmoil of modern life, not a few have succumbed to the temptation to idealize the Middle Ages as though predominantly a time of peace inspired by the ethical ideals of a unified Christian Church. Yet, while some authorities have sung the glories of Medievalism, others have occupied themselves with the task of showing the errors in a laudatory conception of the Middle Ages. Some expound its excellences in ideal and achievement: others its defects in idea and in conduct. There is truth in both views. Error arises when either form of exposition is regarded as giving the whole picture.

Though it may be insisted that "otherworldly" conceptions and attention to religious activities in ceremonies were more widely prevalent in the Middle Ages than in our own day, the time and thoughts of the

masses of the people were nevertheless taken up preponderantly in the mundane affairs of terrestrial life, much as they are today. Yet religion played a sufficiently prominent role for it to be said that the dominant mental attitude was not mere Secularism. There was wide-spread recognition of the significance of a "supernatural" relationship to God in religion and of an after-life of the soul. Christian ethics in the Middle Ages was developed through a number of diverse movements. Monasticism came to maturity, flourished, and largely decayed. Feudal Kingthood became a definite feature of society and then in the main disappeared. Systems of Christian Scholasticism were formulated, the chief of which, Thomism, still dominates much of the thought of the Roman Catholic Church. The emphasis on the religious as distinct from the secular led to the cultivation of a life of contemplative devotion to God and to much mystical literature as its expression. Mysticism was a profound manifestation of the fundamental standpoint of Christian ethics, unequivocally placing first the love of and communion with God.

The importance of monasticism, ecclesiastical organization, and chivalry in the Middle Ages may easily blind us to the Christian ethical ideas and morality of the masses of the people. According to Luthardt popular German poetry of the period reveals "a morality that had a really religious foundation," yet was "free and joyous." "The *vita contemplativa* falls into the background behind the joyous fulfilment of the worldly calling in marriage, etc." Morality plays reveal something of the ethical ideas circulated among the masses, though those known to us date chiefly in the later Middle Ages. The characters were often personified virtues and vices. "The world, the flesh, and the devil," against which the soul of man has to fight, find definite expression in the plays. Man's life was represented as a moral conflict between opposing forces and impulses

striving to dominate his attitude and conduct. The masses were impressed with certain ideals through the rites of the Church connected with baptism, marriage, death, and the confessional. In some form they knew the Ten Commandments, the lists of the Seven Deadly Sins and Seven Christian Virtues. They were urged to almsgiving for the support of the Church and the ascetic orders. Almsgiving and other practices of religion were promoted by the promise of reward in the future life. Threats of purgatory and hell were made the basis of fear to prevent wrong doing and enforce obedience.¹

The idea of purgatory played a great part in determining moral attitudes and conduct in the Middle Ages. From one point of view the doctrine is an expression of the principle that as a man sows so shall he reap. On the other hand it implies that through suffering moral purification may be achieved. The teaching that the souls of the departed may be aided by the spiritual concern of the living had an implication of religious solidarity and unselfishness. Yet in the merely formal reiteration of prayers and the celebration of masses much of the moral value was lost. The efforts to obtain wealth by monastic orders and by the ecclesiastical hierarchy in general led to an exaggerated emphasis on the idea of purgatory. The Medieval Church also acquired wealth in part through penances and the sale of indulgences. The individual was called on and given the opportunity to make formal confession of his sins. The penances imposed often had salutary effects. Yet too frequently the cupidity of ecclesiastics led to the imposing of penance in the form of a payment. Though never meant to be a substitute for repentance, such payments were easily regarded as taking the place of a more genuinely moral recompense. The detrimental effect on morality must have been worse when, through the purchase of an "indulgence," penance for sins could be abrogated in advance.²

With the centralization of ecclesiastical authority and its attainment of a widespread power came a large amount of enforcement of uniformity of doctrinal statement. Heresy was regarded as a sin, and attempts to stamp it out constitute some of the most questionable conduct of ecclesiastics acting in the name of Christianity. Salvation and moral merit were considered to be bound up with theological conformity. Augustine has been charged with being "the representative and promoter of this retrograde movement," Theodosius, "a fervent Churchman" with harsh suppression of the Arians, and Justinian with the closing of the Greek School at Athens. From the end of the fourth century Christian history up to the threshold of the modern era has been sullied by cruel persecutions aiming at the suppression of opinions differing from ones held by those in ecclesiastical power.³

In the Church of the West, Ambrose (340-397) was a pioneer in Christian ethics. His "*De Officiis Ministrorum*" has been described as the first manual of Christian ethics. It presented a fusion of Christian and Greco-Roman ideas. A systematic treatment, after the model of a Stoic work by Cicero, it continued in use throughout the Middle Ages. Ambrose adopted from Stoicism the idea of natural law, an idea which plays a definite role in later Scholastic ethics. The law of nature is the law of things as God created them. Thus, from nature itself something is to be learned of the requirements of morality. Within man there is a knowledge of the moral through reason, and conscience as a special function of reason. There is also the revelation of God's will in the Scriptures, culminating in the teaching and example of Christ. Ambrose recognized two levels of morality: the one obligatory for all, the other going beyond this. The aim of Christian life is likeness to God. The highest good is virtue and union with God. The latter—the souls true bliss—is possible in

perfection only in a life beyond this. The present life is one of struggle and effort, the goal mainly in the future. Even in this life virtue is the highest good. Virtue is not dependent upon externals, which are insignificant compared with it. Difficulties and sufferings due to externals may be an instigation to virtue. "The Stoic," writes Dr. Dudden, "could say that suffering does no harm to a good man. The Christian affirms that it positively benefits him." "For," wrote Ambrose, "virtue excels and prevails amid adversities rather than amid conditions of prosperity." This world is to be renounced. Death is to be regarded as good, but suicide is sinful, because man is placed here by God for a purpose, and only God must determine when he is to depart. Martyrdom though not to be avoided is not to be sought. The "living death" of asceticism is possible for all. The "abject and vile" body is to be brought into subjection, and all that distracts from God dispensed with.

Dr. Dudden points out that Ambrose gave a Christian analogue to the aesthetic quality of the ancient Greek ideal in presenting Christian moral character as beautiful. It is "gentle and mild, restraining all violence of passion, abasing itself rather than exalting itself, submitting patiently to guidance, careless of its rights, and when wronged returning good for evil. It displays itself pre-eminently in the modesty which delicately shrinks from everything that savours of impurity and from all that is coarse and jarring in the life of society. Its beauty is indeed the subdued and tender beauty of the meek and quiet spirit which in God's sight is of great price." For the Christian, morality is essentially inward, though the inwardness leads to active service. The whole of life is to be given to cultivating this moral character and performing the service with the aim of ultimate perfection and bliss in the life beyond. Ambrose gave a description of the tranquillity of the Chris-

tian saint similar in many respects to the "apathy" of the Stoic wise man; yet it has a tone of Christian joy contrasting with cold Stoic rationalism.

Ambrose definitely adopted the idea of the Cardinal virtues of ancient Greek philosophy. *Prudence*, however, is not so much supreme rationality or wisdom as a personal knowledge of God manifesting itself in right conduct. From this all the rest of mortality springs. *Justice* must be exercised "first towards God, secondly towards our country, thirdly towards our parents, and lastly towards all." Justice goes further than any rendering to others their due: it involves more in requiring kindness, or benevolence, a state of mind expressing itself in liberality when means are available. The soldier's contempt of death was appreciated by Ambrose, but it is in fortitude in the trials of ordinary life, in the governing of the passions and the steady endeavour for the ideal, that he conceived *courage* essentially to consist. *Temperance* is an expression of self-respect; modesty manifested in every possible form; and an appreciation of others. Though keeping close to much of the terminology of Stoicism and ancient Greek ethics, Ambrose placed his main emphasis on charity as the fulfilment of the Christian law. In his insistence on the Christian virtue of humility he diverged definitely from the antique ideal. Humble with regard to God, man is obedient to His commands; humble with regard to men the Christian is devoid of arrogance, usurps no honours, claims no rewards for his merits. Ambrose explicitly acknowledged the place of friendship in the moral life. He made clear that the qualities of the virtuous Christian are attained and have application within the social groups in which man finds himself.⁴

Ambrose was transitional in his thought: Augustine (354-430) arrived at a distinctively Christian exposition of ethics, at least as understood in the Catholic Church. He systematized the ethics of the Western Church and

laid down fundamental principles which were adhered to throughout the greater part of the Middle Ages. With a keen philosophic mind he also had no mean knowledge of ancient philosophy. In his "Confessions," he admitted that the work of Cicero helped to turn him to "wisdom and God." His revolt from the pagan life of his times was predominantly a moral one, even though he also strenuously opposed non-Christian thought and fought heretical doctrines within the Church. The central and all-dominating ideal of the Christian life is union with God, an experience of perfect peace and blessedness that can be fully achieved only in a future life. In his classic work "The City of God," Augustine distinguished between the "earthly city" which is temporal and the "city of God" which is eternal. Both run on together in the generations of mankind. "There are two sorts of men that do properly make the two cities we speak of: the one is of men that live according to the flesh; and the other of those that live according to the spirit; either in his kind: and when they have attained their desire: either do live in their peculiar peace." One city is "predestined to reign eternally with God; the other is condemned to perpetual torment with the devil."

After a detailed examination of outstanding philosophical doctrines as to the "end" of life, Augustine stated the Christian view: "Eternal life is the perfection of good and eternal death the consummation of evil." The aim of our conduct is to attain the former and to avoid the latter. The Christian looks for final achievement beyond this life, others seek and hope to find happiness here. "This security in the life to come is the beatitude we speak, of which the philosophers, not beholding, will not believe, but forge themselves an imaginary bliss here, wherein the more their virtue assumes to itself, the falser it proves to the judgement of others." He maintained that Plato came nearest to

Christianity, interpreting him as teaching that God is the true and highest good, and that beatitude is enjoying God in loving Him. "No man can have true virtue without true piety, that is, the true adoration of the one and true God." Service for human ostentation is not true virtue.

Though he could say in his "Confessions," "the friendship of this world is fornication against Thee," Augustine, in a definite revolt against Manichaeism, insisted that this world is a divine creation, penetrated by the divine presence. At least on one side of his thought he brought the "worldly" within the scope of his ethical conceptions. Man is not only to enjoy the supreme good of union with God but also to realize the goal of likeness to Him, and thus have interest in His creation. Love, even though not in its perfection and completeness, may nevertheless be enjoyed in life in the world. Human virtues are particular expressions of love. The proper love of one's self and one's neighbour are implicated in the love of God: they are only truly good in so far as they rest on the love of God. Love is led up to by faith and hope. The moral value of good works depends essentially on their relation to the inner disposition of love. Love of God implies conformity to His will which is the eternal ground of all morality. The essence of sin is opposition to His will, through a lack of genuine love of Him, and involving selfishness and worldliness. Insisting on the primordial and central character of love, faith, and hope, in Christian ethics, Augustine added the four cardinal virtues, to which like Ambrose, he gave a Christian interpretation. Wisdom is prudence or wise judgement in actual living rather than intellectual contemplation; courage is fortitude in face of suffering; temperance is the subordination of the worldly in the scheme of life; and justice is righteousness as the due service of God. In his "Confessions," he also described virtues under

two terms: continency, not trusting in the happiness of the world; and sustenancy, not giving way to the unhappiness of the world.

The moral has its basis in God. It is an accord with the order of the world He has created. Augustine strenuously opposed the sociological theory of morality as based on social custom. "But woe is thee, thou torrent of human custom. Who shall stand against thee?" The authority of the moral is above social conventions and traditional rules. "When God commands a thing to be done against the customs or compact of any people, though it were never by them done heretofore, it is to be done; and if intermitted it is to be restored; and if never ordained it is now to be ordained." "It is not of men, but above man, which beatifies the mind of men. . . ." The highest service to one's neighbour is not as in the social humanistic ethics of "the earthly city," attending to their worldly needs, but "aiding them to love God." Such love itself involves that one should "injure no man" but aid all as much as possible. Social life is necessary but true bliss is not to be found in it. Human justice is always defective.

Augustine considered the Christian view as definitely opposed to any Stoic apathy as regards the emotions. "Our doctrine inquires not so much whether one be angry, but wherefore? Why he is sad, not whether he be sad; and so of fear. For anger with an offender to reform him; pity upon one afflicted to succour him: fear for one in danger to deliver him—these no man, not mad, can reprehend." But man has to guard himself from being a slave to his passions. They have their place, and man can find peace in accordance with the divine order of nature. He himself confessed: "I dwelled with arrogance," was "enslaved by greediness," "chose rather to quarrel than to yield"; "was eager to see vain shows," and "pleasing myself was desirous to please in the eyes of men." His mother's advice "not

to commit fornication, but especially never to defile another's wife" seemed "womanish advices" which he would blush to obey. Then he learned of Christian humility, with its strange contrariety, for "in humility there is this to be admired that it elevates the heart; and in pride this, that it dejects it." As contrasted with the emphasis on knowledge and wisdom in the Greek world and by the Alexandrine Christian thinkers, Augustine placed greater emphasis on the part played by will. Man must surrender his will in love. Though he once implied that the rich and the poor might equally attain to blessedness, he generally placed voluntary poverty as higher than riches. The adoption of poverty is an aspect of a "higher" way of life. This was in conformity with the distinction that had grown up between what was *commanded* for all and that which was *counselled* as going further, making for perfection, and implying works of supererogation accumulating merit.

Augustine's influence was powerful in a direction leading to the later morally as well as intellectually detrimental ecclesiastical opposition to and suppression of individual liberty. He gave up the later part of his life to the Church as an institution, definitely formulating the hierarchical theories and practices that had been gradually growing up through the preceding century. The Church as a continuous episcopal corporation has the "Truth" and the authority to teach it. The Church called for individual submission. Obedience to the commands of God came to be interpreted as obedience to the Church. According to Augustine, says Dr. Allen "The Church was here by divine appointment, and if so, it was the divine will that all men should come into it; and if they would not come of themselves they must be forced to do so; and if the Church lacked the power of compulsion, it was the sacred duty which the State owed to the Church to come to its rescue, and . . . 'compel them to come in' that the Church might be filled."⁵

By the time of Augustine, forms of definite ascetic life had already become established amongst Christians, most often at first by hermits, and then more generally in communities of monks and of nuns. These forms of asceticism arose partly from consideration of aspects of Christianity itself and partly from external influences. Such ethical attitudes were not generally encouraged among the Jews. Nevertheless they were not unknown amongst them. John the Baptist was not regarded as absolutely unique in his manner of living. At least one of the Essene orders, previous to the appearance of Jesus, practiced asceticism, though probably under non-Jewish influences. Extreme forms of asceticism and types of monasticism had prevailed in the Far East long before the rise of Christianity and some influence from them may be surmised if not conclusively demonstrated. But asceticism within Christianity developed chiefly from consideration of aspects of the life and teaching of Jesus and the writings of Paul. Though Jesus was reported to have contrasted his mode of living with that of John the Baptist, there was yet sufficient in it to give a definite support to the ideas and practices of asceticism. He is not known to have married and he wandered as homeless: "the Son of Man hath not where to lay his head." He told the rich young man to sell all he had and give it to the poor and to follow him. He indicated that it might be necessary to forsake one's kindred. His first concern was devotion to God: "Seek ye first the Kingdom of God." It was easy to ignore his attention to physical welfare. He himself had said: "Consider the lilies of the field how they grow: they toil not neither do they spin." In Paul's writings much could be found suggesting that morality is a conflict of the flesh and the spirit, being taken to imply the suppression to a minimum of the satisfaction of the former.⁶

Monasticism became the most characteristic feature of Medieval Christianity providing its dominant concep-

tion of Christian ethics. But although Monasticism became allied with the ecclesiastical organization it arose independently of it and for much of its history retained some independence. In its early periods ecclesiastical officials were in some ways unsympathetic with it. Dr. Workman writes that: "In Spain the Synod of Saragossa (380) forbade clerics to become monks." Monks often held the ecclesiastics in low esteem and endeavoured to avoid them. "A monk ought by all means to flee from women and bishops," for both in their different ways would take him from quiet divine contemplation and the spiritual cultivation of his own soul. Monasticism was in fact a revolt against a growing worldliness in the Church, due in part to its wide expansion on becoming the State religion. Martyrdom having become rare, those intent on some form of self-sacrifice became hermits or joined a community of ascetics. Often deprecated at first, their conception of the ideal Christian life eventually became so predominant in the Church itself that vowed monks were described as "the religious" or "the regulars" and non-monastic priests as "the seculars."⁷

It was pre-eminently Basil (c. 329-379) who inaugurated a definite movement toward community life among Christian ascetics. He saw in such organization greater opportunity for expression and cultivation of Christian love than existed in hermit conditions. Community life provided a social means for correction of faults. Basil was not entirely opposed to hermits as such, in fact he recognized their specific value, and hermits lived near his communal houses. This bringing of cenobites and hermits together was, in the words of Gregory of Nazianzen, "in order that the contemplative spirit might not be cut off from society, nor the active life uninfluenced by the contemplative." Basil maintained that monasteries should be small. He regarded the ascetic life as the purest form of Christianity: the

ideal of the ascetic was to follow the examples of Christ and his apostles in every possible detail. Though prayer was the main duty of the monk, he must also engage in practical occupations. Complete individual poverty was not insisted on: some personal property could be retained. The Superior retained absolute authority, in contrast with the later more democratic internal government of Benedict's Rule. Thus Basil's Rule stressed obedience, and disobedience came to be regarded as a sin.⁸

In the sixth century monasticism was greatly influenced by the work of Benedict, who was largely responsible for directing it in the West along lines more suited to the active and social character of the Roman and northern spirit than those it took in the East. It is usual to distinguish between "Eastern" and "Western" monachism, and there are sufficient reasons for so doing; nevertheless it would be wrong to underestimate the essential importance of their similarities, for they are both in fundamental principle the same. Benedict was born in Nursia about 480 A.D. An inscription on an old Roman tower at Monte Cassino says of him: "He saw the world and scorned it." Nevertheless his organization of monasticism involved no encouragement of ascetic self-torture. "Hitherto the monks had dwelt chiefly upon self-conquest; Benedict rather spoke of self-surrender." By his time the communal life of monastic orders had generally superseded the more or less solitary life of hermits. Continuance in the community was required and wandering from place to place discountenanced. The life of the monastic community was organized in accordance with a "Rule," which all might learn and conform with. Prayer, fasting, and penance had their due place, and decent moderate provision was made for clothing, food, and sleep. No monastic Rule, remarks Dr. Hannah, was less ascetic than Benedict's.

Under Benedict's influence there was a change in the

attitude towards work. The earlier monks had engaged in diverse labors, but work was now emphasized and systematized, and its dignity recognized. This change, it has been said, "lay at the root of all that was best and most progressive in monasticism." With the maxim that "Indolence is the enemy of the soul" many hours of manual work were required from the monks in addition to their reading and study. Each had to perform some practical service. With individual poverty, the products of such work accrued to the community, involving a "communism" in the sense of a community of goods. The organization was democratic, in so far as the Superior was required to have a conference of the members of the community for the consideration of all important matters.

Practical usefulness to society in general was not an explicit intention in Benedict's conception of the monastic life. The motive of his orders was to make good men, leaving their usefulness to God. How this goodness was conceived may be seen in the detailed precepts of the Rule which cover most of Christian ethics as monastically understood. The Christian life is essentially one of love of God, and of one's neighbour as one's self. It is a love of Christ, even with self-denial following him; an ardent desire for eternal life, with a daily readiness for death. There is to be no despair of divine mercy but a continuous trust in God, a dependence on His grace with the remembrance that He sees us everywhere. There is to be a wholesome fear of the day of judgement and of hell. Evil must not be returned for evil but suffering born in patience with love to one's enemies, and the blessing of those who revile. Obedience is to be a fundamental attitude of mind, not simply an external submission. It is a following of Jesus: "I came not to do my own will, but the will of Him who sent me." The Christian life is essentially obedience to the "will of God." Obedience is one ex-

pression of humility. The body is to be chastened, the desires of the flesh controlled, thus chastity will be preserved, fasting practised, adultery, drunkenness, and gluttony avoided. Anger and evil thoughts, foolish speech and falsehood, envy and conceit, strife and stealing are to be entirely ruled out. Diligence is to be shown in prayer, in holy readings, nourishing the poor, clothing the naked, and comforting the sorrowing.⁹

The significance of monasticism in the Middle Ages is to be considered with reference on the one hand to its ideals and on the other to its actual achievements. It was developed in accordance with an ethical theory of a higher and a lower morality—the former that of the hermit, monk or nun, the latter that of the householder. The prime motive in monasticism at the earliest times and throughout was mainly individualistic. In this it stood for something fundamental in Christian ethics. “The monk, whether in the East or West,” says Dr. Workman, “was the voice in the wilderness crying the lost truth of the worth of one soul.” The monk and nun adopted their type of life chiefly for their own salvation, their own attainment. The individualistic point of view in Christian ethics was not an introduction of Protestantism. Even when social activities were developed by the orders their concern was still mostly for their orders and the lives of the individuals within them.

Though the monastic ideal went through a form of development, throughout its history it stood for certain definite moral qualities of Christian character. It emphasized virtues insufficiently stressed in modern life. Foremost of these was humility which must be contrasted with contemporary self-assertiveness. One expression of humility was obedience—submission to the superior—especially to the higher members of the monastic order. Monastic life, in contrast with contemporary living, included definite periods of silence, an incentive to inner contemplation and mental stability,

and a preventive of too great extroversion. In its more healthy forms monasticism promoted diligence: idleness was regarded as a serious sin. Manual labor, usually agricultural, was required in early orders. Later this was left to lay brethren, servants and serfs, and the time of the monks devoted to elaborated religious services. Notwithstanding its motive of individual salvation, Christian monasticism did develop some social service. The monks made contributions to lay education, but they must not be exaggerated. Nunneries provided opportunities for the education of the daughters of wealthy patrons. While benefiting from the almsgiving primarily of the rich, the religious orders recognized the duty of care for the poor. The hospitality of the monasteries in large measure provided the poor relief of the Middle Ages. The worst charge that can be made against it was its unsystematic character, by which beggary was promoted. In their missionary endeavours many of the monks of the early period had shown an altruistic aim.

Bernard of Clairvaux, (1091-1174) by his great saintliness and personal power was for a while able to effect reforms in monastic life. His attitude was expressed in his insistence on more severe asceticism in his monasteries than was elsewhere common in his day. It is also seen in his work on Humility. Humility "enables a man to see himself in his true colours and thereby to discover his worthlessness." It involves self-scrutiny before dwelling on the shortcomings of others. "The first course is humility, purifying by its bitterness; the second is love, comforting by its sweetness; the third is full vision, secure in its strength." But Bernard did not bring about any fundamental change in the character of the ascetic life and ideals, and in the course of a short time the Cistercians fell victims to the evils common amongst many other orders.¹⁰

It was Francis of Assisi and Dominic who pre-emi-

nently brought about changes in the conception and the practice of the ascetic life. Jesus had not been a monk in the Medieval sense that we have considered, and Francis endeavoured to live as Jesus lived. It would certainly be wrong to suppose that the Friars had no aim of their own salvation as individuals; yet the manner by which this was conceived was such as gives justification for the view that their dominant ethical motive was the welfare of others. "It was the supreme passion to give rather than to get which became the dominant and distinguishing note of the Franciscan revival," says Mr. Rudman. Francis himself explicitly faced the choice between the spiritual welfare and even general well-being of others, and concentrated devotion to prayer and his own spiritual advancement, between a life of religious service and one of contemplation. His "human interest and love of man," wrote Dr. H. O. Taylor, "drew monasticism from its cloister and sent it forth upon an unhampered ministry of love."¹¹

The ethical ideal of Francis was simply and solely the imitation of Christ, specifically in spirit but also in large measure in details of conduct. For him preaching the Christian doctrine was subsidiary to this moral and religious purpose. This is abundantly seen in the two works, "The Little Flowers of St. Francis" and "The Mirror of Perfection." True to the Medieval tradition, the dominant attitude is other-worldly. The Christian must have a contempt for temporal things. "Brief is the joy of this world; the pain that cometh hereafter is everlasting: small is the pain of this life, but the glory of the life to come is infinite." The mundane can lead to no enduring satisfaction. "Every day we see worldly men toil and moil much, and encounter great bodily perils to gain these false riches, and after they have toiled and gained much, in a moment they die and leave behind all that they have gained in their lives."

Concerning his "bride," his "lady" poverty, Francis

said: "This is that celestial virtue whereby all earthly and transitory things are trodden under foot and whereby every hindrance is removed from the soul, that she may be freely conjoined with the eternal God." Poverty was to be adopted chiefly in striving to bring others to penitence, peace, and joy. Francis made the poor the special object of his work. With poverty goes humility. "Without humility no virtue is acceptable to God." "Humble thyself every day in all things thou doest and in all things thou seest." Friars were exhorted to serve the lepers, even to live in their houses, and "there lay a foundation of holy humility." Francis warned against pride. He condemned idleness and urged all to diligent labours of diverse kinds. Even of the gentle Francis it could be reported that "no idle man could appear before him without being immediately attacked with biting tooth." "Even as sloth is the way that leads to hell, so is holy diligence the way that leads to heaven." Francis himself worked with his hands and desired all the brethren to work at some honest trade. The occupations of the friars were varied: study, preaching, giving instruction, visiting the poor and caring for the sick, missionary travel, the collection of alms, as well as work in diverse trades. Obedience was a definite requirement in a communal organization such as that of the friars. Francis considered it also as a characteristic of Christian life, which involves obedience to God, to the Church, and to superiors in general.

Some other aspects of Christian ethics were included in the Rule for the Franciscan friars: The penitent was to make restitution of all ill-gotten gain, to become reconciled with his enemies, to live in peace and concord with all men, to pass his life in prayer and works of charity, to use no foul language, to take no oath save under exceptional conditions, and never to bear arms. The friars' salutation was to be: "The Lord give thee peace." Avoiding anger they were to preserve their

own peace and promote peace among others. With patience under adversity, cheerfulness must be cultivated. Sadness and slackness of soul were treated as a sin in the Middle Ages. Francis often reproved his followers and hearers "for sadness and outward grief." He taught that real joy is spiritual, coming from "cleanness of heart and purity of continual prayer": it is not the "re-joicing in idle and vain words that provoke laughter." Love, not simply as an emotion, but as devoted service for good, was for Francis the highest characteristic of Christian morality. "The Little Flowers" tells of various persons, who on entering the brotherhood, sold all they had, to give to the poor, the sick, widows, orphans and pilgrims. Love leads to self-denial. "Always I have taken less than I needed, lest I should defraud other poor folk of their portion, for to do the contrary would have been theft." Charity and compassion lead to care for the sick and the assistance of all who need help. They are the opposite of selfishness. "Above all the grace and gifts of the Holy Spirit that Christ giveth to His beloved is that of overcoming self. . . ." Courtesy is one of the attributes of God "who gives His sun and His rain to the just and to the unjust for courtesy, and courtesy is sister of charity, and she quenches hatred and preserves love."¹²

In their own way, the friars were pioneers of social reform, as may be best illustrated by passages from Mr. Owst's work on Medieval preaching. "It is the glory of the mendicant preachers of all Orders that, as champions of the poor, they attacked the tyranny and oppressions of lords, the weaknesses of knights, the ravages of retainers, the cunning and extortion of merchants, the corruption of the law, in short every conceivable form of injustice in the land. With passionate violence they arraigned the social frivolities of the day in high and low alike, the amusements men preferred to the holy services of the Church. Nothing escapes their notice."

"Once planted firmly in every quarter of the civilized community, with the world for their parish, and almost the width of God's heaven for their pulpit canopy, there was no privileged class they might not dare to assault, no private folly they might not expose." ¹³

The monks took the vow of chastity. Women were to be avoided as sources of temptation. This does not necessarily mean that the monks always had a low view of womanhood, though there is evidence that many of them had. The monks were not entirely unaffected by the widespread cult of the mother of Jesus, but she was regarded as a virgin, which to them made a fundamental difference. They may have had a high regard for those women, who with the vow of virginity, came together in the nunneries. The founding of nunneries was due chiefly and primarily to the high estimate of virginity, placing it as a condition far superior to that of marriage. It was said of one of the first nuns in England: "She increased the lustre of her royal lineage with the higher nobility of a more exalted virginity." A work on Virginity by Ealdhelm (died A.D. 709) in circulation right up to the sixteenth century says: "Virginity is of gold; chastity is of silver: marriage is of brass"; "Virginity is wealth: chastity is sufficiency; marriage is poverty." Miss Eckenstein nevertheless points out that it was not the general or avowed attitude of the nuns to despise or decry marriage. Throughout the Middle Ages the nuns were probably mostly of the higher social classes. For the women of these classes the convents gave the only opportunities for types of career other than marriage. Amongst these were educational activities, study, industrial arts, devotional and mystical self-realization. The chief importance of the convents was as centres for the cultivation of piety. The nunneries did something for the advance of the Christian ethics of womanhood. There was an implication of the dignity of women as such. The opportunities for education and training

enabled their intrinsic worth to become appreciated. To one of the most prominent early leaders, Christianity stood for "the purity and gentleness of woman," while paganism embodied "the vigour of men." The nuns cultivated a character of gentleness. They engaged in forms of philanthropy, and a few produced literary works, the more outstanding of a mystical character.¹⁴

Judgements on monastic achievements must differ for different periods of history. The chief cause of failure to realize its ideal was probably the increase of the wealth of the monasteries. It came to be that much of the time of the heads of religious houses was occupied with their material concerns. Conflicts with the secular authorities and among themselves arose frequently with regard to property. Abuses due to their wealth were part cause of the suppression of the orders. That wealth was a temptation for their spoliation by others. Long before many of the monasteries were suppressed, charges were made against the mode of life within them. There is sufficient evidence that some abbots, priors, and ordinary monks were guilty of reprehensible sexual conduct. Though even nuns were not all guiltless in this respect, we are warned to accept such charges against them with caution. Women not infrequently took refuge in nunneries after sexual disgrace, and did not commit the misdemeanours as inmates. It is probable that the vow of celibacy was more observed than broken both by monks and nuns. This may be suggested by the attention paid to instances of discovered sexual irregularities. However, there seems much truth in Dr. H. O. Taylor's statement: "Human nature saw to it that monasticism should constantly exhibit frivolity instead of seriousness; gluttony instead of fasting; avarice instead of almsgiving; anger and malice instead of charity and love; lustfulness instead of chastity; and instead of meekness, pride and vainglory."

A charge valid against some of the Superiors of more

wealthy houses was addiction to luxury and gluttony, concomitants of prevalent idleness. The universities had increasingly assumed the responsibilities of education and advancement of learning. While the cities with their guilds developed the crafts, agriculture became more the affair of the yeoman farmer. Preaching, other than that of the parish priests, became largely a concern of the wandering friars. Like their spiritual brothers, the nuns fell victims to the loss of early enthusiasm and to the acquisition of wealth by the orders. They were charged with and warned against luxury, pride, and avarice and complaints were made of luxury in dress and ornaments. Even the orders of friars became decadent. It has been contended that the Franciscan rule was too strict and exacting to be observed by many, yet the order grew large and beyond the range of those who could adhere to its mode of life. It fell a victim to the snares of wealth and elaborate communal organization, and by the opening of the modern era the friars had ceased to be a widespread effective force. In the changes from the Middle Ages to the modern era, most of the members of these Medieval orders were thrown back more and more on religious exercises and passing the time in their own houses. Their dissolution must be regarded in part as due to a conviction that they did not fulfil an adequate social role. The property and incomes of many of them were assigned to what were described as more useful purposes, as to educational institutions. Some were diverted to royal and private persons. This was one expression of the beginning of modern secularism. In a measure it implied the application of a test to monasticism in terms of ends which it was not the primary purpose of the monasteries to fulfill. They were a manifestation of the idea that the worldly is at best secondary, a reminder to men of the primacy of religion. Their loss removed an important challenge to secularism.¹⁵

The idea sometimes held, though not by historians, that the Middle Ages, before the rise of the modern States of Europe, were times of peace is erroneous. In the main the Church endeavoured to preserve peace, though it was most often swayed in its attitude towards particular conflicts by the prospective effects on its own temporalities. In this period, in fact, certain influences came into the Christian ethics of the West from martial aspects of the lives of those converted from the north. An ideal of knighthood (to be referred to under the term Chivalry,) was developed by a combination of some pagan and some Christian virtues. This ideal presents marked contrasts with that of monasticism, though there were instances of some coalescence of the two. As monasticism was the ideal of the élite in religion, chivalry was that of more secularly minded members of higher social classes. Neither monasticism nor chivalry represented the ethical conceptions of the masses though they contributed to and had influence on them. As monasticism was in some respects democratic, chivalry was essentially aristocratic. The twelfth century has been called the Golden Age both of monasticism and of chivalry. Of the development of chivalry Dr. Taylor wrote: "Chivalry—the institution and the whole knightly character—began in the rough and veritable, and progressed to courtly idealization. Likewise that knightly virtue, love of woman, displays a parallel evolution, being part of the chivalric whole." The ethics of chivalry was a reaction against the cruelty, greed and lust of the earlier feudalism. Nevertheless the essential function of the knight was to fight, and martial virtues were fundamental in the ideal. That raises the question whether, in opposition to Christian morality, the knight did not promote or seek occasions for fighting. He tended to avenge an insult rather than to forgive it, to resist the evil one rather than to try to win him over through patience and love. Chivalry had

some influence against the brutalities of warfare, such as the killing of the wounded and the harsh treatment of prisoners. Ecclesiastics expressed their view of what chivalry involved. Thus John of Salisbury wrote: "But what is the function of orderly knighthood? To protect the Church, to fight against treachery, to reverence the priesthood, to fend off injustice from the poor, to make peace in your own province, to shed your blood for your brethren, and if needs must, to lay down your life."¹⁶

The monastic mode of life implied an avoidance of woman. The Church in its promotion of the veneration of Mary, the mother of Jesus, presented something of a different attitude. In the nunneries many maintained high standards of womanhood, commanding respect. Nevertheless the rightful claims of sex-love were recognized neither by monks and nuns nor by the Church. By them sex-love was deprecated rather than idealized. The ideals and practice of chivalry in this direction were influenced by the troubadours, whose attitude was contrary to that of monasticism. "Love was man's nature, not his disease." "This resistless love was also life's highest worth, and the spring of inspiration and strength for doing valorously and living nobly." "To the Church's disparagement of the flesh, love made answer openly. . . . The love of man for woman was to be an inspiration to high deeds and noble living, as well as a source of ennobling power."

Gröber maintained that in the Middle Ages woman was considered "only a fickle, unaccountable creature, incapable of education, controlled by evil impulses, who must be subordinated to man, for whose sake alone she exists. They saw in her only the Eve of the Old Testament through whom man had become a sinner, without whom Adam would have always remained a saint, and the Atonement would not have been needed." Such an attitude was probably dominant among monks and ecclesiastics; it may be doubted whether it was that of the

majority of laymen. Nevertheless ideas concerning women and the intimate relations of men and women were in general crude rather than otherwise. Chivalry helped to refine and idealize the relation of man and woman. In association with the troubadours the knights romanticized sex-love in opposition to the monastic view of it. Vossler says: "The troubadours were the first to bring a spiritual element into passion." The knights caught the spirit of what the troubadours expressed. The service of woman came to have its duly recognized place by the side of religious worship, being motivated partly by pleasure and love of beauty and partly from loftiness of soul and magnanimity. As Vossler maintains this gave to chivalry a dignity, and nobility of soul became a rival to nobility of birth. The knight was called on to respect the honour and the purity of woman and defend her against assaults upon them. The ideal of chivalry implicated the virtue of chastity. The adoration of the beloved tended to resemble the veneration of the Virgin. However, in the orders of the Hospitallers and the Templars, there was a blending of the ethics of chivalry with those of monasticism, for together with the martial vows of the former, poverty, celibacy, and obedience were professed.¹⁷

Certain definite virtues were thus involved in chivalry. It emphasized personal loyalty to superiors, to comrades, and to the cause. It called for courage, for taking risks of self-sacrifice for the cause and for the succour of the oppressed. The true knight must be gentle and courteous in demeanour in ordinary life, self-controlled in warfare, showing due and fair consideration for all, even his enemies. He must be magnanimous, taking no unfair advantage. At all times he must keep his dignity and self-respect, and avoid haughtiness and pride. He must speak the truth and keep his troth. A true son of the Church he was to be obedient to it and help to uproot heresy and to destroy

the infidel. "The knightly virtues," observed Dr. H. O. Taylor, "range before us as distinctly as the monastic; and harsh is the contrast between the character they outline and the feudal actuality of cruelty, greed, and lust." No one supposes that the knights all or always came near to realizing their ideal: that they often did not may be one reason why they disappeared even more rapidly than the monks from the social structure of Europe. What remain are "honorary" "decorative" orders, and influences of certain aspects of their ideal upon general conceptions of Christian morality. The excellences and defects of chivalry on the ethical side have been well summarized by Mr. Cornish: "Chivalry taught the world the duty of noble service willingly rendered. It upheld courage and enterprise in obedience to rule, it consecrated military prowess to the service of the Church, glorified the virtues of liberality, good faith, unselfishness and courtesy, and above all courtesy to women. Against these may be set the vices of pride, ostentation, love of bloodshed, contempt of inferiors, and loose manners. Chivalry was an imperfect discipline, but it was a discipline and one fit for the times."¹⁸

There are good reasons for regarding the fundamental attitude of Dante as essentially Medieval. Because in his poetical descriptions of the after-life of hell, purgatory, and paradise he had perforce to use earthly pictures, one should not conclude that he was mainly concerned with the experiences of souls in this life. No doubt he would have insisted that his accounts in part corresponded with present conditions, but that does not justify any view that Dante was not pre-eminently "other-worldly" in his central attitude, in the same manner that the Middle Ages were. Once that is recognized, it is possible to admit that he caught the spirit of Humanism in its reaction to Medievalism on behalf of the values of earthly life. Dante, contended Dr.

Wicksteed, steadily maintained "the intrinsic worth of the secular life." At the end of his "De Monarchia," Dante implies that the Earthly Paradise typifies the life of blessedness on earth, to guide us to which is the special function of reason. The highest stage to which souls reach in purgatory is the ideal of the life that might have been entirely achieved on earth if man had not fallen into sin. According to Dr. Wicksteed, Dante "had the profound conviction that the temporal order is an essential part of the Providential scheme and is under Providential love, that it ought to be and can be brought into closer relations with the spiritual sphere."

The "Divine Comedy" is essentially ethical in character. The scope and diversity of human moral life are brought into view. "In his *Commedia*, writes Dr. Vossler, the practical moral values of the state, of the family, of civilization, the subjective value of the individual conscience, the social value of the general welfare, and the individual ethical value of separate persons, all are united under the strictly religious and Christian viewpoint of salvation in the other world, and as far as possible reconciled with it and each other." Dante was aware that the highest attainment of Christian life, the beatific vision, the perfect contemplation and love of God, is beyond description in human words and analogies. That his dominant sentiment was love, may be urged with good reason, nevertheless the fundamental ethical principle of the "Divine Comedy" is divine justice.

The distinction between those committed to hell and those sent to purgatory is that between the impenitent and the penitent. Dante recognized, in accordance with Christian teaching, that it is the persistence of an attitude of impenitence that involves everlasting punishment. "Malicious sins are excluded from purgatory for the unanswerable reason that *malitia* in the will is a state of impenitence." Every form of evil life is its

own punishment. In his estimates of the relative evil of the various vices as indicated by the different levels in hell, Dante was largely in accord with Christian ethical classifications of the Middle Ages. Hell has a place for those guilty of wrong attitudes and conduct towards the Church: heretics, schismatics, and those guilty of simony. Carnal sinners are in the second circle, while in the lowest pit of all, in the ninth circle, are Lucifer with his pride and arrogance and others most like him. In the various circles and divisions between, roughly in the following order, are the gluttons, the avaricious, the angry, those guilty of fraud and usury, of different forms of violence, including suicide and blasphemy, seducers of women, flatterers, those presuming to predict future events, public cheats and hypocrites, thieves and robbers, evil counsellors and scandal-mongers, alchemists and forgers, counterfeiterers of coin or of other persons, traitors, betrayers of others under the semblance of kindness, and betrayers of benefactors. Dante, in accordance with the standpoint of Christian ethics, is more concerned with these as attitudes of mind or will than with respect to particular acts of conduct.

As previously noted, the idea of purgatory had a great ethical significance in the Middle Ages, and has continued of importance in the conceptions of the Roman Catholic Church. Its essential character is depicted in the second part of Dante's poem. Dr. Gilbert says: "In the Purgatorio we see those who have been thrown out of proportion by sin, but who have seen their condition and are striving to compensate for their excesses or defects by a strong over-bending in the contrary direction that strict justice may find no fault in them and that they may merit happiness." The souls in purgatory have the attitude of repentance and moral effort. They strive for freedom from their sins, pride, envy, anger, indifference (a defect of love), avarice, gluttony, immodesty, incontinence. They have before them ex-

amples of the opposite virtues, humility, charity, patience, voluntary poverty, temperance, and chastity. Two maidens represent the active and the contemplative life respectively, four virgins the cardinal virtues, and three virgins the evangelical virtues (or Christian graces). "Repentance, in fact, is the one decisive thing in the spiritual life. Without it the sinner is lost, and with it he must at last be saved." Dante implied the Christian view that sufferings are a means of moral discipline and a check to man's inclinations to evil.

Although the highest bliss of the Christian life, and the chief glories of heaven are indescribable in human words, Dante nevertheless endeavoured to indicate something of the character of the Christian moral life in the *Paradiso*. Beatrice assures Dante that

"Among themselves all things
Have order; and from hence the form, which makes
The universe resemble God. In this
The higher creatures see the printed steps
Of that eternal worth, which is the end
Whither the line is drawn. . . ."

Dr. Gilbert suggests a main idea of the *Paradiso*: that "the blessedness of man essentially depends not on the quality of his natural endowment, but on the use he makes of it. Man's place is in society, and society cannot exist without members of various powers and capacities. The just world is that in which every individual performs the duties proper to him." Saints who had successfully devoted themselves to a life of contemplation are in a very high rank in paradise. But it is in a circle beyond theirs that Dante is questioned by Peter concerning Faith, by James as to Hope, and finally by John as to Charity. "Keep," he is told, "the choicest love for God."¹⁹

The moral attitude of the Christianity of the Middle Ages is best expressed in a work which through all the

ages since it was first published has had a wide appeal: "Of the Imitation of Christ," ascribed to Thomas à Kempis. Though the standpoint of the whole is mystical and devotional, it presents an essential Christian ethics the fundamental principle of which is indicated in the title. It was no purpose of the author to discuss theories. He wrote: "I had rather feel compunction than know its definition." The relation to God dominates his exposition. In all things the desire is to be that "God alone should be glorified." "Son, I ought to be thy supreme and final end, if thou desire to be truly blessed." All human solace is brief and in the end inadequate: only in God is true peace to be found. Therefore "care for nothing but the things of God." The point of view is definitely "other-worldly," not merely in the sense of the superiority of the spiritual over the physical but of a neglect to take into consideration the due claims of the latter. The highest wisdom is to condemn "the world." It is vanity to covet a long life and neglect a good life, to seek perishing riches, solicit human honours, to follow the desires of the flesh, to set the heart on the transient and give attention solely or mainly to this life. There is a strain of pessimism with reference to this world. "Truly it is misery to live upon earth." "The inward man is much oppressed with bodily necessities in this world." Nevertheless the situation has to be faced by all. "Thinkest thou to escape what no mortal can avoid? . . . this whole mortal life is full of miseries and signed on every side with crosses." "Woe be to them that know not their own misery; and still more woe to them that love this miserable and contemptible life." Troubles and crosses call a man back to his heart, reminding him that he is an exile and not to place his hope in any worldly thing. One is to study now so to live that at the hour of death one may "rather rejoice than fear." "Thou oughtest so to order thyself in all thy deeds and thoughts, as if today

thou wert doomed to die." As "all worldly delights are vain and base" one is not to "make much of anything temporal." "We are too much occupied by our passions, and too anxious about transitory things." The moral life should be lived not only as the way to true blessedness but also "to escape eternal punishment in the future."

The Christian moral aim is thus a purely spiritual one. The second book opens with Jesus' saying "The Kingdom of God is within you" and that indicates the character of the whole exposition thereafter. Good and evil are essentially inner states. "If there be joy in the world, surely a man of pure heart possesses it: and if there be anywhere tribulation and distress an evil conscience best knows it." "Have a good conscience and God will defend thee well." In our existence in this world such spiritual aim is only attainable through suffering. "As long as it is grievous to thee to suffer and it is thy mind to flee, so long shalt thou be ill at ease, and flight from tribulation will pursue thee everywhere." It is "through many tribulations we must enter into the Kingdom of God." In passage after passage the author revealed the inmost spirit of his conception of the Christian life. "By two wings a man is lifted up from the earth: namely by Simplicity and Purity. Simplicity ought to be in intention, Purity in affection. Simplicity intends God: Purity apprehends and tastes Him." "He is truly great that hath great charity . . . that is little in himself and makes no account of any height of honour. . . . He is truly learned that does the will of God and forsakes his own will."

In the "Imitation" there is a remarkable absence of insistence on man as inherently corrupt. "All men indeed desire that which is good, and make some show of good in their words and deeds." Nevertheless there is a distinction between the "life of Nature" and that "of Grace" (or the Spirit) of which man learns by "special

gift of God." Nature always has self for her end; the spirit does all purely for God's sake. Nature loathes to be in subjection; the spirit seeks to be in subjection, to live under God, humbly bowing down "to every ordinance of man." Nature strives for her own advantage: the spirit for what may be for the good of many. Nature gladly receives honour: the spirit attributes all honour to God. Nature fears shame and contempt: the spirit rejoices to suffer reproach for the Name of Jesus. Nature loves ease; the spirit cannot be idle and cheerfully embraces labour. Nature seeks to have things exquisite and beautiful; the spirit delights in the plain and the humble. Nature rejoices over earthly gains; the spirit looks to things eternal. Nature is covetous, loves what is private and her own; the spirit is kind-hearted and sociable, judging that it is more blessed to give than to receive. Nature inclines a man to the creatures of his own flesh: the spirit hates the desires of the flesh. Nature is very earnest to have her works and gifts and words much valued; the spirit seeks its reward in God alone. Nature rejoices to have many friends, glories in noble place and pedigree, smiles on the powerful and fawns upon the rich; the spirit loves even her enemies, sympathizes with the innocent more than with the powerful, ever exhorting men by virtues to become like the Son of God.

The "Imitation" does not exaggerate the advantage of poverty as such. Men are warned that earthly goods "are never possessed without anxiety and fear," and are exhorted to remember "that all things pass and thou with them." Earthly goods are not to be considered egotistically, but we are to bear one another's burdens. Man is to beware of becoming the slave of things: "all outward things are to be under thee and not thou under them." We are counselled not to have that which may hinder us and rob us of inward liberty. We must learn to part from all things and all human beings: "know-

ing that we must at last be separated from one another." Self-love is the greatest danger. "Know thou that the love of thyself doth thee more hurt than anything in the world." He asked: "Who hinders and troubles thee more than the unmortified affection of thy own heart?" "Son, thou canst not possess perfect freedom unless thou wholly renounce thyself." Therefore, "Know for certain thou shouldst lead a dying life." "The more any man dies to himself; the more does he begin to live unto God." "To many this seems a hard speech: 'Deny thyself, take up thy cross and follow Jesus.' But much harder will it be to hear that last word: 'Depart from Me ye cursed into eternal fire.'" The beginning of morality is thus to control ourselves. Humility is the virtue that fundamentally represents this attitude, and it is stressed throughout. Pride is to be entirely shunned in all its forms, in wealth, in powerful friends, in the stature or beauty of the person, in cleverness or wit, and in well-doing. Man has nothing due to himself as a ground for any pride: therefore "Suffer no pride to live in thee." What others say of us is of little if any consequence: slander should not trouble us. "Fear not the judgement of men when conscience pronounces thee dutiful and innocent." "The glory of a good man is the testimony of a good conscience."

Obedience is a fundamental attitude of the Christian life, whose main principle is "submission in all to God's will." All other obedience is to conform with that and is virtuous only when voluntary. A man is to learn to submit to his superiors. "No man rules securely but he that loves to be beneath. No man commands securely but he that has learned loyally to obey." Inward peace is characteristic of the Christian life. "Peace is what all desire." "My peace," says God, "is with the humble and gentle of heart. In much patience shall thy peace be. If thou wilt hear Me and follow My voice, thou shalt enjoy peace." Four things are enumerated which

bring "much peace": study to do the will of another rather than thine own; choose always to have less rather than more; seek always the lowest place and to be inferior to everyone; wish always and pray that the will of God be wholly fulfilled in thee. The poor and humble in spirit walk in a "multitude of peace": the proud and covetous can never rest. There is no peace in the heart of one given up to carnal and outward things. Inward peace does not imply idleness: "thou art born to toil." "Never be wholly idle, but either reading or writing or praying or meditating or endeavouring something for the common good." All work is to be done as unto God and with charity. "Without charity the outward work profits not at all." Useful employment is one of the main guards against the approach of the evil one. Real peace is not to be obtained by an avoidance of life's difficulties. "My will is that thou seek not a peace which is free from temptations or feels no disturbance." Nevertheless peace may in part be cultivated, and Thomas described our need of times of solitude. "Seek a fit time to retire into thyself, and mediate often upon God's loving kindnesses."

In this work Thomas à Kempis was not concerning himself with the specific moral requirements of particular conditions of life. His aim was rather to express the fundamental motives and principles that must underly all Christian conduct. The book is not, and was not intended to be an exposition of Christian morality in its detailed activities. It concentrates on something more important: the essential qualities of that morality. The criticism, therefore, that the book neglects consideration of domestic and social conduct suggests a failure to appreciate its real character and intention. It is interesting to note how free it is of any exaggeration of celibacy. With regard to women the author stated with simplicity and dignity: "Be not familiar with any woman, but in general commend all good women to God."

Whatever the defects in Medieval conceptions of the moral life, in all its history Christian ethics has not contained a more sublime utterance than the "Imitation's" description of Christian love: "The noble love of Jesus impels to great deeds and arouses a constant desire for greater perfection. Love longs to soar and will not be held down by things that are low. Love longs to be free and estranged from all worldly affection, that its inner eye may not be dimmed; that it may not be caught by any temporal prosperity, or by any adversity cast down. Nothing is sweeter than Love; nothing braver, nothing higher, nothing wider; nothing deeper, nothing fuller nor better in Heaven and in Earth; because Love is born of God and can only rest in God above all created things. The lover flies, runs, and rejoices: he is free and cannot be held. He gives all for all; and has all in all, because he rests in One Highest above all things, from whom all good flows and proceeds. He regards not the gifts but turns himself above all goods to the Giver. Love often knows no measure, but is fervent beyond all measure. Love feels no burden, counts no pains, exerts itself beyond its strength, talks not of impossibility for it thinks all things possible and all permitted. It is therefore strong enough for all things; and it fulfils many things and warrants them to take effect where he who loves not faints and lies down. Love is watchful and sleeping slumbers not: though weary it is not tired, though hampered is not hindered, though alarmed is not affrighted, but as a lively flame and burning torch it forces its way upwards and serenely passes through. If any man love he knows what is the cry of this voice. A loud cry in the ears of God is the glowing affection of the soul, which saith: My God, My Love, Thou art all mine, and I am all Thine."²⁰

The beginnings of Christian ethical theory in the Middle Ages have already been considered in the works of Ambrose and Augustine. Gregory the Great

and Isidore of Seville contributed by further exposition and systematization. Though Anselm (1033-1109) did not figure as a writer on Christian ethics specifically, his view of the Atonement may have been a part cause of arousing Abelard to his exposition of Christian ethics, rejecting any notion of redemption as a specific historical transaction external to those redeemed. Abelard maintained that morality is possible through an inherent moral faculty. The moral law is a natural law of man, and the Gospel is a renewal of that law. Ethics is not dependent upon Christian dogmatic theology. Moral distinctions lie ultimately in the motives and the intentions from which acts arise rather than in the acts themselves. The central ethical significance of Christianity is the revelation in Christ of God's love to us, so that Christ is the moral pattern for Christians. Peter of Lombardy in the twelfth century did little more with reference to ethics in his famous "Sentences" than give the popular classifications of the virtues and vices.²¹

Christian ethics in the Middle Ages reached an authoritative statement in the works of Thomas Aquinas, (1225 or 1227-1274). His treatment of morality constitutes an integral part of a general philosophical and theological system. Though he called Aristotle "Master" and was indebted to him for much of the general character of his ethics, he was also markedly influenced by Augustine. Thomas saw that the genuinely moral must be voluntary. The ultimate end for which man acts, or should act, is "beatitude," "true blessedness," which when fully attained is all-sufficient. That end must not be dependent on physical circumstances. Exterior goods of the body are requisite for the imperfect happiness of this life, but not for the perfect happiness which consists in the vision of God. "Naturally man desires permanence in the goods he has. But the goods of this life are transient." Pleasure accompanies the good, but is not itself the good. The "Object," upon

which happiness depends must be other than the mind itself which needs something other than itself to know and to love. Nothing can fully satisfy except an Infinite, that is, Eternal Goodness, God Himself. Thus the ethics of Thomas insists on a Christian theistic ultimate as supreme object and final good of the moral life.

"The virtue or proper excellence of everything consists in its being well-disposed according to its kind and nature." As "man is constituted in his species a rational soul," human virtue "is in accordance with reason"; and vice "is against the order of reason." "Whenever the act of man proceeds to the end according to the order of reason and of the Eternal Law the act is right: when it swerves from this rectitude it is called a sin." "The Eternal Law is simply the Eternal Reason of God, writes M. Gilson, seen as Law-Giver for all works, acts and movements done by created things, whatsoever these be, and in consequence, it is the final source of all other laws." All may know the Eternal Law to some extent. Good ends are those approved by reason, judging as to the duties and functions of man and his relations. But this reason is ultimately the divine Reason: "The light of reason that is within us can make known to us that which is good and direct our will, only in so far as it is the light of Thy Countenance,—that is, derived from Thy Countenance." Thus morality is an expression of the Eternal Law of the Divine Reason, and implies perfect obedience to it, in consecration of the soul to God as Loving Spirit. The Divine Law is expressed in part in the natural law written in the heart and in part in the Old and New Testaments. "By theologians sin is considered principally as an offence against God; but by the moral philosopher as an act contrary to reason." Thomas saw quite clearly the inadequacy of any merely sociological view of morality: "Man is not referred to the civil community to the extent of his whole self and of all his

belongings; and therefore it is not necessary that his every act be meritorious or demeritorious in reference to the civil community. But all that man is and can and has must be referred to God. . . ."

God being the ultimate origin and the ultimate end of man, the absolute and highest good, He "alone can give peace to man's will." Yet, as M. Gilson says: "The ethics of Thomas is quite intellectualistic, because God, to Whom man is subject, is pure intelligence." Thus, for the rational being, man, with such an Object, the highest goal is "knowledge of," "a beatific vision of" God. "The end of ends for an intelligent creature is to see God as He essentially is." The contemplative life even in its incipient and imperfect state on earth is an anticipation and commencement of true blessedness, and in its perfect state in heaven is the full blessedness itself.

From this standpoint Thomas turned to a more detailed consideration of Christian morality in a discussion of the virtues and vices. As M. Gilson expresses it: "A virtue is a settled habit of doing good, and the proper subject of it, is the power of choice in an intelligent being." Virtues are thus habits of the soul in accordance with which it performs good acts. Thomas classified the virtues as (1) Moral, the four cardinal virtues, prudence, justice, temperance, and fortitude; (2) Intellectual, understanding, knowledge, wisdom; and (3) Theological, faith, hope, and love. The first two may be known by reason, but the last are revealed to us by God. The natural virtues lead to development of character and are fundamental for happiness in earthly life. The theological virtues are essential for spiritual happiness here and bliss in the life to come. The moral virtues correspond in a measure with the cardinal virtues of Greco-Roman thought. In their Christian context, however, they have not entirely the same implication. Prudence, (in place of the Greek wisdom), is given practical significance in the wise organization of our ac-

tions in accordance with conscience. Justice consists in rendering their due to man and to God. Temperance is the moral attitude with relation to the emotions. The passions are themselves morally indifferent: they are to be governed by the will under the guidance of knowledge. Fortitude is strength of will in the pursuit and maintenance of the good.

Of the theological virtues, faith, hope, and love (charity), the last is the highest, really including all others in itself. They "set man in the way of supernatural happiness." "Hope makes us tend to God as to a final good to be obtained, and as to an efficacious aid to succour us; but charity properly makes man tend to God, uniting his affection to God, so that man may no longer live for himself, but for God." By the "Gifts of the Spirit" man is led from the sensuous to the highest spiritual bliss. These "gifts" are as expressed in the New Testament: "Blessed are the poor in spirit, for their's is the kingdom of heaven"; "Blessed are the meek"; "Blessed are they that mourn"; "Blessed are they that hunger and thirst after righteousness." In accordance with these "gifts" men may forsake objects of desire, in themselves reasonable, and assume sufferings for higher ends.

A true expounder of the Christian ethics of the Middle Ages, Thomas accepted its twofold attitude to morality, as is evident in his discussion of the "Evangelical Counsels." The earthly and the heavenly life are compatible, and morality does not necessarily demand the forsaking of the former. Nevertheless one may turn one's attention definitely to the heavenly alone, and Thomas praised those who could do so. This renunciation of earthly things is expressed in the Counsels of poverty and celibacy, and of our own will in that of obedience. The highest stage in Thomas' ethics is thus a presentation of the ethics of the monastic vows.²²

CHAPTER IV

FROM THE RENAISSANCE AND THE PROTESTANT REFORMATION TO THE PRESENT TIME

The dominant view of Christian ethics in the Middle Ages was the subordination of the earthly—the ideal for the highest adepts its essential suppression. The actual achievement along these lines has been diversely estimated. It is evident that in reaction to theory, luxury and earthly values were in no small measure pursued even by the monks and religious themselves. The Church had been able to exert its wide-spread power through its teaching of obedience, its emphasis on the idea of purgatory, and on conditions in this life which might affect the next. The Church directed attention almost entirely to religious salvation thought of in terms of bliss in a future life.

The tendencies grouped together under the term, Renaissance, were a transition to the modern era. They involved some distinct changes in the attitudes to life. The Renaissance has frequently been praised for emphasizing the value of the human individual. But individualistic motives were rarely absent from the moral and religious life of the Middle Ages. Further it must be remembered, as Dr. H. O. Taylor pointed out, "that in Italy there was never among the educated a complete break with ancient pagan tradition and learning. City life had been continuous in the past and elements of Humanism had always existed in it." The Renaissance brought changes in relative emphasis. It stood frankly for the human values and culture of the terrestrial life to an extent unknown to the Middle Ages. But the individualism of the Humanists often

became an egotism that was not merely non-social in motive; it was frequently even anti-social in practice. The Renaissance produced no profound or widespread ethical social theory.¹

Among the Humanists there was much confusion regarding religion. Though probably most attended to its externals the ideas and affairs of religion were not dominant for them. Even when immortality was not denied or doubted, it ceased to play its former role: "the great earthly task of discovering the world . . . absorbed most of the higher spiritual faculties." The contemplative type of Christianity had no appeal for the Humanists in general and the traditional views of sin and atonement meant little or nothing to most of them. They brought into view again aspects of ancient Greek and Roman ideals that had been neglected. Plutarch's "Lives" became a very popular book, presenting traits of noble and manly life. The motive of fame and glory took the place of the Christian ideal of holiness. Honour, described by Burckhardt as an "enigmatic mixture of conscience and egotism," became the sentiment of strongest moral force. Revenge, and its continued form in the vendetta, called forth the efforts of the Church to achieve reconciliation. Supramundane religious principles were given so little play that there was a tendency to instability and lack of moral endurance.

Nevertheless, the Renaissance effected a lasting widening of life's horizon. As Burckhardt said: "By the side of profound corruption appeared personalities of the noblest harmony and artistic splendour which shed upon the life of men a lustre which neither antiquity nor Medievalism either could or would bestow upon it." But the fundamental attitude of the Renaissance came to be regarded as sensuous. That conception of it aroused Savonarola to his evangelical zeal. In opposition to its dominant spirit, he proclaimed that "man has only to attend to those things which make di-

rectly for his salvation." So, out of the clash of Medieval and Renaissance conceptions, came into definite view the problem: How to conceive of Christian morality as giving due place to the earthly and the transcendent. That remains an essential problem for consideration in a modern exposition of Christian ethics.²

Savonarola rose in opposition to the moral corruption and the worldliness both of the secular leaders of the Renaissance in Italy and of many of the higher ecclesiastical officials. He fought against the tyranny of princely rulers, specifically of Florence, against monastic corruption and Humanistic profligacy. He was prepared to advocate and to take extreme measures. Of anyone who should be apprehended endeavouring to overturn the Florentine republic, he said: "Cut off his head." Yet we are assured of own personal humility and kindness. In his monastery he performed the lowest tasks. There is no doubt of his fearlessness, self-sacrifice, strength of character and devotion to principle. He took moral requirements seriously, and like all who protest strongly against wrong appeared intolerant. His earlier teaching of love, with forgiveness and peace, tended to give place later to a demand for justice, even when it involved severe punishment: "for too much kindness is not pleasing to God."

Savonarola made a forceful effort for the actual supremacy of the Medieval Christian ethical conception. Other-worldliness, the thought of death and the after-life were to dominate thought and conduct. "We live in this world, O my brothers, only to learn how to die." Nevertheless, it would be quite false to suppose that with this attitude he neglected affairs of this life. He encouraged and supported some of the artistic movements of the Italian Renaissance, painting and poetry, as well as learning. But even so, he had not entered fully into the fundamental idea of that Renaissance; for

him the scope and purpose of art and knowledge to be approved were prescribed by the type of religious conceptions and ideals that he championed. Thus, Michael Angelo, who came under Savonarola's influence, in much of his art represented grief and consolation "through humble faith in the mystery of the crucifixion," and could say: "No thought is born to me that is not stamped with Death." Savonarola thought that pursuit of science should be restricted to a few. Its main motive should be its aid in challenging heresy. His opposition to the merely mundane was expressed in the public burning by his followers in Florence of women's ornaments, paintings and books. He organized an "army" of boys for the suppression of vice, worldly pastimes and frivolities. He attacked "the pestiferous and cankerous worm of usury." He taught that man must ever be at war against the world, the flesh and the devil, and advocated dire punishments for the worst vices on the ground that if men did not love God they should be made to fear Him. For a time he was able to get the public authorities of Florence to close the taverns, to drive prostitutes from the city, to punish gambling, extravagant and immodest dressing, and to forbid dancing. He charged the pope and those surrounding him with pride, ambition, greed, lechery, and whoredom, and with neglect of their true moral and religious duties. He denounced the bishops for their concern with earthly vanities. "In the primitive church the chalices were made of wood and the prelates of gold—today the chalices of gold and the prelates of wood."

On the other hand Savonarola endeavoured to arouse public opinion to the claims of the needy as prior to those of luxury, culture, and religious ostentation. With this attitude, he proposed "that the subsidies of the university of Pisa be devoted for a year to the poor, and that the church vessels be sold for the same pur-

pose." His "army" of boys made collections of alms for the poor. He emphasized the primacy of individual moral conduct in the life of a people, encouraging individual honesty, the return of illgotten gains, and a motive of charity in place of selfish luxury. He appealed for that "inner simplicity which is purity of heart." Every man owes to his brother man a debt of honesty. He maintained that it was a Christian duty to take part in the political and economic organization of the life of Florence. The times needed the sort of challenge that Savonarola made. His movement erred in its extremism, and failed to attain enduring power. His opponents eventually brought about his public execution. He was not concerned with philosophical questions underlying Christian ethics, but with championing Christian morality, as he understood it, both as a general attitude and with reference to details of human conduct. His thought and emotion were dominated too much by a Medieval other-worldliness for him to see that if this world also is God's creation, some right place must be found in the Christian life for all the wealth of human values, for the intrinsic worth of the so-called secular life, for which the Humanists achieved so much.³

Dr. Lindsay remarked that the martyrdom of Savonarola was the crowning evidence that reform of the Church was impossible "apart from the shock of a great convulsion." Such a convulsion occurred in the movements summed up under the term, the Protestant Reformation. The Renaissance and the Reformation were partly in agreement and partly in opposition. Dr. Preserved Smith has aptly summed up some similarities of the Protestant Reformation and Renaissance Humanism. "No one can deny the striking similarity between the two. Both were animated by a desire for a return to antiquity, a nostalgia for the golden age of both pagan Rome and of Christianity. Both were revolts against Medieval Scholasticism. . . . Both were

children of a new individualism . . . both were reactions against the asceticism and other-worldliness of the Middle Ages. The Renaissance saw the cultural, the Reformation the ethical, value of wealth, industry, prosperity and of woman, and both, in comparison with Catholicism, stressed the claims of this world rather than those of the next. . . ."⁴

The Protestant Reformation was in a measure a reaction to the Renaissance as well as a revolt from Medieval Christianity and ecclesiasticism. As Dr. Smith points out, Renaissance Humanism was predominantly aristocratic, concerned with the education of the classes in the things of human culture and was in spirit cosmopolitan, while the Reformation was more a peoples' movement interested in the spiritual life and the conversion of the masses, and became in marked degree nationalistic. Dr. R. H. Murray's statement: "the humanist insisted on the worth of man, the reformer on his worthlessness" is only partially valid, for the worth of the individual soul is definitely implicated in the reformers' thought. What the Reformation did in principle, wrote Dr. Denney, was "to expel things from religion and exhibit all its realities as persons and the relations of persons." Protestantism was in accord with Humanism in its insistence that life is to be lived not in monastic asceticism, but in active participation in the affairs and values of ordinary earthly existence. But it was a reaction to those tendencies of Humanism which appeared to treat sensuous enjoyment and terrestrial culture as the dominant aim of life on earth.⁵

The general attitudes of the knights and troubadours characterized the form of morality associated with the ruling classes in the feudalism of the later Middle Ages. Contrasted with this was monasticism. At the time of and following the Protestant Reformation both of these forms of life were challenged, one as too worldly, the other as an undue neglect of earthly duties on the basis

of an at least partially false idea of righteousness. As both declined and their external manifestations mostly disappeared, the work of the reformers combined to the development of another characteristic general attitude, Puritanism. Something of the type of life of knights and troubadours continued in that of the Cavaliers whose pursuit of gaiety was contrasted with Puritanism which itself carried over into ordinary life aspects of the monastic and general Medieval ideal. "All that that unpopular word 'Puritanism' has ever stood for, to the minutest detail, writes Mr. Owst, will be found advocated unceasingly in the preaching of the pre-Reformation Church."⁶

The most distinctive form of Protestant ethics, Puritanism represented a definitely strenuous attitude in life. It had a spirit of struggle for conquest of the evil inclinations within man and against the temptations of the outside world. From this standpoint it appears in large measure negative and to a considerable degree ascetic. "There is an athleticism, an asceticism, in the Puritan," says Dr. Barker, "as of one running for a great prize which is set before him. This is the rock of Puritan faith. . . ." Puritanism developed a sense of inner strength, promoted in part by some appreciation of the value of solitude, in which the Puritan became conscious of his personality as in the presence of God. There was emphasis on the importance of the individual will, and the cultivation of a type of Stoic attitude. The Puritan carried his moral zeal into every activity of life but he tended to restrict his activities. Adopting a life of simplicity and frugality his forms of amusement became limited. But he "helped to make citizenship an individual responsibility, a matter in which each must exercise his thought and practise his will. He helped to make commerce and industry find their own feet and go their own way, escaping an old system of paternal protection. He helped to make col-

onization a spontaneous movement; and when the colonists had settled in lonely lands beyond the seas, he helped to give that temper of self-reliance which could face and conquer solitude." ⁷

The movement of reform which centered in Martin Luther involved a rejection of the monastic view of life, emphasized inner spirituality as contrasted with an exaggerated estimate of the value of works, and opposed the prevalent system of and ideas concerning Indulgences. The central motive of his work was expressed in his insistence on "justification by faith only." Salvation is a state of the soul, "faith," which is not achieved by man, but is the free gift of God. "There are divers sorts of righteousness. There is a political or civil righteousness, which emperors, princes of the world, philosophers and lawyers deal withal. There is also a ceremonial righteousness which the traditions of men do teach, . . . for the correction of manners, and certain observances concerning this life. . . . There is . . . the righteousness of the law, or of the ten commandments. . . . There is another righteousness which is above all these, viz., the righteousness of faith, or Christian righteousness . . . a mere passive righteousness as the others above are active." Faith, as understood by Luther, leads to "the fruits of the Spirit." Ordinary "civil righteousness" was not his main concern. Having adopted this form of ethical dualism, Luther did not deal in any systematic way with Christian ethics. He considered that he gave full recognition to "good works," even though according them a subsidiary importance as occupied with "earthly things." "When we have taught faith in Christ, then do we teach also good works." Nevertheless "outward virtues and honest conversations are not the kingdom of Christ." "Let every man endeavour to do his duty diligently in his calling, and to help his neighbour to the utmost of his power." Ultimately the one main test of right and

wrong, good and evil, is God's commands in the Scriptures, and the ideal is that of the inner Christ-like personality.

The predominant emphasis which Luther placed on the religious doctrine of justification by faith alone must not obscure for us his attention to matters of ordinary moral concern. In his "Appeal to the Nobility of the German Nation" he criticized the too wide-spread practice of pilgrimages which promoted a distaste for serious steady work; he condemned the making of holy days the occasions for drunkenness, gluttony, and debauchery; and he denounced the vagrancy of the mendicant orders and that degrading concubinage of the priests, which usurped the place of rightful honorable marriage. In his tractate "On the Freedom of the Christian Man" he insisted on the spiritual emancipation of the Christian from forms of arbitrary worldly compulsion, in that his morality is to be a spontaneous manifestation of his inner spirit, sanctified by grace. With this liberty of divine sonship, the Christian makes himself subject to all in righteous service. In ethics Luther turned attention to present human welfare, to the seeking of the glory of God in daily work in one's vocation.⁸

For moral and religious reasons Luther fought the Roman Catholic system of Indulgences. In its original most simple conception an Indulgence was the remission by the Church of a penalty it had itself imposed. This idea however became associated with the conception of a Treasury of Merit, supposed to have been accumulated by works of supererogation of Christ and the saints, and held by the Church for its disposal one might say, to "compensate" for the sins of others to whom it granted Indulgences. The Church obviously had a right to remit penalties imposed by itself. Yet, as the idea of purgatory was kept in prominence by the Roman Church, it cannot be doubted that many supposed that the Indulgences they bought would rescind some pains

of purgatory. The impression that an Indulgence removed guilt was detrimental as wrongly quietening conscience. Though according to the Church no Indulgence could be effective without repentance, it was easy for the payment wrongly to seem a substitute for it. Whatever the theories of the Church, Luther in the "Theses" he nailed up at Wittenburg attacked what he considered to be the views popularly held. He was prepared to maintain that an Indulgence (a) cannot remove guilt; or (b) remit divine punishment; and (c) that it is unnecessary for a true penitent who receives pardon from God, since the true "treasury of merit" is the grace of God which operates without the intervention of the Pope.

The idea of a treasury of merit implied in the developed theory of Indulgences is not in harmony with Christian ethics. The fundamental implication in this notion of merit is that one may do more morally than is necessarily required. Then the suggestion appears to be made that a certain "amount" or kind of sin may be counterbalanced by an "amount" of this merit, with the important implication that the merit of one might be transferred to make up for the wrong of another. No one need dispute that there is such a thing as "vicarious suffering," but the conception of a store of merit which may be dispensed through the granting of Indulgences must be described as a caricature of ethical ideas. As Wuttke remarked, the notion of supererogatory works could not be accepted by the Reformers in view of their recognition "that the life of the most holy always falls short of moral perfection."⁹

John Calvin was a much more systematic thinker than Martin Luther and presented a more unified conception of the Christian life. In the nature of man there is an "internal law," for "God has furnished the soul of man . . . with a mind capable of discerning good from evil and just from unjust, and of discovering by the light

of reason what ought to be pursued or avoided." The internal law is "inscribed and as it were engraven on the hearts of all men." "The law of God, which we call the moral law, is no other than a declaration of natural law and of that conscience which has been engraven by God on the minds of men." The Decalogue is a statement of fundamentals of that law. Christians "are consecrated and dedicated to God" and may not "think, speak, meditate or do anything but with a view to His glory." "To the Lutheran," wrote Wuttke, "Christ is in ethical respects rather the beloved Saviour out of love to whom and in communion with whom he lives in holiness, to the Reformed he is more the moral pattern by which man is constantly learning and which he endeavours to imitate."

As contrasted with Luther's preaching of the centrality of faith or inner spirituality, Calvinism leaned to a type of legalism. Much attention was given by Calvinists to the Old Testament. To conform with the Decalogue is to obey God, and that is morality. Any opposition to God is sin; any tolerance of sin is to share in it. With this view Calvinists manifested harshness to evil-doers. "Calvin," writes Dr. Harkness, "is almost Kantian in his insistence that a lie is always wrong. . . . He insists repeatedly that lying is wrong because it is contrary to God's nature. God is truth, and before him no untruth can find favour." Life ought to be happy, but the pursuit of pleasure and the avoidance of pain are not to be its motives. In his impressive summary of the Christian life Calvin paid especial attention to the need of self-denial. For the rest his position may well be indicated by the following two quotations: "Righteousness includes all the duties of equity, that every man may receive what is his due. Godliness separates us from the pollutions of the world, and by true holiness unites us to God." "Let this then be our rule for benignity and beneficence: that whatever God hath

conferred on us which enables us to assist our neighbour, we are the stewards of it and one day must render an account of our stewardship; and that the only right dispensation of what has been committed to us is what is regulated by the law of love."

A man of great moral force, Calvin directed much of his energy to the suppression of immorality. Calvinism contributed markedly to the cultivation of that energetic progressive individualism which has characterized Protestant ethics. Devotion to one's "calling" was regarded as a religious duty: to work is to worship. The profits of labour are a blessing from God. As the adherents to Calvinism were mainly of the "middle class," many of whom were engaged in industry and trade, this general attitude led to certain characteristic virtues. Of these, Dr. Harkness mentions especially "reverence, chastity, sobriety, frugality, industry, honesty," the last four of which have "an economic reference."

The Heidelberg Catechism of 1563 which has been very widely used in the Reformed Churches contains the Decalogue as "the law of God," with detailed interpretations of the individual commandments. Placing our trust ultimately in anything or anyone other than God is to break the first commandment. To swear in the sense of seriously and reverently to take oath in the name of God is approved. The eighth commandment against theft is taken as forbidding not merely ordinary robbery, but "all wicked tricks and devices whereby we seek to draw to ourselves our neighbor's goods" and all useless waste of God's gifts. Further it is interpreted as involving positive duties: "That I further my neighbor's good where I can and may, deal with him as I would have others deal with me, and labor faithfully that I may be able to help the poor in their need." The ninth commandment requires not only the avoidance of false witness and slander but also the duty "to defend and promote my neighbor's good name."¹⁰

Equally with Luther and Calvin convinced of the need for reform was Erasmus, the leader and representative of a group of thinkers and divines in sympathy with the best in Renaissance Humanism, but temperamentally opposed to the violence of the Protestant protagonists. Throughout his career Erasmus professed his adherence to the Roman Catholic Church. He has been charged with a lack of courage in not joining the movement of Martin Luther. Whatever the truth concerning his character in that regard, a study of his works must convince one that his opinions were in important matters contrary to those of Luther and Calvin. Erasmus saw that Luther's theological position, especially with reference to human freedom and justification by faith alone, was central, and with reluctance, he eventually wrote against Luther. But the authorities of the Roman Church came to disapprove of much of Erasmus' own writings, many of his important works being officially condemned and listed on the Expurgatorial Index.

Pre-eminently a scholar, Erasmus' efforts for reform were through his scholarship and his satire. His attitude is best summed up in his own saying: "I am a lover of liberty: I cannot and will not serve a party." Along with John Colet and Sir Thomas More, he strove to bring into relief the spirit of the Christian life. Erasmus attempted to unite his Humanism with what he found early Christianity to be in the writings of the Greek Testament and the Christian Fathers. He endeavoured to express "an undogmatic religion and an ethical piety founded alike on the Sermon on the Mount and the teachings of the Greek philosophers." He opposed both the asceticism of the Middle Ages, and the pagan elements of the Renaissance. He sought to suggest "the philosophy of Christ" not so much as an intellectual system, but as a philosophy of life. "Erasmus," wrote Dr. Lindsay, "was firmly convinced that Christianity was above all things something practical. It had

to do with the ordinary life of mankind. It meant love, humility, purity, reverence—every virtue which the Saviour had made manifest in his life on earth. . . . A true reformation, he believed, was the moral renovation of mankind.”

In different works Erasmus reiterated the main features of his critical and constructive doctrines. In his “Colloquies” he satirized many aspects of the contemporary “Christian” life, especially of the monk and nun. He criticized the corruptions of the Papal Court and warned against the prevailing foolish conceptions of Indulgences as derogatory to morals. In his “*Enchiridion Militis Christiani*” (Handbook or Dagger of the Christian Knight) he described the Christian life as a warfare with peaceful weapons, contrasting the inner and the outer man, the spirit and the flesh, the moral and the sensual, internal righteousness and external observance; false and true wisdom. But in spite of the modern features of his thought, his outlook and sympathies had decided limitations. He appears to have had little or no interest in the rise of the scientific study of nature, in the results or the exploration of the world, or in the social problems of the masses. “The New World,” writes Dr. Preserved Smith, “meant little to him; the world of poverty and toil and ignorance, nothing at all. The Middle Ages had much charity for the disinherited of life, but no justice for them. In this Erasmus still belonged to the age from which some of his contemporaries were emerging.” His friend, Sir Thomas More, though he did not present his “*Utopia*” as an essay in Christian ethics, manifested in it a distinct conviction that many social evils could be remedied by the application of Christian benevolence and justice with a freedom from traditional customs.¹¹

It is interesting and instructive to turn from a scholar like Erasmus to the work of the simple tinker, John Bunyan. Though it is quite clear that “the saving grace

of God" dominated Bunyan's thought, he concerned himself in detail with characteristics of the Christian moral life. As "The Pilgrim's Progress" depicts the way "to glory," so "The Life and Death of Mr. Badman" describes how the wicked "travel to hell." "The Holy War" is a symbolical account of the conflict of good and evil in and for the soul of man. The works of Bunyan are significant as being the expression of a "common man," largely free from the spirit of traditional ecclesiasticism. There is nothing especially novel in the positions described by him: but in that lies much of their importance. For he brings into relief in impressive fashion fundamental features of Christian moral life and what is opposed to it. He made no contribution to Christian ethical theory, but he did leave a picture of what Christian morality involved for the common man of his time. While condemning worldly vices, he indulged in no general ascetic condemnation of the world, for in England the time for criticism of the monastic life was past.

The Christian life is one of struggle and conflict, participation in a "holy war." In all the three books mentioned, the evils to be fought are described either directly or by obvious metaphors and similes. As a child Badman was addicted to lying and pilfering, and as a youth to cursing and swearing. Come to manhood he gave himself up to sexual irregularities, drunkenness and theft. He "loved to be flattered, praised and commended for wit, manhood, and personage." "He was a very proud man, a Very proud man." He was a hypocrite, posing as moral and religious when apparently of advantage to himself. "Hypocrisie is the highest sin that a poor carnal wretch can attain to." He gave himself up to slander, especially maligning the virtuous. His conduct was that of one heedless of conscience and the existence of God. "He would often please himself with the thoughts . . . I can be religious and irreligi-

gious. I can be anything or nothing. I can swear and speak against swearing. I can lye and speak against lying. I can drink, wench, be unclean and defraud, and not be troubled by it. Now I enjoy myself, and am Master of mine own wayes, and not they of me." Mr. Badman died "as quietly as a lamb," but "peace and quiet with sin is one of the greatest signs of a damnable state."

"The Holy War" tells first of the capture of "the city" Mansoul, by the forces of Diabolus who through pride had rebelled against God. Understanding and Conscience were removed from office, Lord Will-be-will was promoted, having as deputy Mr. Vile-Affection, "wholly given to the flesh," who married Miss Carnal-Lust. Under this pernicious government Mansoul was reduced to bondage, degradation and despair. In the war, in which the forces of good recaptured the city, three banners were unfurled: the black flag of defiance, the red flag of judgement, and the white flag of mercy. Among the good forces were captains Patience, Credence, Good-Hope, and Charity. Messrs. Understanding and Conscience made themselves heard again, the latter being appointed preacher and advisor to Mansoul. Triumphant, the armies of the good (shouting with joy) took up their positions on mounts Gracious and Justice. Mr. God's-Peace was made the new governor of the city. But Mr. Incredulity escaped from prison and still roams uncaptured.

"The Pilgrim's Progress" describes the evils the Christian has to overcome to reach his moral and religious goal. On his journey the Pilgrim comes to the slough of Despond, has to pass through the city of Vanity, and is imprisoned for a time in Doubting Castle. There is the country of Conceit, the town of Carnal-Policy, the land of Vain-glory, the market town of Love-Gain, the hill Lucre, the by-path meadow where is "the easiest going," and the pit into which Vain-

Confidence falls. Vanity fair is a place of cheats, rogues, fools, false-swearers and knaves of every kind, a place of games, plays, thefts, murders, and adulteries. Among the many immoral persons with whom the Pilgrim comes into contact are Mr. Talkative, who "says and does not"; Apollyon, addicted to pride and flattery; Wanton, a woman promising "all carnal and fleshly content"; Lord Luxurious, Messrs. Sloth, Malice, Liar, and Cruelty. Madame Bubble speaks very smoothly, gives you a smile at the end of a sentence, but "she makes variance between rulers and subjects, betwixt parents and children, neighbour and neighbour, man and his wife, man and himself, the flesh and the heart." Despair, of much consequence to the Christian, is represented as a giant. Mr. Fearing "had, I think, a slough of despond in his mind, a slough that he carried everywhere with him." The Pilgrim passes through the valley of Humiliation, goes over the hill Difficulty, reaches the Delectable Mountains, and the mount of Charity, where a man has a bundle of cloth out of which he makes coats and garments for the poor without his bundle becoming any less. Finally, possessed of the necessary courage, he arrives at the Celestial City, being helped on his way by his meetings with many virtuous persons, including Dare-not-lie, the damsel named Discretion, Prudence, Charity, and Sincerity. When the Pilgrim is imprisoned he is patient, "not rendering railing for railing, but contrariwise blessing, giving good words for bad, and kindness for injuries done." But Bunyan's vivid presentation of the Christian moral life is much more detailed than may be indicated in the space here available.¹²

One passes to another impressive personality in George Fox, the founder of the Society of Friends. Readers of his "Journal" will recognize at once his distinctly ethical aims. He described himself as "A preacher of righteousness." The fundamental principle

of his teaching has direct bearing on morality: the immediate knowledge of God that is possible for everyone, giving an inner light for guidance in conduct. "I was commanded to turn people to that inward light, spirit, and their way to God." Upon this inner knowledge of God depends the understanding and proper use of the Scriptures, which, as Fox clearly saw, must themselves have originated in such knowledge. "The Holy Scriptures were given forth by the Spirit of God, and all people must come to know the Spirit of God in themselves by which they might know God and Christ, of whom the prophets and apostles learnt; and by the same Spirit know the Scriptures; for as the Spirit of God was in them that gave forth the Scriptures, so the same Spirit of God must be in all them that come to understand the Scriptures." Insisting on the primacy and centrality of the inner life Fox was a relentless critic of everything which tended to distract man from it. Thus, he constantly condemned the frequent high regard for "religious" edifices. Not a building, but righteous Christians are a "church": not a building but the soul of a faithful believer is a temple of God.

This stress on inwardness was the essence of Fox's message and ground of its significance. With inner attitude attuned to God there was no need of taking oaths, a mere Yea or Nay is sufficient. In fact, Fox maintained that the taking of oaths was directly opposed to the command of Jesus. Intent on the reverence of God and being responded to by Him, Fox was absolutely indifferent to any honour or praise from men. Contending that the spiritual is "free," he was a constant critic of priests performing their functions for salaries. He took seriously the principle of non-resistance as he held it to have been taught by Jesus. Brutally treated time after time on his journeys and in prison, he was often wont to say: "Here, here is my hair, here are my cheeks, here is my back": that his persecutors might

strike him if they would. This was a manifestation of his great moral strength and self-control. He never refrained from expressing the truth either to his judges in the courts or to any others when occasion demanded. He had fear of no man. As he would not offer physical resistance to attacks on his own body, so he would not join in warfare.

The fact that Fox has been so predominantly considered a mystic has sometimes prevented full recognition of his significance as a moral force. Early in his "Journal," (1649) is a passage that may be used as a summary showing what throughout his life concerned him in this direction. "About this time I was sorely exercised in going to their Courts to cry for justice, and in speaking and writing to judges and justices to do justly; and warning such as kept public-houses for entertainment that they should not let people have more drink than would do them good; and in testifying against their wakes or feasts, May-games, sports, plays, and shows, which trained up people to vanity and looseness and led them from the fear of God; and the days they had set for holy-days were usually the times wherein they most dishonoured God by these things. In fairs, also, and in markets, I was made to declare against their deceitful merchandise and cheating and cozening; warning all to deal justly, to speak the truth, to let their Yea be yea, and their Nay be nay; and to do unto others as they would have others do unto them; and fore-warning them of the great and terrible day of the Lord which would come upon them all. I was moved also to cry against all sorts of music, and against the mountebanks playing tricks on their stages, for they burthened the pure life and stirred up people's minds to vanity. I was much exercised, too, with school-masters and school-mistresses, warning them to teach their children sobriety in the fear of the Lord, that they might not be nursed and trained up in lightness, vanity, and wantonness.

Likewise I was made to warn masters and mistresses, fathers and mothers in private families, to take care that their children and servants might be trained up in the fear of the Lord; and that they themselves should be therein examples and patterns of sobriety and virtue to them."

There may have been among Fox's followers a tendency "to scorn delights." However, to form a fair judgement one should remember that the circumstances in which Fox found himself may have seemed to require uncompromising attitudes in order to achieve the needed reform. It may reasonably be maintained that Fox opposed what might be called "worldly" enjoyments only in so far as they led to wantonness and to a frivolous neglect of true religion. In any case, Fox was clear in his enunciation of the supremacy of the spiritual for Christian ethics. Not long before his death, he wrote in an "Epistle": "For the natural soldiers are not to cumber themselves with the world, much less the soldiers of Christ, who are not of this world, but are to mind the riches and glory of the world that is everlasting." "The continued following of the Inward Light," wrote Mr. Braithwaite, "gave Friends a singularly clear judgement on great moral issues. Fox again and again showed a penetrative prophetic insight. . . . One hundred and seventy years before the reforms of Romilly, he had realized the savagery of the English criminal code; he saw the abuses of the power which the justices then possessed of fixing agricultural wages; he showed himself alive to the duties of slave-holders and their slaves." The Friends were from the beginning a closely knit group, their strength lying, says Pfeiderer "in their practical piety, their honesty and sobriety, their patience and equanimity, and above all their affective brotherly love."¹³

In the middle of the seventeenth century a book was published anonymously under the title of "The Whole

Duty of Man." Its great popularity continued for a century. Though the authorship has not been definitely determined, it is clearly from a member of the Church of England. Man learns his duty in part by the light of nature, by conscience, which tells him his general requirements, as expressed for example, in the Ten Commandments. He also learns it in part from the New Testament, especially in the Sermon on the Mount. "The Whole Duty of Man" includes his duty to God, to his neighbour, and to himself. The chief aim of Christian conduct is not welfare in this world, but that "one may be happy forever in the next." The soul being of supreme worth, our affections are to be set on "things above" "in comparison whereof all things here below should seem vile and mean to us." The possibility of the pains of hell hereafter is not to be forgotten. The Christian is called on for "honest and hearty endeavour" to lead a moral life, repenting sincerely for any failure, and trusting in God for forgiveness. The Christian moral ideal though high and exacting is not "an impossible task." In the practice of its duties there is "a great deal of present pleasure." Even where suffering is involved in its pursuit, "there is force and virtue in the testimony of a good conscience as is able to change the greatest suffering into the greatest triumph."

In the forefront of our duty to God, the author placed faith, including belief in doctrines as given in the Apostles' Creed. He considered the Christian moral life to be based on these, which are therefore essential to it. Hope, "a comfortable expectation" of the good things God hath promised is the second duty to Him. The third is love, leading us to do all that is pleasing to Him. Such love is an "enjoying of God," imperfect in this life, but to be made perfect and complete in the next. Fear, the fourth duty, withholds us from sin; the fifth is trust in Him in all our physical and spiritual dangers and wants. This is not to be taken as sanction-

ing neglect of work, but the recognition that we can never prosper without His blessing, and in doing our work to "rest comfortably" on His providence. Humility, a sense of our own meanness contrasted with His excellence is a sixth duty, from which spring obedience and patience, regarded as a form of submission to God's will. The further duty of honouring God is described as implying reverence and worship—of course, as organized by the Church.

Our duty to our neighbour is summed up as righteousness, which includes justice and charity. Negative justice is to do no wrong or injury to any; positive justice to yield to others what is due to them. Both of these refer to concerns of the soul as well as of the body. Leading others to sin is the greatest injury. Murder is not simply the direct or indirect taking another's life, but even causing his death by sinful conduct that may not aim at his death, as for example, if by leading one to drunkenness we thereby indirectly cause his death. Close to murder is depriving anyone of the means of obtaining a livelihood. The author quotes Ecclesiasticus xxiv 21 "The poor man's bread is his life, and he that deprives him thereof is a blood-shedder." The greatest injustice and the most irreparable, a form of theft, is to corrupt a wife or a husband. Theft includes not only ordinary stealing but all voluntary non-payment of debts, all deceit, unfairness and "sharp practice" in business. The author says that the extent of the evil of this last kind among Christians is an "intolerable shame." To lie to, to slander, to despise or scoff at a neighbour are other forms of injustice. We owe to all men to be veracious, courteous and meek. We are not to envy those of extraordinary gifts but to respect them. Gratitude toward benefactors is a duty.

Obedience is a requirement of Christian morality. The ruler, "he whom God hath established" as the supreme magistrate, is to be honoured, revered, and

obeyed. Religious pastors are to be loved, esteemed, and maintained. Children are to honour, love and obey their parents, and parents to give all care, spiritual and physical, to their children. True friendship involves a "concurrence in virtue," implying loyalty, assistance, and admonition. According to the "law of Christ," charity is a debt that we owe to our neighbour and it is unrighteous to defraud him of it. It is an attitude of "sincere kindness," disposing us to wish all good to others and to undertake all active endeavour for their welfare. It is due to enemies as well as friends, and rules out envy, pride, censoriousness, dissembling, self-seeking and revenge. In action it has concern both with the minds and the bodies of others. Almsgiving, as a manifestation of charity, to be virtuous must be done cheerfully and prudently. Peacemaking is an act of charity.

Humility, "the root of all virtue," is our first duty to ourselves. Pride is the root of all vice. The second duty is meekness, "a calmness and quietness of spirit contrary to the rages and impatiences of anger." "Consideration" is the name given by the author to the third duty to ourselves, referring apparently to an attitude of reflection on our spiritual condition and conduct. The fourth duty is contentedness, "without which it is impossible to be happy." That virtue is contrary to envy and covetousness, and to that ambition with which a man eagerly seeking worldly greatness "will stick at nothing," to attain it. Diligence is the fifth duty, a diligence not merely in one's earthly task but even more with reference to spiritual ends. The sixth is chastity, in thought, word, and deed. The seventh temperance, in accordance with which only the kinds and quantities of food and drink needed for the preservation of health are morally justified. In short in performing this "Whole Duty of Man," as Christianity represents it, we art to forsake "the devil and all his works," "the

pomps and vanities of this wicked world," and "all the sinful lusts of the flesh."¹⁴

The seventeenth century also gave us a classical expression of the Christian moral life in Jeremy Taylor's "Holy Living," a work which has been in circulation from the time of its first publication to our own day. Taylor says that Christian ethics is "nothing else but the law of nature and reason, complying with the great necessities of all the world." The Christian life is opposed to sensuality and voluptuousness, which make the spirit of man soft and unfit for noble and wise employments. Sensual pleasure is never truly satisfying: it is "biggest always in expectation, and a mere vanity in the enjoying, and leaves a sting and thorn behind it when it goes off. . . ." In view of this, Taylor advocated an attitude of asceticism and negation of the world. "He that despises the world and all its appendant vanities is the best judge and the most secured of his intentions. . . . In what degree we despise sensual pleasures or secular honours, or worldly reputations, in the same degree we shall conclude our heart right to religious and spiritual designs."

The essential thing in morality is purity of intention, and the Christian intention is to do all to the glory of God and for His approval, not being solicitous of the opinions, the censures or the praises of men, not troubled concerning the success of our actions, but loving virtue for God's sake. The Christian will thus fulfil the duty of "contentedness." This involves trust in divine providence, which "brings great peace of spirit and is the great and only instrument of temporal felicity." "Enjoy the blessings of this day, if God sends them, and the evils of it bear patiently and sweetly: for this day only is ours; we are dead to yesterday and we are not yet born to the morrow." Taylor was in the tradition established by earlier writers in his emphasis on humility. Christ's whole life was "a great continued

example of humility," which is the "great ornament and jewel of the Christian religion; that whereby it is distinguished from all the wisdom of the world. . . ." Poverty may well accompany humility. It is better than riches. It is "the sister of a good mind, the parent of sober counsels and the nurse of all virtue." All should accustom themselves to cut off all superfluity in the provisions for their lives.

Moral relations with others were treated by Taylor under the general concept of Justice. The fundamental principle here is the dictum "Whatsoever ye would men should do to you, even so do unto them." Justice requires due attention to distinctions of rank and status. In this connection Taylor stressed the virtue of obedience, another characteristic of traditional Christian ethics. In all that is not against the will of God, obedience to superiors, ecclesiastical and civil is required. It is to be an obedience inspired by reverence. "Pay that reverence to the person of the prince, of his ministers, of thy parents and spiritual guides, which by the custom of the place thou livest in, is usually paid to such persons in their several degrees." "Lift not up thy hand against thy prince or parent, upon what pretence soever, but bear all personal affronts and inconveniences at their hands and seek no remedy but by patience and piety, yielding and praying, or absenting thyself."

The highest reaches of the Christian life are attained in what Taylor specifically called religion. This includes charity, which is essentially the love of God. "Love is the greatest thing God can give us . . . and it is the greatest thing we can give God." It involves patient service. "Love is communicative as fire, as busy and as active, and it has four twin sisters." These are (1) mercy, (2) beneficence or well-doing, "a promptness and nobleness of mind making us do offices of courtesy and humanity to all sorts of persons, in their need

or out of their need," (3) liberality, "a disposition of mind opposite to covetousness"; and (4) alms, relieving the needy poor. Throughout life it is the Christian's duty to hope, to rely upon God, rejoicing even in misfortune and sadness, knowing that this may work for good to our souls, and will if we are not wanting. In his "Rule and Exercises of Holy Dying," Taylor included an exposition of the Decalogue and a detailed list of the Special Precepts of the Gospel. In the latter he brought together, with references, the chief ethical passages of the New Testament.¹⁵

In the eighteenth century William Law published his "Serious Call to a Devout and Holy Life," in which the Christian attitude to life is expounded with clear ethical implications. It suggests a return to the Medieval point of view and presents a general conception similar to that of Thomas à Kempis' "Of the Imitation of Christ." Law complained that people do not actually intend to be Christian in attitude and conduct. The Christian is seriously called on to devote his whole life to the honour and glory of God. "If contempt of the world, and heavenly affection, is a necessary temper of Christians, it is necessary that this temper appear in the whole course of their lives. . . . If self-denial be a condition of salvation, all that would be saved must make it a part of their ordinary life. If humility be a Christian duty, then the common life of a Christian is to be a constant course of humility in all its kinds. If poverty of spirit be necessary it must be the spirit and temper of every day of our lives. If we are to relieve the naked, the sick and the prisoner, it must be the common charity of our lives as far as we can render ourselves able to perform it. If we are to love our enemies, we must make our common life a visible exercise and demonstration of that love. If content and thankfulness, if the patient bearing of evil, be duties to God, they are the duties of every day and in every circum-

stance of our life. If we are to be wise and holy, as new born sons of God, we can no otherwise be so, but by renouncing everything that is foolish and vain in every part of our common life. . . . If we are to follow Christ, it must be in our common way of spending every day."

Humility is "the foundation and support of every virtue." It "is the noblest state of the soul of man: it will set your heart and affections right towards God and will fill you with every temper that is tender and affectionate towards men." Very near the end of his book he returns to this virtue: "Courage and bravery are words of a great sound, and seem to signify an heroic spirit; but yet humility, which seems to be the lowest part of devotion, is a more certain argument of a noble and courageous mind." Pride is as dangerous a passion as lust. Men can be nothing and can do nothing for which they can rightly give themselves glory. They should "hate and despise all human glory, for it is nothing else than human folly." Pride is stealing what is due to God; and lying in the pretence of being what we are not. "Pride can grow as well upon our virtues as our vices." "Even our devotions and alms, our fastings and humiliations, expose us to fresh and strong temptations of this evil spirit."

Christian love is universal. "A love which is not universal may indeed have tenderness and affection, but it hath nothing of righteousness or piety in it." Such love demands a spirit of obedience, diligence and the avoidance of sloth. Subjects are to obey their rulers and children their parents in all not contrary to the law of God. Underlying all is submission to God, who wills that we should do everything in the best manner that we can, not in order to excel over others, but to please Him. That attitude rules out blamable ambition and covetousness, vices which, along with pride are the causes of most of our troubles. "All the wants which

disturb human life, which make us uneasy to ourselves, quarrelsome with others, and unthankful to God, which carry us from project to project, from place to place, in a poor pursuit of we know not what, are the wants which neither God, nor nature, nor reason, hath subjected us to, but are solely infused into us by pride, envy, ambition and covetousness." "The holiness of Christianity consecrates all states and employment of life unto God." But too many have lost their sense of the real significance of what life offers. "Every gentleman and tradesman loses the greatest happiness of his creation, is robbed of something that is greater than all employments, distinctions and pleasures of the world, if he does not live more to piety and devotion than to anything else in the world." The value of riches is in their use in charity. The imprudent use of wealth corrupts the mind and fills the heart with poor and ridiculous passions. "Love poverty, and reverence poor people, as for many reasons, so particularly for this, because our Blessed Saviour was one of the number, and because you may make them all so many friends and advocates with God for you."¹⁶

It may be questioned whether Protestant Christian ethics right up to the beginning of the nineteenth century was concerned with social welfare even as much as that of the Middle Ages, entirely inadequate as it also must be judged to have been. With the rise of industrialism and the rapid growth of population, as well as under the influence of thinkers like Karl Marx and Auguste Comte from the outside, social problems began to demand and to obtain the attention of some Christian leaders and to alter the character of the presentation of Christian ethics. An expression of the changed attitude was given by a lay scholar, John R. Seeley in "Ecce Homo" which he published anonymously in 1866. Seeley forcibly presented Christianity as a "passion," an "enthusiasm" for "humanity." "The enthusiasm of humanity in Christians is not only their supreme, but

their only law." This enthusiasm is raised to "a high energy by contemplation of Christ's character and by the society of those in whom the same enthusiasm exists."

Christianity deals in positive commands, but Christians are not to ask whether something is commanded by the New Testament, but whether the spirit of humanity requires it. "It is natural to man to love his kind and Christ commands us only to give nature play." The Christian community originated through Christ forming a fellowship of those he had inspired with his spirit of enthusiasm for humanity. "To organize a society and to bind the members of it together by the closest ties, were the business of Christ's life." "He expects us to merge our private interests absolutely in those of this society"—the scope of which is universal. "It is a commonwealth sustained and governed by the desire existing in the mind of each of its members to do as much good as possible to every other member." Seeley maintained that the whole course of his investigation had "shown that the substance of Christ's teaching was his doctrine of Enthusiasm, or a present spirit dictating the right course of action and superseding the necessity of particular rules." Nevertheless that teaching involves three special injunctions: to relieve physical distress and work for its prevention; to seek the amendment of the neglected, outcast, and depraved part of society; to forgive all personal injuries. "Christ did not depreciate the body."

Seeley was far from considering the merely economic or the externals of life the matter of chief consideration. He certainly recognized these as of worth in themselves, but maintained that they are even of greater importance because of their relation to the spiritual life. With his new emphases he still remained true to a traditional fundamental of Christian ethics. It is better for a man to be good than prosperous; it is more im-

portant for Christians to consider "the healthy condition of the soul" than temporary physical welfare. "Christ felt that honesty in word and deed was the fundamental virtue." There must be an effort to remove "all such social abuses as destroy natural affection." Thus Seeley, writing as having the enthusiasm of humanity welling up in himself, urged the Christian duty of concern with all social problems with the spirit of Christ but with methods demanded by the circumstances of the time and place and not restricted by any statements from the Christian scriptures or ecclesiastical tradition. His work advocated not merely a Christian social program comprehensive in its implications, but also an emancipation from the dead hand of the letter of the past. Since his day Christian ethics has become definitely involved with the detail of the problems of the lives of Christians in their social relations. The consideration of these is taken up in later chapters of this book.¹⁷

During the centuries since Luther and Calvin many Protestant thinkers have formulated the theory of Christian morality. Bishop Joseph Butler who wrote in the eighteenth century may be chosen as an illustrious example. His theory has many similarities with that of Thomas Aquinas, but it appears to have been independently developed. Butler recognized two sources of ethical knowledge: nature and reason on the one hand and revelation in the Scriptures on the other. Fundamentally morality is in accordance with the constitution of the nature of man. "Nothing can possibly be more contrary to nature than vice; meaning by nature not only the *several parts* of our internal frame, but also the *constitution* of it." An examination of human nature reveals that man has the capacity of making moral judgements, this, a principle of reflection, is conscience. "There is a principle of reflection in men, by which they distinguish between, approve and disapprove their own actions. We are plainly constituted such sort of crea-

tures as to reflect upon our own nature. The mind can take a view of what passes within itself, its propensions, aversions, passions, affections, and respecting such objects, and in such degrees; and of the several actions consequent thereupon. In this survey it approves of one, disapproves of another, and towards a third is affected in neither of these ways, but is quite indifferent." Thus man "hath the rule of right within: what is wanting is only that he honestly attend to it."

The goal of human life is virtue, which in its full achievement ultimately (in a future life) will be accompanied by complete bliss or happiness. Though virtue is of worth in itself, God who has constituted human nature is trusted to unite happiness with it. "Virtue, he wrote, is to be pursued as an end, eligible in and for itself." As man is constituted he has capacities for self-love, for the love of his fellow men, and of God. Complete virtue involves the use of all these capacities; and satisfaction depends upon due attention to all. The individual man is of worth in himself, having a nature the functions of which are to be kept in harmony for his own achievement of good character and of happiness. Rational self-love is a duty in and for itself, as well as for the relation of the self to others and to God. "Self-love in its due degree is as just and morally good, as any affection whatever."

Man's nature being constituted for life in society he has a need of social relationships and a capacity for social conduct. Virtue in this direction is described by Butler as benevolence. While emphasizing this he did not enter into detailed consideration of what it involves. From the standpoint that man and society are within the divine scheme of creation he accepted the view that the true welfare of the individual will fit in with the true welfare of others in the social whole. For the rest he conceived benevolence, as was usual in the eighteenth century and formerly, as help shown by individuals

to others in need. "To relieve the indigent and distressed, to single out the unhappy, from whom can be expected no returns either of present entertainment or future service, for the objects of our favors; to esteem a man's being friendless as a recommendation; dejection, and incapacity of struggling through the world, as a motive for assisting him; in a word, to consider these circumstances of disadvantage, which are usually thought a sufficient reason for neglect and overlooking a person, as a motive for helping him forward: this is the course of benevolence which compassion marks out and directs us to: this is that humanity, which is so peculiarly becoming our nature and circumstances in this world."

Rational love of self and benevolence to others, including moral character of personality and the terrestrial values that human nature can enjoy, do not alone constitute the whole good, and cannot alone satisfy. These are in some respects implied in the love of God, for His requirements written in our nature and His commandments in the Scriptures imply self-love and benevolence. But the love of God is more than that. Man has a need of communion with God and a capacity for it. "It is plain that there is a capacity in the nature of man, which neither riches, nor honours, nor sensual gratifications, nor any thing in this world can perfectly fill up, or satisfy: there is a deeper and more essential want than any of these things can be the supply of." "Almighty God is the natural object of the several affections, love, reverence, fear, desire of approbation." God is the source of the moral law in conscience, in the constitution of nature, and in the Scriptures. As such He is not merely Creator but also moral governor of the world, hence the moral law is authoritative. The Scriptures give men guidance by precept and example of what morality is in details of conduct and of character.

Thus Butler's theory of Christian morality is based primarily on an examination of human nature consid-

ered as a divine creation, a nature which itself reveals in conscience "the voice of God." All Christian morality is included in the love of God, of others, and of the self, each and all considered as constituents of a divine system which includes God Himself. Christian ethics is not a theory of conduct or the good arbitrarily dictated but is in conformity with the constitution of mankind. Yet it implies an authority which does not rest merely upon the constitution either of the individual man or of society, but upon God Himself. It is an ethics at once empirical and transcendent; anthropological and theological.¹⁸

CHAPTER V

CHRISTIAN ETHICS AND THE NATURE OF MAN

It was contended in the Introduction to this book that one requirement of modern life is an adequate conception of the nature of man. Christianity has continued the view expressed in the Hebrew Scriptures that God created man both body and spirit. The *prima facie* dualism of common-sense has provided the general idea under which Christian ethics has considered man. In some Christian literature, there is a threefold differentiation: body, soul and spirit, but the distinction between soul and spirit is not clear and tends to confusion. In this book the terms, soul, mind, and spirit, are treated as identical. The body is a physical organism with which the soul finds itself associated. From it or in it arise various impulses and through it the soul carries on most of its intercourse with other human beings and the non-human physical world. Its preservation makes demands upon the soul's activities. Originally formed in the body of the mother, after death it decays. For Christians the soul is a conscious being whose origin and continuance do not depend on the body. In the symbolic language of the book of Genesis, God breathed into man's body and he became a living soul. The soul has qualities and functions of its own which are not just simply qualities or functions of the physical body. Morality is essentially an affair of the soul. The human soul is regarded as not ceasing at death.

Even at the outset of the book of Genesis man is described with spiritual activity, exemplified in Adam's disobedience to the command of God. This spiritual activity is expressed by the conception of will. The soul

has also the capacity for understanding and for making judgements, amongst which are moral judgements. The book of Genesis rightly stresses man's capacity for a knowledge of good and evil. Throughout the Scriptures the soul is depicted as subject to inner conflicts, occasioned in part through its relations with God and other souls. The Old Testament undoubtedly emphasized the sufferings and welfare of "the people of Israel," but even so the individual as in himself a morally responsible being, was not lost sight of. John the Baptist and Jesus called individuals to repentance and to discipleship. In the Gospels social relationships are definitely recognized, but clearly as relations of individuals. Actual men are individuals in physical and social environments. The significance of individuals as such has been acknowledged since the very beginning of Christianity. Men are not primarily parts of a social whole. Their moral life is not determined solely by any social whole. Their conduct is the expression of their own wills as particular beings. As such it is judged by themselves and by other human beings, and it is thus that God also judges it. That in their conduct and in their moral judgements they in large measure conform with mores and traditions common to the group in which they live, does not alter this fact. Conformity, no less than nonconformity, is an act of individuals. "Instead of the mind of man being developed by the form and fashion of his age, wrote Dean Wace, he receives within himself the source of a new life and becomes the originating germ of a transformed age. From within and not from without; from the mind and not from the world, by the birth of what is new and not by the growth of what is old, the whole aspect of human nature is transfigured."¹

This persisting concept of the soul as a spiritual being is one of the foci of Christian ethics. The intrinsic nature of the soul is fundamental, for on that depends in

large measure not only its own satisfaction, but also the significance of its relations with God and other human selves. Throughout its history Christian ethics has been primarily an ethics of personal character. Only a man of the highest character can be fully worthy of his own love and love his brethren and God as he is required to do. The complete satisfaction of the soul involves all that. But what character of soul is the highest? That is a question which it is a duty of each to strive to answer for himself, taking into account all that he may learn from others. For help to this end, Christians look specially to Jesus and saints and leaders of the Christian Church. Both in the religion of Israel with its prophets and in Christianity with its founder, its apostles and saints, there has been recognition of significant differences in souls, such that some are outstanding leaders. As in the course of human history there have been geniuses in making, e.g., mathematical judgements, or in apprehending and expressing the beautiful in music, so there have been geniuses in making moral judgements. Of these Christians have affirmed Jesus to have been the greatest.

When Christian teachers have talked of man being made in the "image of God" they have thought of him as soul. Though the Hebrew Scriptures contain numerous anthropomorphic expressions relative to deity, the fundamental attitude was maintained that no physical image should (or really could) be made of Him. While in Greek mythology and art there was much anthropomorphic representation of deity, Greek philosophical influences aided the Christian description of God as spiritual. But a distinction has been made: though in his essential being man is in the image of God, through sin he has an "unlikeness" to God. Christianity is concerned with the attainment of likeness to God. Christians are called to strive to become "like" God in His perfection. They have not stressed in the first place the

wisdom of God as the Greeks, but His character as love. In being in the image of God men are capable of love; they are to endeavour to be like Him in love.

Jesus accepted the traditional view of his own race that man is body and soul. Paul represented the soul as one, with functions of the heart, reason, and conscience, making morality possible. The early Greek Fathers, under the influence of Greek philosophy, emphasized man's kinship to God in his rationality, but they insisted that morality does not depend solely upon reason or knowledge. As soul man is capable of morality and union with God. God comes inwardly to man, wrote Origen: "Great is the heart of man, spacious, immense, at least if it is pure. Do you wish to know its grandeur and immensity? Observe how it receives the majesty of the sense of the divine. He himself, says Scripture, has given me knowledge of what is; He has made me to know the order of the world, the works of the elements, the commencement, the end and the middle of centuries, the vicissitudes of time, the change of the months, the circle of the years, the place of the stars, the nature of the animals, the passions of ferocious beasts, the fury of the winds, and the thoughts of men, the multitude of the trees, and the force of the roots. Thou seest that it is not little, the heart of man to embrace so many things. Understand further, that it is not the quantity of the the body but its spiritual power that embraces so much knowledge and truth. . . . And, if it is not little, the way of the Lord is prepared there; His path in it is straight; the word and the wisdom of God walk in it." ²

Ambrose laid stress on the worth of man as God's highest creation. He is soul and body. "What is according to the nature of the body is contrary to the nature of the soul; and what is according to the nature of the soul is contrary to the nature of the body." The soul is the essential man: the body is merely its instru-

ment to be governed by it. The soul has a rational part, sometimes referred to as spirit; and an irrational which makes its bond with the body. Morality is rational, involving not the eradication or entire suppression of the passions but their government by reason. The moral judgement, the dictum of conscience, is a judgement of reason. These views concerning the nature of man as a moral being, developed thus by early Christian thinkers, were further expounded in the Scholasticism of the Middle Ages and have been satisfactorily defended through all later Christian history. For modern life this general Christian conception of human nature may be claimed to be superior to any alternative that is presented for our acceptance.³

Jesus did not in general associate the body with moral evil. For him sin was due to or existed in a wrong attitude of mind. Yet he recognized the possibility of the body being a source of temptation. "If thine eye offend thee, pluck it out: if thy hand offend thee, cut it off. . . ." Some of Paul's references to the "flesh" might suggest that he was inclined towards a derogatory view of the body. But Dr. Alexander reasonably states his position otherwise: "If we are sinners, our flesh becomes the occasion and instrument of our sins. If we are spiritually minded, it becomes the condition and instrument of all purity and righteousness." In the course of Christian history there have been heretics who regarded the body itself as evil, and association with it the cause of the soul's ills. No inconsiderable number of ascetics, though not judged heretical, have assumed attitudes of contempt for the body, though not describing it to be evil in itself. Augustine, who after his early contact with Manichaeism, had taught that the body created by God is good, nonetheless continued attitudes of asceticism towards it. Christians in general have acknowledged that man is psycho-physical and that the good life on earth consists of something more than moral character.⁴

There is considerable misunderstanding as to the implications of the theory of evolution for the conceptions of human nature and ethics. There is a tendency to assume that the theory can be applied to the mental nature of man in a way analogous to the physical. A human person receives his body from both of his parents. Thus his body is in the line of biological evolution. Is there any evidence to show that his mind is composed of parts of the minds of his parents? There does not appear to be. Hence it cannot necessarily be said to be in a line of evolution in the same manner that the body is. There is in fact no way of establishing scientifically the nature of the origin of the individual human soul. If an adequate idea of the creative power of God is held, the notion of His particular creation of each individual soul is by no means nonsensical. Those who treat it as such may be invited to state their own alternative view. As individuals, souls must be created different from each other. They may be regarded as introduced into history, not merely as products of it.⁵

But whatever be the nature of the origin of human souls or the manner of their first appearance in history, Christian thinkers have maintained that they are imperfect. Most great literatures contain forms of expression of man's attempts to describe the origin of evil. Christianity inherited from the religion of Israel the story of the "Fall of man" in the prime disobedience of Adam. Though so fully conscious of the evil among men, Jesus cannot be said to have expounded a doctrine of inherited sin, even while he affirmed that the consequences of sin may be felt by later generations. In the writings of Paul there are suggestions of a corruption of human nature in general, as is implied in his preaching of Christ as the great renovator. The early Fathers had no developed doctrine of original sin and its inheritance. The Greek Fathers looked upon the natural man, as most Greek philosophers did, as in some manner defective.

They regarded Christian morality as a process of betterment in accord with and in an unbroken continuity with the rational morality of the pre-Christian world. Dr. Allen wrote that the "dogma of original sin was unknown to Greek theology" and that it was "an innovation of Latin thought." Though Origen said: "We receive germs of sin from our natural tendencies," he also significantly remarked: "The image of God always remains although you cover it over with the image of the worldly man." In the Christian creeds of the early centuries there is nothing or very little concerning original sin and the corrupt nature of man. There are approaches to the doctrine in the works of Tertullian, Cyprian and Ambrose, but it comes to a definite formulation in those of Augustine. A continuance of influence of his early association with Manichaeans may be partly responsible for his view. He wrote a long dissertation: "On the Grace of Christ and on Original Sin." "Men are born with the fault of original sin." There is a "fatal flaw" in their nature.⁶

The Council of Trent declared the Roman Catholic doctrine to be that original sin is a change of body and soul for the worse for Adam and all his offspring. Baptism taking away this sin, "there is nothing that God hates . . . in those who are born again." "But this holy synod confesses and is sensible that in the baptized there remains concupiscence or an incentive (to sin), which, whereas it is left to our exercise cannot injure those who consent not." The Longer Catechism of the Orthodox Catholic Eastern Church (1839) says that "all have come of Adam since his infection by sin, and all sin themselves."⁷

The doctrines of original sin and of the consequent corruptness of human nature have been stressed with varying emphases by the Protestant Churches. The First Helvetic Confession (1536) contains the statement: "This inherited and original sin has so permeated the

human race and has so devastated and poisoned it, that man who has become a child of wrath and an enemy of God cannot be helped or restored except by God through Christ." The French Confession of Faith (1559) states that "all posterity is in bondage to original sin, which is an hereditary evil. . . ." "We cannot have a single good feeling, affection, or thought, except God has first put it in our hearts." The extent of the corruption is indicated in the Formulae of Concord (1576): "We believe, teach, and confess that Original Sin is no trivial corruption, but is so profound a corruption of human nature as to leave nothing sound, nothing uncorrupt in the body or the soul of man, or in his mental or bodily powers. . . ." The Westminster Shorter Catechism and the Westminster Confession say that the Fall brought about the corruption of man's whole nature which is "wholly defiled in all faculties and parts of soul and body." Even the Quaker, Robert Barclay, (1675) could write that "the posterity of Adam is fallen and degenerated."⁸

Blaisé Pascal saw that reason is repelled by the dogma of original sin, but that nevertheless it expresses something that cannot be denied about human nature. "It is beyond doubt that there is nothing which more shocks our reason than to say that the sin of the first man has rendered guilty those, who being so removed from this source seem incapable of participation in it. This transmission does not only seem to us impossible, it seems also very unjust. . . . Certainly nothing offends us more rudely than this doctrine, and yet without this mystery, the most incomprehensible of all, we are incomprehensible to ourselves." For experience reveals to us man with diverse characteristics which would not be found if this doctrine did not contain some truth. "For, in fact, if man had never been corrupt he would enjoy in his innocence both truth and happiness, with assurance; and if he had always been corrupt he would

have no idea of truth or bliss." "What a chimera is man! What a novelty! What a monster! What a chaos! What a contradiction! What a prodigy! Judge of all things, imbecile worm of earth; depository of truth, a sink of uncertainty and error; the pride and the refuse of the universe." Therein lie both the need and the possibility of morality and grace. "Let man know his value. Let him love himself, for there is in him a nature capable of good; but let him not, for this reason love the vileness that is in him." Man "wants to be great, and he sees himself small. He wants to be happy and he sees himself miserable. He wants to be perfect and he sees himself full of imperfections. He wants to be the object of love and esteem among men and he sees that his faults merit only their hatred and contempt." Within that is implied man's ideal, less than which cannot fully satisfy him: "Man is made only for infinity." Pascal thus considered Christianity to contain a true description of the nature of man, a conception that philosophy has not attained to. "Christianity is strange. It bids man recognize that he is vile, even abominable, and bids him desire to be like God. Without such a counterpoise this dignity would make him horribly vain, or this humiliation make him terribly abject." ⁹

The doctrine of the corruption of human nature is not simply the view of Christian theologians. The philosopher, Kant, in his "Religion within the Limits of Reason" started out with the opposition of the natural sensual and selfish desires to the moral law of reason. This he called "radical evil" and maintained that man finds this opposition as a given fact from the beginning. Dr. Wace, who wrote at a time when a superficial interpretation of evolution was popular in England, asked: "Who can deny as a matter of fact the existence of such a thing as 'Original or Birth Sin?'" Do we not observe a fault and corruption in the nature of every man born by natural birth, from the first moment of dawning

reason? . . . Is there not a tendency rooted in us—whether you call it ‘the wisdom’ or the ‘sensuality’ or the ‘affection’ or the ‘desire’ of the flesh—which is not subject to the law of God? If this is theological language, it is none the less the language that describes everyday realities.” Within more recent times Dr. Gore has said: “We inherit, so the Christian doctrine tells us, a fallen nature. I will not enlarge on that, save by saying that all experience seems to verify the doctrine.” “The disharmony between our nature and our vocation,” wrote Dr. Denney, “—between our nature as we know it in our moral consciousness and our calling to live in union and communion with God—is the primary fact from which we have to start.” To start, one may add, with reference either to Christian ethics or Christian religion.¹⁰

On behalf of a particular conception of the work of Christ, theologians have grossly exaggerated the notion of human corruption. We cannot today accept the view that human nature is radically evil, or that in all, or most, or perhaps even any individuals, evil necessarily predominates over good. Pascal’s statement: “All men naturally hate one another,” seems to us false. But discard the mythological in the traditional doctrine, and reject this gross exaggeration, as we may, we cannot deny the defects in human nature and the limits of its powers. A modern Christian ethics may be allied with a view of Christianity as a religion which teaches that man’s spiritual welfare depends more on God than on himself. Man’s physical well-being depends more on the uniformities of physical nature and the processes therein than on his own activity. Yet as his own efforts are still required for physical preservation, so his own attitude and endeavour are involved in his spiritual welfare. The aim of moral effort implies that man is in some manner defective. But has man in himself any capacity to contribute to or to hinder the achievement of

a higher type of life? That is the problem concerning the freedom of the human will. In the course of Christian thought there have been reiterated efforts to give due recognition on the one hand to the power of God and on the other to the activity of man. The difficulty of this problem is very great and it may be doubted whether human thought has arrived at an entirely satisfactory conclusion with regard to it.¹¹

The New Testament does not include any systematic enquiry into this question. Some passages emphasize the power and need of divine grace: others human responsibility. Paul saw the difference between having a good motive and the actual achievement of good in conduct. He complained: "For the good I would, I do not: but the evil which I would not, that I do." He looked for the grace of God through which he might attain to victory. Some passages in his Epistles even suggest a predestination to good or evil. God gave some over to a "reprobate mind." "He hath mercy on whom He will, and whom He will He hardeneth." For "hath not the potter right over the clay, from the same lump to make one part a vessel unto honour, and another unto dishonour?" Much discussion is possible as to whether Paul (a) virtually denied human responsibility; (b) recognized clearly human culpability; or (c) somehow implicates both. He said "God will render to all men according to their deeds." Dr. Alexander maintains: "One great fact stands clear and unassailable in the letters of the Apostle—the freedom and responsibility of every man before God. Except upon the basis of this fact his preaching of Christ has no value, and the offer of the Gospel no meaning. Upon this truth . . . his entire ethical teaching is based." Yet it is largely with references to Paul's writings that many Protestants have adopted the doctrine of justification by faith alone.¹²

In the course of time Christianity stimulated reflec-

tion upon the subject of freedom. Among the early Fathers the problem appears to have come definitely into discussion in the opposition of Justin Martyr to ideas of fate held by many non-Christians in his time. He maintained that man with the aid of reason has the power of choice. He appealed to experience to support his position. For him, free will and reason stand or fall together. Without free will men could not, as they do, pass from one extreme to another. If there were no free will moral distinctions would be meaningless, and that he held to be contrary to reason. He contended that the truth in the doctrine of fate is that the choice of good or evil leads inevitably to its appropriate consequences. "The Epistle of Barnabas" insisted on the need of the individual's own effort for salvation. "The Epistle to Diognetus" maintained that acceptance of Christ is a free choice: Christian teaching is a form of persuasion, there is no compulsion. Irenaeus wrote: "God made man a free agent from the beginning, possessing his own power even as he does his own soul, to obey the behests of God voluntarily and not by compulsion of God . . ." Tatian also emphasized the doctrine of freedom, contending that moral good is achieved only through freedom. Upon that rests the actuality and the justice of reward for the good and punishment for the evil. He attacked the fatalism of the ancient world. Nevertheless, "our free will has destroyed us; we who were free have become slaves . . . we ourselves have manifested wickedness." Yet, "we who have manifested it, are able again to reject it."¹³

Clement of Alexandria saw man's likeness to God in his reason and his freedom. Sin is possible just because of man's freedom. As free he is subject to praise and blame. "And it is intended that we should be saved by ourselves. This then is the nature of the soul, to move of itself." Origen also acknowledged human freedom. "How, indeed, he wrote, could God make demands of

man, if man had not in his power that he might offer to God what He demands of him?" Experience and reason show that man has the power to use for good or evil even external things which do not themselves depend on him. Scripture teaches the freedom and responsibility of man, and passages that appear to contradict it may be interpreted so as to be in accord with it. Temptation which may come from outside can have no effect unless through something in ourselves we give way to it. We may even sin from promptings of our own nature apart from any external temptation. But Origen recognized that through his freedom alone man cannot attain to perfection: he needs the co-operation of divine grace. For Ambrose also morality would have no meaning if the will is not free. "We are not constrained by servile necessity, but act with free will, whether we are disposed to virtue or inclined to vice." But sometimes he passed over to a view which seriously modified, if it did not negate his doctrine of freedom. For he contended that right choice depends on wisdom, and this comes from enlightenment through revelation and grace. As Dr. Dudden points out, Ambrose insisted that "until the whole man is recreated by divine grace, there is no possibility of moral action." From this standpoint it appears as though man's salvation depends initially upon God. In some passages he suggested that God decides man's salvation, giving or withholding the grace for good. "I dare to maintain that man cannot begin his way unless the Lord go before him." More often he was prepared to admit that it depends on the individual to accept or reject His help. "The Lord heals those who will suffer themselves to be healed, but forces no man against his will."¹⁴

Owing no doubt in the main to the vigor and extent of Augustine's writings against him, Pelagius came to be regarded as the most emphatic early Christian exponent of the doctrine of human freedom in moral life.

Dr. Allen has suggested that Pelagius was influenced by and really in conformity with the early Greek Fathers, and that he was opposed to an exaggeration of the doctrine of grace which gave the Church unwarranted dominance as claiming to be the dispenser of it. Convinced that the Augustinian doctrine of grace promoted moral slackness he preached the initiative and volition of the individual. "Pelagius," says Dr. Bussell, "was quite willing to refer to God's grace all subsequent steps in Christian development, but not the first moment of turning to Him." According to Dr. Bethune Baker, Pelagius definitely maintained that "we really do neither good nor evil except by the exercise of our will—we are always free to choose one of two things." The argument that we have no power to fulfil the divine commands "implies that God orders us what is impossible for us to do and then condemns us for not doing it."¹⁵

Augustine wrote very much about free will and divine grace. Too much of a philosopher not to be aware of the difficulties of the different positions, he oscillated from one to another. Seeing how many of his works were directed against the Pelagians, and in view of his exposition of the doctrine of predestination, it may be urged that he was more opposed than otherwise to a definite doctrine of freedom which made the individual's own attitude the initiative or at least a fundamental factor in his moral and religious salvation. But his writings are often ambiguous, and reveal an instability similar to that of Ambrose. This is illustrated by the following statements in which the difficulty is covered but not concealed by the words "their own deserts" and "deservedly." "God works in the hearts of men to incline them after the pleasure of His own will, whether to good deeds—according to His mercy, or to evil—after their own deserts." "No one is forced by God's power unwillingly either into evil or good, but that

when God forsakes a man, he deservedly goes to evil; and that when God assists, without deserving he is converted to the good." Some of Augustine's statements accredit all to God. "In some the will is prepared by the Lord, in others it is not prepared. . . ." When he tried to answer the question why the gift of God is not made to all, he was led simply to admit: "His judgements are unsearchable, and His ways past finding out." On the other hand he was at times emphatic about the reality of freedom. One whole chapter shows "how very plainly is set before our view (in Scripture) the liberty of the human will." "Now wherever it is said: 'Do not do this' and 'Do not do that,' and wherever there is any requirement in the divine admonitions for the work of the will to do anything, there is at once a sufficient proof of the liberty of the will. . . . He shall reward every man according to his works." Such a passage does not suggest that the will has capacity simply for evil and none for the good. Yet in his "Confessions" he wrote: "My good deeds are Thine appointments and Thy gifts: my evil ones are my offences and Thy judgements." In "The City of God" Augustine described the will as the cause of all evil, saying the will "depraves itself." "For what causes the will's evil, the will being the cause of all evil? . . . No inferior thing depraves the will but the will depraves itself by following inferior things inordinately." Such a passage aids little in clearing up Augustine's position, for he quite definitely adopted a privative view of evil as nothing but the absence of the good. It would thus seem as though the capacity of the will to sin is simply in its refusal of the good. As a controversialist Augustine tended to exaggerate the divine power to the extent of making God seem arbitrary; yet as a philosopher he had doubts as to the extent to which his arguments held against the Pelagians.¹⁶

Medieval thought in general may be described as

Semi-Pelagian, an attempt to admit at one and the same time the reality both of human freedom and of divine grace. That is essentially the position of Aquinas, in spite of the difficulty of reconciling his statements on the different sides of the problem. Though there is much in his writings insisting on the divine power to the extent even of predestination, he maintained "Man has free will, otherwise counsel, exhortation, precept, prohibition, reward and punishment would all be in vain." The Roman Catholic Church has stated officially a similar position on the question, in the following Canon of the Council of Trent: "If anyone saith that man's free will, moved and excited by God, by assenting to God, exciting and calling, nowise co-operates towards disposing and preparing itself for obtaining the grace of justification, that it cannot refuse its consent, if it would, but that as something inanimate it does nothing whatever and is merely passive, let him be anathema." The concept of freedom was fundamental for Dante, being implied in the very idea of divine justice in "the Divine Comedy." "Dante makes us feel," wrote Dr. Wicksteed, "that over a wide area of life, at any rate, man gets essentially not only what he deserves, but what he chooses; and that he neither deserves nor gets it except because he chooses it." It is men's choice that takes them to hell, and it is their choice that keeps them there.¹⁷

The pronouncement of the Council of Trent was clearly directed against views dominant among Protestant reformers. Luther had taught "justification by faith alone" in such a manner as to deny human freedom in the spiritual realm. In 1525 he published his "De servo arbitrio." The early Lutherans, following Luther, declared in the Augsburg Confession (1530): "Man's will hath some liberty to work a civil righteousness and to choose such things as reason can reach unto; but it hath no power to work the righteous-

ness of God or spiritual righteousness without the spirit of God." . . . "It (nature) cannot work inward motions, such as the fear of God, trust in God, chastity, patience, and such like." Yet Article xix declares the "cause of sin" to be "the will of the wicked," implying that man is free to sin but not to do the spiritual good implicated in the Christian ideal.¹⁸

According to John Calvin the will of man is bound with the firmest bonds. "Men can effect nothing but by the secret will of God, and can deliberate on nothing but what He has previously decreed and determined by His secret direction." "The will is so bound by the slavery of sin, that it cannot excite itself much less devote itself to anything good." Calvin's statement: "Your mind depends more on the influence of God than on the liberty of your own choice" might well be accepted without admitting that one's "own choice" is turned always to evil as he suggested elsewhere: "For your nature is not only destitute of all good, but is so fertile in all evils that it cannot remain inactive." He considered in detail "the objections commonly urged in the support of free-will." Nevertheless there has been considerable discussion of his position, and it has been maintained that he insisted on human responsibility. Though the most forceful Christian writer critical of the conception of human freedom, he made statements reminiscent of the instability of Augustine. He said the moral law is to receive our "veneration and obedience," and added, "Whatever He requires of us, since He can require nothing but what is right, we are under a natural obligation to obey; but our inability is *our own fault*."¹⁹

It was Luther's attitude to the problem of freedom that led Erasmus to take up his pen against him, publishing his "Diatribes on (or Discussion of) Free Will" in 1524. Erasmus considered free will to be a capacity to apply one's self to things that make for salvation.

He referred to Biblical texts implying or declaring human choice and responsibility for such choice and contended that without freedom repentance would be unmeaning and punishment for sin unjust. "To talk of morality without freedom of choice is absurd." Lutherans called Erasmus a Pelagian and later authorities of the Catholic Church made a like charge against him. Erasmus did not deny the need for and the power of divine grace. The individual must consent to receive grace: it is not forced upon him. "They singularly exaggerate original sin who maintain that the best powers of human nature are so corrupt that it can accomplish nothing of itself except to hate God and to be ignorant of Him." He concluded that "the opinion of those who attribute much to grace but something to free will pleases me best." "The gift of grace is God's, but man's share is the reception of it." ²⁰

In the course of time some Protestant communities have modified their formularies so as to admit a factor of freedom. The strongest influence to this came from Arminius who, at Leyden in the early seventeenth century, said that grace is offered to men, making the good life possible, but it does not force them. It may be resisted and rendered ineffectual. Even the regenerate may lose their justifying faith, fall from a state of grace, and die in their sins. The fourth Arminian Article of 1610 says that grace is "not irresistible, inasmuch as it is written concerning many that they have resisted the Holy Ghost (Acts. ch. vii and elsewhere in many places)." Nevertheless an attitude of indecision is evident in these Arminian Articles, for they also assert that "man has not saving grace of himself, nor of the energy of his free will, inasmuch as he, in the state of apostacy and sin can of and by himself neither think, will, nor do anything that is truly good." Grace is described not merely as the continuance, but also as the beginning of all good. The Arminians have however

generally been understood to insist on man's co-operation (or opposition) through his freedom.²¹

A modern Christian ethics ascribes freedom to individual minds. But two things must be distinguished: the actuality of freedom as such and the limits of its operation. No individual is without an environment. The freedom of the individual has some limits set by his own body. There are other aspects of the physical world which he cannot alter. But the main interest in ethics is with reference to personal relations and personal character. A definite doctrine of freedom in Christian ethics involves that with regard to the exercise of activity in moulding his own character morally there are no limitations. It implies that an individual can "reform" his character; can continually rise to higher levels; that there are no inherent limits to his attainment of perfection of character, whatever perfection may mean. This may or may not be true: it certainly cannot be proved to be false. That divine grace is needed in addition to the activity of will may be admitted. The choice is left to man. Directly or indirectly God may urge but not compel him to choose the good. Having chosen it, he finds himself acting in co-operation with God and so has the support or "grace" which that involves. As Pascal says: "Grace is indeed needed to turn a man into a saint: and he who doubts it does not know what a saint or a man is."²²

What may be said of the actuality of freedom? Much that is irrelevant, little that is truly significant. Arguments may be given to refute the view that human conduct is entirely determined by external conditions and circumstances. Self-determinism, the theory that conduct is determined by the nature of the self fails to touch the centre of the problem because it does not fully recognize the facts of reform or change of character. In the end all that can be significantly said is that freedom as an inner spontaneity is to be accepted on the basis of

the individual's immediate experience of it. What of the relation of individual wills to one another? It has often been said: "You can take a horse to the water, but you cannot compel him to drink." That indicates the essence of the answer to this question. What individuals may do is to assist or prevent the activities of others with respect to the objective world common to them. One may not only give the horse the opportunity to drink; one may also take away or prevent the horse getting that opportunity. Individuals (as such or in groups) may extend or narrow the limits of the exercise of individual wills with respect to what is objective to them. But is there any possibility of one will really controlling another? Though that cannot dogmatically be ruled out, it is certainly open to considerable doubt. For Christian theology the question may be asked whether God can or does control the wills of others. Those who assert that He can may still hold that He does not because the life of man with its opportunity for moral development is by God's intention left in part to his freedom as an indispensable factor. The acts of one's own will are essential in the evolution of personal character: only so may conduct be ethically judged.

As far as the subject of the nature of man is concerned, there remains the doctrine of immortality. Whatever is meant by "immortality," it has never been found possible definitely and finally to "prove" or "disprove" it. Though its acceptance is thus an act of faith, it is not evidently opposed to reason. In general in the history of Christianity immortality has been understood as the survival and continuance of the individual soul after its separation from the body at death. The view that immortality simply implies the eternal values of the good, the true, and the beautiful as though in some transcendent quasi-impersonal Whole—a view which has appealed to some Christian thinkers—must be declared to be due to a worship of ideas. The belief in

personal immortality is associated with the ethical teaching that personal character is of far more worth than the transitory goods of physical life. The supremacy of moral values over other values lies in their intrinsic nature: it holds whether men's souls continue beyond death or not. But the belief that they have a duration beyond that of other values is of significance. The doctrine of immortality in Christianity is a support to the contention that moral values have a predominant claim to priority of consideration; and implicates the possibility of advance in moral well-being beyond what may be reached on earth.²³

Christian tradition has associated with the doctrine of "everlasting life" the further idea of a "resurrection of the body." Here we are not concerned with the stories of the resurrection of Jesus which have been widely accepted as justifying the Christian belief in immortality and the resurrection of the body. Paul gave a new expression when he wrote: "It is sown a natural body; it is raised a spiritual body." But it is not in this direction that the doctrine has its real significance for Christian ethics. Rather it is an expression of a characteristic of man's nature as spiritual, that though he may "fall" in the "death" of sin, he may "rise again" to newness of virtuous life. For the moral life it is fundamental to recognize the capacity for regeneration, even repeated regeneration. A man is not only to be forgiven his sins "until seventy times seven," but to be regarded as capable of repenting and starting again "until seventy times seven." From the standpoint of ethics this idea of spiritual resurrection refers to an essential aspect of the nature of man in accordance with which he should never give way to final despair but may and should have an unceasing hope.²⁴

CHAPTER VI

THE CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE OF GOD AND ITS ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS

Christian ethics teaches that human nature has functions involving relations with a spiritual environment, the being of God. "Finite spirits," wrote Dr. Illingworth, "are as necessarily dependent upon their spiritual environment as are finite bodies upon their material environment; and that spiritual environment is ultimately God." In the Christian view acquaintance with God is possible for every one. The good is known because God reveals Himself. The physical world itself must stand in some relation to man for him to know it. Similarly unless God stands in some relation to man, that is, reveals Himself, man could never know Him. "If God is a reality," writes Karl Heim, "and not to be explained away in the manner of Idolatry and Pantheism, then it is impossible for us, by any observation and thinking of our own, to reach what He is and what He wills. We are thrown back on God's own revelation." Christian ethics rests on an actual acquaintance with God, and not on any philosophical justification of an "idea" of God.¹

Jesus and his immediate followers shared the monotheistic belief of the people of Israel. They give no evidence of arriving at this belief through intellectual reflection, and did not engage in philosophical defence of it. For them God was a reality with Whom they were in some kind of contact. They considered morality not as dependent solely on men and social mores, but as conformity with the "will" of God. Expressed in more modern terms, God is the moral governor of the world and moral "law" is divinely authoritative.

In continuance of the Hebrew attitude, Jesus implied this not merely in his recognition of the two great *commandments*, but also in many of his parables and other sayings in which God is likened to a kingly ruler or described as eventually administering reward or punishment to men according to their deserts. Throughout Christian history this conviction that morality is not simply an invention of man, but has reference to cosmic purposes, has been a firm foundation for Christian conduct. In all the periods of this history it has been emphatically declared that man ought to obey God rather than any contrary commands of human authorities. That was the attitude of the early Christians when refusal to comply with earthly powers led many to martyrdom. Under this principle Roman Catholic authorities judged, condemned, and defied by excommunication and otherwise, sovereign powers during the Middle Ages. All the great Protestant churches have proclaimed this Christian fundamental. "Moral surrender to God," says Dr. Gore, "is the cardinal idea of Christianity." "There is a relation between God and His human creatures," writes Dr. Denney, "a relation of universal moral significance, on which the blessedness of man and his attainment of his chief good are dependent." A widespread neglect or actual rejection of this fundamental principle in modern life has gone along with theories of a moral relativism that fail to recognize the finality of moral values. As a practical consequence individuals and groups, such as nations and business corporations, disregard moral values for what appear terrestrial gains.²

The central fact for Christianity is God as real. He was central for Jesus. Though the Gospels present Jesus as saying remarkably little about God, what they report gives a distinct impression of what He was for him. Jesus was not particularly concerned with descriptions of God. His attention was directed to living in

proper relationship with Him and making clear what that involves for human life and conduct. He emphasized that what is required for acquaintance with God is not intellectual subtlety but childlike simplicity. Jesus felt a personal relationship to God, a communion exemplified in his prayers to Him. His attitude was one of filial submission: "not as I will, but as Thou wilt." His conception of God is suggested by the terms he most frequently used with regard to Him: "Father" and "King." The former is explicitly applied in the first phrase of the prayer he taught his disciples: "Our Father." The latter is involved in the phrase "the Kingdom of God" and is implicated in some of the parables. Neither of these terms was an original contribution of Jesus. They were present in the history of religion long before his time. He experienced God as Father so definitely in his religion as to constitute a vital transformation in the history of religion and of morality. He manifested morality as a filial loyalty and co-operation.

The concept "Father" implies that God is a Spirit, a living being capable of personal relations with mankind of the same kind that men as spiritual may have among themselves. "God is a Spirit, and they that worship Him must worship Him in spirit and in truth." The essential quality of deity, connoted by the term Father, was expressed in the first Epistle of John: "God is love." Jesus represented God as Father as always concerned for His children, striving to bring them back to filial devotion when through neglect or positive wickedness they turned from Him. The Father cares for individuals as individuals. The Gospels do not reveal Jesus' concept of the Father as an unduly sentimental one. As a Jew, he was in a social environment which had developed continuously from a patriarchal form of society. The seat of authority in the family was the father. That fact must not be forgotten in considering the ethi-

cal significance of Jesus' idea of the Fatherhood of God. The Hebrews were conscious of God's righteous anger: "Whom the Lord loveth He chasteneth." The God of the Old Testament was never passively acquiescent towards wrong-doing, though always longing for the return of His people to the paths of righteousness, and willing to receive in worship those of a contrite heart. Jesus never failed to recognize all these aspects of the divine Fatherhood. He insisted that men must repent before they could be in a condition to receive God's love. This is forcibly expressed in the parable of the Prodigal Son. Attention has often been so directed to Jesus' teaching of God as Father as to lead to a neglect of his conception of Him also as King. For Christian ethics this has not infrequently meant a loss of due consideration of the implication of His sovereign rule. It is God the King who is described in the Gospel of Matthew as judging men and administering reward and punishment. From this standpoint the moral is conformity with a Sovereign supreme over all earthly powers, One to whom all human rulers are called on to be subservient.³

Christian thought has retained certain doctrines concerning deity found in the religion of the Hebrews. God is the "creator" of heaven and earth. No responsible Christian theologian has ever suggested that man knows the "how" of creation. The concept is of significance for Christian ethics. For man and nature are therein considered to be the result of the volition of an intelligent Spirit and not of fortuitous processes of substances or forces, however conceived. Human morality is thus accepted as intelligible in an intelligible world. It is an aspect or constituent of God's plan or plans in creation. That in modern times God's creativity is thought of as continuous and evolutionary does not alter the fundamental connotation of the concept. Creation is one expression of God's power. To Him "all things

are possible." In His might, as in His correlative goodness, men may and should put their trust. God also is the "all-seeing," able to look into all men's hearts. Nothing can be concealed from Him. "Whether I am alone or seen of men," wrote Pascal, "I do all my actions in the sight of God Who must judge of them, and to Whom I have consecrated them." Looking upon all men God manifests His loving-kindness, making "His sun to shine on the evil and on the good." He is the "righteous Lord" who will judge all with equity.⁴

Paul gave no general statement of his concept of God. Concerned with preaching a religion of redemption he brought into the foreground the ideas of "the forbearance," "the patience," "the mercy," "the grace" and "the love" of God, who is the "author of peace." God is our Father: we are His sons. He is the creator, the "living God" in continuous relation with His creation. Paul referred to the "eternal power," "the wisdom" and "the glory" of God. He is "true" and "righteous" and will judge mankind. His wrath is directed against all ungodliness. His gift is "eternal life": He "quickeneth the dead." The non-Pauline Epistles of the New Testament contain little concerning the nature of God. "God gives liberally of wisdom to those who ask in faith." "One day is with the Lord as a thousand years, and a thousand years as one day." "God is love"; and "to love God" is to "keep His commandments."⁵

This is not the place to discuss critically the dogma of the divinity of Jesus. The essential thing concerning Jesus for Christian ethics is his character, the attitudes and conduct in his life, the fundamental principles of his moral teachings, and the manner of his acceptance of death. It is sometimes maintained that the doctrine of the Trinity implicates an inner personal relationship of love in the nature of deity. No special consideration need be given to the doctrine of the Holy Spirit, if it is

admitted that God as Spirit may enlighten men's minds revealing to them the nature of the moral good in revealing to them Himself. Christian ethics implies that knowledge of the moral comes through men's relation to God, they seeking, He revealing.

Though the Fourth Gospel and the Pauline Epistles are distinctly Christological in their teaching, the early Fathers and Apologists were more concerned with the practical moral and religious life and the relation of ideas of God to this life than they were with dogmatic Christology. The missionary efforts of the early Christians were directed to the conversion of the comparatively unlearned. Christian teachers were thus critical of the mythological ideas of the popular paganism. They endeavoured to arouse the moral sense against the vices to which the pagan deities were described as addicted. They strenuously opposed the polytheism of the prevailing pagan religions. In this they were in accord with definite tendencies of the higher non-Christian thought of their age. It was one of the first duties of Christians to keep themselves from all practices associated with polytheism. The early persecutions arose primarily through their refusal to participate in pagan rituals of the official cult. They were charged with atheism. The Apologists were very emphatic in their rebuttal of this accusation, being repelled by it, as though implying an absence of moral integrity. The Christian life was actually conceived as one of loyalty to God. In the pagan religion of Rome, the honoring of the emperor was confused with the rites and ideas concerning the supra-mundane: the Christians distinguished clearly between their worship of the one God and their fealty to earthly rulers. In their attitudes and writings the early Christians evidenced a fundamental of Christian ethics that religious practices are not to be considered as of worth because of their political utility, that the Church is not the handmaid of the

State, but a community whose Father and King is God.⁶

The importance the early Christians placed upon their belief in God is illustrated in "The Shepherd of Hermas" in which the *first* Mandate runs as follows: "First of all believe that God is one, even He who created all things and set them in order, and brought all things from non-existence into being, Who comprehendeth all things, being alone incomprehensible. Believe Him, therefore, and fear Him, and in this fear be continent. Keep these things, and thou shalt cast off all wickedness from thyself, and shalt clothe thyself with every excellence of righteousness, and shalt live unto God, if thou keep this commandment." Athenagoras rebutted the charge of atheism on the ground that Christians lived good lives because they believed in God and His judgement of them in "a world to come," and because He sees all by night and by day. He distinguished the Christian belief in God from any merely theoretical philosophical conception of Him, in that it involves definite practical consequences in the Christian mode of life.⁷

The significance of the nature of the Christian belief in God was insisted on in the "Apology" of Aristides. The Christian conception is in marked contrast with that implied in the stories of the immoralities of the deities of the Greek pantheon. Christian belief implies the unity of the ideas of deity and of the good. While pagans too often worshiped the created, Christians distinguished definitely between God, the eternal, and the transient objects of His creation. It was because the Jews had recognized this that they had attained to a true ethical idea of God, and so to a better understanding of human moral ideals than the heathen had achieved. Philosophy may help man to understand aspects of the idea of God. Christian morality, however, Tertullian contended, is not based on the conjectures of human philosophy but on the revelation of God to men.

Though men have by nature some apprehension of God, Christianity makes more explicit what the character of God is. There is a divine authority in the ethical. " 'The great God,' 'the good God,' 'the God which is the giver of all good things,' are forms of speech in every one's mouth upon special occasions. This God is appealed to as 'Judge of the world,' by saying, 'God sees everything,' and 'I recommend myself to God,' and 'God will recompense me.' Oh! What are these sayings but the writings of God upon the heart, but the testimonies of the soul thus far by nature Christian? And when she has these words in her mouth she turns not her eyes to the capitol, but to heaven, as well knowing that to be the residence of the living God, and that He is the author of her being, and heaven the place of her original." ⁸

Ambrose related the Christian ethical ideal definitely with its theism. God is a perfect person, giving men commands for goodness and treating them in accordance with their deserts. God, the giver of the moral law, sees all. His law is stated in the Scriptures. Virtue is essentially an aspiration to God and co-operation with Him. It differs from the contemplative ideal of ancient Greek philosophy in involving a fear and a love of God and an effort for likeness to Him. The imitation of God is pre-eminently in mercy. ⁹

In opposition to heretical movements within the Church and to forms of Gnosticism outside of it, early Christian thinkers made clear that for Christianity God is the creator of physical nature. This was important for Christian ethics in that it implied the possibility of a balanced view free from exaggerated asceticism, and admitting care for the body and participation in worldly affairs. Augustine, who for nine years had associated with Manicheans, later became an outstanding opponent of their view of a radical dualism involving that matter is evil. He maintained that God created all. He

THE CONCEPT OF GOD

never ceased to urge that apart from God man can never reach complete satisfaction and peace. He opened his "Confessions" with the words: "Great art Thou, O Lord, and greatly to be praised; great is Thy power and Thy wisdom infinite. And Thee would man praise; man, but a particle of Thy creation; man, that bears about him his mortality, the witness of his sin, the witness that Thou resistest the proud: yet would man praise Thee; he, but a particle of Thy creation. Thou awakest us to delight in Thy praise; for Thou madest us for Thyself, and our heart is restless until it repose in Thee." Love of God is supreme. Augustine asked and answered: "What do I love, when I love Thee? Not beauty of bodies, nor the fair harmony of time, nor the brightness of the light, so gladsome to our eyes, nor sweet melodies of varied songs, nor the fragrant smell of flowers, and ointments, and spices, not manna and honey, not limbs acceptable to embracement, when I love my God; and yet I love a kind of light, and melody, and fragrance, and meat, and embracement, when I love my God, the light, melody, fragrance, meat, embracement of my inner man: where there shineth unto my soul, what space cannot contain, and there soundeth, what time beareth not away, and there smelleth, what breathing disperseth not, and there tasteth, what eating diminisheth not, and there clingeth, what satiety divorceth not. This is it which I love, when I love my God." Upon this the whole moral life depends. Thomas à Kempis towards the end of the Middle Ages resembled Augustine in the manner in which he expressed the supreme significance of God for Christian life. "Because Thou, O Lord my God, art supremely good above all: Thou alone art most high; Thou alone most powerful; Thou alone most sufficient and most full. . . . For my heart cannot truly rest nor be entirely contented until it rest in Thee: and pass above all gifts and all creatures."¹⁰

The idea of God as Father was overshadowed in the Middle Ages. Attention became very much occupied with discussions of an abstract character concerning the nature of God. With the development of ecclesiasticism, the Church was considered to be the Kingdom of God on earth. The conception of Christ as mediator between men and the Father was interpreted as to include in mediation the pope and his subordinates in the ecclesiastical hierarchy. Rites and sacraments of the Church were considered as instrumental in this mediation. Much attention that should have been directed to God was turned to the Church. Thomas Aquinas summed up and co-ordinated Medieval thought concerning God. He had a high estimate of divinely given human reason, and expounded in detail the conception of God attainable by it. Revelation in the Scriptures, in no way inconsistent with reason, gives us knowledge that unaided men cannot arrive at. Aquinas' elaborate dialectic concerning the existence and the perfection of God, His will, unity, infinity, intelligence and goodness, as creator, conserver and as providence cannot occupy us here. In spite of his apparent denial that men can have a direct awareness of God, he insisted that the only knowledge of God that can truly satisfy the soul is a "vision" of Him. Of Aquinas' position, Dr. Patterson writes: "Although the vision of God is far above human attainment, yet it is not beyond the power of God to raise men thereto." But Aquinas was ecclesiastically minded and recognized that claims to direct awareness and communion with God might be made a basis for rejection of or indifference to the mediatory functions of the Church.¹¹

The Protestant reformers revolted against Scholastic intellectualism to turn again to a simple faith in God as a felt personal relationship. Although Luther's writings involve a theological system he discouraged "all curious speculations of God's unsearchable majesty"

which is "immeasurable, incomprehensible, and infinite." For him the essential thing was for men to experience the grace of God mediated through Jesus Christ. Nevertheless he insisted on the idea of the omnipotence of God to Whom alone salvation is due. God "foreknows, pre-ordains, and accomplishes all through His unchanging and eternal and unfailing will. This principle, he continued, like a lightning stroke strikes to earth and crushes out free will." He did not face the difficulty that according to this view God must have "pre-ordained" and "accomplished" Erasmus' defence of freedom as well as his own rejection of it! ¹²

The theistic basis of Christian morality was clearly stated by John Calvin. "The first foundation of righteousness is certainly the worship of God, and if this be destroyed all the other branches of righteousness like the parts of a disjointed and falling edifice are torn asunder and scattered. . . . We assert that it is the source and soul of righteousness; because men are taught by it to live temperately and justly with one another if they venerate God as the judge of right and wrong." By nature men have an awareness of God: "God hath given to all an apprehension of His existence," but it is the Scripture which brings together and unifies "in our minds the otherwise confused notions of deity; dispels the darkness and gives us a clear view of the true God." Calvin had to admit that men cannot properly understand the Scripture without some immediate inner relation to God. "For as God alone is a sufficient witness of Himself in His own word, so also the word will never gain credit in the hearts of men, till it be confirmed by the internal testimony of the Spirit." This "knowledge of God . . . afforded us in the Scripture . . . invites us first to the fear of God and then to confidence in Him that we may learn to honour Him with perfect innocence of life and sincere obedience to His will and to place all our dependence on His good-

ness." For Christian ethics "the divine will is the perpetual rule" to which men ought to conform. "Moral law binds the conscience, not simply through men's relation to his fellow man or out of consideration for them, but as of God alone." "We are not our own: therefore let us not propose it as our end to seek what may be expedient for us according to the flesh. We are not our own: therefore let us, as far as possible forget ourselves and all things that are ours. On the contrary, we are God's: to Him therefore let us live and die. We are God's: therefore let His wisdom and will preside in all our actions."

Though in His essence God is incomprehensible, and His majesty not to be perceived by the senses, His glory is inscribed in all His works. God is the creator and we must "not disdain to receive a pious delight from the works of God." In them we find manifestations of His power, wisdom and goodness. Calvin, like Luther emphasized the doctrine of God's power in the preservation and government of the world as to suggest the rejection of the idea of the freedom of human will. God "regulates all things in such a manner that nothing happens but according to His counsel" . . . (He) "attends to the government of particular events: . . . they all proceed from His determinate counsel." "We assert that not only the heaven and the earth and inanimate creation, but also the deliberations and volitions of men, are so governed by His providence as to be directed to the end appointed by it." Calvin observed that "from the dictates of common sense and experience the heathen poets call Him the Father of men." Nevertheless, elsewhere, he contended that men cannot conclude that God is Father from a contemplation of the world when their conscience is disturbed on account of sin. Yet the recognition of the Fatherhood of God is essential for the Christian moral life. "Nor will any man freely devote himself to the service of God, unless

he has been allowed to love and reverence Him by first experiencing His paternal love." That service—the purpose of human life—is to glorify God.¹³

Christian ethics rests on the fundamental basis that "God is good." A problem has been raised in this connection which should be briefly considered. Is what God commands good because He commands it? or Does He command it because it is good? The acceptance of the first alternative is supposed to involve that the commands may be purely arbitrary. The second is said to implicate some ideal or standard of good which must be conceived independently of God, by consideration of which He commands. But here we have reached an ultimate, and Christian ethics like all branches of knowledge and systems of thought, cannot escape from the admission of ultimates. Attempts at descriptions or definitions of ultimates are inevitably forms of tautology or like arguments in vicious circles. All that can be said in answer to the problem is thus: "God is good"—"Good is the nature of God." "What God commands is good" and "Men can accept it as good because He commands it." By resting on both horns of the dilemma instead of being impaled on one, an ultimate stability is found. What He commands is in conformity with His nature. He is the objective basis involved in our apprehension of moral good.

An ideal for human conduct is reasonable only if there is a possibility of its attainment. Christian ethics bases upon faith in God the conviction that its ideal is attainable. His "power" so determines the nature of things that the ideal is capable of achievement. The term "almighty" applied to God is, philosophically considered, ambiguous, but a discussion of that must be left for a philosophy of religion. As far as Christian ethics is concerned, all that is needed is the conviction that God's power is sufficient to triumph over all power that might be ranged against Him; sufficient for the whole-

hearted and unhesitating trust of man in Him. But whatever meaning is given to the term "almighty" as applied to God, it may be asked: "If God is both 'good' and 'almighty' why does He not entirely overcome or prevent evil? Or is it that He is 'good' but cannot do this because He is not 'almighty'? Or is it that He is 'almighty' but not all 'good' and Himself causes the evil?"

No answers given to this, the so-called "problem of evil" have ever been regarded as entirely satisfactory. On the ground of the existence of evil some reject belief in God, but they do not thereby escape a problem of evil. Attempts have indeed been made to prove that "there is no such thing as evil." In modern life this view is not infrequently urged, but by persons who seem quite incapable of appreciating the difficulty that even from their standpoint the evil thought or imagination of evil remains. Augustine's somewhat similar view that evil is privative, simply the absence of good, not only contradicts experience but also still leaves us with the "evil" of "finitude." Christian ethics acknowledges the reality of evil, especially in the forms of sin and suffering. Though no claim is made that the "problem of evil" is therein solved, Christian ethics certainly bears significantly on certain aspects of the problem.

As discussed in the preceding chapter, according to Christian ethics man has the capacity of choice. He enjoys or suffers the consequences of his choices. God has provided scope for man's moral action and opportunity for moral achievement and development. The power that He has accorded to men, even in its totality may be small, but it may be sufficient to develop or to destroy human civilization. Having accorded man this power, He does not "step in" to deprive him of any of it, or to interfere with the consequences which in the nature of His creation follow from their particular forms of exercise of it. Thus the question is often asked: Why

does not God prevent or stop human wars? The answer of Christian ethics is that to do so He would place a restriction that He does not intend on man's choices and limit the scope of man's moral responsibility and possibility of moral achievement. War is an evil introduced by the immoral use of man's capacity of choice: by sins of commission on the part of the instigators, by sins of omission on the part of those who have not worked sufficiently for conditions that would prevent wars.

The physical world with its processes and the psychological nature of man with its capacity for social relationship are not of man's creation. The characteristics of these, upon which human life and development in major part depend, are regarded by Christian ethics as aspects of a divine scheme, or divine schemes. The moral life of man is to fulfil a divine intention. This is what is meant in describing morality as conformity with God's will. Thus the Christian conception of sin is not that of simple social wrongdoing or crime: it is opposition to His will, lack of co-operation to achieve His intention, alienation from Him. "This, says Dr. Illingworth, "is the essence of the Christian view of sin, that it consists in alienation from God and further that 'all unrighteousness is sin': that is to say that vice and wrong done to our own nature, and crime and wrong done to society, only are what they are because ultimately they are sins, or acts of disobedience to God."¹⁴

The possibility of falling into sin is a necessary concomitant of the possibility of moral life and development itself. The recognition of this involves an important consideration, relevant to ethics and the existence of evil, which Dr. Sorley has elaborated in his "Moral Values and the Idea of God." The imperfection of the world as judged by man, the fact that men are not by nature harmoniously co-ordinated with one another or with their physical environment, is a necessity for moral achievement. As Dr. Sorley puts it:

"an imperfect world was required for the making of moral beings; they had to be tried in and habituated to, all kinds of circumstances, in order that they might grow into goodness." "The variety of natural and social conditions offers a training ground for the good will . . ." From the ethical point of view therefore "the very imperfection of the world" may be regarded as evidence of God's moral purpose for mankind. Christian ethics acknowledges the possibility and in many instances the actuality of moral significance in some suffering. In the effort, often painful, that he puts forth to preserve his life, man develops moral strength. His own suffering gives an opportunity for fortitude; the sufferings of others draw him in closer bonds of sympathy and service to them. Though earthly existence may be in part "a vale of tears" it is also "a vale of soul-making." But Dr. Illingworth exaggerates when he says "it is an incontestable fact of experience that suffering can fashion human character as nothing else can do," a statement that he himself corrects later when he says simply that "pain and sorrow are among the factors in the development of character." According to Christian ethics it is love and kindness that best fashion human character, and parents, pastors, teachers and social workers, have certainly enough experience to justify that view.¹⁵

The Christian doctrine of God implicates that reality is not to be understood or described as a fortuitous concourse of physical elements nor as a meaningless sequence of events. Man as intelligent finds himself in a world more intelligible than chaotic. Only one side of his nature responds to the abstract idea of an impersonal Order. The source and ground of the intelligibility of the world, and of his own intelligence and other aspects of his nature, moral, emotional, and volitional, the Christian finds not in any such abstraction but in an actual Being, a Supreme Spirit, God. Morality, of intrin-

sic significance, nevertheless is within the wider cosmic, or otherwise expressed, theistic Whole. In further stressing the nature of God, from the moral point of view, as "Father," Christian ethics frees the ethical from consideration of achievements by force or power, and presents it rather as persuasion in and through personal relationship. In the moral realm the power of God does not compel obedience; He authoritatively commands it, and looks for filial loyalty which His love may or may not be allowed to inspire leading to the fulfilment of His commands.

In modern life there is very much confusion of thought concerning the Christian idea of God. This confusion is not found so much among the ordinary members of the Christian communities as among scholars within and beyond them. The former continue to live with some kind of consciousness of a personal relationship, however vague and ill-defined, with God who is felt to be watching over them, seeing them, to Whom with or without words they may lift their hearts in supplication or adoration. On the other hand, there are scholars of eminence who reject the description of God as "personal," without even investigating the significance of that term. Notwithstanding anthropomorphic terms used symbolically with reference to God, Christianity like the Judaism out of which it first arose, has never meant by "personal" any kind of physical resemblance to man. What is implied is stated in the phrase: "God is a Spirit." Man as spirit is made in "His image." A spirit is a being the qualities and functions of which are intelligence or wisdom, will, and feeling. In so far as all or any one of these qualities or functions have dominance in reality, the "personality" of God in the Christian sense is so far implicated. Any description of reality as a whole in "impersonal terms" is implicitly, if not explicitly, due to a conception of it as non-rational.

During the latter half of the nineteenth century there were marked tendencies among some Christian thinkers to stress the idea of God as immanent in nature and man. In England and America this was due in part to somewhat delayed influence of forms of Hegelian idealism. It was also an attempt to find a mode for Christian thought to admit evolution (in its main character if not in its details) as propounded by biologists of the period. But these tendencies did not represent the continuing Christian tradition which was still expounded in the literature used in the theological seminaries and involved in the religious reading of laymen. There was a lack of clarity in the statements of the doctrine of divine immanence, and a failure to distinguish in nature and man between the immanent deity and what is not such. In essence the immanental conceptions of deity are a fusion, rather veritably a confusion, of a conceptual Idealism and a romantic Naturalism: and they share the defects of both. An exposition of an immanental theology in England by Dr. R. J. Campbell in a volume entitled "The New Theology" had a very short-lived popularity, and not long after its publication the author himself seemed to recognize its defects as an account of the Christian doctrine of God.

The merely immanental conception of deity appears to have become the terminology of a form of idealized Naturalism which glorifying the integrating processes in nature and mankind ignores, generally surreptitiously, those of disintegration. Without seriously endeavouring to make clear the idea of divine immanence and to overcome the difficulties involved, some later Christian writers have supposed it possible to maintain the fundamental Christian conception by affirming at one and the same time the immanence and the transcendence of God. Notwithstanding this and other aberrations in the course of the history of Christian the-

ology, for Christianity as a religion and as involving morality there has been throughout Christian history radical opposition to *any* confusion of God with His creation. The rejection of these forms of presentation of God as immanent does not entail a lapse into a type of eighteenth century Deism. It means the maintenance of the traditional Christian theism, that God is *a Spirit* Who is in continuous relation with His creation. He has been described as "preserver" and "sustainer," but this does not imply holding the "created" in a static condition. Nothing may have been created as static; and nothing may be sustained as static. The Christian theist may accept a doctrine of evolution without committing himself to the conceptions of divine immanence that have been expounded in modern times. God for Christian morality is a spirit the fundamental nature of Whom is described as wisdom, love and will, characteristics known to us as those of personality. He is the source of the moral ideal, and in communion with Him the moral life may realize its consummation.¹⁶

The attribute of "immutability" ascribed to God by Christian theology, "God, the same, yesterday and for ever," does not mean "changelessness," which would suggest a life-less being, but continued consistency of character. The world, created by such an immutable Being, is one in which there can be a continuity of consistent moral life. What is morally "good" today is morally good always, though the "right" relative to it may vary with time and place. Moral values as ultimate in the divine Being and absolute in the ideal for man, are consistent with a relativism of moral rules of conduct contingent on circumstances. God's immutability implies the permanence of absolute moral values in Him.

God is real for the Christian life. In his treatment of "The Vision of God" as the *summum bonum* of Christian life, Dr. Kirk has given a definite exposi-

tion differentiating Christian ethics from all secular systems. He maintains that Christianity came "into the world with a double purpose, to offer men the vision of God and to call them to the pursuit of that vision." As he shows in some detail, both Hebrew and Greek thought had affinities with and anticipations of this ideal. Jesus had said "Blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall see God." Though these words seem "to stand even without an echo in the Synoptic tradition," Dr. Kirk is justified in asserting that "in actual fact the idea of the vision dominates both" Jesus' teaching and the Synoptic presentation of his life. "Jesus spoke first and foremost of God and only in the second place of man and his conduct" for, from the Christian standpoint " 'self-centeredness' even in the morally earnest is the greatest snare of life; 'God-centeredness' the only true salvation." "The vision of God is the thought to which Paul recurs in some at least of his most exalted moments, and it cannot be denied that it dominates" the Fourth Gospel and the First Epistle of John, a vision not to the physical eye but in spiritual intuition. In "allotting to prayer the primacy among Christian activities" Monasticism was in conformity with this attitude, for prayer in its truest sense involves a "looking towards God." The ultimate ideal for Augustine was "the vision of God in the city of God." Though the position of Aquinas is open to discussion there are some good grounds for maintaining, as Dr. Kirk does, that by him "the intuitive vision of the divine essence—the sight of God face to face—is sternly reserved for eternity." Whatever the terminology that has been used in Christian history or may be used today, it must be insisted that for Christianity "personal contact with God is of the essence of that towards which the good life is directed."¹⁷

CHAPTER VII

CRITICISMS OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS

That Christians have not always fully understood the implications of Christian ethics and have frequently failed to live in accordance with them is admitted; but that critics have been able to offer a more acceptable conception of the moral life and its ideal is strenuously denied. The type of answer to them must consist of a statement of Christian ethics in its general principles and in its details. This whole book is to be regarded as such an answer. Some particular questions are dealt with in other chapters; but certain types of criticism have been frequently reiterated, or have been associated with some eminent thinkers. It is with some of these that we are immediately concerned.

The manner in which some modern criticisms are to be met depends upon the standpoint from which Christian ethics is considered. Two points of view are possible in theory. According to one Christian ethics is based on the authority of Jesus, who provided in his personality, life and teaching a perfect ideal. According to the other Christian ethics is the moral implications of Christian theism, the conception of which is subject to development. God, central for ethics as Jesus understood it, is also central for Christian ethics in our own time. For this view, criticisms of Jesus and his teachings do not touch the main characteristics of Christian ethics nor undermine it in any way.

Mr. Henry Sturt writes that the whole career of Jesus, his little rustic mission in Galilee and pitiful death in Jerusalem was "a very trifling affair," and that it is entirely against the notion of progress that we should get our moral view from a Jewish teacher of nineteen centuries ago. "To trust him for guidance in our mod-

ern world," writes Mr. Floyd, "is to pin faith on an incompetent instructor." "Jesus did not explain relations between man and wife, nor between employer and employee, nor how to educate children, nor how to preserve health, nor how to make a living, nor how to prevent war, poverty and suffering." He contends further that his spiritual advice was not clearly enough expressed to enable man to apply it to modern conditions. Yet that "little rustic mission," in spite of what Mr. Sturt calls its "transience," has become a world-wide movement in human history. From Jesus the chief impetus has come to bring a fundamental principle of permanent worth into the centre of human ethics. Vital and ultimate principles of morality do not belong specifically to any one age. It may be admitted that Jesus was a man of his own time. But that in no manner rules out the possibility of his grasping principles that may be valid for all times and places.¹

There have been adverse comments concerning certain traits of Jesus' character and conduct. The claims he made and his attitude on some occasions are said to reveal him as intensely egotistical. He may have made the claims because they were true, or they may have been wrongly ascribed to him by others. The occasional vehemence of his language is condemned: "O generation of vipers"; "Ye serpents"; "a liar like unto you"; "All that ever came before me are thieves and robbers." With such utterances is allied his cursing of the barren fig-tree; even though "the time of figs was not yet." In some of these circumstances strong words were needed. Jesus did not refrain from holding up to the wicked the prospects of the pains of hell. He insisted on repentance as a condition for forgiveness. Hell is not for those who sincerely repent, for God abides as a Father to forgive His prodigal sons. The harsh words of Jesus were for such as did not repent. His driving the money changers from the temple courts has been

described as a manifestation of anger. He *was* angry: he was intensely opposed to the degradation of things meant for religious worship to the use of mere worldliness. That was righteous anger: "Be ye angry and sin not." The criticism has been made that on one occasion he was disrespectful to his mother, in saying: "Woman, what have I to do with thee?" His rebuke was more in pity than in anger. Though he said to the Syro-Phoenician woman, "It is not meet to take the food of the children and give it unto dogs," in the end he helped her. Revolting from his own statement of the view that "salvation was of the Jews," by his act he took a definite step to the universalism which has characterized Christian ethics.

Jesus' asceticism has been condemned. But it was involved in the performance of his work, and not because he regarded as bad the things he denied himself. He accepted invitations to eat with the rich. The complaint was made that his disciples did not fast as the Pharisees did. Jesus is not recorded to have indulged in any physical self-torture, except his alleged fasting for forty days. It may not be possible entirely to rebut the charge that he did not fully appreciate the goods of the physical life. Yet to the objection that he taught the complete renunciation of worldly goods, Dean Rashdall has justly replied that he did so only in special cases. The "otherworldliness" of Jesus' attitude consisted in his primary attention to moral and spiritual goods. "The Kingdom of God is within you": personal character and love, trust and integrity. He criticized wealth only in so far as it was a hindrance to attention to the highest goods of life. He assumed that men would usually seek their physical welfare without any specific urging by him. Actually in several of his parables he referred with evident approval to men diligent in the ordinary affairs of earthly life. The main purpose of his teaching was to lead them to more attention

to moral and spiritual values, which they were inclined to neglect. So viewed the contention that Jesus' teaching was "otherworldly" is the recognition of an important truth.

It is sometimes objected that some of Jesus' utterances are obscure, and his treatment of main problems too inadequate to be really helpful. On the one hand he exhorted to non-resistance and on the other the rendering to Caesar, thus involving, says one critic, the submission for military service. The contention that his teaching of non-resistance to evil is inconsistent with "manly self-respect," depends upon what really is involved in "manly self-respect." A man may be equally or even more manly in the self-control of "turning the other cheek" than in giving blow for blow. His attitude to sex-life is also said to have been ambiguous. He advocated purity of thought, word and deed, and yet condoned the fault of the woman taken in adultery. He took part in a marriage feast and on a number of occasions spoke as though celibacy is the ideal.

The parable of the laborers in the vineyard has been criticized as an approval of injustice. But those who worked longest received what had been agreed upon. The Lord was generous to those who had worked less. That was not favoritism, for all worked from the times they were given the opportunity to do so: as their willingness was equal, their reward was equal. Another writer has argued that in the parable of the prodigal son, our sympathy ought to be with the older brother. "There may be joy in heaven," he says, "over such a reveller who repents when he hopes to gain some advantage for himself, and the angels may sing songs of gladness on his account: but we are upon earth and before all things we desire justice, justice for all men." Jesus' ethics was not restricted by ordinary ideas of justice. He wished to point to something better: love. In the parable he illustrated his approval of the father

manifesting forgiveness and love and the gladness that come with it, and his disapproval of the older brother inspired by the common notion of justice. The allegation that the parable of the unjust steward commends dishonesty entirely misses its purpose, which was to urge men to attend to their spiritual interests with the assiduity that the steward applied to his material gains. The exhortation: "Take no thought for the morrow" has been interpreted to imply that Jesus did not teach prudence and thrift. But his main objective was the personal moral character of men, their love of one another, and their communion with God. What we shall eat, what we shall drink, wherewithal we shall be clothed, are of subsidiary importance. If men are constantly worrying about these things they will be distracted from the more important values. Jesus was obviously warning men against excessive anxiety and concern for material goods.

The central principle of Christian ethics has been attacked on the ground that it is psychologically impossible to love everybody. Love, it is urged, is a form of emotion and cannot be generated towards everybody by acts of will. In Christian love there is undoubtedly a strong emotional element as an aspect of its worth. But men can and do suppress some emotions and cultivate others. Kindliness, a constituent of love, can undoubtedly be developed; and its opposite suppressed. Christian love is not simply an emotion: it is a practical moral attitude. It is not impossible for men to aim at the welfare of all others, independent of age, sex, race, nation, or creed, as children of the same Father. Christian love is not a sentimental emotionalism, but an emotional activism expressing itself in service.

It is objected that Christianity teaches a submission to suffering. Undoubtedly Christian ethics is opposed to escape from suffering by resort to unethical conduct. It teaches that vice is to be shunned rather than suffering.

For the achievement of a good, some suffering may rightly be accepted. That admitted, there is nothing in Christian ethics against the adoption of every moral means to eradicate any suffering that can be eliminated. Christian ethics calls for fortitude in face of suffering that cannot be avoided or morally escaped from. The exhortation to "Take up one's cross" has been considered to exaggerate self-sacrifice. Dean Rashdall met this criticism by contending that Jesus' teaching is that one should love one's neighbour as one's self—not more than one's self. However, he recognized that sometimes for the greater good of others one's own good may need to be sacrificed. That such self-sacrifice is sometimes called for, implicates the so far unsolved problem of evil. It has been contended that Christianity directs attention to past sins, and arouses self-condemnation and remorse, in themselves futile and sometimes even detrimental. This objection indicates a failure to understand certain definite characteristics of the Christian point of view. Not to repent of a wrong past act, and not to compensate for it to the best of one's ability, suggests a continuance of an evil attitude, an enduring defect of character. It is simply untrue to say that Christians are so much concerned with past sins that their occupation with the affairs of the present and future is thereby adversely affected.

There has been much justification for the criticism that Christian ethics especially in the past has taught a neglect of this world, often with the motive of obtaining bliss in a future world. Formerly many probably of the best men and women were led to neglect the duties of ordinary life. The doctrine of "otherworldliness" has been too often used to support the continuance of unrighteous social conditions by diverting attention from injustice. In the course of history a less erroneous view of Christian morality has emerged. While emphasis is still placed on the intrinsic worth of good char-

acter, attention is given to the value of happiness on earth. But the critics seem to imply that a future life may and need not be taken into account. To any such suggestion, Christian ethics is opposed. Its vision is not limited to the conditions of earth. Christians have been charged with inadequate appreciation of the true and the beautiful, even with not infrequent opposition to their cultivation. Contrasted with the attitudes of the ancient Greeks, Christian ethics has deliberately placed the emphasis on moral goodness of character and conduct. Though Christian churches at times hindered the advance of knowledge, they have also promoted it.²

These last types of criticism are implied in modern movements described as "ethical" or "secular" churches or societies. The British Secular Union, founded about 1874, maintained principles the tenor of which was to counteract the "otherworldliness" of the Christian attitude. "We judge conduct by its issues in this world only." "The promotion of our individual and of the general wellbeing in this world is at once our highest wisdom and duty." The criticism implied counts against that form of Christian ethics expressed pre-eminently in monasticism. A Christian might even accept the contention made that the concerns of this present life claim our primary attention: the question is then as to the *relative* importance of *different aspects* of this life. When the emphasis is placed on human effort, with an implied doubt of divine aid, it may be replied that nothing in Christianity suggests that the believer himself should not strive morally to the utmost.³

Christian ethics has place for all the moral values that ethical culture movements positively stand for. Thus the statement of Mr. Adler of the "Ethical Movement" is in accordance with Christian ethics: "I assert first my indefeasible self-hood which is never to be sacrificed, secondly, in ethical experience I assert the indefeasible self-hood of my fellows." There is no

question of actually "sacrificing one's self-hood": according to Christian ethics in "losing" one's soul one veritably "saves" it. There is surely nothing contrary to the Christian viewpoint in "the consecration of life towards the ethically perfect society . . . living in promoting the life in others with a view to the perfect unity of life among all spiritual natures." Mr. Salter actually describes morality in terms that sound like a paraphrase of a Christian principle: "morality *is* this going out of one's self and living in, living for, something larger." If that *is* morality, then the criticism that "Jesus does not furnish a basis broad enough and large enough for the present and coming time" either is unjustified or applies equally to the position of Mr. Salter, for that is one of the things Jesus taught. What Mr. Bridges "assumes"—"that all men are beings possessing intrinsic and unconditional worth"—has been constantly reiterated among Christians. "The Churches," writes Mr. Elliott, "celebrate the holy communion as their most sacred symbol of the relation of God with man. The Ethical Religion bases itself on another kind of holy communion, that of men with men, and endeavours to express this sense of the ultimate sacredness in daily living and in the work of the world." The Churches in attending to the former have not excluded the latter. The ritual of the Holy Communion is a corporate one, and with the "love of God" Christian ethics also insists on the "love of man." These ethical culture societies have their main significance in their attempt to dissociate the ethical from Christian doctrines that are found unacceptable. "We assert the independence of morality." Yet one writer in the same volume admits the religious attitude to morality: "Regarded as the effort of the finite to relate itself to the infinite; to get into vital touch with something infinitely sublime, sacred, exalting, religion is an ultimate spiritual need of universal human nature."⁴

Though in his own opinion Leo Tolstoy was a preacher of genuine Christian ethics based on his interpretation of the teaching of Jesus as found in the Gospels, he was a critic of Christian ethics as he found it generally conceived in his own day as the result of historical development. He described his aim: "to find out the eternal law of God from amidst the precepts men call His law." In the preface to "The Gospel in Brief," he wrote: "I sought a solution of the problem of life, and not of a theological or historical question." In the course of his life his views changed, and he left many of his ideas indefinite. Thus, his constant references to God are as though to a personal Being, yet, says Mr. Maude, "he did not believe in a personal God—that is to say, he was not prepared to make definite statements on a matter he could not verify." He came eventually to accept the idea of a continuance of his spiritual being, but he did not definitely affirm a belief in personal immortality.

Tolstoy referred to his work "The Union and Translation of the Four Gospels" as more important than anything he had written. According to Mr. Maude, he omitted from it anything which "he did not understand or disapproved of"; and his expressions of some of the teachings of Jesus are "too rigid, too logical, too precise and unqualified to be true," and in special cases not in harmony with the evidence. He discarded much of the ethical tradition of the churches. He concluded his book entitled: "The Kingdom of God is within you," with the statement: "The only significance of life consists in helping to establish the Kingdom of God." Without giving adequate attention to the Christian principle that one is to love one's neighbour *as one's self*, Tolstoy, overemphasizing certain sayings of Jesus exaggerated the idea of renunciation. "There is no other love than this, that a man should lay down his life for his friend. Love is love only when it is the sacrifice

of one's self." "Real love always has at its foundation renunciation of individual happiness." "True love becomes possible only on the renunciation of happiness for the animal personality."

In contrast with the general recognition of political government by Christian ethics in history in accordance with teachings of the New Testament and the early Church, Tolstoy's position has been called "Christian Anarchism." He maintained that the principal deviation from the doctrine of Jesus, an ecclesiastical perversion, has been and is the evasion of the commandment that forbids man to resist evil by violence. "I was taught to resist an offender by violence; to avenge a private insult; or one against my native land by violence." Yet, he asks: "Is not all Christianity summed up in the words: 'Love thine enemies'?" "Resist not evil"; offer violence to no-one, is a fundamental principle of Christian ethics. The great distinctiveness of Christianity is that it abjures all use of force to gain its ends. "Christ says: you think to destroy evil by evil. That is irrational. In order that there shall be no evil, do no evil." "Christians in name, professing the principles of liberty, equality and fraternity . . . in the name of liberty . . . yield to the most abject and slavish obedience; in the name of equality . . . approve of the most rigid and senseless subdivision of men into classes; and in the name of fraternity are ready to slay their own brothers." As he interpreted it, Christian ethics involved the elimination of all political authority. "The Christian who contemplates that law of love implanted in every human soul, and quickened by Christ, the only guide for all mankind, is set free from human authority." In contrast with general Christian practice he opposed making use of, or admitting the right of, law courts. Jesus' saying: "Judge not, that ye be not judged" he considered to be a definite rejection of the whole juridical system. Courts of

law resist evil. They return evil for evil. They punish: they do not forgive. He says Jesus actually forbade going to law: "If any man sue thee at law for thy coat, let him have thy cloak also." To act as judge or to serve on a jury is to judge others, and that is un-Christian. No man is qualified to judge another: judgement must be left to God alone. The violence used in the enforcement of human laws only serves to increase evil.

Tolstoy fought against two views, frequently expressed, which seemed to him not only erroneous but also pernicious. The first was that ideal Christian conduct — Christian love — is impossible of observance owing to the weakness of human nature. Against this he maintained that actually the Christian law of love is not difficult and that it can be realized on earth. The second was that Christian ethics is simply a concern of private personal life. "To affirm that the Christian doctrine refers only to personal salvation and has no bearing upon State affairs is a great error." Our lives are interwoven with others in society. But if we are to live as Christians we must dissociate ourselves from everything co-ercive in social organization. Any such co-ercion is antagonistic to Christian morality. An adequate survey of Christian ethics might have prevented Tolstoy from maintaining that in the teaching of the Church the "struggle between the intellectual and the animal nature of man which lies in the soul of each, and is the substance of the life of each, is entirely set aside." Throughout Christian history there have been those who have contended, as Tolstoy, that "The doctrine of Christ—that life cannot be assured and that we must be ready for suffering and death every moment of our lives—is incontestably better than the teaching of the world, which says that we must strive to make our lives as comfortable as we can. . . ."

Tolstoy's criticism is of the nature of an exaggeration

and over-emphasis as against the effort through history to arrive at a balanced conception of the contents of Christian ethics. He gave a literal and sometimes an expanded interpretation to some of Jesus' sayings and neglected others. He paid no regard to teachings of Paul and other New Testament writers which have been accepted by the leaders of Christianity. Apart from his emphasis on Christian love, his teaching tended to be negative. If the following commandments are fulfilled there would be peace among men: "Be at peace with all, consider none foolish; annihilate all enmity; avoid what leads to carnal lusts; never take oaths or vows; avoid vengeance and so-called human justice; avoid enmity between States: all men are your brethren." He spoke frequently of "the law of Christ" and tended towards a legalistic interpretation of Jesus' sayings. He came to exaggerate the factor of suffering in human life, and almost to treat renunciation as though of worth in itself. He felt it necessary to revolt against the pride of the Russian nobility, the servility of the Russian ecclesiastics, and the bad conditions of the masses. He taught scorn of the approbation that comes from obedience to the law of men, and spoke of the love, humility, self-denial, persecution and sorrow that is the life of the true follower of Jesus. The attitude implied in Tolstoy's teaching was not one of feeble sentimentalism but of moral strength. He saw that it would call for fortitude and courage in submitting to persecution and suffering inflicted by "the world." Yet as Mr. Maude rightly comments, he "sets up superstitions of his own in place of those he overthrows. His superstitions are the 'principles' of Non-resistance, No-government, No-human-law, No-property." ⁵

The aggressiveness and self-assertion repudiated by Tolstoy has been considered to be defended and championed by Friedrich Nietzsche. In the many writings of Nietzsche there is such a wealth of detail that any

brief statement is likely to be partial. It may be asked whether he is consistent throughout, or whether in the course of his life his views altered. Towards the end of this account the latter is suggested. "A criticism of Christian morality," he wrote, "is altogether lacking." More than anyone else he has been regarded as providing such a criticism and that with tremendous force. He said of himself: "I am not a man, I am dynamite." The main purpose of his writings was ethical. In fact he maintained that an ethical motive is present in all philosophies: "the moral (or immoral) purpose in every philosophy has constituted the vital germ out of which the entire plant has always grown." Thus in his presentation of "a transvaluation of all values" he rejected doctrines upon which Christian ethics seemed to him to depend, the existence of God, the spiritual nature of man and his personal immortality. "God is dead." Man is no longer to be derived from Spirit, from God, but placed back among the animals. "The awakened one, the knowing one, saith: 'Body am I entirely, and nothing more, the soul is only the name of something in the body.'" In contrast with Christian philosophy his "fundamental" idea is that of "eternal recurrence." He accepted what appeared to him to be the essentials of the doctrine of biological evolution as expounded in his day: inheritance and the struggle for existence. Advance is achieved through conflict with the survival and continuance through inheritance of the strong and healthy, the elimination of the diseased and the subordination of the weak. If not hindered, natural evolution must eventually lead beyond man as we now know him, to a stage which he calls Superman.

Nietzsche posed fundamental ethical questions and gave his answers: "What is good? All that elevates the feeling of power; the will to power; and power itself in man. What is bad? All that proceeds from weak-

ness. What is happiness? The feeling that power increases, that resistance is being overcome." His ideal is thus not simply "the will to live" but "the will to power," not as leading to anything but as good in itself. "Only where there is life there is also will, not however, Will to Life, but—so teach I thee—Will to Power." "This world is the Will to Power—and nothing else"—a "Dionysian world of eternal self-creation, of eternal self-destruction."

From that standpoint Nietzsche in the main developed his criticism of Christian ethics as he understood it. "I regard Christianity, he wrote, as the most fatal and seductive lie that has ever yet existed. . . . The *morality of paltry people* as the measure of all things. . . ." Christianity "is a degenerative movement." It "says, 'No,' to all that is natural." It is "the denial of the Will to live." It was born out of the spirit of resentment, "a great rebellion against domination by noble values." He said he fought Christianity because "it aims at destroying the strong, at breaking their spirit . . . at converting their proud assurance into anxiety and conscience trouble. . . ." In contrast with his own ethics of a Will to power, he regarded Christian ethics as implying a morality of submission. Christian morality is antagonistic to the methods of evolution. Christian love, caring for the feeble, the sick, and the diseased, keeps them alive, while the natural struggle for existence would eliminate them. Through Christian morality the strength and health of the community is lowered. The Christian virtue of humility is not conducive to preservation and dominance. To resist is in conformity with human dignity: not to resist is to invite inevitable destruction. Nietzschean "master morality" is opposed to Christian "slave morality." "In the sphere of so-called moral valuations, there is no greater contrast than that between master morality and the morality of the Christian conception of worth."

"Master morality *affirms*, just as instinctively as Christian morality *denies*."

"The Christian faith from the beginning, is sacrifice: the sacrifice of all freedom, all pride, all self-confidence of spirit: it is at the same time subjection, self-derision, and self-mutilation." Christianity is a religion of "pity," of "sympathy" which not only increases the sum of suffering but is a form of hypocritical selfishness. "The sentiment of surrender, of sacrifice for one's neighbour, and all self-renunciation morality, must be mercilessly called to account and brought to judgment. . . ." The Christian idea of sin, the scorn for the body and flight from the world, are all to be rejected. Nevertheless "the continuance of the Christian ideal belongs to the most desirable of desiderata," for it gives something to fight against and become master of. As Dr. Foster wrote "critics are mistaken in declaring that Nietzsche totally rejects Christian morality. He rejects it only for the masters, not for the slaves."

Nietzsche rejected the Christian doctrines of God and of the spiritual nature of man. It may be doubted whether he ever seriously considered the grounds upon which Christian thinkers accept those doctrines. Apparently he revolted from them because he considered them implicated in certain attitudes and conduct among Christians with whom he was acquainted. Thus he interpreted Christian charity or love as "pity" or "sympathy" (Mitleid). As a matter of fact he stressed what is and has been emphasized in Christian ethics. He constantly insisted that "man is something that has to be surpassed." That, like Christian ethics, admits the defects in man. But Nietzsche pointed onwards to "the superman," while Christianity points to God and to the spiritual advance of man. The student of the history of religion in general and of Christianity in particular is not surprised to find Nietzsche saying "We are tired of *man*." From its theistic standpoint Christian ethics cer-

tainly does not involve a restriction of "neighbour love" to those contemporaneously around us, though inevitably in practice it is those who are immediately concerned. It implies recognition of duties to the yet unborn. With a question as to the meaning of "superman," Christian ethics is not in essential discord with the positive aspects of Nietzsche's statement: "Let the future and the furthest be the motive of thy today; in thy friend thou shalt love the Superman in thy motive. My brethren, I advise you not to neighbour love—I advise you to furthest love!"

It has sometimes been maintained that Nietzsche's ethics was a return to Hellenistic views: it certainly was not merely so. But though with change in tone in interpretation the "cardinal virtues" of the Greco-Roman world were taken up into Christian ethics. Whatever the aberrations among Christians, truth and wisdom have been insisted on, though the wisdom may involve a more profound contemplation of God than Nietzsche seems to have been able to appreciate. Christian ethics has certainly never underestimated courage, but it has not identified it with the strength of the physically fit who may triumph in battle. Courage has been called for in face of suffering. In fact Nietzsche himself, though perhaps with exaggeration, echoed something of the Christian view when he wrote "As deeply as man looketh into life, so deeply also doth he look into suffering."

In the past Christian ethics has given little if any recognition to laughter, but there has been nothing in it ruling out laughter and a modern Christian ethics may accord it a place. The Christian life has certainly not been and is not devoid of laughter. On the other hand in spite of Nietzsche's exhortation: "Ye higher men, learn I pray you—to laugh," his writings suggest a man of grim earnestness rather than one himself addicted to laughter. Their satire is clever: whether it is or was

meant to be humorous may be questioned. Nietzsche also stressed joy. Throughout the history of Christian ethics there has been an insistence on joy, but it is a spiritual joy felt as enduring and more deeply satisfying than a boisterousness of physical health or a glow of satisfaction at triumph over an opponent, the overcoming of resistance, the kind of joy suggested by Nietzsche. Christianity has never denied the worth of physical health: indeed it has opposed ascetics who in heresy neglected the body. It may reasonably be maintained that much of what has been done for the improvement of physical health in the occident and by medical missionaries in the orient has been done with Christian inspiration. Christians, like Nietzsche, can and do applaud health in those who have it, but unlike him they acknowledge a duty to help all those to it who lack it. His contention that their activities in this direction are degenerative has not been proved, and the opposite may be maintained if we think not merely of the few but of the many, not simply of the "masters" but of mankind in general.

In some respects Nietzsche supported the Christian view concerning the individual against a tendency of modern times to subordinate the individual to the State. In his opposition to democracy he made many gibes against the idea that "all men are equal," the meaning of the Christian statement of which "before God" he certainly misunderstood. Yet with some justification he described the State as the "new idol," and with some exaggeration declared: "False is everything in it." Though he gave no sign of being aware of it, he was entirely in accord with Christian ethics when he denounced as a fundamental error the regarding "the herd as an aim instead of the individual. . . . Nowadays people are trying to understand the herd as they would an individual, and to confer higher rights upon it than upon isolated personalities. Terrible mistake!!" Yet

Nietzsche fell into an Individualism which entirely failed to do justice to the dependencies of individuals within the social group. The theory of biological evolution has become much more elaborate and comprehensive than it was in Nietzsche's time: important factors are insisted on which he did not recognize. The struggles of life are in large measure between individuals, but Nietzsche did not take sufficiently into account what Kropotkin emphasized: that those species survive in which there is (along with other things) mutual aid and social solidarity. That gives even a biological basis for an ethics of co-operation, and is already a big step back to the actual teaching of Christian ethics. Christian ethics is just as emphatic as Nietzsche concerning the individual, but it also regards as equally important the social relations of individuals in "the Kingdom of God."

Nietzsche had a radically unsatisfactory view of Christianity as fundamentally a feeble sentimental sympathy and pietism, a submission to suffering rather than an endeavour to overcome it. He paid little attention to the strenuous efforts of Christians to bring the sufferer back to health and power. The co-operation which Christian ethics, along with biological theory admits, goes far to realize things which Nietzsche rightly valued: physical vitality and the cheerfulness that is often its accompaniment. He was undoubtedly performing a service to mankind in preaching that health and strength and rule by the best are important factors in human evolution.

What according to Nietzsche is to be the character of the Superman, which one should try to bring into existence? That is an important question, and it is with reference to it that it is possible to maintain that Nietzsche's exposition underwent changes. In the beginning and in the main his conception of the Superman was expressed in naturalistic terms. But at times, especially

in the later writings, the Superman is accorded qualities raising him above the stage of merely physical conflict. He has magnanimity, nobility, majesty. He gives to others out of the richness of his superabundant wisdom. He "loves" humanity, because he feels the necessity of exerting himself for the good of others. His love is triumphant, unselfish and universal. The Superman is also to be of childlike innocence. The Christian who understands the ethics of Christianity will find himself in agreement with Nietzsche in his statement: "Under 'Spiritual freedom' I understand something very definite: it is a state in which one is a hundred times superior to philosophers and other disciples of 'truth' in one's severity towards one's self, in one's uprightness, in one's courage, and in one's absolute will to say 'nay' even when it is dangerous to say 'nay'." The positive values upon which Nietzsche insisted are not alien to Christian ethics, and he did some service to it in calling specific attention to them among Christians who were inclined to minimize their worth. Yet even in their widest range his view falls short of the Christian conception of the ideal, and the relative emphases of the highest Nietzschean ethics differ from those of Christian ethics. Nietzsche talks of triumph, of overcoming. In face of the indefiniteness and inadequacy of the concept of the Superman, the triumph of the Christian view need not be doubted: an ideal society of human beings with health and power, an abundant life of physical and cultural goods, feeling a community of love and peace among themselves, with a reverent and joyful worship of what is "beyond man," God.⁶

Other oppositions to Christian ethics, besides that of Nietzsche, have also been predominantly individualistic, setting up as an ideal merely the aesthetic and cultural enjoyment of life and discounting the demands of co-operation and sacrifice made by Christian ethics. There have been several noteworthy representatives of this at-

titude. George Moore, the Irish novelist, in his "Confessions of a Young Man" contrasted this view of life with what he understood to be that of Christian morality. "The bold fearless gaze of Venus is lovelier than the lowered glance of the Virgin. . . ." "I met a chappie yesterday whose views of life co-incide with mine. 'A ripping good dinner, he says, get a skinful of champagne inside you, go to bed when it is light and get up when you are rested.' " As for the care for others: "Humanitarianism is a pigsty, where liars, hypocrites and the obscene in spirit congregate. . . . Far better the blithe modern pagan in his white tie and evening clothes and his facile philosophy. He says: 'I don't care how the poor live; my only regret is that they live at all'; and he gives the beggar a shilling." The ancient pagan world is appealed to as providing an ideal of life as the enjoyment of physical pleasures and of forms of beauty. Christianity, according to Moore, introduced pity into human history, and pity is the "most vile of all vile virtues." 7

According to Christian ethics life is not simply a pleasant journey along a rose-strewn path. Demands of sacrifice involving suffering are made of men, and they have that within them that makes them rise morally to such occasions. Christian ethics does not leave this out of account, but encourages men to be ready to act nobly when these occasions come, as come they do for all men. Christian pity is not the feeble sobbing sympathy which Moore conceived, but an instigation for strenuous service to aid those in a manner in which at the time they cannot aid themselves. It does not relieve any of the responsibility to aid themselves to the best of their ability. But it entails that a man should be prepared not merely to help himself: he is enjoined to aid others also. The pursuit of the pleasures of human culture, it will be maintained in our last chapter, is not alien to Christian morality.

Leaders of movements with a socialistic goal have often turned to criticism of Christian ethics. Cotter Morison in his book "The Service of Man" complained that the "whole idea of Christianity is steeped in suffering. 'Blessed are they that mourn; Blessed are they which are persecuted for righteousness sake.' Why? Because 'great is their reward in heaven.' " In contrast he urged that men should be occupied with the things of the immediate world, and they should work together, man for man. Justice, considered primarily with reference to present economic goods and services, is put forward as the fundamental principle. Christian Churches have indeed done much to sustain class systems of social organization. This they have done implicitly rather than deliberately. Objection has been made against them for receiving from the wealthy money that has been acquired by un-Christian means. They have exhorted their members to give to the poor "in charity," what they ought to have told them not to have taken away in the first place by injustice. This is a criticism of practice rather than of Christian ethics as such, for its conception of charity properly and widely interpreted rules out from the very beginning any element of injustice.⁸

The more recent movement described as Humanism presents no new criticisms of Christian ethics. It manifests an astounding failure to recognize the deeper problems of life, and the philosophical implications of the views set forward. Mr. Potter's chief criticism of Christianity in his "Humanism: A New Religion" is against the beliefs in God and personal immortality. Yet without considering the implications, he says that "the universe has meaning," and talks of "the infinite possibilities of human personality." Posing as ignoring metaphysical questions, yet implicitly assuming one type of answer to them, when challenged on metaphysical grounds, Humanists "bury their heads in the sand."

National-Socialist opposition to Christianity appears to be on the basis of a crude conception of some of Nietzsche's teachings allied with national and racial forms of a sociological theory of ethics as criticized in the following chapter.⁹

Christian ethics is competent to meet all the criticisms urged against it. Each of its opponents manifests some one-sidedness, an exaggeration of some aspects of the good life and a neglect of others. The criticisms of Jesus fail to touch the main character of his influence and the fundamental principle of his moral teaching. Tolstoy's anarchism rested on a selection of the sayings of Jesus and the ignoring of others and the general development of Christian ethics. Nietzsche failed to pay due attention to the wider context of man's life as a physico-spiritual being. The advocates of Aesthetic Individualism gave inadequate attention to the moral demands of social relationships. They have taken a superficial view even of the individual man as such, ignoring the heroic and self-sacrificing tendencies in his nature, upon which his feeling of dignity and self-respect to some extent depend. Socialistic critics have neglected some profound traits of human nature. Christian ethics accepting man as physico-spiritual includes due and proper satisfaction of the body. Challenging injustice as sin, its aim goes beyond what mere justice demands. It charges Humanism with being incomplete in failing to accord a place to capacities and needs of human nature carrying man beyond men, the satisfaction of which is necessary for his complete happiness. Covering all that modern Humanism rightly stands for, Christian ethics goes further in insistence on the duty of the love of God.

CHAPTER VIII

CHRISTIAN AND NON-CHRISTIAN ETHICS COMPARED

Throughout its history Christianity has come into contact with and been influenced by forms of ethical thought and moral life which have originated and developed wholly or in part independently of it. Christian and non-Christian ethics have marked similarities. As wholes and in their details they also manifest significant differences. Christian ethics has obtained its forms of presentation in part through opposition to non-Christian conceptions of moral life and moral worth. These non-Christian views have not influenced Christian thinkers specifically in the order in which they themselves appeared chronologically. Though aspects of Neo-Platonism came into consideration late in the second century A.D., during the early Christian expansion Stoicism came more into view. It was not till the Middle Ages that the influence of Aristotle was definitely felt. Post-Reformation non-Christian ethics, however untrammelled by Christian dogmas in their development, have not been wholly unaffected by Christian conceptions.

The ideas of Christian morality only gradually became systematically co-ordinated. When early Christian teachers came into contact with it, Stoicism had already been formulated by eminent thinkers. Stoicism itself underwent development. The egoistic self-concern with their own peace of mind, with which Stoics have been charged by some Christian critics, may have been a characteristic of early adherents of Stoicism. Even in that attitude a fundamental of all genuine ethics was implied. Christian hermits and monks strove for individual

salvation—an end included in Christian ethics. But Stoicism evolved a cosmopolitan view of ethics. Though Christianity did not derive its universalist attitude from Stoicism, the establishment of the Christian idea was probably aided by Stoicism. Stoicism, emphasizing a life of reason, encouraged an attitude of detachment from the physical. Here again, though there is a difference between Stoic and Christian ethics, they have something in common in their inwardness and their view of the physical as at best secondary. In contrast with Stoic intellectualism and apathy, Christianity approved joyous feelings. It also taught that mankind must be prepared to suffer, sometimes voluntarily, and must not forego feelings of grief and remorse. Contrasted with the aloofness and essential pride of the Stoic wise man was the brotherly love and humility of the Christian devotee. Christians emphatically rejected the Stoic contention that sometimes suicide is not immoral. The influence of Stoicism is to be seen in what has been described as the first treatise on Christian ethics, Ambrose's "*De Officiis Ministorum*." ¹

Platonism directly, and indirectly through Neo-Platonism, was a factor in the thought of the Christian thinkers of Alexandria. Probably through Neo-Platonism, Augustine also had considerable knowledge of Platonic philosophy, for which he expressed his admiration. During the later history of Christianity at various times expression has been given to what may be called a "Christian Platonism." For Platonism, as for Christianity, existence is to be understood from the standpoint of spirit, and goodness is the essential character of ultimate being. Both have insisted on the rational nature of human beings. But Christianity emphasized the fact of will in a manner not to be found in Platonism. Though in practice there have been social classes in Christian countries, Christian ethics does not admit the grades of society formulated as a definite aspect of Pla-

tonic ethics. Instead of a type of intellectual contemplation as the highest aim for a highest class, Christianity has taught the ideal of an active love as a supreme state open to all.²

During the Middle Ages there developed what might be called a "Christian Aristotelianism." For Aristotle's ethics, the concept of human well-being, of the individual in the social whole, is dominant. In this the virtues as dispositions cultivated in the soul are of prime significance. Aristotle also explicitly admitted the factor of will in human nature. From the Christian standpoint, it has seemed that Aristotle's ethics is anthropocentric. Human wellbeing as represented in it lacks features which it has in a religious ethics with its high-water mark of "beatific vision." Thus, in Scholastic ethics the Aristotelian ethics of reason was transformed in the light of the ethics of Christian revelation. The influence of Aristotle has endured in the ethics of the Roman Catholic Church through the continued position it accords to the work of Thomas Aquinas. The conception of the "Cardinal virtues" taken from Greek thought by early Christian writers became definitely embodied in Scholastic Christian ethics.³

With the attainment of more liberty of thought and of freedom from persecution from the courts of the Inquisition, there developed in Protestant countries forms of philosophical ethics not explicitly resting on the Christian scriptures or any authoritative tradition. These systems were not entirely uninfluenced by Christianity or by those earlier non-Christian forms of thought which had previously affected Christianity itself. Nevertheless they have been formulated in large measure by new efforts of human reason examining the constitution of human nature, the goals of its striving, the actual character of human conduct, and the forms of moral judgements.

The conception of ethics that has made an immediate

appeal to many is Hedonism—that the aim of moral conduct is the attainment of the greatest possible pleasure with the greatest possible avoidance of pain. The moral criterion is ultimately the relative preponderance of pleasure over pain. The theory known as Psychological Hedonism—that one can act *only* with the motive of attaining pleasure or avoiding pain—involves the question whether in such case any genuine morality exists. For if one *can* do only just this, there is little if indeed any meaning in saying that one *ought* to do this or that. Rarely now maintained by scholars, Psychological Hedonism need not be further discussed here. A person acting immorally, as well as morally, may be said to be aiming at pleasure or the avoidance of pain. If it is maintained that immorality consists in aiming at less than the greatest possible pleasure or the least pain, the distinction between the moral and the immoral is conceived as merely quantitative. Unfortunately for such a theory, not only is there no known method of estimating pleasure as such quantitatively, but also, as has been repeatedly pointed out, actually in experience qualitative differences are taken into account. That was implicitly admitted by John Stuart Mill when he accredited a man dissatisfied with a higher moral position than a pig satisfied. The difference of morality and immorality must thus have reference specifically to the different qualities of pleasures rather than to different quantities of pleasure. And that involves principles or values for discrimination other than mere pleasure and pain as such. The assumption, generally implied in Hedonism, that only pleasure or the avoidance of pain is desirable cannot be said to be justified.

Another difficulty urged against Hedonism is that though it implies that the individual is to aim at his own greatest predominance of pleasure over pain, morality as understood in history has been regarded as involving also the direct or indirect consideration of others. To

meet this the Hedonistic theory, under the name of Utilitarianism, was stated to refer to the aim as "the greatest happiness of the greatest number," and later simply as "the greatest happiness" whether implicating one or more. The question was then asked: What, on a Hedonist theory, should motivate an individual to forego his own pleasure for that of others? To this it was replied that social arrangements are to be such that through "Sanctions," as for example, social disapproval and legal punishment, the individual will himself get more pleasure or less pain by acting in accord with the greatest pleasure when others also are taken into account. Long before Mill's classic presentation of Utilitarianism, the Christian writer, William Paley, (1743-1805) had viewed Christian ethics in a predominantly Hedonist fashion. He regarded the hope of heaven and the fear of hell as dominant sanctions to impel individuals to seek satisfaction in accordance with the commandments and teachings of the Holy Scriptures. In this attitude he was in agreement with much of the Christian thought of the eighteenth century. Paley wrote at a time when the important distinction between the general concept "pleasure" and "actual pleasures with their particular qualities" was not recognized.

In stating the Christian position with regard to Hedonism a distinction must be made which Hedonists have not usually made, between "pleasure" and "happiness," between "pleasure" and "satisfaction." Often enough, and not unjustifiably, the Christian aim has been described as "happiness." But Christian happiness, though pleasurable feeling may be an aspect of it, is not co-incident with pleasure. Being essentially a satisfaction of spiritual rather than physical needs, it is better referred to as "bliss" or blessedness. On the other hand, seeing that the pursuit of pleasure is involved in most immorality, Christian ethics in the course of history has had to oppose the general view of Hedonism that pleas-

ure, with the avoidance of pain, is the correct aim of moral conduct.⁴

Most contemporary theories of ethics give some recognition to ideas of evolution, but what came to be called "Evolutionary Ethics" is a distinctive view, Naturalistic and Hedonist in character. Though this theory is subject to the general criticism of Hedonism already made, it includes certain specific contentions which need consideration. According to it, the right is that which conforms with or aids preservation of life and when possible also its evolution to a higher stage. Any conduct which militates against life-preservation or hinders such evolution is wrong. Pleasure is regarded as the sign and value of the former, pain of the latter. As to early biological evolutionists the preservation of life appeared to be dependent predominantly on the adaptation of the organism to the environment, Herbert Spencer considered the morally right to be the conduct which, bringing the organism into harmony with its surroundings, produces pleasure, or as generally occurs, a predominance of pleasure over pain. Christian ethics does not deny that in general moral conduct involves the preservation of life and its evolution to a higher stage. It admits all that contributes to such wellbeing and development. But it objects to interpreting "the preservation of life" as simply the continuance of the processes of the physical organism. It declares that there may be occasions when the individual, in conformity with moral demands, ought to "lay down" that is, sacrifice, his physical life. The higher stage to which in evolution mankind is to strive is not conceived by Christian ethics as though higher simply because of having more pleasure and a greater preponderance of pleasure over pain than the lower stage. Christian ethics may accept that as actually one aspect of the higher. Nevertheless in it the higher is described rather as consisting mainly in certain intrinsic moral values constituent of

the spiritual characters of persons, and of the spiritual relations between persons, including deity. In other words, Christian ethics is essentially a spiritual not merely a biological theory.⁵

The philosopher, Kant, fought the eighteenth century Hedonist theory, maintaining that the individual's pursuit of his own pleasure is in itself only natural and as such not specifically moral. The moral implicates not simply what one likes but what one "ought," whether one likes it or not. Kant's own exposition of ethics demands critical consideration. In its detail there is much to be objected to, but all that can be done here is to state certain fundamentals. For him, morality is clearly *sui generis*, something not to be identified with the mere satisfaction of physical desires. The "moral law" is of the nature of a "categorical imperative" and is not a "hypothetical imperative." The moral is not simply a means to obtain an end other than itself which we may or may not choose to strive for. We "ought" to do what is right, when we know what it is. Bishop Butler expressed essentially the same view in his emphasis on the "authority" involved in the moral. The "ought" of Kantianism can be paralleled in Christian ethics in its insistence on obedience to the divine will. Kant also maintained that to be moral the individual must act autonomously, with free choice, not unwillingly in response to any kind of external compulsion, but obeying the inwardly acknowledged categorical imperative. He introduced the concept of person. Each and every person is to be regarded ethically as of intrinsic worth, never merely as a means. Persons are not morally isolated but are members of a "kingdom" or realm of ends. Though the pursuit of pleasure or happiness does not constitute morality, one is to expect that happiness will eventually be associated with virtue and misery with vice. In all these contentions Kant was in general accord with Christian ethics, but his support of them was on the

basis of critical reflection and not of Christian tradition.

It has been urged that Kant's position is in conflict with Christianity in that man is not "an end in himself, but a member of a divine family, of which the Father is the object of supreme devotion." Such a criticism fails to give adequate recognition to the side of Kant's thought regarding a realm of ends. The supreme devotion to the Father is not ruled out by Kant's views: it is simply not included in what he understood by the moral. The relation of morality to religion was inadequately considered by Kant. He did not interpret the authority implied in the categorical imperative as due to the moral law being a divine command, as Christian thinkers have done and from the standpoint of Christian theism may reasonably do. That is to go beyond Kant's explicit statements, not to contradict him. His ethics has also been said to express morality in terms of law while Christianity conceives it as the expression of a fundamental attitude of love. While objection may be made to this mode of statement, there is certainly some such difference. But Christianity is not debarred from the recognition of principles of the moral life that may be stated in the forms of laws. Christian ethics emphasizes an emotional attitude that Kant did not stress. While his ethics is not merely rationalistic it is predominantly so. For Christian ethics it is not reason that is primary in ethical evaluation or moral conduct. From none of the forms in which Kant stated the categorical imperative of morality is it possible to deduce the content of the moral life in detail, that is, to arrive at actual moral values. On the other hand Christianity insists on specific virtues and condemns particular vices.⁶

Both in his philosophy in general and in his ethics, Kant left his positions with reference to many fundamental problems highly indefinite, and in consequence subsequent philosophers, even when claiming to be following him, developed divergent views. Hegel pro-

pounded an elaborate system of Idealism and his followers also have interpreted and developed his views divergently. It is almost if not entirely impossible to give an account of Hegelianism without being charged by someone that one is misrepresenting him. In his "Philosophy of Right," Hegel described the achievement of moral individuality and freedom as attained in the social whole. Some Christian thinkers saw in this a position in essence identical with that of a view of Christian ethics according to which "dying to live," "dying as selfish individuals to live in the wider whole of the kingdom of God" is fundamental. However, Hegel considered this social whole as at present existing as the State, although he admitted that, beyond the ethical, religion was concerned with the Infinite. It was easy to interpret Hegelianism as making the State the aim of morality and conformity with its welfare the criterion of right and wrong conduct. The assumption is implied that the true self-realization of the particular person coincides with true social realization, that in short, there are not and cannot be real conflicts between the actual good of self and of others.⁷

For F. H. Bradley, an exponent of the self-realization theory of ethics, to "realize yourself" meant "be an infinite whole." "The final end with which morality is identified, or under which it is included, can be expressed not otherwise than by self-realization." Only, however, if by that is meant realizing one's self as a member of an infinite whole by realizing that whole in one's self. Notwithstanding this view, Bradley did not—we maintain because he could not—derive the details of morality from the idea of an infinite whole. He passed abruptly to the idea that the whole in which the self is to realize itself is the social community, and then to the notion of "my station and its duties." In his enthusiasm for this view of morality he said that we must say farewell to visions of superhuman morality, ideal

societies and such like. But elsewhere we are told: "the content of the ideal self does not fall within any community," is "in short, not merely the ideal of a perfect social being." Thus Bradley's exposition of the theory of self-realization or perfection swings from the infinite whole to the social whole with its varied stations and duties, and then back again to the infinite whole. It is a fundamental of Christian ethics that the morally good is of cosmic significance and has implications beyond human society. It does not fail to recognize the social aspects of morality. There is no evidence of anything of value in Bradley's theory of ethics which has not been admitted in Christian ethics. But his ambiguous philosophy sometimes seems to teach that the human self and morality are only appearances and moral distinctions not ultimate. Such a view, taken along with the theory that time also is only appearance is considered to be in direct opposition to Christian ethics.⁸

Rightly according to some, wrongly according to others, Hegelianism and positions like Bradley's have been charged with failing to do justice to personality. Hegel has been accused of substituting "a bloodless strife of categories" for the actual processes of history which depend on real individual persons. Though some Hegelians have presented Hegelianism in personalistic form, the main philosophical movements of Personalism were conceived as a reaction from Hegelianism. Some of these forms of self-realization ethics have placed the main emphasis on the life and character of the particular person. Both social and personalist self-realization theories of ethics have been welcomed by Christian thinkers as essentially in accord with Christian ethics, though not the State but the Christian community, the Kingdom of God, "the body of Christ" is conceived as the social whole, and this presentation of ethics thus saved from the charge of being merely secular or terrestrial.⁹

The self-realization theory, conceived personally, came in some quarters to be interpreted in an individualistic manner with the ideal considered in mundanely humanistic, aesthetic or even popularly epicurean fashion. The "cult of the individual" in this sense cannot be said to have found expression in a definite philosophical theory of ethics but has been rather an attitude assumed by individuals and small groups of individuals. Christian thinkers have in the main felt compelled to combat this view and attitude, insisting that there is fundamental ethical significance in the response in Christian history to the suffering and crucifixion of Jesus. This individualism has appeared to them as having no appreciation of the moral worth of self-sacrifice, of "dying to live."¹⁰

Such individualistic movements were submerged in the great tide of social thought which swept in during the later years of the nineteenth century and the early years of the twentieth. Under the influence primarily of the school of sociology founded by Auguste Comte in France, there developed a sociological theory of ethics according to which the forms of the moral arise solely in the organization of the social group. The power of the group over its members, a power exerted in numerous ways, through language, tradition, custom and otherwise, constitutes the sole moral authority. In short: sociology is the basis of ethics. This theory, though developed empirically, was associated by some with one interpretation of Hegelian ethics, to which we have already referred. For those who posed as abjuring everything of a metaphysical and theological character, this sociological ethics was humanistic and terrestrial in its outlook and content. But the nature of actual moral values could not be deduced from any general sociological principal. The moral life is not to be understood apart from an adequate detailed consideration of the goods men in their social groups seek, and this involves

the question of values in their particular distinctive characters.¹¹

Ethics has thus now been taken up into the wider study of values. This tendency has gone along with realistic and pluralistic movements in modern thought. These latter have emphasized actual particulars in all their multiplicity as contrasted with universal ideas. The general concepts of happiness or pleasure, perfection and self-realization, though not ruled out as of no worth, are not regarded as of chief significance. Attention must be turned to moral values in the plural rather than to discussions of the general concept of moral value. In this the distinctiveness of particular values as constituents of personal character and a type of life has been insisted on.¹²

Christian ethics has characteristics of all the types of ethics considered in this chapter, as well as differences from them. Enough has been said concerning Stoicism, Platonism and Aristotelianism: attention will be given here to the modern theories. Christian ethics cannot be said to be non-Hedonist. It definitely acknowledges the happiness of satisfaction. A modern view insists that the enjoyment of even physical functions in a divinely created world is part of the significance of existence. But these functions are not isolated and are to be performed with reference to a wide and co-ordinated whole of the good life. As achieved in the context of other selves and God, the good life entails that distinctive spiritual pleasure or happiness called "bliss." Christian Hedonism has a predominantly spiritual character as opposed to any mainly sensuous Hedonism. Even the sensuous pleasures emphasized in modern aesthetic individualism are not excluded: they are simply accorded their due subordinate place.

Christian ethics is perfectionist: "Be perfect, even as your Father in heaven is perfect." As such, and dynamic, it is also a form of self-realization theory. In

this it is in accord with the teachings of Aristotle and Kant concerning the individual. The realization is of the self as an individual spirit of intrinsic worth. The individual is called on to strive for self-realization in the perfection of his own nature, as God is perfect in His own nature. But self-realization in this sense has not been and is not regarded by Christian thinkers as entirely capable of attainment in terrestrial life. Christian ethics is also rigorist in the same sense that Kant's ethics has been described. For it includes definite categorical imperatives: "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God . . . and thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself." In its condemnation of vices, it includes "thou shalt not." There is nothing hypothetical in the manner in which Christian ethics considers the divine moral commands.

Christian ethics is humanist. There are no values admitted by modern humanist ethics whether individualistic or socialistic, that are not or may not be recognized and striven for by Christians. But modern Humanism is naturalistic and according to the Christian point of view has an inadequate conception of the nature of man. Further, though not necessarily, it usually places emphasis on the external consequences of conduct. In contrast, in its teaching that man should love himself, and others as himself, Christian ethics conceives of the inner character as implicated in genuine self-respect and true regard for others as far more important than any external consequences of individual acts or social relations. Even when Humanists pay attention to qualities of character, they are inclined to consider them almost, if not entirely, from the point of view of social utility, rather than as virtues of personality in itself of intrinsic worth, a worth not bound up with existing terrestrial conditions. Humanist ethics are inadequate in range. Christians, on the other hand, have at times neglected to give adequate attention to the values with which Humanists concern themselves.

The individual has social relationships and Christian ethics is sociological to the extent that self-realization is within a social whole, called the "Kingdom of God." This kingdom is a spiritual kingdom. Though it may implicate the terrestrial community it is not simply identical with it. Christian ethics is not a product of social relationship. It embodies the principles and expresses the values that are to guide, dominate, and reform social organization. There are no values recognized in the sociological ethics that are not or may not be admitted in Christian ethics. The exponent of Christian ethics must charge sociological ethics with failure to appreciate the basis of morality, with an inadequate concept of its ideal, and a tendency to exaggerate the importance of social organization over that of the individuals for whose welfare it exists. When closely examined it is found that sociological ethics implies that all moral values are merely instrumental. It is a fundamental of Christian ethics that some moral values are intrinsic aspects of personal spirits.

The latest phase of scientific and philosophical ethics is, in our opinion, a recognition of what throughout history has been implicated in Christian ethics. That does not mean that philosophical and Christian ethics have now achieved an identity. For both, the moral life involves a variety of distinctive and intrinsic moral values which cannot be deduced from any one general term. It cannot be said that either yet recognizes all the values. It is not evident that they accord the same relative significance or give the same emphasis to the different values. Modern philosophical ethics does not give to humility a place similar to that which it has had, and may still claim, in Christian ethics. Though philosophical ethics recognizes no fixed scale of moral values, it must nevertheless view these as constituents within living as in some degree co-ordinated. The general type of life it represents may, and must, be compared with that of

Christian ethics. But it may rightly be objected that there is not just one type of life implicated by modern philosophical ethics. A philosophical consideration of the ethically ideal type of life as a co-ordinated whole of values has not yet been seriously attempted. What we have is a number of unco-ordinated movements. In many of these, either social or individual aggressiveness, in each case with a predominant aim for economic welfare and mundane enjoyments is the leading characteristic. That there is diversity of view also among Christians may be admitted. Nevertheless it can be maintained that, considered historically and systematically, Christianity has presented in general a consistent view of life as a whole. Though there have been aberrations, as in some forms of monasticism, they have not been able to dominate practice nor irretrievably to vitiate theoretical expressions. Christian ethics is, and has been throughout its history, essentially a theory of co-ordinated moral values. It has presented a type of life in which distinctive virtues are fundamental. These virtues have been experienced as supporting one another not only as constituents of individual character, but also as conducive to social welfare. The worst tragedies in human history have been due to the lack of possession of some of these virtues or to a failure to give them their due place or proper strength or universal range of influence. In the course of its history Christianity has included all virtues within its ethics. This has been shown in detail in the earlier chapters of this book and no further enumeration of virtues and vices is required here. The insistence on love and compassion, humility and gentleness has not involved any lack of appreciation of justice, temperance, patience, fortitude and courage. As it is a main purpose of this book to show in detail, the Christian moral ideal never has been, and cannot be, adequately expressed in one general term, but embraces in harmony the whole wealth of moral values.

CHAPTER IX

THE CHRISTIAN ETHICS OF SEX AND THE FAMILY

In modern life problems of the relations of the sexes are widely considered independently of the teachings of the Christian churches. There has been much scientific inquiry into all aspects of sex life; and there has been a revolt against the notion of ecclesiastical authority in this direction. The charge is made that the Christian attitude of the past, and officially even today in some churches, has been one of ignoring or denying the intrinsic worth of sex experience in human life. A modern Christian ethics acknowledges that worth, while definitely opposing contemporary theories of sexual licence. Contrasted with the wide-spread modern view that the good life should include sex satisfaction there has been much praise of celibacy in Christian history. The question may be asked whether in Christian ethics celibacy is to be ranked morally higher than marriage, whether the Christian ideal implicates not the satisfaction of sex but its suppression.

If the life and conduct of Jesus be regarded as perfect and Christian morality the imitation of Jesus, on the basis of the evidence that he himself was celibate, it would seem that Christian ethics must accept celibacy as a feature of the highest ideal. Jesus himself is reported to have declared that in the Kingdom of Heaven there is no marriage. He approved those who should abstain from it for the Kingdom's sake. Yet he participated in a marriage feast and exhorted the married to cleave together as one flesh. The positions of Jesus and of Paul in this regard are ambiguous. Both lean definitely to the superiority of celibacy, though Paul indicated a re-

vulsion from sex that is hardly to be found in Jesus. Both may have been influenced by belief in an early coming of the Kingdom, but it seems possible that Paul's attitude was due to strong personal feelings. Their adoption of and exhortation to celibacy have had marked influences during Christian history. For Paul marriage was a means to avoid the greater evil of fornication. He did not see in it either a realm of moral companionship or of experience of a sexual good. He taught that it should be avoided as far as possible. "It is good for a man not to touch a woman." With the declaration of a "permission" to marry (for it is "better to marry than to burn"), he nevertheless said: "I would that all men were as I myself," that is, celibate. Even Mr. Alexander who seeks always to present Paul's views in the most favorable light writes: "Marriage is at the best only a second best—a permission to obviate greater evils"—a sentence that in the first half seems to implicate marriage as a good, but not the best; and in the second half as a lesser evil helping to avoid a greater! The Epistle to the Ephesians suggests a high view of marriage in its symbolic description of the Church as the bride of Christ: but it is now maintained by scholars that this is not a Pauline writing. For Paul marriage was "essentially a concession to weakness" and thus definitely not a constituent of the highest moral life.¹

Prominent leaders of Christian life and thought in the early centuries expressed a similar attitude. Ignatius warned those leading a celibate life not to be vain concerning it, showing that in his time it was regarded as a higher achievement than marriage. "The Shepherd of Hermas" placed a high value on continence; opposed re-marriage after divorce; and maintained that the widowed though not sinning in re-marriage would lead a higher life as single. Later in life Tatian considered celibacy superior to marriage. Athenagoras exaggerated the value of sexual continence, and described marriage

as a lower state than celibacy; holding further that a second marriage was really adulterous. Tertullian, though in one treatise indicating how highly marriage could be regarded, in others accepted the view that virginity is the more exalted condition.

Clement of Alexandria finding on the one hand a prevalence of sexual licence and on the other hand an exaggeration of the worth of celibacy endeavoured to present a healthy view of Christian marriage. He noted some detrimental results of celibacy. "I have observed that many who have abstained from marriage have not progressed in accordance with holy knowledge: they have fallen into misanthropy and the fire of charity has become extinguished in them." Yet, "others fettered by marriage" "lead an effeminate life" and "with the condescension of the law 'have come to resemble beasts.'" Though in certain circumstances celibacy is not only justifiable but laudable, for the majority marriage is the better condition. Marriage, divinely ordained, is to be morally ordered. It is not to be subservient to passion. Within marriage there should be spiritual continence, for wrote Clement, when procreating a man should not "desire even his own wife." Thus it can hardly be said that he recognized any worth in sex experience in itself. Insisting that the essential purpose of marriage is for procreation, in a number of places he admitted that it is also for the companionship and mutual help of man and woman, and the wholesome upbringing of the children. Origen, himself ascetic in temperament, exaggerated the worth of virginity. The continent make of their bodies a pure offering to God. They ought not to regret having no children: indeed, they have children—the fruits of the spirit, the virtues. Origen had of necessity to admit the morality of marriage, but there is little evidence that he fully appreciated its worth.²

In Cyprian's view, the dignity of virginity stood next

to that of martyrdom. "When ye continue to persevere in chastity and virginity, ye are like the angels of God." "The Lord does not command abstinence but encourages to it." Lactantius also agreed that celibacy is higher than marriage. Three treatises in praise of virginity as the moral ideal are accredited to Ambrose. For him, as for Paul, marriage was a sign of weakness. Jerome considered marriage a slavish yoke, only praiseworthy to the extent of producing children to become celibates. "The married may seek their glory in this, that they are next after the virgins." The ideal moral life is that of the monk. Even Gregory of Nazianzen who taught that marriage is a good thing, confessed "But I cannot say how much more sublime is virginity." Readers of Augustine's "Confessions" know that his sex-impulses were strong and that his conversion was marked by a renunciation of sex-life. He came to teach that celibacy is a higher condition than marriage. Yet though it is not an essential of the good life, he gave it the status of a sacrament. He suggested that before Christ "was the time to embrace"; since Christ, the time "to refrain from embracing." Apparently he regarded procreation as the only purpose of sex-intercourse. "The man makes a bad use of this good who uses it like a beast, intent merely on the gratification of his lust, instead of the simple desire to propagate his species." But he admitted that there is a desire for pleasure in sex, and though he described this as sinful, in man and wife the sin is venial. The gratification of concupiscence "means not the imputation of sin, but receives forgiveness owing to the married state in which it is indulged. This therefore must be reckoned among praises of matrimony; that on its own account it makes pardonable that which does not essentially appertain to itself. The truth is that the nuptial embrace which subserves the demands of concupiscence, is so effected as not to impede the child-bearing, which is the aim of marriage."³

The view that virginity and the celibate life are nearer the ideal than marriage was a feature of the whole history of monasticism. At the time when monasticism was in decline, and a wide movement for the dissolution of monasteries and convents had set in, the Roman Church made its official pronouncement concerning the question. Canon X of the Council of Trent (1563) reads: "If any one saith that the married state is to be placed above the state of virginity or of celibacy, and that it is not better and more blessed to remain in virginity or celibacy than to be united in matrimony, let him be anathema." It may be presumed that this remains the official attitude of that Church today. In the cult of Mary, the mother of Jesus, her virginity is insisted on. Admission to the Church's priesthood involves obligatory celibacy. Such encouragement as may be given to the laity to marry is from this standpoint an inducement to a form of life lower than the highest. As late as the early nineteenth century, the Eastern Orthodox Church in an approved Catechism declared adherence to the same position: "Virginity is better than wedlock, if any have the gift to keep it undefiled."⁴

But Dr. H. O. Taylor aptly asked: "Who has not marvelled that the relationship of marriage should make so large a part of the symbolism through which monks and nuns expressed the soul's love of God? . . . Did not the holy priest, the monk, the nun, feel and know that marriage was the great human relationship?" In the late Middle Ages, ideal conceptions of sex love sought expression and became a challenge to the view of the superiority of celibacy. While the orders of the Church preached the excellence of virginity, the troubadours sang of the raptures of love. "Love with the Troubadours and their ladies was a source of joy. Its commands and exigencies made life's supreme law. Love was knighthood's service; it was loyalty and devotion; it was the noblest human giving. It was also

the spring of excellence, the inspiration of high deeds." The actual conditions and even the ideas of the Roman Church on this matter were criticized by Erasmus. The scandals connected with monasticism and celibacy called forth his strongest condemnation. In his Colloquy "Of Rash Vows," he wrote that: "As manners now are, I think it a holier work to dissuade men altogether from such vows than to urge them to making of them." In the Colloquy: "The Virgin averse to Matrimony" he made one character say that to contend "that it is a meritorious work to enter into voluntary confinement" is a Pharisaical doctrine. He asked: "Do any laws discharge you from your duty to your parents?" He warned that "chastity is more in danger in a cloister than out of it." It is best for women to devote themselves to domestic life. In his works on marriage, he definitely upheld it as a constituent of the moral life, taking the Christian view to be a perpetual life-time union of man and wife. In 1519 his "Encomium of Marriage" was attacked as heretical and in 1525 the authorities of the Sorbonne condemned it to be burned.⁵

There were some definite changes of attitude among the Protestant reformers, but even amongst them and their followers up to our own time no definite recognition was made in Christian ethics of an intrinsic value in sex experience. The Protestant challenge was against the idea that celibacy is a higher type of life than marriage. Speaking of the early period of the Reformation, Miss Eckenstein writes: "Both in England and on the Continent the idea that virginity was in itself pleasing to God was no longer in the foreground of the moral consciousness of the age; it was felt that the duties of a mother took higher rank and that the truest vocation of women was to be found in the circle of the home."⁶

The Calvinists regarded marriage as a divine ordinance with high moral value. However, its essential purpose is procreation: for the rest it is a guard against

sexual promiscuity. Along with a failure to admit the value of sex relations in themselves, there was something of fear or revulsion that led to those aspects of Puritanism which seemed to regard sex as taboo. "For what else is marriage than the union of male and female? Why, indeed, was it instituted except for these two ends, either to beget offspring or as a remedy for incontinence?" Calvinists treated sex offences with severe punishment. Dancing, going to theatres, or singing songs that might arouse sex feeling were objected to. The exaggerated praise of virginity and the enforced celibacy of the Roman Catholic clergy were condemned by Calvin. It is not only the actual practices but also the involved attitude of mind that he deprecated. He referred to "those frequent and extravagant encomiums on virginity, with which scarcely any other virtue was in general deemed worthy to be compared. Though marriage was not condemned as impure, yet its dignity was so diminished and its sanctity obscured that he who did not refrain from it was not considered as aspiring to perfection with sufficient fortitude of mind. . . ." "We condemn the vow of celibacy for no other reason, but because it is unjustly considered a service acceptable to God, and is rashly made by those who have not the power to keep it." "The interdiction of marriage to priests was certainly an act of impious tyranny, not only contrary to the word of God, but at variance with every principle of justice." As marriage is a divine ordinance, so children came to be regarded as a sign of God's blessing, and many children as a mark of special favor.⁷

The Protestant Churches in general reject the idea that celibacy as such is a higher condition than that of marriage. The most they are prepared to affirm is that there are particular instances when an individual may be called on to abstain from marriage. Affirming the morality of marriage, in principle, for all, the Protes-

tants have contended that it is not wrong for priests to marry. One of the Articles of Zwingli (1523) declares: "all that God allows, or has not forbidden, is right, thus it may be known that marriage is becoming to all mankind." The Ten Theses of Berne (1528) include the statement: "Holy marriage is in scripture not forbidden to any, but the avoidance of fornication and unchastity is commanded to all." The idea that marriage is detrimental to the highest moral life was definitely opposed in the declaration of the First Helvetic Conference (1536) that "no order or condition is so holy and honorable, that the state of matrimony is contrary to and should be forbidden to it." Miss Eckenstein says that some reformers declared celibacy odious, that the vow of virginity was contrary to the teaching of Scripture and itself foolish and presumptuous.⁸

It must not be supposed that all Protestants have rejected the view of the superiority of celibacy to marriage. Jeremy Taylor, for example, wrote that virginity "chosen and voluntary, in order to the conveniences of religion and separation from worldly encumbrances is better than the married life"; however, he continues with a significant admission "not that it is more holy, but that it is a freedom from cares, an opportunity to spend more time in spiritual employments. . . ." "Virginity is a life of angels, the enamel of the soul, the huge advantage of religion, the great opportunity for the retirements of devotions, and, being empty of cares, it is full of prayers." William Law while insisting that every Christian woman should be "but a plain unaffected, modest, humble creature, averse to everything in her dress and carriage that can draw the eyes of beholders," added approvingly that beyond this the good Miranda kept her virginity.⁹

If marriage is to be ruled out of the highest Christian ideal, we are faced by a curious anomaly. On the one hand God as creator and sustainer of human life, and so

of the sex distinctions and their allied emotions, is thereby providing for the continuance of the human race. On the other hand He must be supposed to have revealed an ideal of human life, which, if universally attained, would frustrate that purpose. One may deny that celibacy is an ideal revealed by God, and maintain that it is contrary to His purpose. Or it may be urged that God intends only comparatively few to attain the ideal, leaving the race to be continued by the others. Or it may be suggested that as the human race has had a beginning it may have an end, the period of its existence being one of discipline. When all reach the ideal of celibacy the time will have come for the cessation of the terrestrial life of the human race. With such a possible answer it could not be regarded as a satisfactory rebuttal of the ascetic doctrine that if universally adopted the human race would cease.

The question whether a life of unsullied virginity or one of completely harmonious marriage is superior cannot be answered by any person's actual experience. For that, the individual would have to spend his whole life as celibate; and yet also have experience of harmonious marriage! Most of those who have definitely maintained the superiority of celibacy have been celibate throughout their lives; and those most critical of celibacy have been those who have experienced happy marriage. Those who after a period of undisciplined sex life, or unhappy marriage, have turned to a life of sexual continence, cannot give a satisfactory decision because of the character of the sex life that they have known. Those who after a period of celibacy turn to marriage, and decide that the former state was superior, may have been unfortunate in their marital experience. Thus it is impossible on the basis of individual experience to come to any definite decision as to the superiority of one condition over the other. Evidence of social effects of groups of celibates and of groups of married is inade-

quate to provide an indubitable answer to the question involved, though some would undoubtedly maintain that it points rather to the superiority of marriage than of celibacy.

Throughout Christian literature and in a number of individual lives celibacy has been justified as being the condition in which, in particular circumstances, special aims could be best achieved. From such a standpoint it might be urged that the nature of Jesus' own mission was such as to justify his celibacy. The reasonableness of this attitude must be accepted. Such instances, however, do not implicate the superiority of celibacy over marriage. Viewing the actual history of Christian ethics one cannot escape from the impression that the alleged superiority of celibacy rests on an implied feeling or conviction, even when not expressed, that there is something sensually base in sex-intercourse. Though the proponents of the superiority of celibacy may deny any such implication, the impression is none-the-less given, and the views on some important problems of marriage appear to be ultimately based on that attitude. A modern Christian ethics may adopt quite the contrary attitude of regarding the sex relationship as not base but of intrinsic worth.

It needs scarcely be said that the family is primarily biological in origin. In history there has been a stabilization of the biological family group through conventions, rules, and laws. In its own nature the family is not necessarily sacrosanct. Christian peoples have simply continued to accept family organization on the basis of the biological and psychological facts and the previous traditions of the races from which they sprung. In one direction they have made a change: they have ruled out polygamy even as a possibility for a few. Though obviously most marriages everywhere have been monogamic, most religions have permitted polygamy. As the question of the permission of polygamy is

not a live one today for Christian peoples, the monogamic form for good reasons having been firmly established, there is no need to discuss it here. It is sometimes urged that Christian ethics is inevitably committed to the maintenance of the family. Jesus took family terms, as father, brother, and son, as definitely ethical symbols, so that it would appear that from a moral point of view he held family relationships in high regard. But he used these terms to give them a wider significance, and not at any time to preach the continuity of the particular family organization. That he did not do so does not signify that he did not hold the view that it should be maintained: as a Jew among Jews who held firmly to family life, he may never have thought of any need to discuss the subject. What he did, however, was to speak of the family in a way he spoke of so many other things: if a call to higher things makes it necessary the family may be left. While Jesus accepted the family organization, he was aware of its dangers for the wider social life. Jesus was much concerned to warn men of the dangers of the family. He directed attention to the wider social whole of the Kingdom of God.¹⁰

To have children may be regarded as a normal aspect of marriage. Christian love towards the child involves making the best possible provision for it to be born healthy, and for its every good not merely while a minor, but throughout life. In modern life questions concerning the regulation of the number of children by birth control have become important for Christian ethics. They have come into open discussion because of the development of scientific means for contraception. Three different attitudes are possible towards these means. It may be maintained that Christian ethics is (a) entirely opposed to such contraception; (b) is not committed to opposition or to support; or (c) involves a duty for their proper use.¹¹

The greatest opponent of birth control by the use of contraceptives is the Roman Catholic Church. In his Encyclical on Christian Marriage in 1930 Pope Pius XI authoritatively proclaimed: "Any use whatsoever of matrimony exercised in such a way that the act is deliberately frustrated in its natural power to generate life is an offence against the law of God and of nature, and those who indulge in such are branded with the guilt of a grave sin." If birth-control is really necessary, abstinence from the sex act is advocated. This view is chiefly that of celibate officials, supported by medical doctors who are loyal members of the Church. Yet the bishops of the Anglican Church, assembled at Lambeth in 1930, while admitting that there has been a strong tradition in this direction in the Roman Catholic Church, pointed out that the attitude is "not founded on any directions given in the New Testament," and has not behind it "the authority of any ecumenical council of the Church."¹²

Roman Catholic writers ascribe the increase in the use of contraceptives to the growth of materialism in our time. That there is some truth in this contention cannot be rightly denied. But to suggest that the whole movement for birth control is mainly due to that cause is to give a perversely false impression. The problem of the morality or otherwise of birth control is not to be dealt with satisfactorily by general charges. Dr. Bruehl makes that it is associated with "unChristian principles." It is simply not true that birth control is necessarily bound up with a "denial of the higher purposes of life and the spiritual nature of man." Nor does it involve "the negation of the probationary nature of our earthly existence." In spite of his similar charge that selfish individualism is "the basic principle and driving force of birth control," another Roman Catholic writer, Mr. de Guchteneere, admits that among its adherents are those who "seek to promote the welfare of

society and indeed of the race." Its advocacy is not dependent on the view that the sex-impulse is irresistible. The question involved concerns the extent to which that impulse ought rightly to be given satisfaction and the extent to which it should be controlled. One may agree that it *can* be entirely repressed, and yet maintain that birth control is justified in certain cases when it *ought not* to be repressed. That advocates of birth control frankly admit human impulses is no justification for charging them with regarding man as "merely a carnal and sensual being." Dr. Bruehl's further charge that by the use of contraceptives the woman is reduced to a state of degradation, "the victim of the uncontrolled sex desires on the part of the male," and thus open to "horrors and cruelties" "more terrible" "than the worst sufferings of the most excessive child bearing," suggests that the critic has lost all sense of proportion, or in the excessive heat of his opposition is simply libelling the ordinary married man. The married come to know that there is little satisfaction in sex intercourse not entered into with mutual response.

Birth control is said to be wrong in "thwarting the intentions of nature." Yet civilization has in no small measure proceeded by the increasingly rational balancing and co-ordination of nature's processes. The advocacy of contraceptive methods is not to thwart nature, but to "control" it. As Mr. de Guchteneere frankly admits: "Nobody has the power to abrogate or hinder the laws of nature, which are intrinsically unchangeable." In the practice of contraception use is made of certain natural processes (e.g. chemical) in counteraction to other natural processes, those of conception. There are many counteractions of natural processes independently of man as well as brought about by him. With regard to this subject Roman Catholic writers place emphasis upon what they call "natural law." But confusion arises when on the one hand reason and on

the other actual processes of nature are brought into consideration. The Roman Catholic thinkers often interpret "natural law" as an "order of reason" as "directing everything to its rightful end." At this point the crucial assumption is made that the *only* "natural" or "rational" end of sex-intercourse is procreation. Says Mr. de Guchteneere: "Of itself the sex act has no other object." The flagrancy of this assumption is revealed by his feeling the necessity to add: "Common sense and scientific observation are at one in the matter." No one denies that procreation is an end of sex-intercourse, but common experience and scientific psychology are at one in recognizing it as not the only end. Nature (or God) may well intend love experience as one end, not to be regarded necessarily as subordinate to or as always associated with the other end, procreation. The counteractions of some natural processes by the use of others, including that counteraction involved in contraception, are in an "order of reason," that is, significant within a rational life scheme. Reason has led man to scientific methods of birth control. It is an unwarranted assumption that "*the* order of reason" is their negation and involves their rejection. Various types of conduct, relative to self-preservation, apparently in accord with nature at certain levels, have later been condemned in the name of rational morality. The marital relation is often enough entered into without contraceptive methods with no offspring resulting, so that it cannot dogmatically be said that it is either nature's or God's intention that offspring should always result. If it cannot be shown that it is always God's or nature's intention, one cannot rightly condemn man as immoral when he has not that intention. God through allowing man knowledge and some freedom may have accorded to him some choice as to the intention or not.

Critics of the use of contraceptives quote medical opinion against it. But medical opinion in opposition

does not appear to outweigh that in favor. There are several things to be said in this connection. It is not claimed that the means yet provided are always certain to be effective: we are probably to some extent in the experimental stage. With care contemporary methods can be in no small degree effective. To the charge that the use of such methods may have injurious results, it may be replied that experience suggests that bad effects come from the abuse and not from reasonable use of the methods. There is medical evidence to the effect that abstinence is for some persons detrimental. We are faced by a calculation of consequences of the use of contraceptive methods on the one hand and their rejection on the other. With their casuistic moral theology Roman Catholic thinkers ought to be prepared to acknowledge this.

It is argued that contraceptive methods are "hostile to national welfare." Such methods can be no more hostile to national welfare than restriction through abstinence, if the attention is chiefly upon the number of offspring. Those who think of numbers from the standpoint of war may be correct in this contention. Not unreasonably the idea of war with some makes strongly for restriction: some women ask why they should bear and rear children and men why they should take upon themselves the responsibilities of children to hand them over to the brutalities of war. National welfare, properly understood, must depend more on the quality than the number of the people. A people of quality are more likely to be peaceful. Great numbers may make a nation belligerent. Peoples of quality may through co-operation find other means than war for their defence.

It is interesting to note the change that has occurred in the view on contraception expressed by such a representative body as the Lambeth Conference of Bishops. At its meeting in 1908 it declared: "The Conference regards with alarm the growing practice of artificial

restriction of the family and earnestly calls upon all Christian people to discountenance the use of all artificial means of restriction as demoralizing to character and hostile to national welfare." "We would appeal to the members of our own churches to exert the whole force of their Christian character in condemnation of them." The deliberate prevention of conception was referred to indiscriminately as "grave immorality." It was urged that "to marry with the deliberate intention of defeating one of the chief ends of marriage is to deprave the ideal of marriage." The use of contraceptives was regarded, without exception, as due to a shirking of responsibility and a resentment of self-denial, resulting in a weakening of character, with the danger of loosening home ties and of race deterioration. The Conference advocated the prohibition of so-called Neo-Malthusian appliances and of patent drugs and corrupting advertisements, and the prosecution of all who publicly and professionally assisted preventive methods. The Conference of 1920 did not formulate opinions on these matters. In 1930 the bishops assembled were not only prepared to admit the value of sex-intercourse in itself, but the use in certain circumstances of contraceptive methods. "The Conference emphasizes the truth that the sexual instinct is a holy thing implanted by God in human nature. It acknowledges that intercourse between husband and wife as the consummation of marriage has a value of its own within that sacrament, and that thereby married love is enhanced and its character strengthened. . . ." "Where there is a clearly felt moral obligation to limit or avoid parenthood, the method must be decided on Christian principles. The primary and most obvious method is complete abstinence from intercourse (as far as may be necessary) in a life of discipline and self-control lived in the power of the Holy Spirit. Nevertheless where in such circumstances there is a morally sound reason for avoiding complete abstinence, the Conference agrees

that other methods may be used provided that this is done in the light of the same Christian principles. The Conference records its strong condemnation of the use of such methods of conception control from motives of selfishness, luxury, or mere convenience." Thus, in this representative body there has been an advance to the view that not all use of contraceptive methods is un-Christian.

From the point of view of a Christian theism, the question is: Does God mean that sex-intercourse has no other purpose than the procreation of offspring; or does He mean it also to have some value in itself? The experience and the judgements of humanity compel us to admit that it has a value in itself. At a Christian Conference in 1924 Mr. A. Studdert-Kennedy maintained: "It is untrue that the only sacramental union was one that aimed at getting children." "Only the excess energy needed sublimation: the energy left after normal sexual intercourse in marriage." The Christian theist is not unreasonable in suggesting that God created nature thus. If it be replied: God does mean sex-intercourse to have a value in itself, but also that it shall have the concomitant of always leading to offspring, one may point out that only a comparatively small number of possibilities of impregnation actually occur even when no (so-called) artificial prevention is applied. God apparently does not arrange things so that the two values shall inevitably be conjoined. There are advocates of birth control, quite as responsible as their critics, who are fully aware of woman's maternal nature. They have made clear their disapproval of childless marriages. No one need deny Mr. de Guchteneere's statement that maternity is a normal function of woman. Birth control is advocated for the sake of children, wife, and husband. From the ethical point of view it may be admitted that there is a danger, referred to by Dr. Bruehl, that children in small families may lose some of the oppor-

tunities for development of character that hardships in large families frequently entail. Unfortunately critics who urge this fail to mention the benefits that are gained by a family not being over large. They minimize the opportunities for analogous character training accorded in life beyond the family. The advocates of birth control are not committed to any policy concerning the number of children in a family. They may admit the advantages of a family with several.

It is often contended that the use of contraceptives does away with the need of restraint, self-control and self-denial. What it really involves is a change in the motives for restraint, self-control, self-denial. Fear of a birth or of too frequent births is not a highly moral motive for restraint, if indeed it is moral at all. There is a more serious demand for restraint when the means of avoiding such consequences are available. The motive for self-control must then be something different, that involved in spiritual community and marital loyalty. The availability of means of contraception leaves just the same possibility for submitting sex passion "to the rule of the spirit." There is a difference between the control required for total abstinence and that required for temperance. From the ethical point of view the former is not necessarily superior to the latter. Restraint involved in temperance, when contraceptives are available, is a more worthy motive than fear. Indeed it might be maintained that ethically more control is called for when the sex act may be performed with impunity.

Most of the objections raised concerning contraception are valid only against its misuse. It is a duty to use rightly what God through reason and in nature has given us. Even Mr. de Guchteneere says: "Man has not been given the use of reason that he should abdicate it at the most crucial moments. . . ." Birth control with scientific methods is capable of being used, one may

well say, "in God's providence" for human wellbeing. A modern Christian ethics contends that there may be circumstances in which a Christian may rightly use contraceptives. It may be asked what these occasions are. The statement of the Anglican Bishops suggests that they are relatively few. They may be many. The conditions for bearing healthy children and making due provision for their good up-bringing are such that a married woman is not to be condemned if she only gives birth to a small proportion of the children she is normally competent to produce (without restriction) during the from twenty to twenty-five fertile years of her married life. If restriction is achieved through abstinence, during the great part of her and her husband's emotional life, they must both be unduly relinquishing the admitted value of consummation of their love. A positive moral ideal of chastity must now be put before men and women to claim their allegiance, and to make them resist the temptations to immoral sex intercourse. There is no need to insist that sex intercourse expresses and heightens the love of man and woman. It is pursued for itself, as well as at times for the procreation of children. No Christian ethics is adequate or realistic which does not admit this fact. In some instances celibacy may be advisable; but no writer on Christian ethics has yet maintained that it is the best way of life for the great majority of mankind. A modern Christian ethics acknowledges that men and women should have a balanced continued sexual life, and regard it as a duty to use the means by which that is made possible.¹³

Throughout Christian history Christian ethics has included the requirement of chastity. As indicated by Jesus himself, this involves purity in thought, word and deed. It is not easy to describe the nature of chastity. Its character depends upon the fact that a man is not merely a physical body but also a spiritual being. If man were simply at the animal level there might be no

moral questions concerning sex functioning and its implications. But man and woman, being what they are, there is from the side of their spiritual nature a moral demand for the association of sex functions with personal respect and affection. It is the obvious general absence of these latter which justifies the moral condemnation of all forms of prostitution. Put simply in this fashion merely occasional associations of persons who may have mutual attraction and respect are not ruled out. But the fact is that, quite apart from any procreation of children, once adequately considered with their spiritual aspects, sex relations call for a continuous loyalty. Whatever individuals with wayward fancy may think and wish to do, having attained a certain level of moral unity of personality they become aware that actually promiscuity violates the character of sex-relationship while fidelity to one somehow adds to its dignity. This is no arbitrary pronouncement of Christian ethics, but something in which it expresses the experience of mankind. Unchastity of thought and word are condemned just because they imply and help to cultivate an undignified attitude towards a relationship the value of which is at its highest when free from such. The only way morally to fight sexual laxity is to arouse an appreciation of genuine human love as involving the spiritual side of human nature. That this implies marriage for its proper conditions has been so confirmed in general experience that Christian ethics has covered the subject fairly satisfactorily in regarding as fornication sex intercourse outside of marriage or devoid of the intention of marriage. As a practical policy that use of the term may still be approved.

A modern Christian ethics can thus certainly agree with the condemnation of the enjoyment of sex-relationship while avoiding the obligations involved as between husband and wife. The Lambeth Conference of Bishops in 1930 rightly referred to the not infrequent mental

and moral dislocation especially for women, of sex intercourse divorced from the context of a binding loyalty. The Bishops suggested no adequate policy by which legitimate demands for satisfaction of sex needs might be met by those who have no opportunity of marriage. But on the other hand those who advocate sex liberty outside of marriage do not show how the dangers to which the bishops referred can be avoided. A modern Christian ethics may maintain that marriage when not impossible is a duty. If all capable of marriage, and not prevented by insuperable difficulties from it, married in due course, opportunities for sex satisfaction might be available for many otherwise lacking them. Economic hindrances might be removed by social re-organization, and prostitution as far as possible be suppressed. Though the problem might not thereby be entirely solved, the difficulty might be very much mitigated.¹⁴

Within recent times there has been a marked increase of opinion in favor of wider facilities for divorce than have been recognized in traditional Christian practice. Many states have passed laws providing such facilities. Some Christians have opposed this development. What is the attitude to it implied in a modern Christian ethics? Both those who approach the subject as Christians, and those who consider it apart from Christian ethics, agree in general that divorce is, to say the least, unfortunate. For either the man or the woman, or for both, as for the children of the marriage, if any, it involves evils escaped by those who can live together in permanent marriage. Christian communities have mostly maintained the practice either of not granting divorce at all, or only for adultery. Most Protestant writers on Christian ethics in the past have supported that attitude. Calvin admitted it on the grounds of adultery, sexual incompetence, desertion, and incompatibility in religion. The Roman Catholic Church recognizes annulment, which though difficult to obtain achieves the same end.

The basis for the traditional Christian attitudes to divorce is to be found in what has been presented as the teaching of Jesus. In the Gospel of Mark, his condemnation of divorce is without modification, while in that of Matthew it has the qualification "except for adultery." It is open to question whether he meant his words to be regarded as laying down a binding rule for all time. Some writers who insist that others of his sayings are not to be taken literally maintain that this is to be so taken. Yet, time after time, it has been declared that Jesus did not come to set up a code, but to inspire a fundamental attitude to be expressed in accordance with the varying circumstances of time and place. Among the Jews of his time, no law seemed so absolute and authoritative as that concerning the Sabbath. But he taught that the Sabbath was made for man and not man for the Sabbath. Marriage has no more claim to be regarded as an inviolable institution than the Sabbath has. Jesus was presenting the ideal of marriage. If men and women had no "hardness of heart" there would be no need of divorce. The statement accredited to him: "What God hath put together let no one put asunder," is inconclusive and obscure. For ecclesiastics who have performed a marriage ceremony to claim that thereby God has put two people together, is unwarranted. As Dr. Sprague writes: "It certainly is stretching—nay, it is profaning—the words of Jesus, to make the words 'what God hath joined together' cover the union of man and woman where the priest in the very moment when he is solemnizing the marriage, knows that not God, but the devil has joined them together, the devil of lust, or the devil of greed, or the devil of social ambition, or the profane devil that makes a mockery of the deepest sanctities of life." If the officers of the Church could assure themselves in each case that the persons were truly united by God, that is, were completely and profoundly of Christian spirit, for these there would be

little concern about divorce. That, however, would be a condition in a society of saints. The Lambeth Conference of Bishops in 1930, though progressive in its views on some other important aspects of sex relations, reaffirmed definitely a traditional attitude towards divorce: "Inasmuch as our Lord's words expressly forbid divorce, except in cases of fornication or adultery, the Christian Church cannot recognize divorce in any other than the excepted case." That is the reiteration of a statement made by the Conference of 1908. A Conference of Christians in England in 1924 could come to no agreement concerning divorce. Nevertheless three types of views were expressed. The most rigid was that marriage is a sacrament and cannot be undone by any procedure. On the other hand it was suggested that the Church should pronounce only those marriages indissoluble which it had itself blessed. A more realistic, and it may be said also more spiritual view, was that "marriages which in spirit are really no marriages at all are better ended, for the sake of the parties themselves, the children and society."

There is no dispute as to the ideal of Christian marriage. It is a life-long union of two persons for sharing mutual love and the procreation and Christian nurture of children. That ideal does not implicate any law that whether mutual love continue or not the union shall be externally maintained. The application of anything of the character of compulsion in this matter, is not in accord with the *spirit* of Christian ethics. Divorce is not opposed by modern Christian ethics, when the continuance of a union does not aid but rather hinders either or both from attaining the implications of the Christian ideal of character and life. Something of the ethical value of marriage lies in its involving difficulties which require careful moral judgement and continued moral effort. Christians are called on to show forbearance and forgiveness and to exercise patience and endeavour to

avoid divorce. The permanence of marriage is a condition for some of its chief benefits. Divorce should be a last resort: what is called "easy divorce" should be discouraged. In considering divorce the welfare of any children of the marriage must be an important consideration. Nevertheless it has to be recognized that sometimes it is a less disadvantage for children to be brought up by one parent than to live in a continued atmosphere of incompatibility of father and mother. In applying Christian principles to the problem of divorce no specific rules can be laid down. A modern Christian ethics involves that when the conditions of a marital union insuperably hinder the attainment of Christian values divorce actually becomes a Christian duty.¹⁵

Another problem raised in recent times is that of the morality, or otherwise, of the sterilization of those unfit to procreate healthy children. The Malines Conference of Roman Catholics in 1920 declared that it is never permissible to sterilize a man or a woman rendering either unfit for a fertile marriage. Arguing from the morality of making use of the knowledge that God has allowed to man, the holder of a modern Christian ethics may contend that sterilization in certain circumstances may be a duty. Mr. de Guchteneere points out that as sterilization does not always deprive a person of sex impulses the sterilized, if allowed "at large," might still physically and morally contaminate others. Thus, instead of sterilization, he advocates the segregation of the persons concerned. Not rejecting the idea of segregation entirely, it may nevertheless be objected that thereby some individuals would be deprived of valuable forms of social life of which they may be capable. No arbitrary decision that sterilization is un-Christian should be allowed to lead to that. The healthy have the responsibility of guarding themselves from physical and moral contamination.¹⁶

CHAPTER X

CHRISTIAN ETHICS AND POLITICS

The Christian is not only an adherent of the Christian religion: he is also the subject of a State. Does Christian ethics imply anything specific as to the principles and forms of political organization and government? That has been a problem from early times of Christian history and it is significantly raised in modern life. Though it is possible that Jesus was executed on the pretext that he was actually or potentially a leader of a political revolution, the Gospels suggest that he concerned himself little with the actual political government of his time. He did not discuss questions as to the form of government. He is reported to have said on one occasion: "Render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's, and unto God the things that are God's." Throughout Christian history that saying has been widely taken to imply and sanction a division between temporal and spiritual interests and powers. Paul exhorted his readers: "Let every soul be subject to the higher powers." The "powers that be are ordained of God." "They are a terror to evil doers and a praise to them that do well." Christians are "to pray for kings and all that are in authority." As they "must obey God rather than men," they must refuse to do anything in conflict with their religion and ethics. This was the view clearly taught by the early Fathers and Apologists. The latter claimed for Christians freedom from persecution partly on the ground that they were loyal and peaceful citizens. Clement of Rome exhorted the Corinthians to submit to "their rulers and governors upon earth." Theophilus said that though the ruler was not to be worshipped he must be honoured. In advocating

loyalty to the State, Justin Martyr appealed to the saying of Jesus quoted above. Ignatius, on his way to martyrdom, condemned by the State authorities, urged Christians to loyalty.¹

Tertullian, convinced that the prosperity of the Roman empire was good for the world, declared emphatically that, in spite of harsh treatment, Christians were loyal and concerned for the life of Caesar. "You may see with what superabundant charity we are commanded to love our enemies, to bless them that curse us, to do good to them that hate us, and to pray for them that despitefully use us and persecute us." "We reverence the providence of God in the persons of the emperors, Who has made choice of them for the government of the world." The State is a divine institution ordained to preserve social order. It is necessary because of man's imperfection. That idea was also stressed by Irenaeus. Clement of Alexandria and Origen teaching loyalty to the State, insisted that the ruler must govern in accordance with law. For Christians to be expected to obey the laws of the State, these must conform with the laws of God. With his thoughts directed towards a cosmopolitanism, Origen wrote: "It appears not only possible but true to say that all rational beings ought to be in unity under a single law."²

Up to the time of Constantine Christians were simple religious communities at times tolerated, at times persecuted, within the State. They sometimes obeyed the State, and sometimes refused to obey, in accordance with the demands of their Christianity. They placed religion as supreme and the State as subordinate. With the conversion of Constantine came a great change of conditions. The Church co-operated with the State in return for support from the State. Warfare to maintain or increase the empire was viewed as indirectly a means to protect, or aid the advance of, the Church. Co-operation with the ruling powers led to increase of

the Church's wealth. In marked degree the Church became the servant of the State, somewhat as the earlier imperial religion had been. But it was not the slave of the State. By the time of Ambrose, the Church had become sufficiently organized and strong enough to criticize and condemn acts of the temporal power. The view was definitely expressed that the emperor, as a son of the Church, was subject to its authority. Ambrose, in his excommunication of the Emperor Theodosius, showed clearly that the Church felt itself called on to consider whether the acts of the State conformed with Christian ethics. In effect this was a claim to the moral supremacy of the Church. Yet, as functional, the Church and the State were conceived as independent mutually aiding authorities. The State had the task of preserving social order and of defending the Church from paganism and heresy. The Church exhorted its members to loyalty and prayed for the State. "The foundation upon which rest the Medieval theories of the relation between Church and State," writes Dr. Dudden, "with all their tremendous practical consequences in Medieval history was laid originally by Ambrose." Actually Augustine's attitude was similar to that of Ambrose; but his theory was not entirely consistent. From one point of view the State is an aspect of the Worldly City in contrast with the City of God. From another it is divinely ordained, rendered necessary by man's sin. The State is to seek and to protect earthly peace, in which the Church also is interested. Dr. Pfeiderer wrote that for Augustine the City of God was essentially the visible Church. Dr. Allen contended that Augustine held that: "The nature of the Church demanded that all men should submit to its sway." Thus the notion developed that in some respects the ruler was the servant of the Church.³

In many ways it was in practice unsatisfactory to regard human life as partly under one authority and

partly under another. For centuries there was a tension between Church and State which at times broke out in open conflict. By the time of Pope Gregory VII (1073-85) the Church had acquired influence enough to declare explicitly that there was no restriction to the superiority of the spiritual over the temporal power. Gregory claimed the right and the responsibility to supervise temporal princes and even to depose them for misrule. He considered it a task of his position "to see that the laws of the kingdom of heaven were maintained in every country against the whim of earthly princes." "The *dictae papae* of the year 1075," said Dr. Taylor, "make the Pope the head of the Christian world: the Roman Church was founded by God alone; the Roman pontiff alone by right is called universal; he alone may use the imperial signia; his feet alone shall be kissed by all princes; he may depose emperors and release subjects from fealty; and he can be judged by no man." According to the same writer, for the century and a half following Gregory these claims were well nigh attained. As late as 1302 Pope Boniface VIII issued a Bull declaring that "all human beings are subject to the Pontiff of Rome, and we assert, define, and pronounce this tenet to be essential and necessary to salvation." Though on the one hand, the Church taught the doctrine of the divine right of kings, that God set up rulers and that to resist them is to offend against God, it also maintained that as the Church was founded by the "son of God" it had from him all authority needed to achieve its task, even control over the State. People looked to the spiritual ruler in Rome for protection from injustices of temporal rulers. Thomas Aquinas definitely formulated the view of the moral supremacy of the Church over the State with some differentiation of their functions in the sense that the State is to aid the Church in the performance of its task. It is the duty of the Church to aid citizens to at-

tain their highest good. A ruler is subordinate to the highest representative of the Church, who may release subjects from obedience to him if he is not true to his proper function of aiding in that attainment.⁴

In his "*De Monarchia*," Dante presented a view of the State as having justice for its motive and peace as its object. "The attempt to deduce all political powers from ethical requirements," says Dr. Vossler, "is what gives to Dante's theory of the State its thoroughly Medieval character. . . . Properly speaking it is not a political theory but public and general ethics. . . ." Dante contended for the autonomy of the State; for a clear division of power between Church and State and for their co-operation. The State was to concern itself with the economic welfare of man; the Church with his spiritual interests. Nevertheless Dante recognized the moral supremacy of the Church. "This independence (i.e. of the ruler) is not to be taken so literally that the Roman prince is in no respect subordinated to the Roman pontiff. For earthly happiness (i.e. the aim of the State) surely is subordinate in a certain degree to future bliss (i.e. the aim of the Church). Thus Caesar (the emperor) must have the same feeling of reverence for Peter (the pope) that the first-born child cherishes towards his father, so that illuminated by the light of paternal grace he may shine so much the more mightily on earth."⁵

The "Papal Syllabus of Errors," promulgated as a corpus in 1864, states important aspects of the Roman Catholic position with reference to some of the relations of Church and State. The fundamental standpoint is indicated in the declaration that it is an error to maintain that moral laws do not stand in need of divine sanction. In other words: God is the one true ultimate authority. Hence it is described as an error to suppose "that in the case of conflicting laws between the two powers (i.e. the State and the Roman Church) the civil

law ought to prevail." It is an error to maintain that "the commonwealth is the origin and source of all rights, and possesses rights which are not circumscribed by any limits"; and that the State should have complete and sole control over education.⁶

From its earliest formation the Christian conception of the State was one requiring conformity with moral principles, whether described in more Stoic fashion as the "law of nature," or in Christian phraseology as the "law of God." It was Machiavelli, a product of the Italian Renaissance, who expressed in classic form a view of the State and the action of its sovereign power as freed from restriction by such principles. Though most often camouflaged, that view, since his day, has had a far greater influence than is generally recognized. It represents the real challenge to a Christian conception of government. Machiavelli's position may be amply illustrated by some brief quotations. "It is necessary for a prince wishing to hold his own to know how to do wrong, and to make use of it or not according to necessity." "It is necessary for him to have a mind ready to turn itself accordingly as the winds and variations of fortune force it, yet as I have said above, not to diverge from the good if he can avoid doing so; then if compelled, to know how to set about it." "In the actions of all men, and especially of princes, which it is not prudent to challenge, one judges by the result." "One prince of the present time, whom it is not well to name, never preaches anything else but peace and good faith, and to both he is most hostile, and either, if he had kept it, would have deprived him of reputation and kingdom many a time." Such a theory was fundamentally opposed to that of his older contemporary, the Christian reformer, Savonarola, who insisted that government must be inspired not by motives of selfish political preservation or advantage, but by fear of God. Conceiving the purpose of government to be for the

common good and not for private interests, Savonarola when in power was prepared to use social force for what he regarded as public benefits. Though the arguments of Machiavelli's "Prince" (which appeared after Savonarola's death) need not be restricted to a monarchical form of sovereignty, it was probably such that he really had in mind. On the other hand, Savonarola, according to Misciattelli, "raised his republican doctrine to the level of a dogma of faith."⁷

The Protestant reformers, as Troeltsch remarked, "regarded the State as a religious institution and saw its end and aim in the protection of the Christian commonwealth and the moral law." Luther fought against the idea that the Pope as representing Christians had any authority over the State. Any such claim of the Pope must be regarded as a usurpation of the secular government ordained by God. For the Lutherans the Church and the State though in co-operation were independent authorities with differing spheres of action. "These two governments," wrote Luther, "must be carefully kept asunder and both be preserved, the one to render men pious, the other to safe-guard outward peace and to prevent evil deeds." The Westminster Confession of 1647 declares that "they who, upon pretence of Christian liberty, shall oppose any lawful power or the lawful exercise of it, whether it be civil or ecclesiastical, resist the ordinance of God." The greater Protestant communities allied with their State governments did not refrain from bringing in the power of the latter in their efforts to suppress some of the smaller Protestant bodies and to oppose Roman Catholicism.⁸

Though it has been said that in Geneva the Calvinists endeavoured to set up a "theocracy," John Calvin insisted on recognition of the distinction between the secular government and the Church. "He who knows how to distinguish between the body and the soul, between this present transitory life and the future eternal

one, will find no difficulty in understanding that the spiritual kingdom of Christ and civil government are things very different and remote from each other." Civil authority derives from God. Subjects should be obedient and reverent to rulers even if their characters be bad. Disobedience is justifiable only when they demand what is contrary to divine commands. The French Confession of Faith of 1559, prepared by Calvin, declared "We believe that God wishes to have the world governed by laws and magistrates, so that some restraint may be put upon disordered appetites. And as He has established kingdoms, republics, and all sorts of principalities, either hereditary or otherwise, and all that belongs to a just government and wishes to be considered as their author, so He has put the sword into the hands of magistrates to suppress crimes against the first as well as against the second table of the commandments of God. We must therefore, on His account, not only submit to them as superiors, but honor and hold in all reverence as his lieutenants and officers, whom He has commissioned to exercise a legitimate and holy authority." The attitudes of Calvinists towards governments have varied with the conditions in which they have found themselves. Where the ruler manifestly failed to perform the duties of the position to which God had called him, his subjects declared on Christian grounds not only the right but even the duty to resist, passively if possible, actively if necessary. Yet the revolt of groups for their own aggrandizement was proclaimed immoral, a violation of what God has ordained.⁹

In recent times some sociologists have maintained that moral principles are the product of the social group, to be enforced as far as necessary through its laws and authority. Political theories have likewise implicated that the State determines what its subjects, as mere parts of it, are to regard as morally required and demands

complete obedience. Yet, as Professor W. Ashley rightly urged, the view "that the State has an unlimited claim on our allegiance can only be held if we grant that in some sense the State is always in the right, that it is the supreme organ of reason." But if it is admitted that the State cannot always be in the right, it is to be asked: Can any Christian Church claim to be? The different churches have not infrequently disagreed. It is not at all evident that even ecumenical councils of the so-called "undivided Church" did not err. An individual member of a Church may feel that he needs a final authority and accept the dictates of that Church. If he does so, he may support that Church against the State even when the former is wrong and the latter right. That is opposed to Christian ethics as to ordinary ethics. Much as some persons wish to avoid the responsibility, they are ultimately directly or indirectly personally involved in decisions. If an individual, with or without serious deliberation, conforms with either the Church or the State, that is still his decision. There is here no question of a "right" to private judgement: there is inevitable inescapable individual responsibility. What Christian ethics demands is that each make his decisions with all the care possible, and in making them to have in mind the ideal for which Christianity stands. Christian ethics implicates the supremacy of its ideal: not the authority of any pronouncement of the Church or the State. Just in so far as the Church is true to that ideal and the State out of conformity with it, just so far he will place the Church above the State in his loyalty. It should be an aim of Christians to dominate the State. Towards this the unification of the now divided churches is an advisable step. True to its ethics a unified Christian church within a nation might and should control it: a unified Christian church throughout the world might and should dominate international policy.¹⁰

A modern Christian ethics must be regarded as en-

compassing the whole of human life. For it, Christians as such are rightly occupied with temporal as with eternal interests. The State is concerned with the personal character of its subjects as with their temporal welfare. The only complete aim of the State is the highest and most comprehensive welfare of its subjects: that of the Church can be no less. The State is wrong if it neglect the highest spiritual interests: the Church is wrong if it neglect the widest material values. The Church has to set forth all aspects of the ideal and mobilize its members so that the secular government will organize the activities for their attainment. Christians as a Church (or a Federation of Churches) have the duty of universal as distinct from mere national welfare, seeking the good of all mankind, for Christian morality is universal in its scope. The Church has in addition its own special activities: the organization of the ritual worship of God. The possibility has to be faced, that in his endeavour for some aspects of the Christian ideal the individual may be made to suffer by the State by imprisonment or otherwise.

The form and functions of the State are thus, by implication, a concern of Christian ethics. Does it involve any specific State form? The Roman Catholic Church has denounced communism not merely because of the treatment of religious organizations by the Russian Soviet government but also on the alleged ground that communism is in principle opposed to Christian ethics. Yet, on the other hand, some modern writers have contended that properly understood Christianity is itself essentially communistic. In the greater part of its history Christianity has not been so interpreted. The Encyclical "*Rerum Novarum*" of Pope Leo XIII, of date May 1891, described as the greatest pronouncement made on social questions by any of the popes, condemned communism chiefly as involving community of goods. Communism, Fascism, and National-Socialism

assert that the State is supreme by right. This is opposed to a fundamental of Christian ethics according to which the highest human values are individual souls, and the supreme authority is God, whose dictates may wrongly be discarded by States. These theories have "deified" the State. All, however, have a trait in common with the Roman Catholic form of Christian morality. They insist on obedience. This goes especially with a hierarchical organization. There have been Christian writers who have stressed the solidarity of the Christian community as "the body of Christ," sometimes associating that expression with a mystical Logos doctrine; at other times with the Church. In some main features Communism, Fascism, and National-Socialism are naturalistic analogues of what some so-called Christian sociologists have presented as the essence of Christian ethics. Christian ethics talks of "duties" rather than "rights." It challenges a false State view of rights. Any rights claimed by the State or the individual can be admitted only when they do not conflict with Christian morals.

If one took literally the saying of Jesus: "Render unto Caesar . . .," it might be inferred that he advocated monarchy or even imperialism. The former at least might be supported by the injunction of the first Epistle of Peter: "Honor the king." Contemporary writers on Christian ethics are not interested in maintaining that the teaching of the New Testament is monarchialism. On the other hand it gives no specific support to republicanism. It is, however, frequently contended that Christianity is democratic in the political sense. But the statement that democracy is government of the people, by the people, for the people is ambiguous. It would be definite if "all" were inserted before "the people" in each instance. There has been and could be no such government. It is said that in a democratic State each should count politically for one and no

one for more than one. Bishop Charles Gore, discussing Christian ethics, said that before God "certainly every man counts for one and no one counts for more than one." "Every human being by virtue of his humanity," wrote Dr. Sprague, "has equal right with every other human being to be counted; every right to be considered; every right to form his opinion, to express it, and to have that opinion pass for what it is worth; every right to have his interest considered, every right to stand erect among his peers, not to be forced to grovel before others arbitrarily classed as his superiors. . . . This is almost distinctively a Christian thought as it shows itself in the life of the State."¹¹

In much of the past Christianity has not conformed with political democracy in practice. The early Fathers, the Medieval theologians, and even the Protestant reformers insisted on the divine right of the government, excluding says Dorner "that theory of it according to which it is based on contract" (we should add: real or implied). In Benedictine monasteries, the Superior was required to have a conference of the members of the community for the consideration of all important matters, and that practice has been considered as having had some influence on the eventual rise of political democracy. If democratic government means majority rule, then it is quite evident that throughout history the great Christian churches have not advocated or adopted such government even for the churches themselves. "The Bible, wrote Dr. Gore, is of all books the most contemptuous of majorities. This is true of the Old Testament as of the New. The true religion, the religion of the prophets and the Psalms, appears as the religion of a faithful remnant who hardly maintain their ground among a faithless people."¹²

That in the eyes of God each stands for one does not imply that they are equal or similar in their endowments. Throughout Christian history it has been a

wide-spread view that individuals are specifically endowed for different things. Some may be qualified to govern; others not so qualified. The Christian principle of the unique worth of every soul does not necessarily involve that each person is to share political power. But it is a Christian fundamental that responsibility lies in the wills of individuals, and for this freedom of choice is implied. As political organization affects so much of life it may be reasonably contended that political choice by individuals is implicated in their moral responsibility, and any suppression of that choice by taking away the political power and freedom of the individual is anti-Christian. On this ground it may be said that Christian ethics is in principle democratic, though the methods and actual forms of such democratic Christian government may vary with circumstances of time and place. The Christian duty is to support those policies which are likely to be most productive of human welfare.

Human welfare is the well-being of individuals. In view of some contemporary sociological and political theories it is of fundamental importance to emphasize that it is only individuals who are known to be "experi-ents," who can enjoy and suffer. The State as a whole cannot experience, cannot enjoy or suffer anything; well-being can be attributed to it only as an expression the ultimate significance of which lies in the lives of the individuals who compose it. This is not to deny that the good of individuals depends in part on the character of their relations, and thus on the forms of social and political organization. In place of attention to the real beings who constitute the State, these theories lead to idolatrous worship of an idea. From the standpoint of a modern Christian ethics, political organization exists for the individuals and may, often must, vary with the conditions on which their welfare depends.

The universalism of Christian ethics, clearly implied

in the teaching of Jesus, and explicitly formulated by Paul, has continued to be recognized in principle throughout Christian history however much it may have been ignored in practice. But inevitably the significance for actual conduct of this principle is partly determined by the nature of human evolution. The differences between races and their different stages of development must be acknowledged. The same also applies to those social groups called nations. Christian ethics does not involve the ignoring of race or of nationality: as universalist it takes these up into the wider whole of Christian humanity. What it does involve is that the relations between such groups shall be in conformity with the principles of love and justice, and not determined by racial and national expediency and selfishness. Races and nations are not similarly and equally equipped. The Christian is called on to aid in the attainment of the best for all races and nations according to their capacities and needs, endeavouring to rule out considerations of selfish partiality. The character of racial and national policies must vary so much with circumstances that no precise directions can be prescribed in detail by any realistic Christian ethics.¹³

Christian Ethics and War

Wars are affairs of States. The problem of the compatibility of war with Christian ethics is a much more difficult one than is often supposed. While on the one hand Christian sentiment leads men to reject it as brutal and destructive, on the other Christian thought is faced by the fact of evil as intellectually incomprehensible in a world regarded as having its origin in a good Supreme Being. If God's purposes are such as Christians believe, it appears as though there are forces in opposition to them. In the world in which we live, are God and those with Him somehow involved in opposing physi-

cal forces by physical forces? The problem of war may be regarded as a part of the general problem of evil. It may be urged that evil must be fought with any and all means in our power. But is resort to war to endeavour by Beelzebub to throw out Beelzebub? It may be contended that in accordance with His moral character God's means for overcoming war need to be other than physical force. The idea that God will eventually triumph over evil by the use of His power has been declared to be one of the fundamental errors of so-called Christian thought. Whatever may be said against war, it still remains possible that in "the nature of things" it is in some stages of development an inevitable factor in efforts for higher levels of experience. Can a full appreciation of and adherence to Christian ethics carry us beyond those stages?

It has been maintained that in some definite respects Christian ethics and war are compatible. A fundamental principle of Christian morality is that a person shall be prepared to sacrifice his life. War is described as presenting such a challenge and an opportunity. For Christianity suffering is not the main evil, indeed it calls on men to be prepared to suffer. Because war involves tremendous suffering it is not necessarily to be avoided at all costs by Christians. Such contentions lead to the questions: For what, in the Christian view, should a man rightly be prepared to give his life? For what, could one rightly involve one's self and others in suffering? According to Christian ethics character is of greater worth than external consequences of conduct. Character is constituted by particular virtues. Some of these, it is urged, are best cultivated on a wide scale by war. The eminent English Churchman, Dean Farrar wrote: "There has scarcely been any war in which some of the finest elements of virtue have not been educated. What splendour of self-sacrifice, what unflinching battle-brunt of heroism, what sense of the absolute su-

premacY of duty does war call forth even in the humblest and most ignorant soldiers! Nor is it only the grandeur of a death-defying courage which such imminent peril evokes; it calls forth no less the tenderness of self-sacrifice. . . . But if, in so many thousands of instances, war thus calls forth the finest feelings of the most ordinary men, it also, undoubtedly, has tended again and again to save whole nations from the eating canker of those vices which too often grow up in the long continuance of peace." ¹⁴

But it is strenuously and it would seem rightly replied that the moral devastation of war far out-weighs any such moral benefits. "War is hell," says Mr. W. L. Crane, "and when hell rules there is no longer any virtue in the world worth speaking about. War is the sum of all villainies; and includes a corruption of moral sense that is the greatest of all its villainies. War kills; but the murderous spirit it creates is crueller than any particular act of murder. War lies; but the lying spirit it engenders is baser than any specific falsehood. War steals; but the pirate spirit it fosters is meaner than any single theft. War lusts; but the general debauchment of morals is fouler than any one rape or violation. The glory of war is one thing. Let it be put in with it. Then into the opposite scale let the moral damage of war be cast. Let the balance be true. Its destructive effect upon the moral character of the nation that wages it, is war's final condemnation." "War, so far from invigorating a nation, or promoting its survival by eliminating the unfit, actually accomplishes the contrary by crippling or killing multitudes of its strongest, bravest and best." ¹⁵

Christianity is said to be compatible with wars of defence. What is it that people defend? Their freedom? But what is the essential implication of freedom? Surely the enjoyment of a certain type of life. Is not the Christian himself to strive for and as far as possible live

and promote a certain type of life, and is he not called on to be prepared to suffer in order to advance that type of life? From such a position it is easy to pass to the view that from a Christian standpoint Christians are justified in getting dominance over other peoples at lower levels to lead them, forcibly if necessary, to Christian levels. Not merely trade, but the Christian missionary also, follows the flag. Christians even when they have not openly admitted it have supported aggressive war that Christian institutions might be set up among non-Christian peoples. This being a world in which there are physical forces, the question is implied, even if not definitely asked, whether such forces ought not to be used when deemed necessary for the promotion of such ends. The late Archdeacon W. Cunningham maintained that it has been a general opinion that appeal to arms is never justified in efforts to promote the Kingdom of God. The term "Kingdom of God" in his exposition is highly ambiguous. The Crusaders and those who fought in the Wars of Religion supposed that they were promoting or defending the "Kingdom of God," in some sense. If the Kingdom of God should include all good, it follows from Dr. Cunningham's statement that war is never a justifiable means to attain any good. But he made a questionable radical distinction between the Kingdom of God and earthly life, for he went on to say that war is not necessarily un-Christian "for an object that frankly concerns earthly life and earthly schemes."¹⁶

What may be found in Christian history on the questions here involved? The position of Jesus may be declared to be ambiguous. The implications of his fundamental teaching may with good reason be said to rule out war. On the other hand it is urged that he did not always condemn it, but sometimes appeared to recognize it. He did not exhort soldiers to lay down their arms. His admission of the payment of tribute to Caesar im-

plied a recognition of military co-ercion. From the fact that he forbade his disciples to use the sword to prevent his arrest, it does not follow that he meant that the sword is never to be used. If Jesus was definitely against military weapons, it may be asked how it was that a close follower of his should be in possession of a sword. Apparently when he drove the money-changers from the temple-courts the authorities were afraid of popular support for him. As Dr. Cadoux suggests, if they had known him as a pacifist, they would not have anticipated any such disturbance. In one parable, the king (without any implied condemnation by Jesus) is described as sending his armies to kill those who had murdered his messengers. Though the passage may be variously interpreted Jesus is recorded to have said: "I came not to bring peace, but a sword." According to Luke, he foresaw a time with regard to which he could say: "And he that hath none, let him sell his cloak and buy a sword." Nevertheless, not only did Jesus use no such weapons himself: he also declared "My kingdom is not of this world, else would my servants fight." In opposition to the principle of retaliation he taught that of non-resistance. But his expression of this was so exaggerated that it actually involves co-operation with the evil assailant. If one takes our coat, we are to give him our cloak also! If he compels us to go with him one mile, we are to go with him two! The ethical validity of such counsels may be questioned and it may be asked whether they could ever be practically adopted. Nonetheless, the principle is clear that the best, indeed ultimately the only successful way to oppose hatred is by love. That undoubtedly was Jesus' ideal. Did he suppose that war was inevitable until a further stage of development was reached, and therefore did not definitely condemn it or the profession of the soldier or the carrying of arms? ¹⁷

There was for a time a definite aloofness of Chris-

tians from military service, for between A.D. 60 and 165 it is difficult to learn of Christians who were soldiers. After A.D. 170 some soldiers were Christians and their profession was not opposed by the Church. Clement of Alexandria and others condemned war in general as contrary to the Christian spirit. To the exhortation of Celsus that Christians should help the emperor, taking up arms, Origen replied that Christians aid the emperor when they clothe themselves with the armour of God. "The more pious one is, the more one brings powerful help to the emperor, and in this one is more useful than the soldiers who go into battles and kill as many enemies as they can." The Christians fight with their prayers for those who make just wars and rule with justice. Tertullian considered war a discipline sent by God, but would not exhort Christians to engage in it. He had a glimpse of the power of a form of passive resistance: "We could also make a terrible war upon you without arms, or fighting a stroke, by being so passively revengeful as only to leave you." Though the early writers often condemned the gladiatorial games they did not similarly oppose war.¹⁸

Augustine considered war as an aspect of the life of the "worldly city." But its aim was that of the essential purpose of the State: the preservation of order and the suppression of evil. "The worldly city aims at earthly peace." "The heavenly city—a pilgrim on earth—uses this peace also." "The aim of war is nothing but glorious peace." Wars of aggression are to be condemned. In "The City of God" he indicated this in a notable passage: "Elegant and excellent was that pirate's answer to the great Macedonian Alexander, who had taken him: the king asking him, 'How darest thou molest the seas so,' he replied with a free spirit, 'How darest thou molest the whole world? but because I do it with a little ship only I am called a thief; thou doing it with a great navy, art called an emperor.'" ¹⁹

The Christian Church in the Middle Ages continued its recognition of war. In promoting the Crusades it encouraged war for what it conceived to be Christian ends. By the religious rites associated with knighthood, it appeared as sanctifying the profession of the soldier. "The Medieval effort to consecrate war," says Dr. Hannah, "was in itself one of the greatest triumphs of the monastic ideal. The noviciate of the knight was borrowed from the noviciate of the monk." However, the Church by its advocacy of "The Truce of God" endeavoured to lessen the frequent petty wars that disturbed Europe for centuries. It opposed the killing of prisoners, and later also the selling of them into slavery, while it promoted the policy of ransom and exchange. Dante taught that the Christian ideal is essentially one of peace: "Whence it is manifest that universal peace is the best of all those things which are ordained for our blessedness. And that is why there rang out to the shepherds from on high, not riches, not pleasures, not honours, not length of life, not health and strength, not beauty, but peace."²⁰

The Protestant reformers engaged in wars and regarded them as justified by their Christian ethics. Luther vigorously supported the war against the peasants. Calvinists, though condemning war in general, have yet been prepared to regard the use of military force as justified as a last resort in defence or to punish malefactors. "It is the dictate both of natural equity and of the nature of the office," wrote Calvin, "that princes are armed not only to restrain the crimes of private individuals by judicial punishments, but also to defend the territories committed to their charge by going to war against any hostile aggression; and the Holy Spirit, in many passages of Scripture, declares such wars to be lawful." But he adds: "Certainly we ought to make every other attempt before we have recourse to the decision of arms." Erasmus, from his standpoint of

a Christian Humanism, pleaded the cause of peace in many of his writings, particularly in "The Complaint of Peace" (1517). He revolted against the brutalities and the futilities of warfare. "In my opinion," he wrote, "Cicero was right in saying that an unjust peace was better than the justest war." He desired a universal realm, which he considered Christianity to imply.²¹

Within the modern era the Society of Friends has been the most persistent among Christian communities in its opposition to war. Passages from the "Quaker Discipline" indicate their attitude through the centuries: "We feel bound explicitly to avow our unshaken persuasion that all war is utterly incompatible with the plain precepts of our divine Lord and law-giver and the whole spirit of his gospel, and that no plea of necessity or policy, however urgent or peculiar can avail to release either individuals or nations from the paramount allegiance which they owe to him who hath said 'Love your enemies.' In enjoying this love and the forgiveness of injuries, he who has brought us to himself has not prescribed for man precepts which are impossible of being carried into practice, or of which the practice is to be postponed until all shall be persuaded to act upon them. . . . When nations conform their laws to this divine teaching, wars must necessarily cease."²²

Admitting that the problem of evil is theoretically insoluble, it is not evident that war is an inevitable necessity in the "nature of things." Having no conclusive proof one way or the other in this regard, we are at liberty to adopt the view that it is not. The un-Christian use of force may be met by the spread of Christian ideas leading to change in the use of force. All right use of force has come through its association with good ideas and sentiments. War is a triumph of the irrational. Jesus has been represented as actually giving up his life for mankind, but he did not go out equipped and with the intent to kill others. Christian ethics does

not imply that an individual is called on to die for the economic welfare or the political prestige of his race or national community, yet it is such ends that are usually the aims in war. Men can love God and their fellow-men and have moral dignity even if they have lost their political liberty and economic wealth. "Is not the life more than meat, and the body more than raiment?" The true worship of God is in the "heart" and political servitude cannot prevent that. The suggestion that honour is defended by the brutality of war is ethically reprehensible. In peace there are ample opportunities for developing all moral qualities. Fortitude as an enduring attitude is far more significant than the spasmodic and often incidental demands for particular acts of courage found in war. The demand for social co-operation and unity in striving for economic and cultural welfare is just as great and more continuous than the *esprit de corps* required in war. War involves unity and co-operation of some, but also a conflict with others. Peace in its fullest Christian sense implicates the widest unity and co-operation of mankind.

The sayings and doings of Jesus do not give a complete and consistent system of ethics. He may have undergone a development in his ethical views. At times he appears to have been under the influence of his immediate environment, and at other times to have had a wider vision of mankind and the conditions of human living. Thus on some occasions a tinge of Jewish nationalism is evident; on others he had an attitude of moral and religious universalism. So, therefore, it may be readily admitted that he did not definitely himself apply his fundamental principle in a prolonged attack on war. He urged the positive aim of brotherly love which would leave no place for war. He indicated the motive for war: to establish or maintain "a kingdom of this world." He ruled war from the Christian life in emphasizing that his world is not of that kind. Noth-

ing more definite than that is required to make his essential attitude clear. But we are still at a level of evolution in which that type of attitude is far from being universally adopted. The individual, striving for the attainment of the Christian ideal, must consciously assume the responsibility of making his own decision whether in the particular stage of development and circumstances he will in any way participate in war. He must be prepared to bear the consequences of his decision. A modern Christian ethics on the basis of its development in history can definitely affirm that peace is the ideal, but may acknowledge that in present conditions it cannot without unjustifiable dogmatism be maintained that all participation in war is un-Christian. It may be an advantage that some, whatever sufferings they incur thereby, should refuse to fight, on grounds of the Christian ideal, that that ideal shall be impressively presented to mankind. The main Christian attitude must be one which with unceasing endeavour so promotes and organizes world economic and cultural welfare that causes of war shall be eliminated. The chief call on Christians in this regard is constant constructive effort for the prevention of war.²³

CHAPTER XI

CHRISTIAN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS

Only actual individuals can enjoy and suffer. Thus in the previous chapter it was contended that the real purpose of political organization is to be found in the well-being of individuals. It is from a similar standpoint that the problems of economics are to be considered. The experience of economic values is an experience of individuals. As in the course of history, forms of political government have developed, being tested in experience, so also various kinds of economic organization have been evolved. These have perforce been concerned in the main with the tangible goods of human life, raw and finished products, and with calculable labour and means of exchange. It has sometimes appeared as though thinkers have supposed that these may be considered by themselves simply as related with physical or, more widely, terrestrial welfare. A modern Christian ethics acknowledges the importance of sound principles and organization for such an end as of worth in itself, but it insists further that effects of economic conditions on the moral and religious aspects of life, and of these on economic conditions, must be taken into account. If we were living in a perfect world, the terrestrially economic, the moral, and the religious would be in harmony. We are not aware of being in such a world. In consequence, differences of views are found between those who regard the economic of dominant significance and those who accord it only secondary importance. It is clear that terrestrial economic wellbeing has never been the prime consideration of Christian ethics.

Forms of economic organization have to be examined with reference to the principles and attitudes underlying

them; their effects on moral and religious life; and their efficiency for terrestrial or secular welfare. Very much of the theory of economics in the past has rested upon an implied assumption, that the dominant economic motive is the desire for profit understood in the sense of the individual's, or his family's, or other narrow group's, or his nation's terrestrial good. A form of psychological hedonism has been implicated in economics long after its general abandonment elsewhere. Even thinkers who deliberately reject this "private" profit motive, all too often actually maintain views on economic organization which imply it. Throughout its history Christianity has challenged the essential egoism of this attitude.

In modern life the narrower types of economic egoism have been challenged by advocates of Communism. In principle Communism must necessarily be international, for it implies opposition to national as to any other forms of egoism. It is sometimes maintained that Christian ethics is communistic. Before considering that contention in the light of Christian history, it should be made clear that Communism so meant is not to be confused with the distinctive policies adopted at the present time in Russia which may be referred to as "Marxism" or "present Russian Communism." In theory and in practice that is in important respects contrary to Christian ethics, which does not involve class war as taught in Marxist theory. As Berdyaev writes, for it "a person as person does not belong to any class, and is distinguished as bourgeois, noble, peasant or proletarian, only by accidental circumstances, by his 'wrapper'; he belongs by his inner being to the spiritual world and to eternity." The Communism of Russia "sets class above personality and regards man solely as a function of society. . . ." As a consequence of this exaggeration of the social whole and its merely terrestrial aims in Russia, "Marxism, says Berdyaev, allows that the souls and bodies of men

may be sacrificed in the interests of economic prosperity: Christianity allows no such thing.”¹

But with the rejection of what goes under the name of Communism in Russia, is there justification for the view that Christianity should otherwise be considered communistic? That question must be regarded as referring not merely to implications of the principle of the love of neighbours as ourselves, but to actual forms of economic organization, and especially as concerns collective ownership of property in contrast with private ownership. The Gospels give us no evidence that Jesus taught either that the possession of private wealth is wrong, or that the moral form of economic life involves collective ownership. He did not talk of wealth in that manner. He warned his hearers against the love of mammon and insisted that it is difficult for the rich to lead the highest moral life. He advised the rich young man, as an individual, to sell all he had and give to the poor, but he did not declare that his possession of riches was itself sinful. According to the “Acts of the Apostles” the small first Christian community “had all things in common.” Yet the complaint against Ananias and Sapphira was not that they did not give up all their private property, but their deceit and pretence that they were giving all. The idea of a community of goods appears to be absent from Paul’s teaching. He exhorted the rich to care for the poor: the value of riches lies just in the opportunity they give for loving service. He also laid down a principle that was maintained in the early Christian communities: “If any would not work, neither should he eat.”²

Tertullian described it as characteristic of some Christian communities that with the exception of wives “all things are in common.” The extent to which this was the case is open to doubt. Harnack contended that there was no Christian communism in the earliest Gentile churches. Christian leaders sometimes questioned the

right to private property. Ambrose wrote: "Nature has poured forth all things for the common use of all men." "Nature created common right, but usurpation has transformed them into private rights." But as Dr. Dudden says, after a detailed account of Ambrose's animadversions on wealth, his socialistic ideal is to be attained "by the gradual penetration of the community by the Christian spirit." Dr. Workman quotes Basil the Great: "If any man calleth aught his own, he maketh himself a stranger to the elect of God." In general the monastic orders practised a communism in the sense of a community of goods. Mr. Owst suggests that "If the friars did not actually preach communism, some of their remarks might easily have been taken to recommend it."³

Yet Christians have constantly been encouraged to practice almsgiving, which implies private property. Early Christian communities had common funds used for the welfare of their needy members, funds to which those who could subscribed. As the Church gained power in the Middle Ages it exerted considerable control over private property and its disposition. It became itself immensely wealthy. Mr. Hobson writes that there was a victory of mammon within the bosom of the Church and its ethics in this direction was seriously affected. "The moral control claimed by the Church over economic conduct and embodied in the principle of 'just price' or fair dealing was everywhere subjected to compromise and concessions that ate away its ethics and made it servile to the interests of the richer members of the community. It did little at any time to curb the greed and rapacity of the strong." Medieval thinkers defended private ownership as a "natural right." Leo XIII in his Encyclical *Rerum Novarum* in 1891 reiterated that theory. Every man has by nature the right to possess property as his own. He needs things for permanent use because he is a rational being with con-

tinuous plans and aims. Man makes his own that with which he has mixed his labour. To deprive him of this is theft. From the State "the chief thing to be secured is the safe-guarding by legal enactment and policy of private property." The present Roman Catholic position has been stated as definitely opposed to collective State ownership. "The main tenet of Socialism, the community of goods, must be entirely rejected."⁴

The great Protestant Churches have supported the principle of private ownership. The French Confession of Faith of 1559, due chiefly to Calvin, asserts: "We detest all those who would like to reject authority, to establish community and confusion of property and overthrow the order of justice." The Anglican Articles affirm: "Christian men's goods are not common." The modern Anglican bishop, Charles Gore, well known for his interest in social problems, wrote: "Christianity is not communistic. I cannot conceive of a healthy society without private property for use: that indeed seems to me to be involved in the independence and nobility of the individual life."⁵

Christian ethics cannot be said to imply any specific form of economic organization as the universally moral one. It does not involve either the morality or the immorality of private property. "Christianity certainly is not pledged to uphold any particular form of property as such. Whether property had better be held by individuals or by small groups . . . is a matter for experience and common sense to decide. But where Christian ethics steps in is, firstly, to show that property is secondary not primary, a means not an end." Christian ethics does not raise the question of the "right" of an individual, or of small groups of individuals, to the possession of natural resources: but it does imply opposition to their exploitation for individual or group selfishness to the deprivation of others. It does involve that economic goods produced by social co-operation should be

for social use and not for the material aggrandisement of the few. Christian ethics is fundamentally opposed to all selfish use of wealth, whether privately or collectively owned. The mere fact of collective ownership is in itself no guarantee that each and every individual would be justly treated.⁶

Even from early times Christians were taught to regard wealth as a trust to be used for the welfare of the brethren. One of the main reasons why they were exhorted to live simply was that thereby they might have more to dispose of in almsgiving. According to Harnack the early Christian communities acknowledged an obligation to secure provision for the livelihood of every Christian brother, either by furnishing him with work if he had none, or by maintaining him. Vossler asserts that in Medieval ethics almsgiving was considered not as a deed of pity but as a matter of justice. The Church was the chief almoner, distributing among the poor "the goods that came back to them by natural right." But the condition at the end of the Middle Ages was one of turmoil and conflict between burghers and noblemen, and between growing trading companies and the old guilds. For some part of the Middle Ages the Church had indeed endeavoured to control some economic matters by its insistence on "just price." That it did not effect much in this direction may have been due to too close identification of its own worldly interests with those of the wealthy. Nevertheless the principle of "fair dealing" in business was taught. There was a Canon Law against the taking of usury for money lent. In 808 A.D. Charlemagne declared that "usury is the demand for something that was not given." Thomas Aquinas wrote that to take usury is unjust: "it is to sell what does not exist, and this leads to inequality which is contrary to justice." In the "Inferno" Dante treated of usury as against divine law: "usury offends celestial goodness." Nevertheless by means of legal fictions

there were ways of circumventing the Canon Law, and even the Papal Court has been charged with engaging in usurious transactions.⁷

Though the condemnation of usury placed some restrictions on the use of capital, even before the time of John Calvin they were being broken down. Calvin gave an avowed Christian moral approval of the use of capital to bring gain of the nature of interest. He urged that the Scriptures did not wholly condemn usury, and that in the changed conditions of his time it was not to be wholly forbidden "except it be repugnant to justice and charity." Interest was not to be taken from the poor. There must be public utility in a transaction involving the payment of interest. The amount ought not to be in excess of that legally allowed in a given region. It should be just, and in accordance with the principle of the Golden Rule. In any case it is better to ask too little than too much. "Before Calvin," says Dr. Harkness, "Protestants as well as Catholics were taking interest, but were doing so either with a guilty conscience or with scruples profitably suppressed. After Calvin, trade with the loaning and borrowing of capital could be engaged in by adherents of the Reformed faith without other moral strictures than those imposed by Calvin's exhortation to judge the matter by the principles of justice and charity." She adds that Calvin's followers "found it easy to take interest with a clear conscience and to forget about the principle of justice and charity." Worldly prosperity came to be regarded as a sign of God's blessing. Calvin upheld the generally accepted opinion of the right to private property. He regarded such property as having been granted to an individual by the good will of God. Encroachment upon it is an offence against God, and not merely a wrong to the person concerned. He condemned not simply theft with violence or open robbery but also "all artifices by which the possessions and wealth of our

neighbours are transferred to us, whenever they deviate from sincere love into a desire of deceiving or doing any kind of injury"—a statement sufficiently wide to cover all dealings in private or business life contrary to fundamental Christian principles.⁸

According to different points of view, Protestantism has been lauded and condemned as being mainly responsible for the rise and development of modern capitalism. Such a contention fails to do due justice to the various influences that came into play in that development, most of which do not seem to have been predominantly ethical or religious. Nevertheless Protestantism was not without definite effects in this direction. It rejected the idea that life in a monastery or convent was necessarily a higher one than that lived "in the world." It frankly welcomed the pursuit of riches as capable of being an ally of religion and not inevitably its enemy. To this end it encouraged diligence and thrift, sobriety and prudence. As freedom from the authority of the Roman Church was admitted by Protestants for religion, it was almost inevitable that freedom should come to be claimed in other directions also, as for example in trade. Thus Protestantism, to an extent not to be exaggerated, was an influence in the promotion of economic individualism. But it cannot be shown to be the main psychical cause of capitalism in its modern forms. In England while on the one hand many of the pioneers of modern industry and commerce came from distinctly Protestant sects, on the other hand the Labour Movement, critical of capitalistic methods, gained much of its early strength among members of the same sects. In Protestant ethics much has been said about a man's "calling" or "vocation." But this idea was not foreign to Medieval theologians. According to them, as for Luther, it referred to a condition of life and of work, into which under divine Providence a man was born, to rebel against which was impious. Calvin

appears to have modified the conception to connote any occupation morally chosen. Whatever his work, the individual has the responsibility to perform it with the utmost diligence, with the sense of fulfilling a religious duty. This devotion to work as a Christian duty and as a means for divine blessing, undoubtedly had its effects in the advance of occidental industry and commerce. Also, as Troeltsch pointed out, the abolition of the monasteries and changes in the attitude towards the conjugal relation led to an increase of population, thus providing the labour required for such advance.⁹

Among Christians in the first centuries there was no specific consideration of the moral issues raised by the manner in which wealth is acquired. Work was insisted on, partly for the welfare of the community, and partly because idleness is moral weakness and leads to other ills. That work might bring wealth for private enjoyment was nowhere considered a moral motive for it. The method of acquiring wealth was regarded as moral in so far as it did not conflict with the attitude of love of one's neighbour as one's self. In every age there have been those, preachers and others who in the name of Christianity have condemned practices against this principle. Mr. Owst tells us of the Medieval preachers who declaimed against the wickedness of the merchants and plutocrats, charging them with lying, perjury, and the basest forms of deceit chiefly at the expense of the poor, as by profiteering in corn, using false weights and measures, mixing sand with their merchandise, and such like practices. In his "Life and Death of Mr. Badman" poor John Bunyan in the seventeenth century condemned at length similar forms of extortion. No considered it an implication of Christian ethics that no man has the moral right always to buy as cheap as he can and sell as dear as he can. In both practices covetousness and deceit are involved. The Christian is to buy and to sell for the full fair price. With this may

be contrasted the view of the saintly but ecclesiastically minded Jeremy Taylor, a member of a different stratum of society. In his "Holy Living," he maintained that when the contractors are acting voluntarily and on an equal footing, they may morally buy as "cheap as they ordinarily can" and sell as dear as they can.¹⁰

In England in the nineteenth century social reformers and prominent leaders of labour began to condemn the Churches for not using their corporate influence for the attainment of general social welfare. Mr. Keir Hardie, the founder of the English Independent Labour Party, said he "had no use for a Christianity which did not protest against social wrongs" . . . which looks "only to a heaven in the next world and ignores the hell in this." "We need today a return to the principles of the Gospel." Among Christian thinkers, as Dr. Temple has remarked, "From about the middle of the nineteenth century the predominant question in this connection was not 'How can we help such and such sufferers?' but 'What is the true Christian order of society?'" In the time of the social disturbances around 1848 a number of Christian leaders, including F. D. Maurice, C. Kingsley and J. M. Ludlow endeavoured to set on foot practical movements to remedy the existing social economic evils. They published a series of tracts entitled "Politics for the People" the fourth of which, written by Ludlow, had the title "Christian Socialism." Underlying his proposals and experiments was a wide general purpose, as was recognized by his opponent W. R. Greg, who wrote: "The Christian Socialists will proceed to complete their undertaking by uniting all the Associations in each trade into one vast guild, governed by a central committee, and finally by effecting a union of these guilds into one gigantic fraternal combination; by this means the whole industrial arrangements of society will be revolutionized."

Christian Socialists of the nineteenth century were

convinced that the modern competitive system of industry and commerce is definitely un-Christian. They condemned the existing conditions. "All this slow robbery and slow murder which is now going on in our so-called Christian society is," said Stewart Headlam, "absolutely non-Christian." They urged Christians to adopt schemes of profit sharing, and to bring about the legal supervision of conditions of labor. They did not maintain that Christian ethics necessarily involves any specific theory of social organization, but that in modern life a socialistic form is more generally conducive than any other to human well-being and the realization of Christian ideals. The Free Church Socialist League in England declared that the conditions in industry and commerce did not conform with the principle of Brotherhood as taught by Jesus. They asserted that the faithful and common sense application of this principle "must result in the socialization of all natural resources as well as the instruments of production, distribution and exchange." The League aimed at the promotion of such a social order. The English Church Socialist League also advocated the methods of Socialism. It strove for the political, economic, and social emancipation of the whole people, "by the establishment of a democratic commonwealth in which the community shall own the land and capital collectively and use them co-operatively for the good of all."¹¹

Among Christians who refrained from advocating Socialism, or even opposed it, there was increasing recognition of Christian duties with reference to economic affairs. In 1897 the bishops at the Lambeth Conference simply said that the great social duty of the Church is that of ministry to man in the things of character, conscience and faith, and to urge "as equitable a distribution as possible of social advantages and opportunities." Those at the Lambeth Conference in 1908 insisted on the moral responsibility of investments and

"the duty of the Church to press on government the opposition to certain wrongs." A representative Christian assembly in a Conference on Christian Politics, Economics and Citizenship in 1924 urged that Christians are called on to take active steps, if necessary through political means, to remedy conditions of low wages, casual employment and unemployment, as well as for social provision in sickness, ill health and old age. Though not questioning the morality of "interest" or "unearned dividends," it insisted on the moral responsibility involved in investments. Pope Leo XIII in his Encyclical on Social Questions emphasized the important fact that inequality in wealth is due in considerable measure to differences of individual capacity, health, strength and opportunity. Poverty is no disgrace. Virtue is within the reach of rich and poor. The possession of wealth does not involve any right for its immoral use, but entails social responsibilities. He urged that the State should protect its subjects from "grasping speculators"; ensure fair living wages and time for rest. Though it should not tax to the extent of eliminating private property, it ought even through "heavy taxation" to reduce the difference between the excessively rich and the poor.¹²

Yet the charge is still made, with sufficient reason, that the Christian churches do not perform their duties in support of just claims regarding economic affairs. Against a widespread view that the Churches are to be neutral in such matters, a leader of the Canadian Labour Party writes: "Labour is not satisfied with that position. It believes that the Church has a responsibility to the masses, which if recognized, will lead to most searching analysis of the ethical and spiritual basis of the many systems of wealth production." It is widely thought that the Churches have failed to give due attention to the ethical aspects of earthly conditions. With this implication a Mexican peasant is reported to have said:

"Do you know what the priests did? They took Jesus who was one of us, a carpenter, and they made him a king." On the other hand it is quite clear that not a few concerned with the economic welfare of the masses ignore or deny the spiritual values for which inevitably Christian ethics primarily stands. Thus, one Russian Soviet leader writes: "The Church is a pestilence. It is a germ which poisons our life. It diverts a great amount of energy from real problems by all kinds of nonsense about the other world and about the fate of the soul after death." Christian ethics stands for full and adequate attention to "this world," but it also insists that man in his entire nature is not and cannot be entirely satisfied by the merely economic and cultural values that these critics are solely concerned with. Even in "this-worldly" affairs, moral principles are implied which transcend economic considerations.¹³

From the fact that there is no universally authoritative type of economic organization prescribed by Christian ethics, it is not to be inferred that it has no definite requirements affecting economic practice. Down to all the details such requirements are involved in the application of the principle of the love of one's neighbour as one's self. "The root of all our trouble," wrote Dr. Gore, "is that we have substituted for the divine law, 'Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself,' a quite opposite maxim or set of maxims as the basis of our industrial and our international life." It has to be recognized that the development of Christian ethics involves the ever wider and detailed application of this principle within the growing complexity of human life. The development that occurred in Christian history with reference to slavery may illustrate the kind of advance that is called for in the conditions of the economic aspects of modern life. Apparently Jesus taught nothing with regard to slavery. Paul did not suggest that it is opposed to Christian ethics. He called on the masters

to treat their slaves with kindness, and on the slaves to perform good service and render obedience to their masters. Even some Medieval monasteries had their serfs, and though Leo X, in about 1520 A.D. issued a Bull declaring that "not only the Christian religion but nature itself cries out against a system of slavery," it was not till centuries later that the Christian world in general came to appreciate the implication of Christian ethics in this direction and suppressed slavery within its domains. The Society of Friends fought against it in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. An Act prohibiting the slave trade in the British dominions was passed in 1807, and a thorough-going Abolition Act in 1833, largely as the result of the work of William Wilberforce, who having undergone a Christian conversion wrote in his diary that the suppression of the slave trade was an aim "God has set before me." Nevertheless right up to the time of the Civil War in America, some Protestant divines argued in favor of slavery as not condemned by Holy Scripture.¹⁴

The Christian motive for economic activity is the general welfare as contrasted with that of the selfish or private profit motive of "the economic man" of the traditional economics. This, as said before, does not necessarily involve the cessation of the policy of private property. Indeed its continuance might be justified on the basis of Christian experience, as contributing to the moral stability of individuals, and as providing opportunities for the exercise of their moral freedom. The Christian has the duty of living in accordance with this principle himself, and is guilty of negligence and acquiescence if he does not do all he can to prevent others from violating it. Analogous with what is here involved as to the use of capital or property, are implications with regard to the employment of labour. The only Christian motive for the employment of labour is general welfare. Any exploitation of human beings as

mere means for the selfish advantages of the few is sin. Christianity focuses attention not merely on the physical disadvantages of the exploited, but also and more especially on the pernicious effects on the characters of the exploited and the exploiters. "Our economic order, says Dr. Fosdick, sometimes seems to me almost as bad for the people who profit by it as for the people who are ruined." The Christian has to take into account both physical and moral or spiritual welfare, and the former is to be judged both in itself and in its bearing on the latter. "We never can separate the spiritual interests of individual souls from the social situation." "Wage-earners," wrote Dean Inge, "have not yet emerged from quasi-servile conditions." It is essentially to use men simply as means if their needs are met only when they are required for work and are left unprovided for when unemployed. Christian ethics demands that all to the extent of their capacities shall share in necessary work, and that all shall have this sense of "security" that at all times they shall be accorded their share in the general welfare. If any *will not* work, he is to be treated as an invalid or a criminal. Not to provide for those who are willing to work, whether there is work or not, is a sin of which all concerned in a social community must be judged guilty. It is a caricature of Christianity to suppose that according to it "charity" may "cover a multitude of economic sins."¹⁵

In addition to the selfish exploitation of natural resources and of human labour there is a similar use of mechanical aids of all kinds that lead to economic advance. Some of the major problems of modern life are due to the fact that machinery is exploited by comparatively few to considerable detriment to many. Christian ethics is not opposed to machinery: it implies its greatest possible use as a means of reducing physical toil and the time given to it, thus freeing mankind for attention to

higher values. Some of these higher values have been made possible for the many only because of the development of mechanical inventions. The exploitation of scientific ideas and these inventions has led, not to general emancipation from arduous toil, but to the slavery of some men to machines by their too many hours of occupation with them, and to the unemployment and consequent poverty of others. Christian ethics does not deny rights of private ownership in such inventions, but it may ask who might claim share in that ownership. Most often inventions have depended and depend upon scientific advances through the accumulated efforts over long periods of scientists other than the inventors. These scientists have been and are supported directly or indirectly by the community, and consequently the community has rightly some share in the eventual results of their work. Christian ethics does deny any right for the selfish use of these inventions and presents as the principle for their employment the welfare of others as for ourselves. The Christian has the duty so to use such instruments as he may himself be in control of, and further of preventing others from contrary practice. In so far as through negligence he permits the violation of this Christian principle he must be adjudged as sharing the guilt thereof. The control of machinery for general welfare instead of private profit should do much for lessening for individuals the amount and number of hours of physical toil and contribute largely to overcoming problems of unemployment which its selfish exploitation has mainly caused.

The problems of economics have become so complex in modern life partly because of the tremendous increase in the range of terrestrial values. Besides the basic provision of the necessities for physical preservation, food, clothing, and shelter, human activity is now organized for the production of the means for a great variety of culture values. Only by questionable simplification is

it possible for so-called scientific economics to make statistical calculations of factors involved. Some of the psychological factors, incapable of any exact statistical formulation, have far-reaching effects, and it is precisely in these that ethical considerations are implicated. The method, recognized by most traditional theories of economics, of calculating the relative worth to the community of intellectual and artistic work as compared with manual labour is with reference to supply and demand. Here arises another form of selfishness, with detrimental effects in modern life, of individuals demanding or acquiescently accepting emoluments so large as to reduce seriously what may be available for others concerned. In the production of motion pictures, for example, many are exploited with low remuneration and often only spasmodic employment, that the few may be given far more than is required for a high standard of living. Many executives of "big business" have assigned to them salaries and bonuses far in excess of what they may spend in healthy cultured living. A moral question is here involved to which Christian ethics has its answer, implying a different mode of calculation which should be acknowledged by all employers and all employed, and put into application in accordance with particular circumstances: "From each according to his abilities, and to each according to his needs." By this is not meant, as the late Archdeacon Cunningham seemed to imply, simple "maintenance," but also the satisfaction of those cultural demands that modern life has awakened and education developed.¹⁶

The most pernicious form of selfish exploitation in modern life is found in connection with the means of exchange, which may be described as finance. By manipulations, often intricate, the producers are forced to accept the lowest prices for their commodities and the consumers to pay the highest prices, so that financiers shall accumulate private wealth in the processes of ex-

change. Both in the commodity and in the stock markets wealth is obtained through socially detrimental speculative gambling, the real costs of which fall eventually on the producers and the consumers.¹⁷

One of the most difficult problems of modern life arises with reference to the economic relations between different nations. National economic selfishness is a main cause of war. Christian ethics is undoubtedly opposed to such selfishness, and implicates international co-operation in place of competition. But a Christian nation is not called upon for self-sacrifice in every instance for an economically less-favored people. It may, indeed should, in general endeavour to maintain any economic advantages it may have over peoples who do not manifest genuine effort for a standard of moral and cultural life on the level of its own. The Christian is not primarily interested in the economic welfare of his own or of any other nation; he is much more concerned with the protection and the promotion of the advance of a moral culture.

Those who from a material standpoint selfishly gain by the various kinds of economic exploitation often maintain, with the support of writers on economics who cannot emancipate themselves from traditional theories, that the economic system with which these evils are bound up, is one of inevitable necessity in the nature of things. Such a contention is incapable of justification. By bringing economic activities under control with the progressive elimination of these forms of exploitation, a system may be developed the motive and aim of which is not "private profit," but "service," the equitable welfare of all individuals composing the community.¹⁸

Members of the religious orders of monks and nuns in the Middle Ages were required to take the vow of poverty, which was an expression of the conviction that terrestrial wealth is of secondary significance for human happiness, even that it may on occasion be detrimental

to the attainment of spiritual peace. But in due course there was a natural and justifiable reaction against an exaggerated "otherworldliness" and the religious communities accumulated wealth. There is ample evidence that they used much of that wealth in laudable ways. That it led some to indolence, sensuous living and to quarrels is also to be admitted. Throughout a large part of Christian history the churches have acquired wealth and used it for a variety of purposes, the promotion of divine worship, education, evangelism, sick and poor relief. Though poverty may have been appropriate for Jesus and some others for their particular tasks, and may always be best for some, Christian ethics has not been and is not committed to it as a characteristic of the Christian mode of life. In fact it stands rather for the greatest possible wealth to be used in accordance with Christian principles. Christian ethics has evolved with Christian experience and in its modern form it acknowledges that economic poverty and economic superfluity alike are morally detrimental. The attention and activities of the poor become directed solely or almost solely to the attainment of physical necessities; and those of the over-wealthy most often predominantly to the selfish enjoyment of their riches. Christian ethics requires that economic organization which shall give to the largest possible number of individuals the greatest degree of emancipation from distraction by affairs of economics.

The Golden Rule, as enunciated by Jesus, is an adequate fundamental principle for right conduct in economic matters. The forms of actual economic organization must be determined with reference to conditions of time and place. Christian ethics implies the moral obligation to strive for that type of organization which in the particular circumstances may best provide opportunities for Christian character and fellowship, and along with these the physical and other means for a

comprehensive physical and cultural life for all to the extent of their capacities to enjoy such. It unhesitatingly places persons above things. The subordination of human beings to the production of economic goods it definitely condemns. It insists that the welfare of the worker is a first consideration. If the private profits of industry and commerce were devoted entirely to the advance of cultural goods, the contention would still be the same, for such goods may eventually and probably could now be obtained without human exploitation. Actually in modern life private profits cater too often to private indulgences. Contrary to practice in accord with much of the traditional theory of economics, wages should not be the lowest for which a man's labor may be obtained, but the highest which the enterprise can pay. The hours of the individual's labor should not be the longest which the employer can enforce, but the shortest that the business will allow for him with honest work to earn a wage adequate for a worthy standard of living. Christian ethics is opposed to all selfish exploitation. The Christian is called on not only to refrain from it himself, but also to protect others from it. He should endeavour to lead others to follow the Christian principle. He has the duty, through the political means available in orderly society, to strive so to control economic practices and organization as to eradicate all forms of exploitation detrimental to the individuals constituting society.¹⁹

CHAPTER XII

CHRISTIAN ETHICS AND HUMAN CULTURE

A modern Christian ethics is concerned with the whole of human welfare: it is both "this-worldly" and "other-worldly." It considers body and soul as factors in the good life: the physical world of nature and the spiritual as parts of the divine scheme. There is nothing novel in such statements: with varying emphases most Christians are living in accordance with them. Yet in the writings of opponents of Christianity and in modern life in practice, there is much in contrast with this comprehensive ideal. There is a practical secularism in that many find all their time and energies occupied with merely mundane affairs, to the neglect of all concern with the implications of beliefs in God and of a life beyond that of earth. There is a theoretical secularism in that not a few maintain that such beliefs are unjustified and unjustifiable. "Of the various enthusiasms of our day, wrote Dr. Percy Gardner, there is probably none save secularity which is not to be reconciled with Christianity." What exactly he meant by "secularity" is open to doubt. But a modern Christian ethics, while making it clear that, the nature of man being what it is, the merely secular is inadequate for complete satisfaction, must include full recognition of the claims of the secular, insisting that from the standpoint of a Christian theism the so-called secular and the so-called sacred are both constituents in a divinely conceived life.¹

A modern Christian ethics is the result of historical development: it is not to be completely identified with the ethics of the New Testament or of any previous period in the history of the Christian churches. It not

only carries on principles and details explicitly recognized in the past, but also makes evident what in the living of the past has been implicitly acknowledged. For whatever the one-sidedness of particular expositions of the Christian moral life, and however narrow the modes of living of specific communities within the churches, the great masses of Christians in all ages have endeavoured to live as comprehensively as opportunities afforded. In our day the exponent of Christian ethics has to show explicitly that all human values in modern life are incorporated in the Christian ideal. The art of Christian living is not only to cultivate and experience these values but also to keep them in their proper balance. That is not an easy task: earlier generations of Christians did not always appreciate the nature of their similar task or actually achieve it. "Whether or not Christ's gospel set forth any inherent antagonism between the fulness of mortal life and the sure attainment of Heaven, wrote Dr. H. O. Taylor, its historical interpretations have never effected a complete reconciliation." A modern Christian ethics presents such a reconciliation. This it does first by a full recognition of the implications of a contemporary understanding of Christian theism. Therewith, while taking into account what Christian life and thought in the past has contributed, it expresses the judgements of those at one with that past in their central attitude, but unhampered by any authoritarian pronouncements of the past.²

Actually the Christian life and thought of the past have contributed the essentials, and pointed out the way of advance. Though there were good reasons for certain ascetic traits in Jesus' life and teaching, neither his attitude nor his gospel was dominantly ascetic. He is reported to have said: "I have come that they might have life, and that they might have it more abundantly." In the prayer he taught his disciples, he included the supplication: "Give us this day our daily

bread." It is not unreasonable to regard "daily bread" as symbolical for all upon which our terrestrial well-being depends. Even from minor incidents of his life something may be learned. The story of the marriage feast of Cana of Galilee contains no suggestion of his exhorting any to abstain from wine; and he did not rebuke Mary, the Magdalene, for anointing him with a precious ointment, in spite of the adverse comments of some bystanders. He appreciated the beauty of the lilies: "even Solomon in all his glory was not arrayed as one of these." Among the "blessed" of "his Father" he included those who attended to the mundane needs of those not able to attend to them themselves. Whatever the explanation of the so-called miracles of healing, it may be believed that Jesus definitely occupied himself with care for the sick, suggesting in all its implications the Christian duty of attention to physical and mental health. But he saw the dangers of the exaggeration of worldly values. Concerning the man who, solely occupied with mundane wealth, would pull down his barns and build greater, he said: "Thou fool; this night shall thy soul be required of thee." He taught unequivocally that material welfare is subordinate to inner moral integrity and spiritual relations with one's fellows and with God.³

That Jesus gave most of his attention to values of personal character and inner motives, and to the relation of men and God, and that in this he has been followed by all the great leaders of the Christian churches, does not imply any rejection of other values made possible by divine creation. In general, mankind has needed and needs little urging to seek those values. It is a ground for approval and not of condemnation of those who have stood for Christian ethics, that they have warned men and women against the delusion that in worldly values they could obtain complete satisfaction. The New Testament as a whole does not present a dom-

inant attitude of asceticism. Though it reveals little interest in secular cultural values, being concerned with those of character, brotherly love, and divine worship, it does not oppose them in themselves. It is possible to interpret some passages as giving them recognition. One may so understand Paul's exhortation to the Philippians, which might be accepted as summing up even a modern Christian ethics. "Finally brethren, whatsoever things are true; whatsoever things are honest; whatsoever things are just; whatsoever things are pure; whatsoever things are lovely; whatsoever things are of good report; if there be any virtue, and if there be any praise, think of these things."⁴

Though, to use Dr. H. O. Taylor's words, a "conflict between the finite and the eternal" "dawned in the Apostolic Age" and "in the patristic period worked itself out to a formulated opposition between the world and the City of God," finding its chief expression in monasticism, there was exaggerated emphasis rather than any complete division and opposition. In the nature of things no complete opposition was or is possible: even the monks and nuns could not entirely escape from worldly affairs. The course of monastic development led towards a rectification of the mode of living based on the earlier exaggerated emphasis.⁵

Leaders of the Church had to protest against predominant and exclusive strivings for worldly pleasures. Clement of Alexandria, for example, entered into detailed consideration of the lives of the cultured people of his time in Alexandria. But it is evident that he fought against the abuse of the things of the world rather than against them as such. The "voluptuous and ignoble life of the many is alien to the true love of the beautiful and to refined pleasures. For man is by nature an erect and majestic being, aspiring after the good as becomes the creature of the One. But the life which crawls on its belly is destitute of dignity, is scandalous,

hateful and ridiculous." It may be admitted that he did not fully appreciate the worth of aspects of human culture which God's creation had made possible. Against the sensuous luxury of his times, he felt it necessary to advocate simplicity. It was thus that he was led to urge that clothes are to be simply for the protection of the body and, presumably, for due modesty. Not only must they not be made for beauty in themselves: they ought not to reveal the beauty of the body. He declared that even artificial colouring of materials is unnecessary and to be avoided. Yet, though he had sympathy with those who dismissed from their cities the makers and sellers of perfumes, he was prepared to "permit women to make use of a small quantity of perfume, such that will not overcome men." Though he thought women should keep the affection of their husbands by prudent love, he allowed that they might resort to jewels and ornaments if they helped to this end. Advocating in general the drinking of water and the avoidance of wine, he agreed that a little wine might be useful in helping to give warmth and to revive the gaiety of the aged. The reason why he counselled his readers not to go to theatres and spectacles was because they mostly displayed the stupid and the vicious and aroused bad passions. If Clement were here to survey modern life, he might be expected to insist still on some of his former objections while admitting the necessity of a wider acceptance of earthly values than is found in his works.⁶

Origen, more ascetic in temperament than Clement, scorned temporal pleasures. Cyprian was very emphatic in his condemnation of ornaments and embellishments as well as of the theatre. Concerning the use of cosmetics, he wrote: "You have polluted your skin with a false medicament; you have changed your hair with adulterous colour; your face is violently taken possession of by a lie; your figure is corrupted; your count-

enance is another's." "Necklaces with stones set in gold and with pearls distributed in woven series or numerous clusters" are an invention of the devil "wherewith you hide a neck which God made." Ambrose, conceiving the world as also God's creation, admitted that the body must be cared for, that wealth may be used for good, and that the senses are not in themselves evil. Though somewhat grudgingly, he acknowledged that beauty is to be admired. However, in accord with the emphasis among Christians of his time, he maintained that "the gaities and amusements of the world are vanity. Even intellectual pleasures are dangerous. Knowledge itself, unless it be knowledge of God, is a tissue of futile obscurities and search for it is merely culpable curiosity." 7

In spite of some adoption of an ascetic attitude, Augustine appears to have been conscious of the appeal of terrestrial goods. He explicitly declared that though they cannot of themselves entirely satisfy human nature, because they do not share God's eternality and infinity, they nevertheless come from God. "For whithersoever the soul of man turns itself, unless towards Thee, it is rivetted upon its sorrows, yea, though it is rivetted on things beautiful. And yet they, out of Thee, and out of the soul, were not, unless they were from Thee. They rise, and set; and by rising, they begin as if it were to be; they grow, that they may be perfected; and perfected they wax old and wither; and all grow not old, but all wither. So then when they rise and tend to be, the more quickly they grow that they may be, so much the more they haste not to be. This is the law of them. Thus much hast Thou allotted them, because they are portions of things, which exist not all at once, but by passing away and succeeding, they together complete that universe, whereof they are portions. And even thus is our speech completed by signs giving forth a sound: but this again is not perfected unless one word

pass away when it has sounded its part, that another may succeed. Out of all these things let my soul praise Thee, O God, Creator of all; yet not let my soul be rivetted to these things with the glue of love, through the senses of the body. For they go whither they were to go, that they might not be, and they rend her with pestilent longings, because she longs to be, yet loves to repose in what she loves. But in these things is no place of repose; they abide not, they flee; and who can follow them with the senses of the flesh? Yea, who can grasp them when they are hard by? For the sense of the flesh is slow because it is the sense of the flesh; and thereby is bounded. It sufficeth for that it was made for; but it sufficeth not to stay things running their course from their appointed starting place to the end appointed. For in Thy Word, by which they are created, they hear their decree, 'hence and hitherto.'" He admitted: "With the allurements of smells I am not much concerned. When absent, I do not miss them; when present, I do not refuse them; yet ever ready to be without them." "The delights of the ear had more firmly entangled and subdued me; but Thou didst loosen, and free me. Now in those melodies which Thy words breathe soul into, when sung with a sweet and attuned voice, I do a little repose; yet not so as to be held thereby, but that I can disengage myself when I will."^s

In the Middle Ages, among some of the most influential groups of Christians the scorn of the world reached its climax. It is incorrect to suppose that this characterized the lives of the masses of Christians. That is suggested by the fact that the preachers of the Medieval period denounced "unsparingly the wanton fashions, the wigs, the paint . . . the long-flowing trains, the rich furs and wasteful sleeve lengths, as well as womanly pride and fashion." Even the monks and nuns did not entirely abstain from such things. As early as the eighth century complaints were made of their use

of "many-coloured vestments." "With elegant adornments the body is set off, and the external form decked out limb by limb." It was one devoted to the mystic life, John of the Cross, who could say: "The spiritual Christian ought to suppress all joy in created things, because it is offensive in the eyes of God." It was Guigo, a Carthusian prior, who asserted that "the main content of passing mortal life, while not evil in itself, is so charged with temptation and allure, that it is worthy only of avoidance." It was Peter Damiani who unwittingly expressed the absurdity of this attitude carried to its climax, in his statement: "The world is so filthy with vices, that any holy mind is befouled even by thinking of it."⁹

"In Francis of Assisi, writes Dr. Workman, there was an absolute joy in the created world, the like of which had never been known before, the consequences of which cannot be over-estimated. Francis felt himself one with Nature, for everywhere he realized the presence of love . . . Of his tenderness for created things, the sweet and simple stories are numberless." In this Francis had no doubt whatever that he was true to the fundamentals of Christian ethics. Though some of those caught up in the Renaissance may have lapsed into a sensuous luxury meriting the onslaught of Savonarola, and though these and others may have lacked appreciation of some of the significance of the spiritual life of the Middle Ages, most of its adherents considered it not an opposition to but a widening of the Christian life. Dante, profoundly conscious of the ethical implications of Christianity, recognized the values and shared the ideals for which the leaders of the Renaissance stood. The development of a mundane culture in the Papal Court itself was a necessary reaction to inadequate Medieval conceptions of life. Even Savonarola acknowledged the value of art and knowledge allied with religion.¹⁰

Though the conditions in Geneva in Calvin's own

time included considerable suppression of worldly enjoyments and though in some later periods Calvinists have been excessively puritanical, John Calvin has expressed a well-balanced judgement concerning terrestrial values. "Ivory and gold and riches of all kinds are certainly blessings of Divine providence, not only permitted but expressly designed for the use of men; nor are we anywhere prohibited to laugh, or to be satiated with food, or to annex new possessions to those already enjoyed by ourselves or by our ancestors, or to be delighted with musical harmony, or to drink wine. This, indeed, is true; but amidst an abundance of all things, to be immersed in sensual delights, to inebriate the heart and mind with present pleasures, and perpetually to grasp at new ones—these things are very remote from a legitimate use of the Divine blessings. Let them banish, therefore, immoderate cupidity, excessive profusion, vanity and arrogance; that with a pure conscience they may make proper use of the gifts of God." ¹¹

The simple Bedford tinker, John Bunyan, was not necessarily opposing recognition of the good things of terrestrial life, when he described "ornamental dress" "naked shoulders and suchlike manifestations of pride" as "arousing lust." In his "Serious Call to a Devout and Holy Life," William Law opposed luxuries that disenable us to attend to the needs of others. The eighteenth century author of "The Whole Duty of Man" exhorted simply against an excess of attention to and occupation with mundane enjoyments. There has been and is a need for protests against such excess, but they do not involve that Christian ethics rules out terrestrial values from the ideal life. "The European bourgeois spirit of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, writes Berdyaev, shows a great weakening of spirituality, an interest exclusively directed toward things visible, a denial of things invisible,—it repre-

sents, in fact, that economicism so thoroughly absorbed and made absolute by Karl Marx." Yet, while there is a place for some who like the saintly bishop, Dr. Charles Gore, devote themselves to considerable asceticism for emphasis on the spiritual, it is surely an exaggeration to say as he did: "I must eradicate out of the very foundation of my being the idea that I am justified in living to enjoy myself." The question is not one of enjoyment or not, but whether the enjoyment is that of the whole self, physical and spiritual, and whether it is pursued with due regard to others.¹²

Because man is not merely "animal," but is also and even specifically, "spirit," is no ground for the neglect or rejection of the values dependent chiefly on his physical nature. A modern Christian ethics asserts the duty of man to endeavour to become a healthy and satisfied animal, as well as to strive to become an intelligent, loving and lovable spirit. It insists not only on the duty of every possible care for the body, but also on the privilege of satisfaction of its divinely given impulses. The human being "eats to live": he also in some measure "lives to eat." Only when it implies an exaggeration of the worth of eating relative to other values, is the gibe "living to eat" ethically derogatory. It was really in accord with such a point of view that the Anglican bishops at the Lambeth Conference of 1888, urging temperance but not total abstinence, said: "We desire to discountenance the language which condemns the use of wine as wrong in itself." Clothes may and should be considered not merely from the standpoints of health and modesty, but also of aesthetic enjoyment. The view that Dr. Gardner accredited to the Greeks must be accepted as in conformity with Christian ethics: "The idea that lies at the root of the Greek love of beauty is this—that God desires to see in every corporeal frame the highest beauty of which it is capable, that He has an ideal after which every person is bound to strive,

and every approach to that ideal is in accordance with the will of God and a gratification of His love to men." ¹⁸

Because amusements have so rarely been the subject of constructive appreciation in the history of Christian ethics, it must not be supposed that Christian leaders have never promoted them under Christian inspiration. Though some have opposed them because of evils associated with them, others have encouraged them as turning attention from evils. In Medieval morality plays the vices were often "laughed out of court." Early Christian writers condemned the gladiatorial contests on the ground of their cruelty and arousing of ferocious passions. But in modern times Christians have certainly not been less ardent than others in the promotion and enjoyment of healthy sports. Yet Christians of a later time may be amazed at the very little opposition of Christian leaders today against the betting that has become associated with sports.

Betting and gambling are such definite evils in modern life that the implications of Christian ethics with reference to them need to be stated. That they depend in part on a desire for excitement does not justify them. It is futile to deny that their main motive is to obtain money without genuine, socially beneficial, work. Christian ethics recognizes three ways by which men may obtain values morally: the free gifts of Nature (or God); the free gifts of person to person on the basis of friendship and love; and as the result of honest beneficial labour. The money gained from betting and gambling does not come from any of these. On the other hand they provide inducements to dishonesty and theft, and not infrequently to hatred and conflict. Money gained thereby goes to those who, as is suggested by the very fact that they bet and gamble, are more likely to use it unworthily than worthily. On the serious effects of gambling connected with the financial

and economic life of a people, it is unnecessary to dwell. Insurance is sometimes said to be a form of gambling: though plausible, that contention nevertheless appears wrong. Insurance is actually a form of co-operation by which those who participate help to protect one another. Insurance has an individual and social utility: gambling is detrimental both to the individual and to society.

The destruction of art objects by early Christians and the opposition to art by some Christians of later centuries have been insignificant compared with the Christian promotion of art in very many forms, music and painting, sculpture and architecture, types of metal work and fine weaving. Objects of art were created and used in religious worship just because of the appreciation of the beautiful. That the cult of the beautiful is no longer bound up predominantly with ecclesiastical organizations, does not place it outside of the scope of Christian ethics. Indeed, it may be definitely maintained that from the standpoint of a modern Christian ethics the tolerance of the avoidably ugly is a sin; and the promotion and enjoyment of the beautiful a duty and a privilege. That too often in the past Christians hindered the advance of human knowledge may be admitted. The exponent of a modern Christian ethics acknowledges they were at fault in so doing. But he is also aware that even in the past the Churches have often recognized and fulfilled the duty of the promotion of knowledge, and that today Christians are second to none in their intellectual pursuits.

Human culture includes not merely the enjoyment of physical values, the appreciation of the beautiful and the apprehension of the true. The qualities of moral character are of intrinsic worth and are also an essential of it. Many proponents of secular ethics explicitly or implicitly regard morality as merely instrumental. Those who do not may almost always be charged with inconsistency between their ethics and the fundamentals

of their secularism. For Christian ethics qualities of character are of fundamental significance in human culture. Indeed, it involves that they are not to be sacrificed for any physical, aesthetic, or intellectual value, if, in the circumstances of this imperfect world, any conflict should arise. The highest quality love (*caritas*, or charity) without these physical, aesthetic, and intellectual values is accorded more worth than these without it. Thus, from the Christian standpoint, Paul with pardonable exaggeration wrote to the Corinthians: "though I . . . understand all knowledge . . . and have not charity, I am nothing." The ignoring of moral values or their subordination to the economic is one principal cause of social maladjustments, and the main cause of aggressive modern warfare. The most serious evil of modern life is ethical: the remedy the recognition in theory and in practice of the intrinsic worth of moral values and their supremacy over any values that appear in conflict with them.¹⁴

Human culture is experienced by individuals and the creative insights and efforts involved in its development are those of individuals. The actual participation in human culture varies with individuals and the contributions they make to it are diverse. Nevertheless it is a result of their co-operation. If we avoid conceiving of society as a "super-individual," we may say that culture is a social achievement. Christian ethics, no less than secular ethics, recognizes the moral duties thereby implicated. From the outset it has never considered the particular person as isolated: it has always been a social ethics. Jesus taught his disciples to pray "*Our Father*"; "*Give us this day our daily bread*"; "*Forgive us our trespasses.*" He preached the "*Kingdom of God*," which is a social conception, whatever else it may also imply. Except by the few isolated hermits, the Christian life has always been conceived in Christian history as within a community.

It is futile to ignore the differences between secularist and Christian ethics, however much they may have in common. They co-incide in their recognition of what may be called worldly goods: all that is included in physical well-being and enjoyment, art, and knowledge. Christianity goes further and has a wider view encompassing relations with a Supreme Being for the worship of Whom man has the capacity in his nature; and reaching out beyond the confines of earthly existence. This wider vision implicates fundamental differences in emphasis in Christian ethics from those in secularist ethics. It involves a transcendent basis for the moral in the character of God, and is thus free of any notion of individual or social expediency. The continuity of the spiritual life beyond physical death conforms with the insistence of Christian ethics upon enduring character as more important than any transient earthly consequences of conduct, however valuable these may be in themselves.

The main lines of development of human culture in history have always included religion in the sense of a recognition of and a commerce with an Other, distinct from the realm of physical nature and mankind. Any study of human psychology which ignores religious experience is incomplete. Though the values of human culture are particular and intrinsic, they are not isolated one from another, but are the constituents of a dynamic life. Religion often has been and is, as it may and should be, the central dominant attitude. Christian morality has its basis in religion, in the ideal of which it shares. It cannot be separated from religion and remain true to itself. For in religion human culture is consummated: the love of the beautiful, of the true, and of the morally good is united in the worship of the Holy.

NOTES

The literature on the subjects considered in this book is vast, and what is here referred to must be regarded as mainly illustrative. Very few untranslated works in German and French have been included.

The following is a short list of books dealing in a general way with Christian ethics: Martensen, H.: *Christian Ethics*. (1871) trs. Edinburgh, 1891-2; Wuttke, A.: *Christian Ethics*. New York, 1876; Gass, W.: *Geschichte der christlichen Ethik*. Berlin, 1881, 1886; Luthardt, C. E.: *History of Christian Ethics*. Edinburgh, 1889; Smyth, N.: *Christian Ethics*. Edinburgh, 3rd ed. 1894; Strong, T. B.: *Christian Ethics*. London, 1896; Dorner, I. A.: *System of Christian Ethics*. Edinburgh, 1906; Hall, T. C.: *History of Ethics within Organized Christianity*. London, 1910; Alexander, A. B. D.: *Christianity and Ethics*. London, 1914; Kirk, K. E.: *The Vision of God: The Christian Doctrine of the Summum Bonum*. London, (1931) 1937; Niebuhr, R.: *An Interpretation of Christian Ethics*. New York, 1935.

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1. Branscomb, H.: *op. cit.* pp. 64; 70-71; 86; 337.
2. *Mat.* v. 18; *Luke* xi. 42; 38; *Mat.* xv. 6; 11; xxiii. 4.
3. *Exodus* xxi. 24-25; *Mat.* v. 43; Gore, C.: *The Sermon on the Mount*. London, 1896. p. 67; Montefiore, C.: *The Teaching of Jesus*. London, 1910. p. 81; Macintosh, H. R.: in Gore, C.: *The Doctrine of the Infallible Book*. New York, n.d. says "Calvin declares that the example of David in hating his enemies has been set before us by the Holy Spirit for our imitation."
4. *Mat.* iv. 17; Branscomb, H.: *op. cit.* p. 125; Inge, W. R.: *Christian Ethics and Modern Problems*. London, 5th ed. 1932 p. 42; Sorley, W. R.: "The Ethics of the Kingdom" *Modern Churchman*. London, Vol. XV. 1925. p. 371.
5. *Luke* xviii. 17; 24; xxiv. 26.
6. *Luke* ix. 62; *Mat.* xiii. 33; *Luke* xvii. 20; *Mark* iv. 26; *Mat.* xxii. 11-13; xii. 50.
7. Gore, C.: *op. cit.* p. 62; Gardner, P.: *Evolution in Christian Ethics*. London, 1918. p. 93; *Mat.* v. 21-22; Gore, C.: *op. cit.* p. 15; *Mat.* v. 3-11.
8. *Deuteronomy* vi. 5; cf. x. 12; xi. 1; xix. 9; xxx. 6; *Leviticus* xix. 18; *Mat.* xxii. 37-40; *Luke* x. 27.
9. *Luke* x. 29; *Mat.* v. 44; 46; *Luke* vi. 36; 31; Gardner-Smith, P.: *The Christ of the Gospels*. Cambridge, 1938; King, *op. cit.* p. 29.

CHRISTIAN ETHICS

10. *John* xvi. 33; *Mat.* x. 16; v. 39; *Luke* xiv. 27; ix. 24; *John* xv. 30; *Mark* xiii. 13; *Luke* xii. 35-48.
11. *Luke* x. 5; *Mark* ix. 50; *Luke* ii. 14; *John* xiv. 27; *Mat.* xii. 30; *Luke* xii. 51; *John* xv. 11.
12. *Mat.* vii. 13. For Jesus' condemnation of hypocrisy and pride see *Mat.* vi. 5; vii. 5; xv. 7-8; xxii. 18; xxiii. 13-15; *Luke* xiii. 15; xxiv. 49; of the unforgiving, *Mat.* xviii. 22-35; of the worldly, *Mat.* vi. 19; *Luke* xxi. 34; xiv. 18; *Luke* xii. 19-20; of the untrustworthy and negligent, *Luke* xiii. 5; *Mat.* xxv. 14-30. The "unpardonable sin," *Mat.* xii. 32. W. L. Davidson quoted by King, H. C.: *op. cit.* p. 38n.
13. *Mark* viii. 36; *Luke* xvii. 21; *Mat.* xxiii. 11; cf. *Luke* xxii. 25-27; *Mark* x. 45; *John* xiii. 14; *Mat.* v. 9.
14. *Mat.* xviii. 1-4; *Luke* xiv. 11, cf. xviii. 10-14; *Luke* xvii. 10; *Mark* ix. 35.
15. See *Mat.* vii. 20; *Luke* xiii. 6-9; *Mat.* xxi. 19, cf. 43; *Luke* viii, the parable of Sowing Seed; vi. 45; and x. 38-42.
16. Walker, G.: *The Idealism of Christian Ethics*. Edinburgh, 1929. p. 86.
17. Peabody, J. G.: *Jesus Christ and the Social Question*. New York, (1900) ed. 1907. p. 83; *Mat.* xxv. 34-40; Rauschenbusch, W.: *Christianity and the Social Crisis*. New York, (1907) ed. 1910 p. 47; *Luke* iii. 10-11; Rauschenbusch, W.: *op. cit.* p. 71
18. *Luke* vi. 20-25; xii. 13; Inge, W. R.: *The Social Teaching of the Church*. New York, 1930. p. 19; *Mat.* v. 42; Peabody, J. G.: *op. cit.* pp. 110-111.
19. *Mat.* xv. 24, cf. *Mark* vii. 27; *Mat.* x. 6, 5; *Luke* xvi. 16; *Mat.* xxiv. 14; xxviii. 19, 20.
20. *Luke* ix. 27; xviii. 30; *John* xiv. 2; x. 28.
21. *Acts* i. 6; Major, H. D. A.: *The Gospel of Freedom*. London, 1912. pp. 151; 153-4.
22. *Luke* iv. 15; cf. *Mat.* iv. 23.
23. Branscomb, H.: *op. cit.* p. 97; Smyth, N.: *Christian Ethics*. Edinburgh, 3rd ed. 1894. p. 122; Robinson, C. H.: *Studies in the Character of Christ*. London, (1905) 1907. pp. 38; 37; 39; Inge, W. R.: *Christian Ethics and Modern Problems*. London, 5th ed. 1932. p. 49; Montefiore, C.: *op. cit.* p. 58.
24. Peabody, J. G.: *op. cit.* p. 85; *Mat.* xi, 29; King, H. C.: *op. cit.* p. 35; Rauschenbusch, W.: *op. cit.* p. 87; Forrest, D. W.: *The Christ of History and of Experience*. Edinburgh, 6th ed. 1908. p. 19.
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26. *Mat.* xxvi. 39; xxvii. 46; *Luke* xxiii. 46, 43, 34; *John* xix. 26, 27. On the ethical significance of the doctrine of the Trinity see Webb, C. C. J.: *Divine Personality and Human Life*. London, 1920 p. 163f.
27. *Mat.* xvi. 27; xxv. 31; xii. 36; *Luke* xiv. 14; xx. 16.
28. *Mat.* vii. 2; xviii. 35; vi. 1; *Luke* xii. 47, 48; *Mat.* xxv. 46.
29. *John* iv. 37, 36.
30. *John* xv. 2; v. 24; iii. 16; vi. 35, 27.

NOTES

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10. *Lightfoot*. pp. 428; 429; 431-2; 436; 430; 442; 422; 423; 428; 445; 426; 432; 433.
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 8. See especially Clarke, W. K. L.: *The Ascetic Works of St. Basil*. London, 1925; Hannah, *op. cit.* p. 45.
 9. Cf. Workman, H. B.: *op. cit.* pp. 139-40; 144; 150 cf. pp. 152-3; 154; 23.
 10. Bernard of Clairvaux: *The Twelve Degrees of Humility and Pride*. (trs. B. R. V. Mills) London, 1929. chs. I and IV.
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 13. Owst, G. R.: *op. cit.* pp. 80; 92; cf. also Coulton, G. G.: *From St. Francis to Dante*. London, 1906.
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 19. Wicksteed, P. H.: *Dante and Aquinas*. London, 1913. pp. 134; 129; Reade, W. H. V.: *The Moral System of Dante's Inferno*.

NOTES

- Oxford, 1909. p. 433; 9; cf. Wicksteed, P. H.: *op. cit.* p. 200. Vossler, K.: *op. cit.* p. 215; cf. Gilbert, A. H.: *Dante's Conception of Justice*. Durham, N. C.: 1925. preface, also pp. 67; 74; 90; 108; 180; 181. Dr. Gilbert makes a detailed comparison of Dante, Aquinas, and Aristotle with reference to justice. Dante: *The Divine Comedy*. H. F. Cary's translation. London, *Paradiso* xxvi pp. 62-65.
20. Thomas à Kempis *Of the Imitation of Christ*. (trs. C. Bigg) London, 1905. (Roman numerals for books; Arabic for chapters) I 1; 15; IV 9; I 23; I 1; 22; II 12; I 22; 23; 9; II 4; 2; 12.4; 12.5; 4; I 3; IV 54; II 1; IV 38; 27; I 9; IV 27; II 12.5; 12.1; IV 32; 40; II 6; IV 28; 36; I 9; 20; IV 25; 23; I 19; 15; IV 12; I 20; 8; IV 5. Writing of the "Imitation" in his *Martin Luther and the Reformation in Germany*. London, 1889. p. 47 C. Beard says: "Its ideal of human perfectness is distinctly monastic. Indeed it is justly liable to the charge of being only a manual of sacred selfishness; the domestic and social virtues are entirely overlooked by it; it points the way to the salvation of the solitary soul."
21. Abelard: *Ethics*. trs. McCallum, J. R. Oxford, 1935.
22. The principal ethical portions of Aquinas' *Summa Theologica* have been brought together in translation in Rickaby, J.: *Aquinas Ethicus*. London, 2 Vol. 2nd ed., 1896. References in the text are to this work: I. ii. q IV. a vii. (I. p. 29) I. ii. q V. a iv. (I. p. 34); I. ii. q XXI. a i. (I. p. 80); I. ii. q XXI a iv. (I. p. 85); II. ii. q XVII a vi. (I. p. 339); II. ii. q XX. a i. (I. p. 345). Gilson, E.: *Moral Values and the Moral Life*. St. Louis, 1931, is an excellent brief statement largely composed of translations of Aquinas' works. See pp. 44; 51; 196; 147. Also Sertillanges, A. D.: *La philosophie morale de S. Thomas d'Aquin*. Paris, 2nd ed. 1922; Vann, G.: *Morals makyth Man*. London, 1937.

CHAPTER IV

1. Taylor, H. O.: *The Medieval Mind*. 3rd American ed. New York, 1919. p. 252; cf. also pp. 510-11.
2. Burckhardt, J.: *The Civilisation of the Renaissance in Italy*. New York, n.d. pp. 288; 238; 250. Petrarch's disquisition concerning solitude does not appear as religiously inspired for contemplation on God but for escape from the turmoil of the world. His sympathy for celibacy was not because of any religious excellence in it. One who desires peace is to "keep away from woman." "Whoever you are therefore that would avoid strife, avoid also woman. . . ." Petrarch, F.: *Life of Solitude*. (trs. J. Zeitlin) University of Illinois 1924. p. 206.
3. Misciattelli, P.: *Savonarola*. New York, 1930. pp. 108-9; 145. Roedder, R.: *Savonarola, a Study in Conscience*. New York, 1930. p. 190; Misciattelli, P.: ch. xiii; Roedder, R.: p. 136; Misciattelli, P.: p. 61; see also Villari, P.: *The Life and Times of Girolamo Savonarola*. London, 1888. Roedder, R.: *op. cit.* p. 129. Savonarola was not entirely oblivious to the appeal of Nature, though his thought was directed by it to God.
4. Lindsay, T. M.: *A History of the Reformation*. New York, (1906) 1936. p. 163; Smith, P.: *Erasmus: A Study of His Life, Ideals, and Place in History*. London, 1923. p. 321.

CHRISTIAN ETHICS

5. Murray, R. H.: *Erasmus and Luther*. London, 1920. p. 215; Denney, J.: *The Christian Doctrine of Reconciliation*. London, 1917. p. 91.
6. Owst, G. R.: *Preaching in Medieval England*. Cambridge, 1926. p. 94.
7. Barker, E.: *Church, State and Study*. London, 1930. pp. 113; 115; Chaplin, F. K.: *The Effects of the Reformation on Ideals of Life and Conduct*. Cambridge, 1927. p. 72. For a concise account of Protestant ethics with further historical material and a contrast between Lutheran and Reformed attitudes and ideas, see Wuttke, A.: *Christian Ethics*. New York, 1876. Vol. I. pp. 235-255.
8. Luther, M.: *A Commentary upon the Epistle of Paul to the Galatians*. trs. Connecticut, 1837. pp. 27; 133; 455. These are quoted as typical of Luther's position as expounded also in his other works. Smith, P.: *The Life and Letters of Martin Luther*. New York, 1911. ch. viii. "Of all Luther's works the most eminent next to his translation of the Bible are three pamphlets written in the later half of 1520; To the Christian Nobility of the German Nation on the Improvement of the Christian Estate; A Prelude to the Babylonian Captivity of the Church; and The Freedom of a Christian." p. 78. Dr. Smith gives analyses of these with important quotations: see especially pp. 80-85; 92-94. Also *Luthers Werke*. Berlin, 1905. Vol. I. pp. 197-316; Beard, C.: *Martin Luther and the Reformation in Germany*. London, 1889. chs. v; vii. Many details of Luther's ethical views may be found in selections from his "Table Talk": Smith, P.: and Gallinger, H. P.: *Conversations with Luther*. New York, 1915. For a general Catholic criticism of Luther, see Clayton, J.: *Luther and his Work*. Milwaukee, 1937, especially the Conclusion, which describes a disintegration of Christian ethics in the modern world under Protestant influences.
9. For the Ninety-five Theses, see Clemen, O.: *Luthers Werke in Auswahl*. Bonn, 1912. Vol. I. pp. 3-9; on the treasury of merit, Coulton, G. G.: *Social Life*, etc. pp. 203-4, quoting Bishop Lynwood. The Canons and Decrees of the Council of Trent, in their only short references to Indulgences, maintain that the power involved was given by Christ to the Church, and urges that abuses be rectified. Schaff, P.: *The Creeds of Christendom*. New York, Vol. II. pp. 205-6; Wuttke, A.: *op. cit.* Vol. I. p. 233. In opposition to Luther's insistence on justification by faith only, the Council of Trent contended that Christ is not only a redeemer to trust but a legislator to obey. Schaff, *ibid.* p. 110ff. Lutherans have not really denied this: see e.g. the Augsburg Confession. Pt. I. vi. and xx, that men ought to do the good works commanded by God. Schaff, Vol. III. p. 11; pp. 56-7; also *Formulae of Concord*: pp. 124-5.
10. Calvin, J.: *Institutes of the Christian Religion*. trs. J. Allen. Philadelphia, 1935. Book I xv p. 181; II viii p. 329; III vii p. 619; 620; IV xx p. 649; Wuttke, A.: *op. cit.* p. 246; Harkness, G.: *John Calvin: The Man and his Ethics*. New York, 1931. p. 174; 159; Calvin, J.: *Institutes*. III vii pp. 621; 624; Schaff *op. cit.* Vol. II. pp. 342-349.
11. Smith, P.: *Erasmus*, etc. p. 334; 15; 88-89; Lindsay, T. M.: *A History of the Reformation*. New York, (1906) 1936. p. 173.

NOTES

- See also Murray, R. H.: *op. cit.*; Erasmus *In Praise of Folly*. (trs.) Oxford, 1925; *The Colloquies*. (trs.) London, 1900; Seebohm, F.: *The Oxford Reformers: John Colet, Erasmus and Thomas More*. New York, 3rd ed. 1896.
12. John Bunyan: *The Pilgrim's Progress from this World to that which is to come*. (1678) (ed. London, 1905); *The Life and Death of Mr. Badman*. (1680) (ed. Oxford, 1929); *A True Relation of the Holy War*. (1682) (ed. London, n.d.).
 13. The edition of *The Journal of George Fox* here used is that of the Everyman Library. London, 1924. References in the following order: pp. 21; 78; 22; appendix; p. 345; Braithwaite, W. C.: *The Beginnings of Quakerism*. London, 1912. p. 522; Pfeleiderer, O.: *The Development of Christianity*. (1910) p. 237; cf. Jones, R. M.: *The Faith and Practice of the Quakers*. London, 1927, especially ch. vii.
 14. The edition of *The Whole Duty of Man* used is that in The Ancient and Modern Library of Theological Literature. London, n.d. pp. 10; 5; 229; 128; 176.
 15. Taylor, J.: *The Rules and Exercises of Holy Living*. (edition) London, 1938. pp. 47; 48; 19; 99; 106; 76; 117; 137; 138; 182; 249.
 16. Law, W.: *Serious Call to a Devout and Holy Life*. 1728 (Everyman edition) London, 1906. pp. 221-2; 6; 244; 351; 244; 209; 279; 121; 269; 263.
 17. Seeley, J. R.: *Ecce Homo*. (1865) 18th ed. London, 1885. pp. 181; 170; 148; 247; 87; 134; 109; 116. The Italian leader, Joseph Mazzini, 1805-1872, ought to be treated in the text, but space did not permit. He was inspired by a conception of Christian ethics as a gospel of humanity in relation to God. *The Duties of Man, and Other Essays*. (Everyman ed.) London, 1907.
 18. Joseph Butler's ethics is to be found in (a) his *Sermons*, edited by Gladstone, W. E.: Oxford, 1897; and (b) in *Analogy of Religion to the Constitution of Human Nature*. ch. iii. and Appendix: Dissertation on Virtue. Everyman ed. London n.d. From his Christian theistic position Butler definitely gives priority to reason and nature as compared with revelation. His exposition is thus eminently philosophical and not simply "dogmatic." "Virtue being the natural law we are born under, and the whole constitution of man being plainly adapted to it, are prior obligations to piety and virtue, than the consideration that God sent his Son into the world to save it, and the motives which arise from the peculiar relation of Christians, as members one of another under Christ our head." *Sermons*. p. 29. Quoted in text pp. 9; 36; 59; 24; 22; 97; 210; 204.

CHAPTER V

- i. See the important detailed treatment of individuality in Dorner, I. A.: *System of Christian Ethics*. trs. Edinburgh, 1906. pp. 141-9. Protestantism has emphasized individuality. Nevertheless, Protestant communities have in practice enforced ecclesiastical authority. Thus, e.g. the *Quaker Discipline*, II, says "The whole spiritual life grows out of the soul's relation to God and its co-operation with Him, not from any outward or traditional

- observances." Yet in I. 3, this is followed by the statement: "the sanctified conclusions of the Church are above the judgement of a single individual." Wace, H.: *Christianity and Morality*. London, 1877. p. 147. Further p. 148: "Circumstances are an unquestionable element in human development; but its most characteristic and important factor is the influence of personal and spiritual agencies in controlling circumstances."
2. Cf. Harnack, A.: *The Expansion of Christianity*. London, 1904. Vol. I. p. 141-4.
 3. Quoted by Dudden, F. H.: *The Life and Times of Ambrose*. Oxford, 1935. p. 506.
 4. Alexander, A. B. D.: *The Ethics of St. Paul*. Glasgow, 1910. p. 81. See the detailed study of F. W. Bussell; *Religious Thought and Heresy in the Middle Ages*. London, 1918; cf. Augustine *The City of God*. ed. xii (xiv) 3.
 5. No view of the creation of the soul of man has been authoritatively declared to be the only orthodox one. Three different conceptions have been held. Pre-formationism regards all souls as created at one time and existing from the beginning in Adam. Traducianism considers the souls of the descendants of Adam and Eve to be the off-spring of their souls. Creationism may be taken to mean that each soul is a new creation by God. The first two views have been accepted as giving a basis for the corruption of human nature by the Fall. They involve considerable metaphysical difficulties. The apparent defective nature of all human souls is difficult to explain on the last theory.
 6. Allen, A. V. G.: *The Continuity of Christian Thought*. 2nd ed. Boston, 1894. p. 157; cf. Schaff, P.: *The Creeds of Christendom*. New York, (1877) 1919. Vol. II. pp. 1-74; Bardy, G.: *Origène*. Paris, 1931. pp. 71; 84; Augustine *Anti-Pelagian Writings*. Vol. III. p. 89.
 7. Schaff, P.: *op. cit.* Vol. II. pp. 85; 89; 470.
 8. Cf. Calvin, J.: *The Institutes of the Christian Religion*. Philadelphia, 1935. Vol. II. p. 229; Schaff, P.: *op. cit.* Vol. III. pp. 213-4; 365-7; 100; 103; 679; 615; 731.
 9. Pascal, B.: *Pensées*. (1670) trs. W. F. Trotter (Everyman edition) London, 1931. References are to the numbers of the *Pensées* in this edition: 434; 423; 100; 536; (cf. also 347; 400; 415); 441; 445; cf. the Heidelberg Catechism of 1563; "I am by nature prone to hate God and my neighbour." In contrast note the modern view of Seeley, J. R.: *Ecce Homo*. 18th ed. London, 1885. p. 148. "It is natural to man to love his kind, and Christ commands us only to give nature play." Further on Pascal see Bishop, M.: *Pascal, the Life of Genius*. London, 1937.
 10. Wace, H.: *op. cit.* p. 81; Gore, C.: *Christian Moral Principles*. 2nd ed. London, 1932. p. 100; Denney, J.: *The Christian Doctrine of Reconciliation*. London, 1917. p. 200.
 11. Pascal, B.: *Pensée* 451.
 12. *Romans* I. 28; ix. 18; 21; cf. II *Cor.* v. 10; *Gal.* vi. 7; Alexander, A. B. D.: *op. cit.* pp. 84-5.
 13. Justin Martyr *Apology*. ANF. Vol. I. chs. ii 7; i 43-44; Irenaeus. ANF. Vol. I. p. 518; Tatian. ANF. Vol. II. p. 70.
 14. Clement of Alexandria. ANF. Vol. II. p. 502; Bardy, G.: *Origène*. pp. 31-44; Dudden, F. H.: *op. cit.* pp. 510-1; 632-3.
 15. Allen, A. V. G.: *op. cit.* p. 154; Bussell, F. W.: *op. cit.* p. 668;

NOTES

- Bethune Baker, J. F.: *An Introduction to the Early History of Christian Doctrine*. London, 1903. Footnote 314-5. See whole chapter xvii. Also Luthardt, C.: *History of Christian Ethics*. Edinburgh, 1889. pp. 232-4.
16. Augustine *Anti-Pelagian Works*. Edinburgh, 1873-6. Vol. III. pp. 62; 263; 133; 60; 17; *Confessions*. (Everyman edition) London, 1907. p. 206; cf. also pp. 121; 165; *The City of God*. (edition F. W. Bussell) pp. 230-1; Book X 22 (XI); *Confessions*. p. 135.
 17. Thomas Aquinas: *Summa Theologica*. I q 83. 1; Schaff, P.: *op. cit.* Vol. II. p. 111; Wicksteed, P. H.: *Dante and Aquinas*. London, 1913. pp. 197-8; 200.
 18. Luther: *Werke*. Berlin, 1905. Ergänzungband II. pp. 214-521, Von verknechteten Willen. Schaff *op. cit.* Vol. III.
 19. Calvin, J.: *The Institutes of the Christian Religion*. Philadelphia, 1935. Vol. I. pp. 211; 265; 283; 230; 326; 330. Jonathan Edward's treatise on this subject has come to be regarded as noteworthy: *The Works of President Edwards*. New York, 1881. Vol. II. His instability is like that of Calvin and Augustine. "It is evident that such a providential disposing and determining men's moral actions, though it infers a moral necessity of those actions, does not in the least infringe the real liberty of mankind. . . ." (p. 161) What did he mean by "the real liberty of mankind?" In some sense he regarded God as cause of, good and bad. "For it is in its own nature fit, that infinite wisdom and not blind chance, should dispose moral good and evil in the world." (p. 164) "It is not a bad tendency for the Supreme Being to *order* (italics mine, A. G. W.) and permit that moral evil to be, which it is best should come to pass." (p. 165). A variation of expression only covers the difficulty and adds to the confusion: "Men do will sin as sin, and so are the authors and actors of it. . . . God does not will sin as sin. . . ." (p. 163) Such a statement involves a characteristic in the nature of human willing for which God is asserted not to be cause or responsible. See also Schaff *op. cit.* Vol. III. pp. 109; 623.
 20. Smith, P.: *Erasmus*. London, 1923. p. 337; Murray, R. H.: *Erasmus and Luther*. London, 1920. p. 219, quoting Erasmus.
 21. Schaff. *op. cit.* Vol. III pp. 547; 744; 753.
 22. Pascal, B.: *Pensées*. Pensée 508.
 23. Salmond, S. D. F.: *The Christian Doctrine of Immortality*. Edinburgh, 1897; Farrar, F. W.: *Eternal Hope*. London, 1877; Ward, J.: "The Christian Ideas of Faith and Eternal Life" in *Essays in Philosophy*. Cambridge, 1927. pp. 349-366.
 24. Widgery, A. G.: "The Idea of Resurrection" *Hibbert Journal* 1915-16. Vol. XIV. pp. 149-155 (also in *Immortality and Other Essays*. Baroda, 1919.)

CHAPTER VI

Hughes, H. M.: *The Christian Idea of God*. New York, 1936;
 Garvie, A. E.: *The Christian Belief in God*. London, 1932; Gore, C.:
Belief in God. London, 1921; Matthews, W. R.: *Studies in Christian
 Philosophy*. London, 1921; *God in Christian Experience*. London,

1930; *The Purpose of God*. New York, 1936; Hocking, W. E.: *The Meaning of God in Human Experience*. New Haven, 1912.

1. Illingworth, J. R.: *Christian Character*. London, 1904. p. 25; Heim, K.: *God Transcendent*. (Trs. of Glaube und Denken) New York, 1936. p. 231.
2. Gore, C.: *Christian Moral Principles*. London, 1932. p. 41; Denney, J.: *The Christian Doctrine of Reconciliation*. London, 1917. p. 189.
3. *Mat.* vi. 30; x. 29-31; xxvi. 39; *Luke* x. 21; *Mark* xii. 27; *John* iv. 24; I *John* iv. 8; *Hebrews* xii. 6; *Mat.* xxv. 41-46. Exaggerated emphasis on Jesus' description of God as Father, as though the most original and fundamental feature of his teaching has rightly been objected to: see Scullard, H. H.: *The Ethics of the Gospels and the Ethics of Nature*. London, 1927.
4. For a modern discussion concerning God as Creator see: Matthews, W. R.: *Studies in Christian Philosophy*. London, 1921 Lecture VI; Pascal, B.: *Pensées*. (Everyman ed.) London, 1931 *Pensée* 549; *Mat.* v. 45.
5. *Rom.* i. 16; 18; 20; iii. 6; 7; 22; 25; iv. 17; v. 2; 8; 15; viii. 7; 28; ix. 23; xii. 1; 2; xiii. 1; xv. 33; I *Cor.* i. 21; v. 13; xiv. 33; II *Cor.* iv. 6; vi. 1; xiii. 11.
6. For a concise statement of these dogmatic developments, see: Bethune-Baker, J. F.: *An Introduction to the Early History of Christian Doctrine*. London, 1903. On non-Christian tendencies of thought: Angus, S.: *The Environment of Early Christianity*. London, 1914, especially pp. 94-98.
7. Lightfoot, J. B.: *The Apostolic Fathers*. London, 2nd ed. 1926. p. 422.
8. Tertullian: *Apology*. trs. Reeve, W.: London, n.d. p. 54.
9. Dudden, F. H.: *The Life and Times of St. Ambrose*. Oxford, 1935.
10. Augustine. *Confessions*. (Everyman ed.) London, 1907. pp. 1; 208; à Kempis *Of the Imitation of Christ*. trs. Bigg, C. London, 1905. p. 104.
11. Patterson, R. L.: *The Conception of God in the Philosophy of Aquinas*. London, 1933. p. 486. See whole of ch. xvii.
12. Luther, M.: *Commentary on the Epistle to the Galatians*. trs. Connecticut, 1837. pp. 49; 47; *Werke*. Berlin, 1905. Ergänzungsband II.
13. Calvin, J.: *The Institutes of the Christian Religion*. Philadelphia, 1935. Vol. II. pp. 337; I. pp. 51; 72; 79; 96; 619; 76; 167; 185; 191; 60; II. 306; I. 60.
14. Illingworth, J. R.: *op. cit.* p. 10; cf. Strong, T. B.: *Christian Ethics*. London, 1896. Lecture V; Denney, J.: *op. cit.* p. 52.
15. Sorley, W. R.: *Moral Values and the Idea of God*. Cambridge, (1918) 2nd ed. 1921. pp. 504-7; Illingworth, J. R.: *op. cit.* pp. 52-55.
16. Webb, C. C. J.: *A Study of Religious Thought in England from 1850*. Oxford, 1933; Campbell, R. J.: *The New Theology*. London, 5th imp. 1907; Moore, A.: "The Christian Doctrine of God" in *Lux Mundi*. (ed. Gore, C.) London, 1889, 11th ed. 1891; Illingworth, J. R.: *Divine Immanence*. London, (1898) 1904 though it must be considered along with the same author's *Personality, Human and Divine*. London (1894) 1905, does not

NOTES

- evade the difficulties. For a trenchant criticism of some conceptions of Divine immanence see: Rashdall, H.: "The Alleged Immanence of God" in the *Contemporary Review*. London, Vol. XCI. June 1907. pp. 852-867; see also by Rashdall, "Personality, Human and Divine" in *Personal Idealism* (ed. Sturt, H.) London, 1902; and *Philosophy and Religion*. London, 1909.
17. Kirk, K. E.: *The Vision of God: The Christian Doctrine of the Summum Bonum*. London, (1931) 1937. pp. 1; 94; 97; 107; 203; 207; 300; 391-2; 466.

CHAPTER VII

1. Sturt, H.: *The Idea of a Free Church*. London, 1909; Floyd, W.: *The Mistakes of Jesus*. New York, 1932. p. 83.
2. On subjects in the preceding paragraphs see Rashdall, H.: *Conscience and Christ*. London, 3rd impression 1924. pp. 134-194; Inge, W. R.: *Christian Ethics and Modern Problems*. London, 5th ed. 1932. pp. 61-75; Weinell, H.: and Widgery, A. G.: *Jesus in the Nineteenth Century and After*. Edinburgh, 1914 pp. 245; 168; 198-9; 246-249; 385-392; Montefiore, C.: *The Religious Teachings of Jesus*. London, 1910. pp. 37-38.
3. d'Alviella, G.: *The Contemporary Evolution of Religious Thought in England, America, and India*. London, 1885.
4. *The Fiftieth Anniversary of the Ethical Culture Movement*. New York, 1926. pp. 17; 28; 49; 162; 99; 45; 127.
5. Leo Tolstoy's writings were intimately related with conflicts in his own life. Maude, A.: *The Life of Tolstoy*. London, (1908-10) revised ed. 1930 may be regarded as the best exposition of his views in English as it amply quotes the writings in relation with his life. For an excellent summary approved by Tolstoy, see II p. 32. As in his different works relative to religion and morality Tolstoy frequently re-iterates his contentions, the quotations are made chiefly from *What I Believe*. (W) trs. London, 1895 which is his own best summary statement. In the American edition this work is entitled *My Religion*. *The Works of Tolstoy*. New York, 1899. Vol. IV. *My Confessions*. (C); *The Gospel in Brief*. (G); *Life*. (L); Vol. VII. *The Kingdom of God is Within You*. (K). (W) p. 67; (G) p. 287; Maude II. p. 58; (C) pp. 59-60; Maude II. pp. 509; 48; (K) pp. 294; 335; (L) pp. 383; 381; 379; (W) pp. 14; 91; (K) pp. 193; 196; (W) pp. 34; 112; 188; Maude II. p. 56.
6. Nietzsche, F.: *Thus Spake Zarathustra*. (Z); *Beyond Good and Evil*. (B); *The Genealogy of Morals*. (G); and *Ecce Homo*. (E) referred to in *The Modern Library Edition*, ed. Wright, W. H.: New York, n.d.; *The Case of Wagner*. (C); *The Will to Power*. (W); *Human: all too Human*. (H); *The Joyful Wisdom*. (J) and *The Anti-Christ*. (A) in the Macmillan edition, ed. Levy, O.: (B) I 6 p. 6; (Z) prologue 2 p. 27; I 4 p. 50; III 57 p. 226; (A) section 2; (Z) II 34 p. 127; (W) 1067 p. 432; Knight, A. H. J.: *Some Aspects of the Life and Work of Nietzsche*. Cambridge, 1933. p. 127; (W) 200 p. 163; 147; p. 127; 154 p. 136; (W) 252 p. 209; (C) Epilogue; (B) III 46 p. 53; II 33 p. 39; (J) 130 p. 172; (W) 361 p. 291; Foster, G. B.: *Friedrich Nietzsche*. New York, 1931. chs. X; XII-

- XIV; p. 191; (Z) I 10 p. 63; I 14 p. 71; (G) I 12 p. 26; (Z) I 16 p. 76; III 46 p. 166; III 74 p. 295; I 11 p. 64; (W) 766 p. 214; 465 p. 384. Many writers show the same tendency as Nietzsche and were possibly influenced by him. Thus George Moore in the work referred to in note 7, (p. 154) represents Christianity as a gospel of pity. He "hates" Jesus who started this movement in contrast with "the terrible austere laws of nature which ordain that the weak shall be trampled upon. . ."
7. Moore, G.: *Confessions of a Young Man*. London, 1886 (2nd ed. 1904) pp. 67; 258; 293; 154.
 8. Cotter Morison, J. A.: *The Service of Man: An Essay toward the Religion of the Future*. London, 1887.
 9. Potter, C. F.: *Humanism: A New Religion*. New York, 1930. pp. 14; 33. Cf. also the "Social Program" on pp. 124-5; Dakin, A. H.: in *Man the Measure: An Essay on Humanism as Religion*. Princeton, 1939, gives a critical discussion of some leading contemporary humanistic thinkers. The whole book should be referred to as covering material not introduced here. Humanistic features have characterized much anti-Christian thought since the time of Auguste Comte. Thus, for example, Reade, W.: in *The Martyrdom of Man*. (1872) the Thinkers' Library ed. London, n.d. with an assurance only equalled by that of the traditional orthodox theologian, wrote dogmatically "God-worship is idolatrous. The soul is not immortal. Prayer is useless. There are no rewards and there are no punishments in a future state. . . ." Christianity "is pernicious to the intellect. . . ." "Those who believe in a God of Love must close their eyes to the phenomena of life, or garble the universe to suit their theory. This . . . is injurious to the intellect: whatever is injurious to the intellect is injurious to morality." pp. 420; 425. Yet later he admits "Our conscience teaches us it is right, our reason teaches us it is useful, that men should live according to the Golden Rule." But his ethic is simply "the service of humanity." "Our hope is placed in the happiness of virtues; our faith in the perfectibility of man." p. 432; Keller, A.: *Religion and Revolution*. New York, 1934. p. 111; whole of lecture IV.

CHAPTER VIII

Hirst, E. W.: *Jesus and the Moralists*. London, 1935; Gillet, M. S.: *La Morale et Les Morales*. Paris, 1925; Moore, T. V.: *A Historical Introduction to Ethics*. New York, 1915; Sidgwick, H. and Wiggery, A. G.: *History of Ethics*. 6th ed. London, 1931.

1. Stoicism should be studied in Stoic writings: e.g. Marcus Aurelius: *Meditations*. trs. Haines, C. R.: London, 1916; Cicero: *De Officiis*. trs. Edmonds, C. R.: London, 1856; Epictetus: *Encheiridion; Dissertations; and Fragments* in *The Teaching of Epictetus*. T. W. Rolleston, London, n.d. On Stoicism and Christianity see Strong, T. B.: *Christian Ethics*. London, 1896. pp. 117-119.
2. Bigg, C.: *The Christian Platonists of Alexandria*. Oxford, 1886; Inge, W. R.: *The Platonic Tradition in English Religious Thought*. London, 1926; Powicke, F. J.: *The Cambridge*

NOTES

- Platonists*. London, 1926; Whichcote, B.: *Moral and Religious Aphorisms*. (1703) London, 1930.
3. Aristotle's best known contribution to ethics is in *Nicomachean Ethics*. There are various translations. That in Everyman's Library is a convenient edition. London and New York, n.d.
 4. On Hedonistic Theories see: J. Watson *Hedonistic Theories from Aristippus to Spencer*. London, 1895; E. Albee *History of English Utilitarianism*. London, 1902; J. S. Mill *Utilitarianism*. London, 1863 (Numerous later editions); H. Sidgwick *The Methods of Ethics*. London, 1874 (7th ed. 1907; rep. 1913); Mackenzie, J. S.: *Manual of Ethics*. London, 5th ed. 1914. pp. 69-71; 214-5; Paley, W.: *The Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy*. London, 1785. (Many later editions). 7th ed. corrected 1790. Bk. I ch. 6. II chs. 4; 6. Paley, a churchman, is in the Christian tradition in giving attentions to details of the moral life.
 5. Williams, C. M.: *The Systems of Ethics founded on the Theory of Evolution*. London, 1893; Spencer, H.: *Data of Ethics*. London, 1879, (Various later editions.) and *Principles of Ethics*. London, (1893) 1904; Huxley, T. H.: *Evolution and Ethics, and Other Essays*. (Ed.) New York, 1898. This volume is critical of the biological theory as also is Sorley, W. R.: *Ethics of Naturalism*. 2nd ed. Edinburgh, 1904.
 6. Kant's writings on Ethics are collected in translation in T. K. Abbott: *Kant's Critique of Practical Reason and Other Works on the Theory of Ethics*. 6th ed. London, 1909. On Joseph Butler see end of our Chapter IV.
 7. Hegel, G. F.: *The Philosophy of Right*. trs. S. W. Dyde, London, 1896.
 8. Bradley, F. H.: *Ethical Studies*. Oxford, (1876) 2nd ed. revised 1927; *Appearance and Reality*. Oxford, (1893) 9th imp. 1930.
 9. Green, T. H.: *Prolegomena to Ethics*. Oxford, (1883) 5th ed. 1906; Pringle-Pattison, A. S.: *Hegelianism and Personality*. Edinburgh, (1887) 2nd ed. 1893; Martineau, J.: *Types of Ethical Theory*. Oxford, (1885) 2nd ed. 1886; Sturt, H.: (ed.) *Personal Idealism*. London, 1902.
 10. Weinel, H.: *Ibsen, Björnson, Nietzsche: Individualismus und Christentum*. Tubingen, 1908.
 11. A Sociological presentation of Ethics is given in Levy-Bruhl: *La Moral et la Science des Moeurs*. Paris, 1903; cf. also J. Dewey and J. H. Tufts *Ethics* (1908) 1932, New York.
 12. For this movement see especially Moore, G. E.: *Principia Ethica*. Cambridge, 1903; Rashdall, H.: *Theory of Good and Evil*. Oxford, 1907; Sorley, W. R.: *Moral Values and the Idea of God*. Cambridge, 1918 and *Moral Life and Moral Worth*. Cambridge, 1911.

CHAPTER IX

1. I Cor. vii. 1; 9; 7; Alexander, A. B. D.: *The Ethics of St. Paul*. Glasgow, 1910. p. 243.
2. Quoted by Bardy, G.: in *Clément d'Alexandrie*. Paris, 1926. pp. 215-6, from *Stromateis* III.
3. See: Luthardt, C.: *History of Christian Ethics*. Edinburgh, 1889. cf. Hannah, I. C.: *Christian Monasticism*. London, 1924.

- pp. 65; 61; Augustine: "On Marriage and Concupiscence." *Anti-Pelagian Works*. Edinburgh, 1874. Vol. II. pp. 113; 101 cf. 107.
4. Schaff, P.: *The Creeds of Christendom*. New York, 1877 (1919). Vol. II. pp. 197; 502. The celibacy of the clergy was almost adopted as the uniform requirement by the Council of Nicea (325), but under the influence of Bishop Paphnutius this step was not taken. Though the theory that the clergy should be celibate had been widely held for centuries, it was Pope Gregory VII (1073) who began to enforce it strictly as a general rule. With the comment that "celibacy is not commanded by God's Word" the Articles of the Church of England declares it lawful for priests to marry.
5. Taylor, H. O.: *The Medieval Mind*. 3rd American edition, New York, 1919. p. 430; Coulton, G. G.: *Medieval Panorama*. Cambridge, 1938. p. 623 says there is no evidence that Mary cult had any far reaching influence in raising women's status in the Middle Ages. Taylor, H. O.: *op. cit.* pp. 588-9; Dante: *Convivis*. IV. 28. Erasmus: *The Colloquies*, trs. by N. Bailey. London, 1910. Vol. I. pp. 247; 251. Cf. Smith, P.: *Erasmus*. London, 1923. p. 279.
6. Eckenstein, L.: *Women Under Monasticism*. Cambridge, 1896. p. 431.
7. Harkness, G.: *John Calvin, the Man and his Ethics*. New York, 1931. pp. 135-6; Calvin: *The Institutes of the Christian Religion*. Philadelphia, 1935. Vol. II. pp. 429; 431; 451; I p. 365.
8. Schaff, P.: *op. cit.* Vol. III. pp. 202; 210; Eckenstein, L.: *op. cit.* p. 433.
9. Taylor, J.: *The Rule and Exercises of Holy Living*. ed. London, 1938. pp. 63; 62; Law, W.: *A Serious Call to a Devout and Holy Life*. ed. London, 1906. pp. 265; 95.
10. Gardner, P.: *Evolution in Christian Ethics*. London, 1918. pp. 11-13; *Report of Conference on Politics, Economics and Citizenship*. London, 1924. Vol. IV. p. 89.
11. The extensive literature on this subject contains much repetition of the general arguments. The Roman Catholic standpoint may be studied in the following: Pope Pius XI *Encyclical Letter on Christian Marriage*. English translation, Washington, D. C. 1931; Sutherland, H. G.: *Birth Control. A Statement of Christian Doctrine against the Neo-Malthusians*. London, 1922; Bruehl, C. P.: *Birth Control and Eugenics in the Light of Ethical Principles*. New York, 1928; de Guchteneere, R.: *Judgement on Birth Control*. New York, 1931. Protestant views are given by Inge, W. R.: in *Christian Ethics and Modern Problems*. London, 1980 (5th ed. 1932). ch. vi. and Coutts, J. W.: *The Church and the Sex Question*. London, n.d. Mr. de Guchteneere, p. 153, says of some opinions that they "are prejudiced from the outset." That appears among Roman Catholic writers. He refers to a fall in the number of illegitimate births, due presumably to contraceptive methods. To some, just as opposed as he to illicit intercourse, this is a real gain, which in itself alone would justify modern birth control. It is sometimes urged that the prevention of conception is only a form of murder. But it is surely a question whether there is a human being until the ovum is fertilized, Contraceptives in general preventing such

NOTES

- conjunction a human being may not be formed, and if not cannot be "murdered."
12. Davidson, R.: *Report of Lambeth Conferences*. p. 90. The following may be quoted as examples of views of early Christian writers: Athenagoras: "the procreation of children is the measure of our indulgence in appetite." "We say that those women who use drugs to bring about abortion commit murder." *Ante-Nicene Fathers*. Vol. II. pp. 146; 147. Justin: "Whether we marry, it is only that we may bring up children; or whether we decline marriage, we live continently." *Ist Apology*, ANF. Vol. I. p. 173. Clement of Alexandria declaimed against women who used methods to "cause their fruit to perish, and who, in destroying it, divest themselves of all sentiments of humanity." Tertullian: "But Christians are now so far from homicide, that with them it is utterly unlawful to make away with a child in the womb, when nature is in deliberation about the man; for to kill a child before it is born is to commit murder by way of advance; and there is no difference whether you destroy a child in its formation, or after it is formed and delivered. For we Christians look upon him as a man, who is one in embryo; for he is in being, like the fruit in blossom and in a little while would have been a perfect man had nature met with no disturbance." *Apology*. IX. Lactantius: "Whatever is sought beyond the desire of procreation is condemned by God." ANF. Vol. VII. p. 143. Augustine condemned the prevention of conception. See: *On Marriage and Concupiscence*. p. 116. The seventeenth century Protestant author of *The Whole Duty of Man* declared that "nothing must be done which may hinder" procreation. p. 107.
 13. Bruehl, C. P.: *op. cit.* pp. 13; 14; 21; de Guchteneere, R.: *op. cit.* pp. 65; 46; 199; 193; Davidson, R.: *op. cit.* Report of 1908, pp. 327; 399-402; Report of 1930, pp. 30; 31; 43. *Report of Conference on Politics*, etc. Vol. IV. p. 115. de Guchteneere, R.: *op. cit.* pp. 127; 56; 76; 65; ch. iv.
 14. Davidson, R.: *op. cit.* Report of 1930.
 15. Sprague, P. W.: *The Influence of Christianity on Fundamental Institutions*. New York, 1925. p. 80. For a characteristic expression of the view that Jesus declared marriage indissoluble, and authoritatively "legislated" to that effect, see Gwynne, W.: *Holy Matrimony and Common Sense*. New York, 1930. The author writes as Secretary of "The Sanctity of Marriage Association." Also, Dörner, I. A.: *System of Christian Ethics*. Edinburgh, 1906. pp. 541-4. Tolstoy adopted a rigorist position on the subject: *What I Believe*. London, 1895. pp. 77-82. The Council of Trent (1563) declared marriage "perpetual and indissoluble." Schaff *op. cit.* Vol. II. pp. 193-196. This was re-asserted in *The Papal Syllabus of Errors* (1864) which further denied the right of the civil authority to pronounce divorce. Schaff *ibid.* p. 229. The Westminster Assembly (1647) declared that: "Adultery is ground for divorce; and the innocent party may remarry." Schaff *op. cit.* p. 655. The Lambeth Conference, 1930, (Report p. 119) pronouncing marriage an indissoluble union, recommended that there should be no Christian re-marriage of a divorcee while the partner is still living. Yet it is certainly true that "Even the Christian Church, while maintaining

CHRISTIAN ETHICS

in principle the evangelic prohibition of divorce, has always recognized it as unavoidable, and therefore to be tolerated in particular cases." *Report of Conference on Politics, etc.* Vol. IV. pp. 165-6; 111.

CHAPTER X

1. *Mat.* xxii. 21; *Rom.* xiii. 1; 3; *I Tim.* ii. 3; *Acts* v. 36.
2. Tertullian: *Apology*. trs. W. Reeve, London, n.d. chs. xxxi; xxxii.
3. Dudden, F. H.: *The Life and Times of St. Ambrose*. Oxford, 1935. p. 501; Allen, A. V. G.: *The Continuity of Christian Thought*. 2nd ed. Boston, 1894. p. 153.
4. Pfleiderer, O.: *The Development of Christianity*. New York, 1910. p. 128; Taylor, H. O.: *The Medieval Mind*. 3rd American ed. New York, 1919. p. 246; Coulton, G. G.: *Social Life in Britain from the Conquest to the Reformation*. Cambridge, 1918. p. 190.
5. Vossler, K.: *Medieval Culture*. New York, 1929. Vol. I. p. 345; cf. pp. 240; 243; 260; Dante *De Monarchia*. III. xvi.
6. Schaff, P.: *The Creeds of Christendom*. New York, (1877) 1919. Vol. II. pp. 222-8.
7. Machiavelli, N.: *The Prince*. trs. W. K. Marriott. London, 1908. chs. xv; xviii; Misciattelli, P.: *Savonarola*. New York, 1930. p. 110.
8. Troeltsch, E.: *Protestantism and Progress*. London, 1912. p. 106; Murray, R. H.: *Erasmus and Luther*. London, 1920. p. 200 quoting Luther; Schaff, P.: *op. cit.* Vol. III. p. 645.
9. Calvin, J.: *The Institutes of the Christian Religion*. Philadelphia, 1935. Vol. II. p. 633; cf. 634-5; 643; Schaff, P.: *op. cit.* Vol. III, pp. 381-2; also 203; cf. Butler, J.: "Since men cannot live out of society, nor in it without government, government is plainly a divine appointment; and consequently submission to it, a most evident duty of the law of nature. And we all know in how forcible a manner it is put upon our conscience in scripture." "Civil government is that part of God's government over the world, which he exercises by the instrumentality of men." *Sermmons*. Oxford, 1897. pp. 282; 305.
10. Ashley, W.: In *The Modern Churchman*. Vol. X. p. 328.
11. Sprague, P. W.: *The Influence of Christianity on Fundamental Human Institutions*. New York, 1925. p. 115.
12. Dorner, I. A.: *System of Christian Ethics*. Eng. trs. Edinburgh, 1906. p. 559; cf. p. 570; Gore, C.: *Christian Moral Principles*. 2nd. ed. London, 1932. p. 29.
13. McDougall, W.: in *Ethics and Some Modern World Problems*. London, 1924. was so intent on stressing the racial and national points of view as not adequately to represent the universalism of Christian ethics as giving a place for them. See also Henson, H. H.: *Christian Morality*. Oxford, 1936. Lecture IX; Oldham, J. H.: *Christianity and the Race Problem*. New York, 1925; Eddy, S.: *Religion and Social Justice*. New York, 1927.
14. Dean, F. W. Farrar quoted by Mügge, M. A.: *The Parliament of Man*. London, 1916. p. 50; cf. J. Ruskin: *Crown of Wild Olive*. Lecture III, "When I tell you that war is the foundation

NOTES

- of all the arts, I mean also that it is the foundation of all the high virtues and faculties of men."
15. Crane, W. L.: *The Passing of War*. quoted by Mügge, M. A.: *op. cit.* pp. 66; 62.
 16. Cunningham, W.: *Christianity and Politics*. London, 1916. p. 263.
 17. Cf. Cadoux, A. T.: *Jesus and Civil Government*. London, 1923. Cf. Scott, C. A.: *New Testament Ethics*. Cambridge, 1930. p. 141; Dr. Percy Gardner wrote: "The non-resistance of evil is utterly incompatible with the possession of private property;" and "The real quietist, as has been realized in all ages by those who absorbed the passion for the life of non-resistance, cannot have a home, or property of any kind, or a wife, or domestic responsibilities. All these things belong, by the constitution of society, to those who are ready to fight for them; and those who are in their hearts purposed never to fight for them must go without them." *Evolution in Christian Ethics*. pp. 7-8. But Jesus taught that his followers must be prepared to forego these things. A condition is not impossible in which through mutual recognition it would not be necessary to fight for them.
 18. Cadoux, C. J.: *The Early Church and the World*. Edinburgh, 1925; Bardy, G.: *Origène*. Paris, 1931. p. 218; Tertullian *Apology*. XXXVII.
 19. Augustine: *The City of God*. (ed. Bussell, F. W.) XI; XII; XVII; IV.
 20. Hannah, I. C.: *Christian Monasticism*. London, 1924. p. 198; Dante *De Monarchia*. trs. A. Henry. New York, 1904. I 4: 16-23.
 21. Calvin, J.: *The Institutes*. Vol. II. p. 645-6: Cf. latter part of Article XXXVII of the Church of England (1571). "It is lawful for Christian men, at the commandment of the magistrate to wear weapons and serve in the wars." Hyma, A.: *Erasmus and the Humanists*. New York, 1930. p. 198.
 22. *The Quaker Discipline*. (North Carolina Meeting, 1923). p. 38. cf. *Book of the Christian Discipline of the Religious Society of Friends in Great Britain*. London, 1883. p. 153; *The Short Journal of George Fox*. ed. Perry, N.: Cambridge, 1925. p. 5, cf. pp. 65-66; *A Collection of Epistles*. London, 1698. Vol. II. letters 9 and 177: "That which is set up by the sword is held up by the sword; and that which is set up by spiritual weapons, is held up by spiritual weapons, and not by carnal weapons." "All Friends everywhere, who are dead to carnal weapons and have beaten them to pieces, stand in that which takes away the occasion of wars, in the Power which saves men's lives and destroys none. . . ." The Quaker position is stated and defended in detail in Barclay, R.: *An Apology*, (1675) proposition 15, sections 13-15. See also: Hirst, M. E.: *The Quakers in Peace and War*. London, 1923. Tolstoy vigorously opposed war. The following is typical of many expressions against it: "To go to war, i.e., to kill men who are complete strangers to us, without any reason, is the most horrid crime, of which only a lost and depraved man, degraded to the rank of a wild beast, is capable." *What I Believe* trs. London, 1905. p. 103.
 23. It has been urged that Pacifism is not negative but involves allegiance to a higher community than any national one: cf. Report of the Conference on Christian Politics, Economics and

Citizenship. London, 1924. Vol. VIII. *Christianity and War*. pp. 59-73.

CHAPTER XI

Peabody, F. G.: *Jesus Christ and the Social Question*. New York, 1900 and many later reprints. Chapter I contains an excellent survey of relevant historical material not referred to in the present volume.

1. Berdyaev, N.: *Christianity and Class War*. London, 1934. pp. 61; 110; cf. Lewis, J.: et. al. *Christianity and the Social Revolution*. London, 1935.
2. *Acts* ii. 44; Alexander, A. B. D.: *The Ethics of Paul*. Glasgow, 1910. p. 249; *II Thess.* iii. 10.
3. Tertullian: *Apology*. ch. xxxix; Harnack, A.: *Expansion of Christianity*. London, 1904. I. ch. iii; Dudden, F. H.: *The Life and Times of St. Ambrose*. Oxford, 1935. pp. 545-6; Workman, H. B.: *The Evolution of the Monastic Ideal*. London, 1913. p. 67. Vossler, K.: *Medieval Culture*. New York, 1929. Vol. I. p. 289, says that not only Basil and Ambrose, but also Jerome, Augustine and others "had taught that all possessions and natural utilities were common property." Owst, G. R.: *Preaching in Medieval England*. Cambridge, 1926, p. 94.
4. Chaplin, F. K.: *The Effects of the Reformation on Ideals of Life and Conduct*. Cambridge, 1927. Hobson, J. A.: *God and Mammon: the Relations of Religion and Economics*. New York, 1931. p. 20; Ryan, J. A.: and Husslein, J.: *The Church and Labor*. New York, 1924. p. 64.
5. Schaff, P.: *The Creeds of Christendom*. Vol. III. p. 381; Gore, C.: *Christian Moral Principles*. London, 2nd ed. 1932. p. 93.
6. Davidson, R.: *Report of Lambeth Conferences*. London. p. 266.
7. Vossler, K.: *op. cit.* p. 289. On usury in the Middle Ages see Coulton, G. G.: *Social Life* etc. Cambridge, 1918. pp. 342-4; Aquinas: *Summa Theologica*. II. ii. q. 78. 1; Dante: *Inferno*. XI. 94f.
8. Harkness, G.: *John Calvin, the Man and his Ethics*. New York, 1931. pp. 209-10.
9. Cf. Weber, M.: *The Protestant Ethics and the Spirit of Capitalism*. New York, 1930; Tawney, R. H.: *Religion and the Rise of Capitalism*. London, 1925; Troeltsch, E.: *Protestantism and Progress*. London, 1912. Barker, E.: *Church, State, and Study*. London, 1930. p. 130, says that the ultimate spirit of Puritanism, free individuality, "expressed itself not only in capitalism, but also in the criticism of capitalism,—not only in the idea of the freedom of trade, but also in the idea . . . of freedom of labour." O'Brien, G.: *An Essay on the Economic Effects of the Reformation*. London, 1923, gives a Roman Catholic exposition that both capitalism and socialism are products of the Protestant Reformation, characterized by exaggeration, the result of the free play of private judgement unguided by authority.
10. Owst, G. R.: *op. cit.* pp. 15-17; Bunyan, J.: *Life and Death of Mr. Badman*. Oxford, 1929. pp. 175-180; Taylor, J.: *Holy Living*. London, 1938. p. 153.
11. Martin, H.: (ed.) *Christian Social Reformers of the Nineteenth Century*. London, 1927. pp. 233-4; 7; 153; Binyon, G. C.: *The*

NOTES

- Christian Socialist Movement in England.* London, 1931. pp. 113; 182; 190; Miller, S. and Fletcher, J. F.: *The Church and Industry.* New York, 1930; Weinel, H. and Widgery, A. G.: *Jesus in the Nineteenth Century and After.* Edinburgh, 1914. ch. iv.; Gladden, W.: *Christianity and Socialism.* New York, 1905.
12. Davidson, R.: *op. cit.* pp. 265-6; 328; Ryan, J. A. and Husslein, J.: *op. cit.*; *Report on Conference on Christian Politics*, etc. London, 1924. p. 328.
 13. Davis, J.: *Labor Speaks for itself on Religion.* New York, 1929. pp. 137; 230; 184; 186.
 14. Martin, H.: *op. cit.* II. on William Wilberforce; Channing, W. E.: *Slavery.* Boston, 4th ed. 1836; Parker, T.: *Works* (Centennial ed.) Vol. XII. Boston, n.d.; *The Journal of John Woolman.* Everyman ed. New York, 1936.
 15. Fosdick, H. E.: *The Hope of the World.* New York, 1933. pp. 27; 29; See also *The Power to See It Through.* New York, 1935. pp. 105-114; *Successful Christian Living.* New York, 1937. p. 117.
 16. Cunningham, W.: *Christianity and Economic Science.* London, 1914. The author, a Tory ecclesiastic, a historian of economics, lacked critical ability.
 17. Orchard, W. E.: *Christianity and World Problems.* London, n.d. says, p. 183, that "the financial system seems to be no longer functioning as a true means of exchange, but is a positive hindrance."
 18. Lindsay, A. D.: *Christianity and Economics.* London, (1933) 1934. Apparently with an unusual degree of academic timidity, Dr. Lindsay refrains from serious challenge of traditional economic theory and practice.
 19. Johnson, F. E.: *Economics and the Good Life.* New York, 1934; Eddy, S.: *Religion and Social Justice.* New York, 1927; Oldham, J. H.: *The Oxford Conference.* New York, 1937, pp. 90-110. Even Dr. Cunningham wrote, *op. cit.* p. 57, "National organization is the most powerful instrument for controlling the use of economic resources and the exercise of economic activities."

CHAPTER XII

1. Gardner, P.: *Evolution in Christian Ethics.* London, 1918. p. 41.
2. Taylor, H. O.: *The Medieval Mind.* New York, 1919, Vol. I. p. 370.
3. *John* x. 10; *Mat.* vi. 29; *Luke* xii. 20.
4. *Phil.* iv. 8.
5. Taylor, H. O.: *op. cit.* Vol. I. p. 371.
6. *Ante-Nicene Fathers:* New York, 1899. Vol. II. *Paedagogus*, books ii and iii, chs. vi; vii; pp. 157; 162.
7. Bardy, G.: *Origène.* Paris, 1931. p. 278; Cyprian: ANF. Vol. XX. Treatise on the Dress of Virgins, pp. 430-436; Dudden, F. H.: *The Life and Times of St. Ambrose.* Oxford, 1935. pp. 512-3.
8. Augustine: *Confession.* (Everyman ed.) London, 1907. pp. 60-1; 284-5; 231.
9. Creizenach, W.: *Geschichte des neueren Dramas.* Halle, 1893. p. 153; Taylor, H. O.: *op. cit.* Vol. I. pp. 407; 384; Owst, G. R.:

CHRISTIAN ETHICS

- Preaching in Medieval England.* Cambridge, 1926. pp. 122-3;
Eckenstein, L.: *Woman under Monasticism.* Cambridge, 1896.
p. 115.
10. Workman, H. B.: *The Evolution of the Monastic Ideal.* London, 1913. pp. 245; 305; 338.
 11. Calvin, J.: *Institutes of the Christian Religion.* Philadelphia, 1935. Vol. II. p. 69.
 12. Bunyan, J.: *The Life and Death of Mr. Badman.* ed. Oxford, 1929. pp. 203-4; Law, W.: *A Serious Call to a Devout and Holy Life.* (Everyman ed.) London, 1906. pp. 76-77; *The Whole Duty of Man.* (ed. Ancient and Modern Lib. of Theological Literature) London, n.d. pp. 123-128; Berdyaev, N.: *Christianity and Class War.* London, 1934. p. 49; Gore, C.: *Christian Moral Principles.* 2nd ed. London, 1932. p. 75.
 13. Davidson, R.: *Report of the Lambeth Conferences.* London. Gardner, P.: *op. cit.* p. 169.
 14. I. Cor. xiii. 2.

INDEX

*Where references are to the text, the corresponding references to the
Notes are not given here.*

- | | |
|---|---|
| <p>Abelard, 99.
Adler, F., 183.
Albee, E., 307.
Alexander, A. B. D., 37, 39, 140,
215.
Allen, A. V. G., 73, 149, 240.
d'Alviella, G., 307.
Ambrose, 67-69, 71, 139, 142, 148,
164, 240, 286.
Angus, S., 304.
Anselm, 99.
Aristides, 163.
Aristotle, 99, 201.
Arminius, 153.
Ashley, W., 246.
Athenagoras, 51, 163, 215.
Augustine, 67, 69-73, 140, 142, 148,
149, 164, 217, 240, 256, 286.</p> <p>Barclay, R., 143.
Bardy, G., 297.
Barker, E., 109.
Barnabas, <i>the Epistle of</i>, 46-48.
Basil, 75, 264.
Baskerville, G., 298.
Beard, C., 299, 300.
Benedict, 76.
Berdyayev, N., 262, 289.
Bernard, of Clairvaux, 79.
Bethune- Baker, J. F., 149.
Bigg, C., 306.
Binyon, G. C., 312.
Boniface VIII, <i>Pope</i>, 241.
Bradley, F. H., 207-208.
Braithwaite, W. C., 122.</p> | <p>Branscomb, H., 12, 15, 28.
Bridges, H. J., 184.
Bruehl, C. P., 225, 226, 230.
Bunyan, J., 116-119, 269, 289.
Burckhardt, J. G., 104.
Bussell, F. W., 149.
Butler, J., 132-135.</p> <p>Cadoux, A. T., 255.
Cadoux, C. J., 311.
Calvin, 112-114, 115, 152, 167-169,
220, 244, 257, 265, 267, 288.
Campbell, R. J., 174.
Channing, W. E., 313.
Chaplin, F. K., 300.
Charlemagne, 266.
Cicero, 67.
Clarke, W. K. L., 298.
Clemen, O., 300.
Clement, of Alexander, 55-58,
147, 216, 239, 256, 284, 285.
Clement, of Rome, 43.
<i>Clement, Second Epistle of</i>, 49.
Colet, J., 115.
Comte, A., 130, 209.
Constantine, 64, 239.
Cornish, F. W., 89.
Coulton, G. G., 297, 298, 300.
Coutts, J. W., 308.
Crane, W. L., 253.
Creizenach, W., 297, 313.
Cunningham, W., 254, 277.
Cyprian, 142, 216, 285.</p> <p>Dakin, A. H., 306.</p> |
|---|---|

INDEX

- Dante, 89-92, 151, 242, 257, 266, 288.
 Gwynne, W., 309.
 Davidson, W., 21.
 Davis, J., 313.
 Denney, J., 108, 145, 158.
 Dewey, J., 307.
Didache, the, 46.
Diognetus, Epistle to, 49, 147.
 Dominic, 79.
 Dorner, I. A., 249.
 Dudden, F. H., 68, 148, 240.
 Ealdhelm, 83.
 Eckenstein, L., 83, 219, 221.
 Edwards, J., 303.
 Elliott, J. L., 184.
 Epictetus, 306.
 Erasmus, 115-116, 152, 219, 257.
 Farrar, F. W., 252.
 Floyd, W., 178.
 Forrest, D. W., 30.
 Fosdick, H. E., 275.
 Foster, G. B., 191.
 Fox, G., 119-122.
 Francis, of Assisi, 79-82, 288.
 Gardner, P., 281, 290.
 Gardner-Smith, P., 19.
 Garvie, A. E., 303.
 Gass, W., 295.
 Gilbert, A. H., 91, 92.
 Gillet, M. S., 306.
 Gilson, E., 100, 101.
 Gore, C., 17, 145, 158, 249, 265, 273, 290.
 Greg, W. R., 270.
 Gregory, of Nazianzen, 75, 217.
 Gregory, the Great, 98.
 Gregory VII, *Pope*, 241.
 Gröber, E., 87.
 Guchteneere, R. de, 225, 226, 227, 230, 237.
 Guigo, 288.
 Hall, T. C., 295.
 Hannah, I. C., 76, 257.
 Hardie, K., 270.
 Harkness, G., 113, 114, 267.
 Harnack, A., 35, 263, 266.
 Headlam, S., 271.
 Hegel, 206-207.
 Heim, K., 157.
 Henson, H. H., 310.
 Hirst, E. W., 306.
 Hirst, M. E., 311.
 Hobson, J. A., 264.
 Hocking, W. E., 303.
 Hughes, H. M., 303.
 Huxley, T. H., 307.
 Ignatius, 44, 239.
 Illingworth, J. R., 157, 171, 172.
 Inge, W. R., 15, 28, 275.
 Irenaeus, 51, 147.
 Jesus, 11-34, 37, 44, 50, 74, 77, 94, 96, 121, 137-141, 157-160, 177-181, 198, 214, 235, 238, 251, 254, 263, 273, 282, 293.
 John, of Salisbury, 87.
 John, of the Cross, 288.
 John, the Baptist, 74, 137.
 Jones, R. M., 301.
 Justinian, 67.
 Justin, Martyr, 50, 239.
 Kant, 144, 205-206.
 Keller, A., 306.
 King, H. C., 19, 29.
 Kingsley, C., 270.
 Kirk, K. E., 175-176.
 Kropotkin, 194.
 Lactantius, 63.
 Lahy, J. M., 295.
 Lang, C. G., 30.

INDEX

- Law, W., 128-130, 221, 289.
 Lecky, W. E. H., 297, 298.
 Leo X. *Pope*, 274.
 Leo XIII. *Pope*, 247, 264, 272.
 Levy-Bruhl, L., 307.
 Lightfoot, J. B., 297, 304.
 Lindsay, A. D., 313.
 Lindsay, T. M., 107, 115.
 Ludlow, J. M., 270.
 Luthardt, C. E., 65.
 Luther, 110-112, 113, 115, 151, 152,
 166, 244, 257.
 Machiavelli, 243-244.
 Macintosh, H. R., 295.
 Mackenzie, J. S., 307.
 Major, H. D. A., 26.
 Marcus Aurelius, 306.
 Marx, K., 130, 290.
 Matthews, W. R., 303.
 Maude, A., 185, 188.
 Maurice, F. D., 270.
 Mazzini, J., 301.
 McDougall, W., 310.
 Michael Angelo, 106.
 Mill, J. S., 202.
 Misciattelli, P., 244.
 Montefiore, C., 29.
 Moore, A., 304.
 Moore, G., 196.
 Moore, G. E., 307.
 Moore, T. V., 306.
 More, T., 115, 116.
 Morison, Cotter J., 197.
 Murray, R. H., 108.
 Myers, P. v. N., 298.
 Niebuhr, R., 295.
 Nietzsche, 188-195, 198.
 Oldham, J. H., 310, 313.
 Orchard, W. E., 313.
 Origen, 58-63, 142, 148, 216, 239,
 256, 285.
 Owst, G. R., 82, 109, 264, 269.
 Paley, W. R., 203.
 Parker, T., 313.
 Pascal, 143-145, 154.
 Patterson, R. L., 166.
 Paul, 37-40, 74, 139, 145, 156, 161,
 215, 251, 263, 273, 284, 293.
 Peabody, J. G., 23, 25, 29.
 Pelagius, 148.
 Peter, Damiani, 288.
 Peter, of Lombardy, 99.
 Petrarch, 299.
 Pfeiderer, O., 122, 240.
 Pius XI. *Pope*, 225.
 Plato, 70.
 Plutarch, 104.
 Polycarp, 45.
 Potter, C. F., 197.
 Rashdall, H., 179, 182.
 Rauschenbusch, W., 24, 29.
 Reade, W., 306.
 Reade, W. H. V., 298.
 Robinson, C. H., 28.
 Roedder, R., 299.
 Rudman, A., 80.
 Ruskin, J., 310.
 Ryan, J. A., 312.
 Salter, W. M., 184.
 Savonarola, 104-107, 244, 288.
 Schaff, P., 300, 302, 308-310.
 Scullard, H. H., 295.
 Seeley, J. R., 130-132.
Shepherd of Hermas, the, 48, 163,
 215.
 Sidgwick, H., 307.
 Smith, P., 107, 108, 116.
 Smyth, N., 28.
 Sorley, W. R., 15, 171.
 Spencer, H., 307.
 Sprague, P. W., 235, 249.

INDEX

- | | |
|--|--|
| Strong, T. B., 295, 306. | Troeltsch, E., 244, 269. |
| Studdert-Kennedy, A., 230. | Vann, G., 299. |
| Sturt, H., 177. | Villari, P., 299. |
| Sutherland, H. G., 308. | Vossler, K., 88, 90. |
| Tatian, 51, 147, 215. | |
| Tawney, R. H., 312. | Wace, H., 137, 144. |
| Taylor, H. O., 80, 84, 86, 89, 103,
218, 241, 282, 284. | Walker, G., 23. |
| Taylor, J., 126-128, 221, 270. | Ward, J., 303. |
| Temple, W., 270. | Watson, J., 307. |
| Tertullian, 52-54, 142, 163, 239,
256, 263. | Webb, C. C. J., 296, 304. |
| Theodosius, 67, 240. | Weber, M., 312. |
| Thomas, à Kempis, 92-98, 128,
151, 165. | Weinel, H., 307. |
| Thomas, Aquinas, 99-102, 132,
166, 201, 241, 266. | <i>Whole Duty of Man, the</i> , 122-126. |
| Tolstoy, 185-188, 198. | Wicksteed, P. H., 90, 151. |
| | Wilberforce, W., 274. |
| | Williams, C. M., 307. |
| | Workman, H. B., 75, 78, 264, 288. |
| | Wuttke, A., 113. |

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
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
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